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The Formation and Execution of Indian Defence Policy - A Frecis
During, the 1947-62 period the Indian Government fostered the attitude 
that its policies represented a fresh approach to inter-state relations. 
Non-alignment with power blocs, peaceful co-existence, disarmament and 
the peaceful settlement of disputes were put forward as the ‘Indian 
formula' for national and International security. In actual practice, 
however, was New Delhi immune from the very fears, complexes and 
neuroses it suspected and condemned in others? Was there anything 
particularly unique in the manner in which a sovereign India moved among 
world realities to seek the achievement of vital national interests - th* 
most important of which was the military security of the state? The 
purpose of this research is to contribute at least partial answers to 
these general questions - and to many more specific ones - through an 
examination of the manner in which the Nehru administration sought to 
secure India and itg vital. exter.nal_ln.teresta Ägainat. or
attack by other powers.
The historical background to the main discussion is provided by a 
review of the defence policy of the British Raj. The British recognised 
that the security of India must be organised on a sub-continental basis 
and could not be divorced from the disposition of power throughout the 
Indian Ocean region and the world. In view of India's financial weakness 
and pressing internal development needs, India's military liability was 
confined to the provision of local defence of the Indian Empire against 
a minor power and with suitable provision for aid to the civil authority 
in the maintenance of law and order; in the event of an attack upon Indie 
by a major power, it was accepted that India must necessarily rely upon 
the speedy arrival of Imperial aid. The liability of India to aid Britair 
in military operations outside the boundaries of the Indian Empire 
remained conditional on the situation prevailing within India and on its 
borders at the particular timeT and such forces as were periodically
drawn from India for employment in other parts of the world were usually 
charged against the British Exchequer. The major and only continuing 
military pre-occupation was with the security of the North-West Frontier 
against the recurring hostility of the trihals and the real or imagined 
threats posed by Afghanistan and Russia. Periodic adjustments, however, 
were effected in policy to accord with changing strategic needs within 
the limitations imposed by India's limited financial resources.
India's nationalist leadership had developed a tradition of general 
opposition to the defence policy of the Raj and a marked tendency to 
assume that a free India would be relatively free from the threat of 
external attack. In various speeches and writings between 1928 and 1946, 
Jawaharlal Nehru defined his personal assessment of India's defence 
requirements and concluded that, while a free India would have little 
j;o fear from other powers for reasons of geography, size and great power 
rivalries, prudence required the speedy reconstruction of the defence 
forces and a vigilant posture on the North-.est Frontier. The tentative 
defence planning of the Interim Government appears to have closely adher 
-d to the conception of India's postwar defence requirements arrived at 
by British planners prior to the conclusion of World War II. This planni 
-g was undercut by partition in its various manifestations and a limited 
conflict in Kashmir was prevented from possible escalation into a 
general Indo-Pakistan war only by the mutual exhaustion of both combatar 
Instead of the desired joint cooperation with Pakistan in defence (and 
other spheres), the Indian Government was forced by prudence and the 
mood of the Indian people to formulate its defence policy against the 
contingency of renewed conflict with Pakistan with additional provision 
for internal security. The adoption of a non-aligned policy towards the 
opposing power blocs was envisaged as minimising the possibility of an 
attack against India by a major power but, in the event that such an 
attack did occur, Indian leadBBS accepted that a country with India's
economic problems had no choice but to rely upon external aid, the 
availability of which was regarded as well-nigh rendered axiomatic by 
the balance of power concept.
The implications for Indian security of the emergence of a China 
united under militant communist leadership and its assertion of control 
over Tibet was not overlooked in official Indian circles. The possibil­
ity of attack was generally dismissed on various grounds, but the need 
to preserve the integrity of India's Himalayan frontiers and her vital 
interests in the strategic kingdoms of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan was 
recognised. The Assam Rifles were re-organised and expanded, adminis­
tration was extended in NEFA, the intelligence network was developed 
in the northern border areas, the economic development of these areas 
was promoted and communications were extended. The Indian Government 
adopted and pursued the former British policy of direct or indirect 
control over Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan and sought to promote social, 
political and econofiTTc-development in these states under its benevolent 
guidance while striving to minimise contacts between these states and 
other powers. The Indian response to the Chinese occupation of Tibet 
in 1950-51 was politically discreet, diplomatically cautious, economica 
of financial and material resources and projected over the long-term.
Chinese activities in the Himalayan region up to early 1959 provoked 
no apparent increase in the precautionary measures conceived in the 
1950-53 period, seemingly due to a general disbelief in the possibility 
of a Chinese attack and the desire not to provoke Peking into more 
openly hostile activities by actions which might be interpreted as 
challenging China's public professions of friendship. The circumstances 
surrounding the Tibetan revolt in early 1959 forced Nehru to adopt, wit 
undisguised reluctance, a firmer stand against China's declared designs 
in the Himalayan region; the 'new1 policy involved declarations of 
the Government's intention to preserve the country's integrity, honour
and self-respect and the integrity of t e Himalayan kingdoms, accelerated 
aid to the Himalayan kingdoms, the assignment of Himalayan security to 
the Army and a ’crash' programme of road-building in the Himalayan region. 
With the exception of the Army's involvement, India's response to the
Tibetan revolt and its repercussions followed the pattern of its earlier 
response to the Chinese occupation of Tibet, albeit on a more comprehensive 
scale. Planning continued to be based on the political assumption that a 
serious Chinese attack was most unlikely. India's military strategy thus 
continued to be oriented towards the contingency of conflict with Pakistan 
in the North-West.
Throughout the period, Indian military policy reflected continual and 
usually unsatisfactory compromises between what was politically desirable, 
financially possible and militarily prudent.
The Indian Navy represented a compro ise between self-reliance and 
explicit dependence upon friendly powers, between direct involvement in 
conflict with a neighbouring, country and at least indirect involvement in 
an East-West war. The development of a navy powerful enough to secure India 
coastline and maritime Interests against a major power was beyond India's 
financial capacities, while continued explicit reliance upon the Royal 
Navy was neither politically wise nor particularly practical. India thus 
developed a small task force large enough to give her local superiority 
against any neighbouring country and so constituted as to facilitate 
cooperation with with Western navies in defence of mutual interests in the 
Indian Ocean against Soviet-bloc submarines in any general war. To some 
extent, the Indian Navy assumed the functions of the former East Indies 
squadron of the Royal Navy. The development programme was affected to a 
considerable extent by financial stringency, but to no apparent extent by 
Pakistani or Chinese postures.
The Indian Air Force was developed largeb&y in accordance with a plan 
which originated with British planners prior to the end of World 'War II ard
was unaffected by partition and the altered operational requirements.
It was developed as a balanced tactical force possessing local superior­
ity against any neighbouring country, save China. The development of 
the Service was affected less by financial considerations than was the 
case with the other two Services and proceeded up to about 1955 within 
the limitations imposed by the availability of trained personnel and 
suitable aircraft rather than money. The scope of the subsequent 
expansion of the fighter, bomber and transport formations appears to 
have been attributable to various factors relating to general prudence, 
concern with specific Chinese and Pakistani actions, domestic politics 
and national prestige. Equipment policy was determined by a general 
desire to retain British weapons systems and organisation qualified by 
a deliberate policy of avoiding excessive dependence on a single source 
of external supply, efforts to obtain the most economical types, an 
initial reluctance to acquire Soviet aircraft for fear of provoking 
a hostile reaction in the ’.test, and a later desire to acquire aircraft 
from this communist source for political and diplomatic reasons.
Long-term planning for the Army was generally deferred in the period 
immediately following independence as ad hoc measures were inflertaken to 
meet the demands of internal security, the integration of the States 
and the operations in Kashmir. Pakistani postures precluded the 
reduction of the Army to the desired size and the resultant establish­
ment caused a general deferrment of the desired re-equipment programme. 
The size of the Army was increased to meet the needs of the operations 
in Nagaland and Himalayan commitments undertaken in late 1959 but, while 
contingency planning was prepared by Army Headquarters to meet possible 
limited Jhinese attacks, the deployment of the Army .-ernained oriented 
against Pakistan. Persistent requests from the Army for new -r^-equipment 
were rejected by the Government on financial grounds. The officer corps 
wa3 rapidly Indianised but a chronic shortage of suitable officers
persisted, despite various attempts to alleviate it, and the corps 
continued to contain a disproportionate element from the Punjab. 
Recruitment to the Service was thrown open to all Indians as an explici 
policy, hut no attempts were made to alter the traditional class/caste 
composition of the infantry regiments. Training and tactics remained 
conventional and traditional and -ritish weapons systems, drill manuals 
and unit tables of organisation remained in use. Various para-military 
organisations were created primarily to Inculcate discipline and some 
sense of purpose into masses lacking in both characteristics; special 
stress was placed upon the youth and the peoples in the border areas.
The development of defence industries was undertaken for military, 
political, diplomatic, financial and emotional considerations. Maximum 
self-suff ciency was desired to enable the country to pursue its foreig: 
policy objectives free of the limitations imposed by dependence upon 
foreign sources of supply, to -relieve the drain of external purchases 
on India's meagre .foreign exchange reserves, etc. The approach to 
b oadening indigenous defence production facilities during the first 
decade would appear to have been a considered one and in accordance 
with India's needs and capabilities. From about 1955, however, planning 
embarked upon ambitious schemes which were not warranted either by 
India's immediate military requirements or by the capacities of local 
tec nology and industry. Evidence suggests that politics emerged as a 
primary determinant of defence production policy during the tenure of 
Krishna Menon at Defence.
The pattern of civil-military relations in India during the period 
was characte ised by the stable subordination of the military to the 
civil power. The Government retained the professional military 
establishment inherited from the British Raj but it deliberately 
reduced the status of the military in both state and society through 
various measures. The ability of the military to influence military 
policy was severely compromised by its excessive subordination to
financial and bureaucratic controls,cthe absence of a unified Service ' 
command, the absence of military access to the highest levels of 
government on a continuing basis, the general complacency with which 
the political executive viewed national defence and the unwillingness 
of successive Defence inisters to seek to influence Cabinet in a 
manner beneficial to a realistic and long-term approach to defence 
planning. In the context which prevailed up to the late ’fifties, the 
military were inhibited from arguing too forcefully against official 
defence and military policy but increasing concern with Himalayan 
developments and the conduct of Defence Minister Menon provoked the 
celebrated incident in August-September 1959 involving the attempt by 
General Thlmayya to resign. Nehru managed to persuade Thimayya to with­
draw his resignation, but Service resentmen^t at Menon's manipulations 
of promotions heightened during the following three years although 
the previous civil-military disagreements over policy would appear to 
have eased to some extent. -- ~ *«. . *■ *
Complacency continued to affect India's Himalayan policy, however, 
and the decision to challenge Chinese control of certain border areas 
from the spring of 1961 was clearly based on the political assumption 
that the Chinese would not risk a major conflict with India for the 
sake of a few square miles of Himalayan frontier. The result was that 
the Army was committed to ope ations for which it was neither trained, 
equipped or suitably led ana suffered ahumialating reverse.
The border war of October-’Tovember 1962 provided many useful le sons 
for Indian defence planners. India's defence strategy has been re-orient 
to provide for contingencies involving China although there remains some 
concern regarding Pakistan's intentions. New Delhi has declared its 
intention to have astrong military defence as a national policy and the 
five-year defence plan for doubling India's military capabilities is not 
solely related to Himalayan requirements. It is unlikely, though, that 
India will assume external military commitments to assist the West in
its efforts to contain China in South-East Asia in the foreseeable ^  
future. India will continue to depend upon Western military power to ^ 
secure the Kiddle East and South-East Asia against communist inroads 
while restricting its own military liability to defence of its frontiers 
(and the integrity of the Himalayan kingdoms) against overt and covert 
Chinese designs and such minor adventures that Pakistan might embark 
upon, as in hutch in early 1965. Indian military policy will seek to 
deter overt and covert designs by China and Pakistan and to provide the 
necessary sanction for Indian diplomacy and influence in a power­
conscious world. India's acquisition of a nuclear capability is 
probably only a matter of time for reasons related to the latter 
factor soreso than to the former.
THE FORMATION AND EXECUTION OF
INDIAN DEFENCE POLICY
by
Lome J. Kavic
Thesis submitted for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy in the 
Australian National University, 
Canberra. July 1965.
This dissertation is based entirely upon my awn
original research*
u
Negotiate from strength, not from weakness, else 
you will find yourself negotiating first at some 
one elseTs expense - which is dirty - and than 
at your own - which is disastrous.
Lord Vansittart
In the domain of IndiaTs foreign politics, I 
know of one fixed and immutable rule only: What 
India has, let India hold. India is large 
enough to covet not a single square mile of 
ground that is not already her own. But India 
is not large enough to allow any invader of 
India - be he independent tribesman or foreign 
power, from south or north or east or west - 
more of her soil than a plot of ground 7 feet by 
and 4 feet deep.
Denis Bray,
Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, in 
the Legislative Assembly on 5 March 1923.
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INTRODUCTION
Two of the unshakable realities of international 
politics are the primacy of the national self-interest and 
the importance of military power as a factor in inter-state 
relations. No government, however pacific-minded, has ever 
been able to rely solely upon the political ethics of other 
states or upon its own diplomacy to deter direct attack or 
interference with its external interests. Armies have, 
therefore, been a feature of every state in recorded history.
Total security has rarely proved obtainable even for 
the most powerful of nations, and the basic dilemma of 
defence policy - how best to acquire maximum security through 
the minimum expenditure on the armed forces - has never 
allowed of a simple solution. Every contingency cannot be 
provided for, and strategy, like politics to which it is 
closely bound, is always a choice between alternatives. The 
quest for security can never be conducted heedless of the 
antagonisms which that search may provoke among other powers 
or upon the domestic scene. There must always be a con­
sidered relationship between commitments and power and 
between power and resources. There must also be a
2willingness to employ such forms of power as may be required 
to preserve vital interests, of which the most basic is 
usually considered to be the preservation of the territorial 
integrity and political independence of the state. The 
essence of a sound national security policy is for government 
to define the nationfs vital interests and to develop suffic­
ient power, alone or in concert with others as the situation 
may be deemed to require, to secure those interests.
How did the Government of India approach the issues of 
national security during the first fifteen years of the 
countryfs existence as an independent state? What was its 
conception of the national interest? From what sources did 
it perceive of possible hostile action, and in what fashion? 
What precautions were taken against the various contingen­
cies of conflict? Three years after the humiliation inflict­
ed by Chinese military forces, the manner in which the Nehru 
administration sought to secure India against attack remains 
subject to extensive speculation largely unsupported by 
factual evidence.
The public postures of the Indian Government during the 
period are well-known as a result of the extensive interna­
tional interest shown in Indian affairs and the ambitious 
diplomacy which characterised Jawaharlal Nehru*s tenure of 
office as Prime Minister of the Indian Union. His
* 3
Government professed to see no threat to India from the 
Communist bloc^. New Delhi fostered, with considerable suc­
cess, the attitude that Indian policy represented a fresh 
approach to inter-state relations in which moral force was 
superior to physical force, Nehru advanced the view that 
the fright approach to defence is.friendly relations with 
other countries1 and professed to see no value in the adop­
tion of * an attitude which just irritates and which induces 
the other party into doing something irritating to you, with­
out producing any other good results*^. He argued the need 
for all countries to lay aside past grievances and approach 
each other ?in a spirit of tolerance and forbearance with 
"charity towards all and malice towards none,,...f^. He 
claimed in I960 that Indiafs policy was rooted in a certain 
line of thinking which was wholly opposed to the purely 
military line of thinking^. Non-alignment, peaceful 
co-existence, disarmament and the peaceful settlement of 
disputes were put forward as the 1 Indian formula1 for world 
peace•
In practice, however, was New Delhi immune from the 
very fears, complexes and neuroses it suspected and condemned 
in others? Did the Indian Government pursue policies distinct 
from the traditional approach in which, though moral and 
other considerations or means are not ruled out, power is
4viewed as the principal means for achieving the nation1s 
ends? Was Indiafs approach to international politics free 
from considerations of power politics? Various statements 
made by Nehru and the more significant actions taken by his 
administration suggest that there was nothing particularly 
unique in the manner in which a sovereign India moved among 
world realities to seek the achievement of the national 
interests.
While New Delhi fostered the attitude that India1s
approach to external issues was based upon higher ideals
than motivated other governments, Nehru admitted that fEvery
countryfs foreign policy, first of all, is concerned with
its own security1^ . The Gandhian creed of non-violence was
eulogised, but its practicability was rejected by Nehru and
his colleagues in government. As the Indian Prime Minister
declared in Parliament on 15 February 1956:
I am not aware of our government having ever said 
that they adopted the doctrine of Ahimsa [non­
violence] to our activities. They may respect it, 
they may honour that doctrine, but as a government 
it is patent that we do not consider ourselves 
capable of adopting the doctrine of Ahimsa.7
Defending the virtues of a friendly approach to relations
with other countries, Nehru nonetheless cautioned !To that
friendly approach must necessarily be allied the watchful,
gthe vigilant approach and a "preparations approach"* •
5Speaking in the Lok Sabha on 29 September 1954> the Prime 
Minister stated: *It would be unrealistic for me to suggest 
that any country in South-East Asia or India should live in 
a false sense of security or tell themselves MLet us sing the 
song of peace and nothing will happen” - I realise that res­
ponsible governments and countries cannot behave in that 
omanner* • Although consistently arguing the need for 
countries to approach one another with less distrust, Nehru 
conceded in the Rajya Sabha on 9 December 1959 that *no 
country finally puts its trust in any other country...in the 
ultimate analysis they have always to keep a loop-hole in 
their minds that the other party will not play up or that 
other things may happen or national interests may come into 
play*10.
While urging other states to resolve disputes through 
negotiation, the Nehru administration resorted to force on a 
number of occasions to effect a solution favourable to its 
policy goals'^. The princely states of Junagadh and 
Hyderabad were coerced into the Union, army and police units 
were despatched to aid the legally-constituted authorities 
in the strategic hill-states of Sikkim and Nepal against dis­
affected elements and military campaigns were waged against 
tribals and Pakistani regulars in Kashmir, against the 
Portuguese in Goa, and ultimately against the Chinese in
6NEFA and Ladakh, Naga demands for the right to determine 
their own political future were rejected and a force which 
eventually comprised some 30,000 troops and police was de- 
ployed in Nagaland to deal with the dissident tribesmen . 
India provided an infantry battalion for the United Nations 
peace-keeping force in the Gaza strip in 1956 and an infan­
try brigade group for a similar force established in the 
former Belgian Congo in 1961 - permitting this brigade group 
to spearhead a United Nations action aimed at crushing the 
secessionist Katanga government of Moishe Tshombe,
While lecturing the great powers on the evils of the 
armaments race, the Indian Government expended on defence 
during the 1947-62 period a sum exceeding Rs 3000 crores 
(about £stg 2,250 million)"^. Writing as late as 1963,
Nehru stated that his Government*s pre-occupation with 
internal problems of poverty and illiteracy had caused it to 
be content to assign a relatively low priority to defence 
requirements in the conventional sense^; by 1962, however, 
fpacific* India possessed the largest navy and air force of 
any country located in the Indian Ocean region and one of 
the largest standing armies in the world. There were, in 
addition, a number of para-military organizations embracing 
several millions of students and adults.
7The raison dfetre of this defence programme was never 
made clear by the Government, on the grounds that it was not 
considered to be in the national interest to reveal informa­
tion about such matters'^ • The attitude of the Indian public 
was, in any case, generally apathetic*^, and Parliament con­
sistently passed by unanimous vote whatever defence estimates 
were placed before it. The annual debate on the defence 
grants has aptly been described as the fduet of the deaf’^ 7 
and as ’an elegant or inelegant repetition..*spiced with 
Opposition criticisms, interspersed with sallies and enliven­
ed occasionally by an odd fresh incident, such as the buying
18of MIGs or appointment of the chief of staff’ . In the 1962 
debate on the defence grants, held at a time of national 
concern with Himalayan developments, an Opposition cut 
motion censuring the Government ’for failure to effectively 
guard the land frontiers of India and preserve inviolate 
India’s territorial integrity’ was defeated by 383 votes to 
35* The vote evidenced rather sharply that only slightly 
more than one-third of the members of the House were suffic­
iently interested in the disposition of over one-quarter of 
the budget to appear to record their judgement. Commenting 
on the vote, the military correspondent of a leading Indian 
newspaper concluded that ’after this one discovers not that 
defence is such a miserably dull topic, but that how few men
8in democracy [i.e. the Indian Cabinet] could indeed have 
such tremendous power
In the absence of any useful official explanation re­
garding the rationale for the Indian military programme, the 
popular view was to attribute much of the expenditure on 
defence (at least up to late 1959) to the existence of 
strained relations with Pakistan^. As the Indian weekly, 
Thought, stated in 1955> the Indian Government and people 
both looked upon Pakistan as King Charles* head and *No 
amount of expense and effort is, therefore, regarded as too 
much if that helps maintain the superiority we have hitherto 
enjoyed and apparently still enjoy over Pakistan...Fear of
Pakistan clouds thinking in India as much as that of Israel 
21did in Egypt* • Pakistan*s receipt of United States milit­
ary aid from 1954 onwards was thus widely viewed both inside
and outside India as provoking significant increases in
22Indian defence expenditures •
With the notable exception of V.K* Krishna Menon - 
whose political appeal in India was largely built upon an 
extreme anti-Pakistani stance - Indian Government leaders 
did not openly encourage this viewpoint, but neither did they 
discourage it. In retrospect, however, Nehru claimed that 
his Government had, from the entry of the Chinese into Tibet 
in 1950-51, been engaged in developing a proper war machine
9
oofor the »inevitable* confrontation with China . Does the 
evidence bear out Nehru*s contention of a considered and 
long-term response to the Chinese threat faulty only in tim­
ing? What was the actual relative influence of Pakistani 
and Chinese postures on Indian defence planning? Was the 
contingency of an East-West conflict and India*s possible 
involvement therein completely ignored?
Any study of Indian defence must also include a discus­
sion of the manner in which policy was formulated, particu­
larly in view of Nehru*s death in early 1964 and the possible
♦
repercussions on Indian defence and foreign policy of his 
passing from the scene* Although no exhaustive examination 
has yet appeared of the process by which India*s defence and 
foreign policies were made during the 1947-62 period, the 
evidence would seem to bear out the opinion of Nehru*s bio­
grapher, Michael Brecher, that the Indian Prime Minister was 
the *philosopher, the architect, the engineer and the voice 
of his country*s policy towards the outside world*^4. Or as 
Percival Griffiths once observed:
People may disagree with him, but they do what he 
says. There may be divisions of opinion inside 
the Cabinet, but when those divisions are put to 
the test it is Pandit Nehru and Pandit Nehru alone, 
who really takes the decision. That is true in the 
Cabinet, it is true in the Congress Party and it is 
true in the country at large.25
To what extent did Indian defence and foreign policy reflect
I
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NFehrufs hopes, fears and predelictions? What was the nature 
o*f the military contribution to policy, and of the relation­
ship between the civil and military branches of government?
A. discussion of these and other related questions involving 
the influence of Parliament, public opinion and pressure 
groups will permit of some assessment of the future trends 
o-f Indian defence policy.
Lastly, it is important to study the nature of Indiafs 
reactions to the traumatic experience of October-November 
1962, What is the nature of the official assessment that 
has been made of the Chinese threat? Concern is being ex­
pressed about Sino-Pakistani collusion against India, but is 
military policy being formulated on this premise? What is 
the significance of Indiafs five-year defence programme, and 
what are its local, regional and even global implications?
Has the policy-making process in India become unduly 
over-weighted in favour of extreme chauvinism, as Pakistan 
professes to fear, or in favour of a military establishment 
excessive to current needs and national capabilities?
The purpose of this study is to contribute at least 
partial answers to the many questions associated with Indian 
defence in the past and at present. The subject has been 
approached in a topical fashion, rather than chronologically, 
although the discussion of the various aspects is treated
11
largely in the latter manner. Contemporaneous developments 
have been referred to wherever it seemed relevant. The his­
torical background to the main discussion is provided by a 
review of the defence policy of the British Raj during the 
1858-1947 period. The origins, bases and aims of the Nehru 
Government *s defence policy are the subject of the second 
chapter. Chapters III to IX deal with the elaboration of 
policy as conditioned by the countryfs resources and the 
wisdom or otherwise of those to whose hands was entrusted 
the responsibility for the formation and implementation of 
policy. Chapter X discusses the fate of policy as condi­
tioned by human skill and fallibility and as illustrated by 
the response of China and other countries. Indiafs response 
to the traumatic experience of the Chinese attacks is 
reviewed in Chapter XI. The implications of that response 
for India and for other countries is commented upon in a 
brief concluding chapter.
The material used in this thesis has been collated from 
diverse sources, including the written works and published 
speeches of Mr Nehru, Indian parliamentary debates and such 
official documents as the annual reports of the Ministries 
of Defence and External Affairs and the White Papers on 
Sino-Indian relations for the period from 1954 to 1962. 
Substantial reliance, however, has been placed upon press
12
items, military and technical journals and personal inter­
views with serving and retired officers and officials - both 
Indian and non-Indian - who have understandably insisted 
upon remaining anonymous*
Notes
1 The Deputy Prime Minister and strong anti-communist, 
Vallabhbhai Patel, declared in 1948 that no foreign country 
would fdaref attack India. Cited, Hindustan Times* 6 Decem­
ber 1948* Nehru informed Trygve Lie in Paris on 18 January 
1951 that fhe was not concerned about the security of his 
countryf. Trygve Lie, In The Cause Of Peace (New York, Mac­
millan, 1954)> pp. 360-2. In 19539 the Indian Prime Minister 
purported to see no threat to India from external communism 
or any other source. Remark on a B.B.C. interview, 12 June 
1953* Cited as footnote in J.C. Kundra, Indian Foreign 
Policy 1947-1954? A Study of Relations with the Western Bloc 
(Groningen, J.bT Wolters, 1955) 9 p. 69. Writing under a 
pseudynom in 1954 > Sir Narayana Raghavan Pillai, a high-rank­
ing official of the External Affairs Ministry, expressed the 
view, with regard to Western warnings about the communist 
threat, that fWe may be stupid or completely blind but where 
we do not see the menace, we cannot pretend to do so, merely 
because we are so advised by no doubt wiser people1. nPM, 
"Middle Ground Between Russia and America: an Indian View”, 
Foreign Affairs (January 1954), p. 261.
2 LSD, pt 2, vol. 2, 31 March 1956, col. 3274*
3 Ibid. pt 2, vol. 14, 21 September 1957> col. 11,322.
4 Broadcast speech from Colombo, 2 May 1954* Jawaharlal 
Nehru, Speeches 1953-1957 (New Delhi, Publications Division, 
G.O.I., 195«), p. 252.
5 Speech to the Bangalore session of the Indian National 
Congress at Sadasivanagar, 17 January I960, Ibid.,
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CHAPTER I
THE DEFENCE POLICY OF THE BRITISH RAJ
The period of Crown rule in India extended from Queen 
Victoriafs Royal Proclamation on 1 November 1858 to the 
formal withdrawal of British authority from the sub-continent 
on 15 August 1947* During this era, the Indian peoples 
dwelt united under one paramount rule and in remarkable 
security from internal disorder and external aggression. 
Internal tranquillity was largely preserved and external 
threats were countered through a combination of astute 
British diplomacy and a generally conservative use of milit­
ary power (the two world wars excepted) employed on or 
beyond Indiafs political frontiers. The price of such 
security imposed a considerable burden on India1s meagre 
resources'*', but must necessarily be viewed with reference to 
the chaotic state of pre-British India and the turmoil which 
afflicted other parts of the world during the 1858-1947 
period.
This noteworthy achievement was effected by a govern­
ment headed by Englishmen and subordinate to the ultimate 
dictates of Britain in all spheres of administration.
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Defence and foreign policy were freserved* subjects over 
which the Indian peoples exercised no direct controls, immed­
iate responsibility for these matters being vested in the 
Governor General in Council and the ultimate authority rest­
ing with the British Cabinet acting through the office of 
the Secretary of State for India, Despite the primacy of 
Imperial considerations, however, the policies of the British 
rulers of India were based upon what were - rightly or 
wrongly - considered to be the best interests of the Indian 
peoples and polity. The inter-dependence of India and 
Britain in defence was a basic premise of policy, and the 
British Government was under a constant liability to rein­
force India with troops in the event of an emergency; at the 
same time, the liability of India to aid Britain in times of 
Imperial need remained conditional on the situation prevail­
ing within India and on its frontiers at the particular 
time. In instances where troops were actually drawn from 
India to protect British interests in other parts of the 
world (interests from which India could not divorce itself), 
their transportation and maintenance was usually a charge on 
the Home Exchequer.
The foreign policy of the British rulers of India was 
directed towards securing the alliance, integrity or neutral­
ization of the borderlands and minor states covering the land
18
approaches to the Indian Empire, The system which resulted 
from these efforts came to be known as the ’Ring Fence1 and 
comprised two more or less concentric half-circles. The 
’inner ring’ consisted of the Himalayan kingdoms of Nepal, 
Bhutan and Sikkim and the tribal areas in north and 
north-east Assam and on the North-West Frontier. The ’outer 
ring’ consisted of the sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf,
Persia, Afghanistan, Tibet and Siam, The ’inner ring’ was
9gradually brought under varying forms of control4 while in­
tensive diplomatic activity, backed by the threat or use of 
force, succeeded in denying a foothold in any of the ’buffer’ 
states in the ’outer ring’ to a major power without compen­
satory advantage.
The success with which the ’Ring Fence’ was maintained 
during a century of intense rivalries among the great 
powers, including two destructive global conflicts, was due 
to a number of factors. Great power rivalries and skilful 
British manipulation of the balance of power minimised the 
possibility of a serious threat to India. British naval 
domination of the Indian Ocean was unchallenged down to the 
brief eruption of Japanese naval power in 1942. America was 
distant, isolationist and friendly. Japan was distant and 
pre-occupied with Far Eastern and Pacific issues and, from 
1902 to 1921, in alliance. China was weak and pre-occupied
19
with internal issues and foreign designs upon her territory* 
Russia was concerned with internal issues and had more vital 
interests in the Far East, the Near East and Europe. The 
smaller states located immediately beyond India1s frontiers 
were too weak to pose any serious threat to British rule in 
India* Nonetheless, the authorities responsible for Indian 
defence could not ignore the possibilities of external and 
internal threats to their authority and domains*
The defence of British India was, therefore, bifurcate* 
The diversity of the Indian peoples posed a constant threat 
^o internal security* The existence of half-civilized and 
nilitant tribes in the north-east and north-west represented 
a serious and continuing danger to the settled areas and to 
vhe tranquillity of India generally* The tribal problem on 
"die North-West Frontier was closely bound up with the dispo­
sition of power in Afghanistan and the attitudes of that 
countryfs leaders towards British rule in India. Afghanistan 
itself occupied a position of great strategic significance 
astride the traditional invasion routes linking Central Asia 
vith the northern plains of India, and its existence as an 
independent or friendly state was a sine qua non of Indian 
security.
As a result of the foregoing factors, the major pre-oc- 
:upation of the defence planners of British India was the
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security of the North-West Frontier against the recurring 
hostility of the fanatical tribals and unfriendly actions by 
Afghanistan and Russia. Suitable provision had also to be 
made against the contingency of internal disorder and pos­
sible rebellion. Persistent efforts were made to effect 
economies in military expenditure and periodic adjustments 
in military planning were carried out in accordance with 
both financial and strategic considerations.
At the time of the transfer of India to the direct 
control of the Crown in 1858, the Russian threat was distant 
behind the intervening khanates of Central Asia and the 
tribals and Afghanistan were quiescent. After the successful 
quelling of the fIndian Mutiny*, Indians defences were thus 
reconstructed, against a background of drastic financial 
retrenchment, to provide for internal security and the local 
defence of the frontier0• The armies bequeathed by the 
British East India Company  ^were re-organized into a force of 
60,000 British and 120,000 Indian troops, the artillery being 
placed in British hands and the Indian battalions recruited 
on the less explosive basis of class and caste. The Indian 
Navy'* was abolished in 1863* in an economy move, and the 
Royal Navy was entrusted with the naval defence of India**.
The Second Afghan War (1878-79) had no appreciable 
effect on India*s defence posture in the North-West aside
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from the fact that it resulted in a specific undertaking by 
Britain to aid the Amir against unprovoked aggression - i.e. 
from Russia, Russia*s absorption of the Central Asia 
khanates following the Crimean War and the advance of Russian 
forces up to the borders of Afghanistan (and Persia) culmin­
ating in the border incidents at Nerv (I884) and Panjdeh
(1885), required that the possibility of war with Russia be
7seriously contemplated and prepared for • The Army in India
owas accordingly strengthened by 30,000 men , and the con­
struction of fortifications, strategic roads and railways on 
the North-West Frontier was pursued with urgency. The war 
scare passed and the conclusion of the Pamir Boundary Agree­
ment in 1895 settled the question of the Russo-Afghan 
frontier, but the continuation of British and Russian sus­
picions regarding each otherfs intentions in Central Asia 
provoked a major reconstruction of India*s defence posture 
between 1899 and 1907.
Shortly after being appointed Viceroy, Lord Curzon 
created (in 1901) the North-West Frontier Province and sub­
stituted *a policy of frontier garrisons drawn from the 
people themselves, for the costly experiment of large forts 
and isolated posts thrown forward into a turbulent and fan­
atical country.,,it is a policy of military concentration as 
against diffusion and of tribal conciliation in place of
22
exasperation’^. It represented, in effect, a compromise
between the ’forward1 and ’stationary’ schools of frontier
, . 10 policy
The reorganization and redistribution of the army was
undertaken by Lord Kitchener following his appointment as
Commander-in-Chief in India in 1902. Since the Mutiny, the
army had been allowed to fall below the standard required
for modern field operations, its organization and deployment
remained based on obsolete conceptions (only four divisions
could be fielded for operations), and the quality of the
11Indian troops remained a source of concern .
Lord Kitchener’s scheme was based upon four major 
principles:
a) That the main function of the army was to defend 
the North-West Frontier against an aggressive enemy;
b) That the army in peace should be organised, dis­
tributed and trained in units of command similar 
to those in which it would take the field in war;
c) That the maintenance of internal security was a 
means to an end, namely, to set free the field 
army to carry out its functions;
d) That all fighting units, in their several spheres, 
should be equally capable of carrying out all the 
roles of an army in the field, and that they 
should be given equal chances, in experience and 
training, of bearing these roles.12
The army was accordingly reorganized to enable the mobiliza­
tion of nine infantry divisions and five cavalry brigades
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(about 152,000 men), leaving 82,000 troops to deal with
internal security. Two great Commands were formed: Southern
Army with headquarters at Poona and its striking point at
Quetta; and Northern Army with headquarters at Murree and
13its striking point at Peshawar . The proportion of Gurkhas 
and Punjabis in the army was increased at the expense of 
Madrassi units.
In the ordnance sphere, efforts proceeded towards mak­
ing India more self-sufficient in its normal military re­
quirements. For purposes of efficiency, the Madras harness 
and saddle factory was closed in 1899 and all work of this 
type was concentrated at the Cawnpore factory, the capacity 
of the unit - which dated from 1873 - being expanded accord­
ingly. A central gun carriage factory was constructed at 
Jubbulpore and, with its completion in 1905, the out-dated 
plants at Fategarh, Bombay and Madras were closed. The in­
troduction of cordite led to the building of a cordite 
factory at Aruvankadu and the closure of the gunpowder 
factory at Kirki. A lyditte-filling plant was inaugurated 
at Kirki in 1901 and a rifle factory and rolling mills were 
constructed at Ishapore^.
On the eve of the Great War, India*s defence outlay 
totalled Rs 29-8 crores (1913-14) or 24 per cent of the 
total expenditure of the Government of India. The army
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comsisted of 75,000 British and 160,000 Indians exclusive of 
nom-combatant Indian personnel, who numbered about 46,000. 
This regular force was backed by a Reserve of 36,000 Indian 
othier ranks, a Volunteer Force comprised of 39,000 Europeans 
and Anglo-Indians, and Imperial Service troops from 29 native 
States totalling 21,000 officers and men^. The organization 
and distribution of the army remained unchanged from 1907*
A Royal Air Force establishment was in the process of being 
set up. The Royal Indian Marine consisted of nine 
ocean-going vessels and a number of smaller steamers and 
launches charged with miscellaneous non-combatant duties^. 
The ordnance establishment comprised, in addition to the 
units mentioned above, a small arms armmunition factory at 
Dum Dum and a clothing factory at Shahjahanpur - the latter 
being opened in 1914*
By 1914 the army was prepared, in accordance with the 
limitations imposed by Indiafs meagre financial resources, 
for internal security, tribal control on the north-east and 
north-west frontiers, and defence against a minor power like 
Afghanistan and against a major power like Russia pending 
the arrival of Imperial aid. The limited military responsi­
bilities of India had been reaffirmed by a majority report 
of the Army in India Committee, prepared in 1913 under the 
chairmanship of Field Marshal Lord Nicholson, and accepted
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by' the Indian Government in that same year:
While India should provide for her own defence 
against local aggression and, if necessary, for an 
attack on the Indian Empire by a great Power until 
reinforcements can come from home, she is not 
called upon to maintain troops for the specific 
purpose of placing them at the disposal of the 
Home Government for wars outside the Indian Sphere.17
The whole measure of preparedness was thus based upon a
principle of limitation which specifically excluded the
external role which the army was to undertake during World
War I.
The outbreak of war, however, provoked an enthusiasm
18among all sections of the Indian populacex that apparently 
came as much of a surprise to the British as to the 
Germans, who had envisaged that the Indian peoples would 
capitalize upon Britain’s peril and revolt. Nepal placed 
its entire resources at the disposal of the British Govern- 
nent, the Dalai Lama offered a contingent of 1,000 troops, 
and Amir Habibullah of Afghanistan remained loyal to his 
■reaty obligations despite approaches by German and Turkish 
agents and demands by the mullahs for a ,jehad against India. 
During the course of the conflict, India recruited
080.000 combatants and 400,000 non-combatants on a voluntary 
basis, despatched 1,215,000 men overseas and incurred
101.000 casualties in numerous theatres of war. India 
supplied equipment and stores for the various theatres to
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the Talue of £ 80 million and, in 1917-18, made Britain a
fr?ee gift of £ 113,500,000, which was equivalent to an
entire year’s revenue and added 30 per cent to her own 
19naticnal debt . She thus made a remarkable contribution to 
the /.Hied war effort.
Demobilization was delayed by the Third Afghan War, 
initiated by Afghanistan in 1919, and by consequent tribal 
risings and the heavy involvement of Indian troops in the 
suppression of the Arab revolt in Iraq in 1920-22. The 
assessment of India’s peacetime military requirements was 
once again made in the context of drastic financial retrench­
ment aimed at sharp reductions in both civil and military 
expenditure.
The army was reconstituted on the principle that ’a 
relatively small army, which is efficient, well-equipped, 
mobile and capable of large expansion in war, is of greater 
value than an army large in numbers but deficient in essen- 
tial ancillary services and up-to-date equipment’ . The 
establishment was reduced by 37,000 (as against 1914) to 
200,000 combatants organized in a field army of four 
infantry divisions and five cavalry brigades, a covering 
force of about twelve brigades for the North-West Frontier, 
and formations assigned to internal security duties. The 
leeessary adjustments were made to permit of rapid expansion
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in war, and India’s wartime military potential was augmented 
by the organization of a more efficient Reserve of 40,000
personnel, and the establishment in 1920 of an Auxiliary
21 22 Force and an Indian Territorial Force •
The Royal Air Force in India was established with a 
front-line strength of six squadrons. The Government 
announced its intention to create an Indian Air Force in 
1928 and, following delays occasioned by financial consider­
ations, the new service was created in 1932 - its first 
’flight’ being organized the following year.
The Government of India accepted, without reservation, 
the conclusion of the Imperial Conference in 1926 to the 
effect that each of the self-governing dominions and India 
should accept the liability of providing for its own local 
naval defence. The Royal Indian Marine was accordingly 
restored as a combatant service in 1928 and was slowly built 
up towards its sanctioned strength of four sloops, two 
patrol vessels and two surveying vessels.
The creation of an Indian officer cadre was undertaken 
in 1917y at which time Indians were made eligible for the 
King’s commission and ten vacancies per annum were reserved 
for Indian officer cadets at the Royal Military College, 
Sandhurst. In March 1922, the Prince of Wales Royal Indian 
Military College was opened at Dehra Dun with a capacity of
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70 cadets to prepare Indians for Sandhurst and effect a 
reduction in the prevailing high rate of failures among 
Indian cadets sent to England^. The Government commenced 
the ’Indianization’ of eight infantry and cavalry units in 
1923^ and, in response to comprehensive Assembly resolu­
tions passed in 1923 and 1925 which criticized the pace and 
scope of the Indianization scheme, the India Sandhurst 
Committee was convened in June 1925* The Committee investi­
gated the possibility of establishing a Sandhurst-style 
military college in India and its proposals J led to the 
establishment of the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun in 
October 1932 with a capacity of 60 cadets. By 31 March 
19359 there were 150 Indian Kingfs Commissioned Officers 
(KCOs) and the first had successfully graduated from the 
Staff College at Quetta. In 19353 the Kitchener College was 
inaugurated at Nowgong to train promising cadets from the 
ranks and, in 1936, an Army Class was started at Government 
College, Lahore.
Indiafs military liabilities in the inter-war period 
remained consistent with pre-war policy until the eve of 
World War II. Section 22 of the Government of India Act of 
1919 specifically limited India’s military liability to local 
defence while reiterating the obligation of His Majesty’s 
Government to come to India’s aid in a grave emergency. In
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1920, the Imperial Defence Committee defined India*s respons­
ibility in the event of a Central Asian war as involving the 
’minor danger* of internal security and frontier defence.
The ’major danger* of meeting an attack by a great power 
upon India or upon the Empire through India was declared to 
be an Imperial responsibility. Defence planning accordingly 
proceeded on this basis with appropriate attention being paid 
to the increasingly onerous problems of internal security 
(arising from the nationalist non-co-operation movement and 
increasing Hindu-Moslem animosity), and tribal control on 
the turbulent North-West Frontier^.
Concern with Soviet Russian intentions, reinforced by 
Moscow’s claim to the island of Urta Tagai in the river Oxus 
in 1926 (the island having been under de facto Afghan posses­
sion for many years) led to the formulation by the War 
Office in November 1927 of the Defence of India Plan to 
counter any Russian attack on Afghanistan, The plan assumed 
the friendliness of the latter and a generally quiescent 
tribal attitude, and it proposed action only in the event of 
a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan - and at the invitation of 
the Afghan Government, whose co-operation in such an event 
was anticipated. The plan involved the employment of the 
Army in India and a British Expeditionary Force and ’The 
main object was to defeat the Russian forces of invasion,
30
to delay and embarrass their advance as soon as they had 
threatened the integrity of Afghanistan thereby reducing 
their efficiency and either forcing them to abandon the 
campaign in its earlier stages, or so reducing their effic­
iency that the main battles would take place under most 
favourable circumstances1^.
The outline of the plan was largely prepared in 1928-29
but official interest quickly waned due to Russia*s internal
pre-occupations, her involvement in border conflict with
Japan in the Far East, and Britainfs growing concern with
the rising power of Nazi Germany. By 1937, the plan was of
only academic significance and had been shelved for all
practical purposes. At best it was a scheme, incompletely
pursued, to defend Afghanistan and ultimately India against
a Russian attack from Central Asia as far from India
2 8frontiers as possible •
The authorities immediately responsible for Indian 
defence disagreed with the assumptions underlying the Defence 
of India Plan. They were mainly concerned with the tradi­
tional contingency of waging a limited war with Afghanistan 
from India*s own resources - i.e. a plan to meet possible 
Afghan and tribal hostility which could, if necessary, be 
expanded to include operations against an invading Russian 
army. The result of this viewpoint was the Blue Plan of
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1927> which was designed to meet the former need by means of 
an offensive against Afghanistan on two lines of advance 
aimed at Kabul and Kandahar with the aim of compelling the 
Afghan Government to sue for peace at an early date^.
The Blue Plan was jettisoned in 1931 for the Pink Plan^. 
This scheme was limited in scope and constituted a restrain­
ing action in the event that the ruler of Afghanistan showed 
symptoms of hostility or seemed inclined to go over to the 
side of Russia, The operations would consist of an advance 
by the Northern and Western Armies to occupy Dakha and Wat 
Thana respectively, and thence continue onwards to Jalalabad 
and Kandahar. There was no provision for any advance beyond 
these last two points. The plan was, in effect, a peactime 
exercise based upon hypothetical diplomatic appreciations, 
conceived for a limited purpose and based upon the resources 
available in India.
Both the Defence of India Plan and the Pink Plan were 
framed upon the assumption of Soviet antagonism with or 
without the collaboration of Afghanistan. The only threat 
against which provision was made was that to the North-West 
Frontier, and no fear was entertained concerning the 
security of the north-eastern approaches, the coastline, or 
the interior of the country. This complacency was dispelled 
by German rearmament, the conclusion of the Rome-Berlin Axis
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and of the Anti-Comintern Pact between Germany, Italy and 
Japan in 1936, and Italian activities in Abyssinia and 
Afghanistan, German and Italian policies posed an increas­
ing threat to Britain in the West while Japan1s ambitions 
for a fco-prosperity sphere1 in the south-western Pacific, 
her successes in China and growing influence in Siam repre­
sented a potential threat to Indian security from the East,
At the same time, British authorities remained of the view 
that Russia continued to pose a threat to the North-Western 
Frontier. These changes in the international situation were 
considered to fhave materially increased Indiafs vulnerabil­
ity and her potential commitments*^.
These new circumstances, coupled with certain condition­
al external commitments previously accepted by the Government 
3 2of India , compelled reconsideration of the Pink Plan. A 
revision of this plan was contemplated as early as 1936 but 
had been deferred by the operations in Waziristan in 1936-37 
and the fluidity of the general situation. The decision had 
been taken, however, to adjust the Pink Plan as, in view of 
India’s growing (especially external) commitments, the 
available land forces were not adequate for a simultaneous 
offensive in both the Kabul orJalalabad and Kandahar areas. 
Thus it had been decided to abandon, or at least defer until 
a later stage of the war, the advance on Kandahar and to
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concentrate on a vigorous offensive on the Jalalabad line.
A revision of the Pink Plan was taken up in earnest in 
1938 when an Outline Plan of Operations was drafted and con­
sidered by the General Staff (India)^^. The Outline Plan 
envisaged the possibility of war with Afghanistan and includ­
ed within its scope the control of the cis—frontier tribes, 
the maintenance of internal security in India and the provis­
ion of a striking force at the frontier railheads. The ap­
preciation of Afghan military strength was based on active 
support to Kabul by the cis- and trans-frontier tribes. 
Assistance to Afghanistan from a foreign country was not 
taken into account as in that event the war would become an 
Imperial responsibility.
The plan had the limited object of ensuring that the 
Afghan Government would seek an early peace so as to avoid 
disintegration or prolonged occupation of the country. 
Economic pressure on Afghanistan in the event of a war was 
impracticable as that country’s trade routes to the north 
and west did not admit of blockade, hence it was proposed to 
prevent the supply of war material or the furnishing of credit 
to Kabul by foreign powers. The appreciation also took into 
account that Muslim sympathy in India for the Afghans in any 
such war might result in widespread disaffection against the 
Government and constitute a threat to internal security.
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The plan of operations was based on the hypothesis that 
the Afghans would have the initiative in launching any attack 
and that the war would commence with air raids and 
anti-British propaganda in the frontier districts and 
Waziristan on a large scale. Such a situation would be 
countered by a determined and rapid advance into Afghanistan 
by the field army, with the Covering Troops engaging the 
tribal forces. The hostile forces would be met as near to the 
frontiers as was practicable, most likely on the Khyber- 
Jalalabad-Kabul line of advance. The British campaign would 
commence with air action aimed at destroying the Afghan air 
force and various military objectives concurrently with the 
occupation of Jalalabad; it was hoped that this latter 
action combined with air attacks and minor diversionary 
actions on the Kandahar line of advance would compel Kabul 
to sue for peace. If the expected result did not material­
ise immediately, a further advance towards Kabul was contem­
plated, mainly by the Khyber route, with utilization of the 
Chaman-Kandahar approach for executing diversions and thereby 
preventing Afghanistan from concentrating its forces against 
the main advance.
The Outline Plan was rendered obsolete by a change in 
policy in mid-1938, whereby Afghanistan was considered by 
the Commander-in-Chief (India) to be an Imperial, rather
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than a local Indian, concern. Subsequent planning was thus 
based on a purely defensive policy which included defence of 
the frontiers and coastline; any idea of a large-scale offens­
ive into Afghanistan was excluded from the calculations, 
although small localised counter-actions were not ruled out.
The altered basis of policy led to the issuance of an 
Interim Plan of Operations in August 1938, this scheme being 
replaced later in the year by the fPlan of Operations (India) 
1938f though without any substantial change^. This latter 
plan governed Indian defence policy at the time of the com­
mencement of World War II.
The underlying note of these two plans was that an 
isolated attack against India by Afghanistan was most unlike­
ly and that the latter would launch such an attack only if 
compelled to do so by circumstances beyond its immediate 
control. If such an attack were launched, it was conceived 
as involving regular land and air forces enjoying foreign 
assistance and supported by tribals from both sides of the 
Durand Line. In reply to such an event, the army in India 
would adopt a purely defensive role - no immediate counter­
advance into Afghanistan being envisaged. Specified vital 
areas would be defended and the existing position maintained 
against the tribes. As the plan was eminently defensive in 
character, it was comprehensive enough to provide
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simultaneously for the defence of the North-West Frontier, 
internal security, coastal defence and overseas commitments.
In the meantime, the maintenance of an efficient and 
up-to-date Indian military and naval establishment had been 
hampered by fluctuating revenues and the opposition of Indian 
nationalist opinion to increased defence expenditures. This 
situation led the Government of India towards increasing 
reliance upon the Home Exchequer. In 1933, His Majesty’s 
Government commenced payment of an annual subsidy of £1.5 
million towards the modernization of Indian defences and, in 
1938, further negotiations were held between the British and 
Indian Governments regarding Indian defence problems.
In an agreement concluded between the two governments in 
January 1938, Britain agreed to the cessation of India’s 
annual naval subvention of £100,000 on condition that India 
maintained an ocean-going squadron of not less than six 
modern escort vessels to co-operate with the Royal Navy. In 
subsequent negotiations, His Majesty’s Government indicated 
its willingness to increase the annual grant towards Indian 
defence by £500,000 from 1st April 1939, and to transfer 
four British battalions stationed in India from the Indian 
to the Imperial Establishment. It also proposed to ask 
Parliament to authorize a capital grant to India of up to 
£5 million for the re-equipment of certain British and Indian
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uinits in India and to provide aircraft for the re-equipment 
of certain squadrons of the Royal Air Force based in India . 
The offers were, however, conditional upon the Imperial 
Reserve being definitely assigned and a clear and precise 
definition of its role being accepted. The Government of 
India agreed to these conditions'^.
The problems of Indian defence were assessed later in
the year by an expert committee appointed by His Majesty’s
Government at the request of the Government of India and
37presided over by Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Chatfield 
The findings of the committee were submitted to Whitehall on 
6 February 1939 and, together with the recorded views of the 
Chiefs of Staff, were considered by the Cabinet on 28 June 
1939^. The Chatfield Committee Report was published on 4 
September 1939 with the announcement that His Majesty’s Gov­
ernment had accepted it with minor modifications. In the 
meantime, in anticipation of acceptance of the report by 
Whitehall, the Indian Government had commenced the moderniz­
ation and mechanization of the army, the improvement of port 
defences and the raising of the first Indian Air Force 
squadron and of some flights for coastal defence. Although 
the Imperial Reserve as such had not been formed up to the 
outbreak of World War II, elements assigned to it were des­
patched overseas in August.
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The defence expenditure of India for the last inter-war 
year (1938-39) totalled Rs 46.68 crores - about 23 per cent 
of the total revenues of the Central Government, The 
British subsidy towards Indian defence represented about 
three per cent of Indiafs total defence costs, and the main­
tenance of the several Indian battalions who formed part of 
the normal peacetime garrisons in Malaya and Hong Kong was 
charged to the Home Exchequer.
The Army in India consisted of about 57,000 British and
TO200,000 Indian combatants , a Reserve of 40,000, an Auxil­
iary Force of 24,000, the Indian Territorial Force of 20,000 
and the Indian States Force of 40,000. There were tribal 
levies on the North-West Frontier and sanction for British 
authority in the frontier areas of Assam was provided by 
five battalions of Assam Rifles - a semi-military force, 
mostly Gurkha, which was commanded by British officers 
seconded from the Indian Army; its cost was charged against 
the revenues of the Assam Government.
The regular army was organized in four Commands 
(Northern, Southern, Eastern and Western) with a field force 
of four divisions (one of which was earmarked as an expedi­
tionary force, with an infantry brigade already in Egypt and 
an infantry brigade group and a mountain artillery regiment 
in Malaya/Singapore), a covering force of about twelve mixed
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brigades on the North-West Frontier, and internal security 
formations. There was a general shortage of anti-tank guns, 
light machine-guns, mortars, pistols, sub-machine guns and 
modern field artillery. The deployment of the army was 
traditional. The officer cadre was largely British and, on 
1st October 1939> there were only 396 Indian officers 
(including three brigadiers) in the combatant arms as against 
a total officer cadre in these arms of 4>424 - a ratio of 
1:10.1^. The Service was responsible for internal security, 
tribal control on the North-West Frontier, defence of India 
against sporadic attacks by hostile air and naval forces in 
co-operation with the navy and air force, defence of India 
against attack by a minor power like Afghanistan, and defence 
of Imperial outposts in the Middle East and the Far East as 
bastions of Indiafs external defences^.
The Indian Navy was comprised of eight minor vessels^2 
and was responsible for the naval defence of India’s ports 
and coastline and a contribution towards safeguarding the 
maritime communications of the Empire. India was also 
required to provide bases and facilities for the repair and 
fuelling of Imperial vessels.
The air force in India consisted of one incomplete IAF 
squadron^ and six RAF squadrons^ and preparations were 
underway for the formation of some coastal defence flights.
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With the exception of the Blenheims, all the aircraft were 
obsolete. There were no bases suitable for an up-to-date air 
force; the few bases available were all located on the 
North-West Frontier^ and none possessed an all-weather run­
way over 1,100 yards in length^. This force was respons­
ible for air aspects of internal security, tribal control on 
the North-West Frontier, resisting a threat from Afghanistan 
or Russia, defence of Indiafs ports and coastline against 
enemy raiders in co-operation with the other two services, 
and reinforcement of fthe bastions of Indiafs external
A 7defences*4'•
The general needs of the army were met by a modest 
ordnance establishment consisting of a Metal and Steel 
Factory (Ishapore), a Rifle Factory (Ishapore), a Gun and 
Shell Factory (Cossipore), a Gun Carriage Factory (Jubbul- 
pore), an Ammunition Factory (Kirki), a Cordite Factory 
(Aruvankadu), a Harness and Boot Factory (Cawnpore) and an 
ordnance clothing factory at Shahjahanpur. The armed 
services, however, were dependent upon external (mainly 
British) sources of supply for all major items of weaponry 
and technical equipment. Ford and General Motors1 assembly 
plants in India met most of the civilian needs of vehicles 
but military vehicles were provided by Canadian and American 
suppliers. Shipbuilding capacity was limited to minor
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vessels and there was no aircraft industry or even aircraft 
repair facilities in India.
The war provoked another noteworthy military effort by
India. The army was expanded to a force of over two million
men, the navy to 126 vessels of all types and the air force
to nine squadrons4 . Shipyards in Bombay, Calcutta and
Karachi constructed merchant vessels and small naval craft.
Aircraft repair and maintenance facilities epp» established
at Bangalore under the registered name of Hindustan Aircraft
49Limited' . The ordnance establishment was expanded to a 
total of 30 production units, including 17 fordnancef, nine 
clothing, two parachute and two harness and saddlery-^.
India was developed into the staging and supply base for the 
South-East Asian theatre. Indian forces served with distinc­
tion in East and North Africa, the Middle East, Sicily and 
Italy and throughout South-East Asia, their major effort 
being in the last theatre^. Some 50,000 Indian servicemen 
lost their lives during the course of the conflict.
In the financial sphere, however, the Government of 
India did not repeat the policy followed in the Great War 
(1914-18) of accepting financial liability for its regular 
peacetime forces employed outside Indiafs frontiers. Indiafs 
financial commitments in the defence sphere throughout the 
war were thus determined by the provisions of the financial
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settlement concluded between the British and Indian Govern- 
ments in November 1 9 3 9 •  All heavy equipment was either 
provided by America under Lend-Lease or by Britain without 
charge, the British Exchequer bore the expenses of all 
Indian troops serving outside India, including Burma, and 
the costs of all airfields constructed in India in connection 
with the operations in South-East Asia Command were absorbed 
by Britain and the United States .
The Second World War provided many useful lessons for 
the planners of Indian defence.
It confirmed the conclusion of the Chatfield Committee 
regarding the need for India to associate itself, for its 
very survival, with the defence of the Middle East and 
South-East Asia. In the West, the approach of Nazi armies 
to IndiaTs very borders had been thwarted only by Imperial 
forces in the Western desert and by Russia’s tenacious 
resistance at Leningrad, Stalingrad and in the Caucasus.
In the East, the occupation of Vietnam had given Japan control 
of the sea and air routes from north and north-east Asia to 
the south-east. Thailand had provided Japan with the spring­
board for the conquest of Burma and Malaya/Singapore, while 
the Japanese capture of Malaya/Singapore and the Philippines, 
coupled with naval supremacy, had rendered the Netherlands 
East Indies indefensible. The loss of Singapore and Burma
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had in turn exposed eastern India to attack by land, sea and 
air*
There had been an excessive reliance upon distance, 
physical geography and potential, as opposed to actual, 
allied military power to deter a would-be aggressor and to 
contain his advances distant from India’s land and maritime 
frontiers. Despite ominous indications of Japanese hostil­
ity and territorial designs since at least the late 1930s, 
India’s defence planners had concentrated on countering the 
’historical bogey’ of a possible invasion through the tra­
ditional invasion route in the north-west. As the official 
British war historian has written:
An invasion of India’s north-eastern frontier 
across the grain of the country had never been 
visualised because of the distance of any possible 
enemy, the difficulties of the terrain and the 
fact that such communications as there were in 
Burma ran north and south. The traditional threat 
had always been from the north-west and India’s 
defences had been planned to meet it.54
Thus, the army and the logistical infra-structure had
been disposed for operations in the north-west and had
actually been strengthened from 1939 to 1941~*~*« On the
other hand, the only force maintained in Burma after its
separation from India in 1937 had comprised two British
infantry battalions, four battalions of Burma Rifles, a
small engineer force, a mountain battery and a field company
loaned from India, three battalions of Burma Military
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Police, six battalions of the Burma Frontier Force (convert­
ed from Burma Military Police in 1937) and the Burma Auxil­
iary Force drawn from the European, Anglo-Burmese and 
Anglo-Indian communities^ • There had been virtually no 
defence works on Burma’s eastern frontier and the absence of 
anything but the most rudimentary communications had rendered 
the deployment and maintenance of large forces to counter 
the Japanese threat a difficult and costly task far in 
excess of India’s capabilities.
The Japanese threat had illustrated Britain’s inability 
to secure India against attack by a major power from the 
east while simultaneously waging a desperate struggle for 
her own existence against a modern military foe west of 
Suez, It attested to the relatively limited military 
capabilities of India, without major external succour. The 
famine in Bengal in 1942-43 and the mass panic which had 
gripped eastern India at the appearance of Japanese naval 
units and aircraft in the Bay of Bengal in 1942 were pointed 
reminders of certain problems of resources and national 
morale which could have far-reaching consequences for Indian 
defence in times of acute national danger. Also, as the 
Government of India noted in a statement on industrial 
policy released in 1945• ’The experience of two wars has 
demonstrated the dangers, both to India and to the rest of
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the Commonwealth, inherent in India’s dependence on overseas 
supplies for vital commodities required for defencet'5^ .
With the successful conclusion of the Pacific War, the 
question of India’s postwar defence requirements was the 
subject of a number of articles by various British and 
Indian military writers. Most of these observers argued the 
need for a regional approach to Indian security, the most 
popular proposal being for a regional Commonwealth strategy
r Oin which India would play a focal role'5 • The most compre­
hensive argumentation for a scheme was advanced by K.M. 
Panikkar, a man described by Alan Campbell-Johnson in 1951 
(at which time he was India’s ambassador to the People’s 
Republic of China) as ’one of about half a dozen men who may 
well have a great influence in the shaping of Indian policy 
at home and abroadt'5^ .
Writing in 1945> Panikkar recognized that ’The present 
war has altered the character of Indian defence. It has ex­
tended the geography of defence so far as India is concerned. 
The outer rim on which India’s security was based - the Ring 
Fence system - inherited from the Company, must now, with the 
increasing range of modern weapons, extend beyond the
/  Abuffer-states of Curzon’ • In a pamphlet published the 
same year, he stated that ’Indian freedom can be achieved 
and upheld only by firmly deciding to shoulder our share at
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all costs in the active defence of the areas necessary for 
our own security
Panikkarfs conception of the desired regional defence 
organization was put forth in a series of essays published 
between 1943 and 1 9 4 6 ,  In his first paper, published in 
1 9 4 3» be suggested the establishment of a Triune Commonwealth 
comprising India, Pakistan and Burma united as a single 
defence area with full British support and co-operation to 
form the main structure for peace and security in Asia . 
Expanding on this theme in a second monograph, published two 
years later, he argued that it was India’s responsibility - 
as Britain’s natural successor state - to provide the main 
forces to man the series of air and naval bases guarding the 
approaches to the Indian Ocean. Such an Indo-British asso­
ciation would, in his view, usher in the Fourth British 
Empire which could justly claim the moral leadership of the 
world^. In a 1946 essay concerning the geo-political situ­
ation of India in the atomic age, Panikkar declared that 
India would, in association with Russian land power, be 
nothing more than an appendage and that she should ally her­
self with Britain in organizing the Rimland to counter the 
Russian-dominated Heartland*^.
In the meantime, the British authorities had made their 
own assessment of India’s postwar military requirements^
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and, as of October 1946, planning appears to have aimed at 
the creation of an army comprised of a * few* infantry divi­
sions, an armoured division, an airborne division and Tsome’ 
frontier brigade groups; the development of a balanced fleet 
having a nucleus of three cruisers; and the expansion of the 
existing ten RIAF squadrons into a balanced force of twenty 
fighter, bomber and transport squadrons backed by the neces- 
sary repair, maintenance and administrative facilities0 •
Due to the political situation, however, such planning was 
necessarily tentative; the ultimate decisions as regards the 
postwar defence policy of India were left to the political 
leadership of emerging nationalist India which had assumed 
the responsibilities of de facto power with the formation of 
the Interim Government, headed by Jawaharlal Nehru, in 
September 1946*
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1 See appendix V for the progress of defence expenditure 
for selected years between 185B and 1947* For a comparison 
of Indian defence expenditure with selected other countries 
for the years 1928-29 and 1936-37> or as otherwise signified, 
see appendix VI,
2 In view of its relevance to the post-1947 period, the 
policy pursued by the British Indian Government in the 
Himalayan region has been briefly reviewed and enclosed as 
appendix VII,
3 As one observer has written, with reference to the 
assessment made at the time, there was fno question of using
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internal security’. Sir Michael O’Dwyer, ’’India’s Manpower 
in the War”, The Army Quarterly. 2:2 (July 1921), p. 251.
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Thomas, ibid, p. 51.
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and the Euphrates; and the construction, repair, manning and 
general supervision of all local government craft for milit­
ary purposes. H.H. Dodwell (ed.), The Cambridge History of 
the British Empire (hereinafter called The Cambridge History), 
vol. 5: The Indian Empire 1858-1918 (London, Cambridge 
University Press, 1932), pp. 150-1. In 1869* India commenced 
payment of a subvention towards the Royal Navy which, from 
I896, totalled £100,000 per annum.
7 The official attitude towards the problem posed to India 
by the Russian threat was aptly summed up by the Secretary 
of State for India, Lord Kimberly, in a letter to the 
Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, dated 28 May 1885s ’It is sad that 
instead of devoting ourselves to internal improvements, we 
must give our principal thoughts to warlike preparations, but 
there is no help for it. Russia is not a Power to be lightly 
dealt with, and the only argument she pays attention to is, 
unhappily, force’. Cited, Rose Louise Greaves, Persia and 
the Defence of India (University of London, Athlone Press
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British ’may well pluck the flower of internal safety: for we 
may say to the Russians what Charles II said to his brother: 
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Sir Mounstuart Elphinstone Grant-Duff, cited in ibid, p. 12.
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Cited, Lord Curzon in India (London, Macmillan 1906), p. 408. 
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10 As one observer has written, Lord Curzon was ’emphatic­
ally against a forward movement [occupation of the tribal 
areas] except that he wished to remain in Chitral. He was 
equally against any procedure which might imply a definite 
retreat. He chose a middle course’. Lovat Fraser, India 
Under Curzon And After (London, William Heinemann, 1911) ,
P. 51.
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and the response during the Great War of 1914-18, see 
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12 The Army in India and its Evolution (Calcutta, Superin- 
tendent Government Printing, 1924), pT 27«
13 The divisions were echelonned back from the North-West 
Frontier along the strategic railway lines, facilitating the 
despatch - in the event of a Russian threat to Afghanistan - 
of one army to the line of the Helmund and the other to the 
heights beyond Kabul. For the resulting composition and 
distribution of the army, see appendix XI.
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14 For a useful survey of ordnance development under the Company, see Brigadier-General H.A. Young, The East India 
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Press, 1937)•
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16 India paid an annual naval subvention of £100,000 towards 
the upkeep of three ships of the Royal Navy which, without 
the consent of the Government of India, could not normally
be employed south of an imaginary line drawn from Aden to 
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17 Cited, The Cambridge History, vol. 5, p. 476. India’s 
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Abyssinia (1867-68), Perak (1875), Malta (1878), Egypt 
(1882), Suakim and Mombassa (1896), South Africa (1899-1902), 
China (1900-01) and Somaliland (1902-04) had been on an ad 
hoc basis and the expenses associated with their use had 
usually been charged against Britain.
18 For comments from the Indian press and leaders of Indian opinion, see India and the War (London, Hodder & Stoughton), 
PP. 54-74.
19 It must be noted, however, that India bore only the 
expenses of her normal peacetime army, the remaining troops 
being maintained at British expense.
20 The Army in India and its Evolution, p. 47» For the 
establishment of the army as of 1923, valid until the eve of 
the Second World War, see appendix XIII.
21 Enrolment for this force was voluntary but restricted to 
persons of British or mixed descent. The force was liable 
for local service in an emergency.
22 The Indian Territorial Force was designed to stimulate 
Indian interest in defence. It consisted of provincial 
battalions (affiliated to regular regiments and liable for
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for service only in their province of origin) and a univers­
ity training corps subject to no liability.
23 The first Indian cadet was appointed to Sandhurst in 1918 
but, of the first 83 entrants (of whom 35 were from the 
Punjab and twelve from the Bombay Presidency), approximately 
30 per cent failed to pass out - as against three per cent
of the British cadets. William Gutteridge, nThe Indianisa- 
tion of the Indian Army 1918-45’*, Race, 4 (May 1963), p. 41. Gutteridge expresses the view that the cost of sending a son 
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Philips (general ed.), Select Documents on the History of 
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the high rate of failures. It recommended a substantial and 
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increase from ten to twenty in the number of vacancies 
reserved for Indians at Sandhurst, a further increase of 
four places per annum up to 1933> and the establishment in 
that year of an Indian Sandhurst with a capacity for 100 
cadets. If its proposals were accepted and implemented, the 
committee envisaged that, by 1945> half of the annual intake 
of officers for the Indian Army would be Indians and that, 
by 1952, half of the officer cadre of the Indian Army would 
be Indian. The relevant extracts from the report are cited 
in Select Documents, vol. 4*> PP« 531-2.
26 The Curzon scheme of tribal control had completely 
broken down in 1919> forcing reversion to a policy of 1paci­
fication through civilisation” which involved the reoccupa­
tion of the tribal areas by regular troops based upon good
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communications and augmented by tribal levies. The burden 
was heavy, amounting to about £30 millions for the inter-war 
period, of which £3-4 millions was expended on military 
expeditions against the fanatical tribals - including the 
sweep of 40,000 troops through Waziristan in 1936-37» for a 
good review of the entire problem, see Sir William Barton, 
IndiaTs North Western Frontier (London, John Murray, 1939)*
27 Bisheshwar Prasad, Defence of India: Policy and Plans. 
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Secretary of State, pp. 1-2.
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ween His Majesty’s Government and the Government of 
India that forces to the extent of one division and 
four air squadrons re-equipped according to modern 
standards, shall be maintained in India for the 
primary purpose of furnishing reinforcements in an 
emergency to areas East of the Mediterranean. These
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described above, may be made available for the 
defence of India against aggression from an 
external enemy or for the maintenance of the 
Internal Security of India. The decision as to 
the actual employment of these forces in an emerg­
ency will rest with His Majesty’s Government and 
they will therefore only be available for employ­
ment under the Government of India after consulta­
tion with His Majesty’s Government.
Telegram from Viceroy to Secretary of State, XX No. 1265-S 
dated 24 September 1938, para. 4. Cited in Defence of India: 
Policy and Plans, p. 7*
37 The Committee’s terms of reference were
In the light of the recent Report of the Chiefs of 
Staff and of the Reports of the Cabinet Committee 
on the Defence of India, and having regard to the 
increased cost of modern armaments to the desirab­
ility of organising, equipping and maintaining the 
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ments, and to the limited resources available in 
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recommendations•
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duction of the first training-type aircraft by May 1941 and
of light bombers in December 1941 > but these plans were not 
realised due mainly to the difficulty experienced in finding 
skilled technicians and mechanics in India - confirming 
thereby the fears of the British Government. See Kirby, op. 
cit., vol. 1, p. 40*
55
50 See Lt. General Sir Wilfred Lindsell, ”The Development 
of India as a Base for Military Operations”, RUSI Journal 
(May 1947)* p. 223. Training schemes turned out 50,000 
workers, supervisers, tool-setters and highly-skilled 
artisans, and the labour force in the ordnance factories 
increased from 15,000 (1939) to 100,000 by 1944. See letter 
by Sir Gerald Butler published in The Daily Telegraph on 17 
November 1962,
51 Indian personnel comprised 80 per cent of the British 
Commonwealth and Empire forces in Malaya, China, Indochina 
and Indonesia on V-J day, totalling about 700,000 men. 
Brigadier J.N. Chaudhuri, ”The Indian Army”, Asiatic Review 
(January 1947* P* 306.
52 Under the agreement (which remained in force until 31 
March 1947)> India was to meet: (a) a fixed annual sum repre­
senting normal net effective cost of the forces in India 
under peace conditions. This was fixed at Rs 36,77 crores, 
being the net budget estimate for defence services, exclud­
ing non-effective charges, for 1939-40; (b) an addition to 
allow for the rise in prices; (c) the cost of such war 
measures as were purely Indian liabilities by reason of 
their having been undertaken by India in her own interest; 
and (d) a lump sum payment of Rs 1 crore towards the cost
of maintaining India*s external defence croops overseas.
The total amount by which the defence expenditure exceeded 
the sum of items (a) to (c) was recoverable from the British 
Government. R.N. Bhargava, The Theory and Working of Union 
Finance in India (London, Allen &* Unwin, 1956), p . 281.
53 The total recoverable war expenditure for the period 
1939-40 to 1946-47 was Rs 1,791.35 crores as againstRs 1,763.19 on India*s account. Ibid, p. 282, footnote.
54 Kirby, o£. cit., vol. 2 (London, HMS0 1958), xvi.
55 For details of planning during this period, see Defence 
of India: Policy and Plans, pp. 61-135«
56 Kirby, o£. cit., vol. II, p. 8.
57 Cited in Select Documents, p. 700.
58 See, for example, Lt. Colonel G.L.W. Armstrong, ”The 
Defence of the Indian Ocean and the Far East”, US I Journal, 
77:326 (January 1947)f pp. 71-3; Lt. Colonel S.G. Chaphekar, 
”A Frank Survey of India’s Defence Problems”, ibid, 78:327
56
(April 1947 ) f PP* 240-5, Lt. Colonel G.N. Molesworth, "Some Aspects of Future Security in the Indian Ocean Area",
Asiatic Review (January 1946), pp. 28-9*
59 Mission With Mountbatten (London, Robert Hale 1951)y 
p. 269.
60 "Defence and National Efficiency", Asiatic Review (July
1945) , P* 293*
61 India and the Indian Ocean (London, Allen & Unwin, 1945)y 
p. l6.
62 The Future of South-East Asia (London, Allen & Unwin, 
1943T
63 India and the Indian Ocean»
64 The Basis of an Indo-British Treaty (London, ICWA, 1946). 
For a similar viewpoint, see Lt. General H.G. Martin,
"India’s New National Army", The Daily Telegraph, 22 November 
1946.
65 See appendix XX.
66 See Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, "Planning 
India’s Post-War Armed Forces", USI Journal. 76:325 (October
1946) , pp. 321-2.
CHAPTER II
THE ORIGINS, BASES AND AIMS OF INDIAN DEFENCE POLICY
The nationalist leaders of independent India brought 
with them into responsible office a long tradition of oppo­
sition to the defence policy of the British Raj.
During the period up to 1919» Indian nationalist opinion, 
as expressed through the Indian National Congress, reflected 
prevailing opinion in influential British circles. In the 
context of India*s pressing poverty, Congress argued the 
need to lessen the military burden on Indian revenues.
There was no opposition to the stationing of an Imperial 
Reserve in India but it was felt that India’s military liabil­
ity should be confined to internal security and defence of 
the actual frontiers, thus excluding the costs of military 
operations carried on beyond those frontiers, military forma­
tions believed to be maintained in the sub-continent for 
this purpose and charges incurred by the British Army in 
India in excess of those that would otherwise be absorbed by 
a comparable body of Indian troops. There developed a gen­
eral disbelief in the possibility of any Russian invasion
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and a marked tendency to minimize the threats posed by 
Afghanistan and the militant tribes on the North-West Front­
ier - and to attribute much of the problem in this quarter 
to the imperialist urges of British authorities. A natural 
corollary of these premises was strong opposition to the 
fforward policy1 of projecting defence strategy beyond 
Indiafs natural frontiers, particularly into the tribal 
territories in both the North-West and North-East, and gen­
eral support for the reform effected by Lord Curzon on the 
North-West Frontier during the 1899-1904 period. There were 
persistent demands for greater Indian participation in 
defence - a broadening of the basis for recruitment to the 
Army and the grant of Army commissions to Indians  ^•
The general identification of Indian and British imper­
ial interests was attested by the wholehearted support
advanced by the INC for the Imperial war effort throughout 
oWorld War I . In the immediate aftermath of the war the 
Delhi Congress, meeting in December 1918, reiterated its 
loyalty to the Crown^ and the militant nationalist and ortho­
dox Hindi, B.G. Tilak, even envisaged in 1919 that India 
could function as a powerful steward of the League of 
Nations for maintaining the peace of the world and the 
stability of the British Empire against all aggressors and 
disturbers of peace whether in Asia or elsewhere^.
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The identification of Indian and British interests 
vanished in 1920-21, however, with the emergence of a more 
independent and militant Congress under the leadership of 
Mohandas K. Gandhi, In September 1920, Congress adopted 
Gandhi’s plan of non-co-operation with British authority and 
association with the Khilafat movement^, calling upon Indians 
not to offer themselves as recruits for service in Mesopot­
amia, In May 1921, Gandhi threatened to preach non-support 
for the Government in the event of hostilities between 
Britain and Afghanistan. The following month, the Congress 
Working Committee advised Indian soldiers not to co-operate 
with the British Government in the event of hostilities with 
the Turkish Nationalist Government. In November of the same 
year, the All India Congress Committee adopted its first 
formal declaration of independence from British foreign 
policy and the first statement of the foreign policy which a 
free India would like to pursue^. In accordance with its 
hardening attitude towards colonialism, Congress demanded in 
1927 the withdrawal of all Indian troops from China, 
Mesopotamia, Persia and all British colonies and foreign 
countries • At the same session, Congress recorded its oppo­
sition to the ’warlike’ preparations of the British Indian 
Government, demanded their cessation and warned that it
gwould not co-operate with any warlike adventures . At its
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Calcutta session the following year, Congress charged that
the policy of the Government Thas been traditionally guided
by considerations of holding India under subjection and not
oof protecting her frontiers1 .
The Congress was particularly emphatic in its condemna­
tion of the reversion, after the Great War, to a 1 forward 
policy1 on the North-West Frontier. In 1931> it recorded the 
opinion that ’the military and financial resources of India 
should not be employed in furtherance of this policy and that 
the military occupation of the tribesmen’s territory should 
be terminated1’*'^. In 1936, Congress condemned the policy as 
a ftotal failure1, rejected the charge that the frontier 
Pathan tribes were truculent and aggressive as ’without foun­
dation1 and charged: ’This policy has been pursued in the 
interests of imperialism and mostly with the object of justi­
fying the heavy military expenditure in India and of provid­
ing training under semi-war conditions for otherwise idle 
troops maintained for imperial purposes1 . There was a 
marked tendency, almost amounting to a conviction, to envisage 
a free India relatively secure against attack. While this 
view was based to a considerable degree upon emotion and the 
fact that nationalist leaders did not have the responsibil­
ities of office, it was supported by pragmatic reasoning on 
the part of the influential Jawaharlal Nehru.
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In his presidential address to the Kerala Provincial 
Conference of the INC at Payyanur on 28 May 1928, Nehru de­
clared that India was protected by the balance of power. He 
dismissed the specific threats which might face a free India 
on various grounds, France, Germany and Italy were
too much involved in their mutual hatred and 
jealousies and are too afraid of each other to 
trouble us at all. The United States of America 
[the imperialism of which was feared by Nehru at 
this time as fthe great problem of the near future*^] are too far away for effective action,
Japan has to face hostility of the United States 
and even of the Western European Powers and cannot 
dare embark on a new adventure, which would be 
fraught with the greatest risks for her, Afghan­
istan is strong in defence but weak in attack and 
it is inconceivable that with its limited resources 
it can do us any harm. It may at most carry out 
a number of successful raids before we can defeat it and hold it in check,,.13
He felt that Russia therefore
remains the sole danger but even this danger is 
largely imaginary, as every one knows or ought to know, that no country is in greater need of peace 
than Russia. The Great War, the civil war, the 
famine and the blockade have shaken her foundations 
and done her tremendous injury. She had made good 
much of her losses but above everything else she 
desires peace to build up the new social order she 
has established. Experts tell us that although 
strong in defence she is weak in attack. Her whole 
government is based on the good-will of the peasant­
ry and she cannot count on this good-will in an 
oppressive campaign. She has so many enemies that 
she dare not of her own accord start an invasion of 
India and leave her Western flanks exposed to attack. 
Nor has she any economic reason to covet India...
She wants capital and machinery and India can 
supply neither. We thus see that no danger threatens 
India from any direction and even if there is any 
danger we shall be able to cope with it.14
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In his most comprehensive statement on Indian defence,
contained in two articles published in 1931> Nehru expanded
on his balance of power thesis as it related to Indiaj
It may be that some will covet her, but the master 
desire will be to prevent any other nation from 
possessing India, No country will tolerate the 
idea of another acquiring the commanding position 
which England occupied for so long. If any power 
was covetous enough to make the attempt, all the 
others would combine to trounce the intruder.
This mutual rivalry would in itself be the surest 
guarantee against an attack on India.
Thus, he concluded, an independent India would occupy a 
favourable position in the world largely free from the dan­
ger of external invasion and more secure than if she contin­
ued to be involved in British imperial policy^•
Speaking in London on 4 February 1936 under the auspices 
of the Indian Conciliation Group and in the context of a 
deteriorating international situation, Nehru once again 
advanced the view that a free India would enjoy relative sec­
urity against external aggression. He felt that the frontier 
problem was not very difficult of solution and could be 
solved by a 1 friendly approach* and on economic lines, as 
tribal restlessness was due to their harsh environment. 
Afghanistan was dismissed as a threat on the grounds that it 
possessed no offensive strength. Nehru felt that there was 
no Power in the contemporary world which was more peaceful 
and less inclined to aggression than the Soviet Union.
63
Russia ’does not require India in the least’ from the econom­
ic point of view and, furthermore, dared not attack India 
’not so much because of the strength of India but because 
any such thing involves to-day international complications, 
whether the invader is Japan or Russia.,.’ He considered 
Japanese aggression against India as virtually precluded by 
Japan’s fear of exposing her flanks to America and Russia, 
her (supposed) need to absorb China prior to any descent 
upon India and the fact that she would have to traverse South 
East Asia and overcome the (Western) naval forces there^.
Nehru’s last pre-war pronouncement on defence was con­
tained in an article entitled ’The Unity of India’ written 
in January 1938. He again dismissed the possibility of an 
attack by a European power on the grounds that each was too 
fearful of its neighbours.
Soviet Russia is definitely out of the picture so 
far as aggression goes; she seeks a policy of 
international peace, and the question of Indian 
territory would fulfill no want of hers. Afghan­
istan and the border tribes also need not be con­
sidered in this connection. Our policy towards 
them will be one of close friendship and co-opera­
tion, utterly unlike the "Forward Policy" of the 
British which relies on bombing combatants and 
non-combatants alike. But even if these people 
were hostile and aggressive they are too backward 
industrially to meet a modern army outside their 
own mountains.
Nehru professed to have no fear of any attack by Japan 
which, in his view, would first have to absorb China, which
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was a Monumental task1; would have to engage in conflict 
with other great powers at some stage; the overland route 
was blocked by deserts and the Himalayas offered ’an effect­
ive barrier, and not even air fleets can come that way*; the 
maritime approach was long, intricate and dangerous. *A 
Japanese invasion of India could become a practical proposi­
tion only if China has been completely crushed, and if the 
United States, the Soviet Union and England have all been 
effectively humbled. That is a large undertakingf^ ?.
Thus we see that, normally speaking, there is no 
great or obvious danger of the invasion of India 
from without. Still, we live in an abnormal world, 
full of wars and aggression. International law 
has ceased to be, treaties and undertakings have no 
value, gangsterism prevails unabashed among the 
nations. We realise that anything may happen in 
this epoch of revolution and wars and that the only 
thing to be done to protect ourselves is to rely on 
our own strength at the same time that we pursue 
consciously a policy of peace. Risks have to be 
taken whatever the path we follow. These we are prepared to take, for we must.^ -°
By the eve of World War II, therefore, the framework of 
Indian defence policy had been defined by the man whose pre­
dispositions were to be mirrored in the defence posture 
ultimately adopted by the Indian Union. Nehru envisaged a 
free India secured against attack either by its geo-strategic 
position, its size or the balance of power. He did not dis­
miss the possibility of aggressive actions against India by 
Afghanistan or the tribes on the North-West Frontier, but he
65
was inclined to minimize the threat and regard even these 
contingencies as mostly of nuisance value and containable by 
relatively small but efficient armed forces. He contemplated 
the speedy development of an effective defence force and its 
employment in defence of the country1s territorial integrity 
- primarily, it would seem, in accordance with the Curzon 
scheme in vogue on the North-West Frontier from 1904 to 
1919^• The speedy withdrawal of British forces from a sov­
ereign India was envisaged and the strong suspicion of, and 
aversion to, great power politics clearly weighed heavily 
against India*s assumption of external military entanglements.
The attitude of Congress towards India’s involvement in 
the Second World War was determined by the over-riding polit­
ical desire to force political concessions from Britain as 
the price of co-operation. The price in these circumstances 
was nothing short of self-government immediately and the 
offer of independence upon the conclusion of hostilities, 
made by the Cripps Mission in March 1942, was rejected as 
inadequate. With seeming indifference to the Japanese threat 
to India’s eastern frontiers, Congress supported Gandhi’s 
’Quit India’ campaign in August 1942. When the Government 
replied by outlawing the Party and interning its leaders, a 
campaign of sabotage commenced only to be crushed within six 
weeks. The conduct of Congress, however, does not appear to
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have unduly affected the mass of the Indian population whose 
support for the war effort exceeded that of the Great War - 
at least in terms of men, money and materials.
India’s significant contribution to the Allied victory 
stimulated the nationalist view that a free India would 
exert a major influence in world affairs. Sir Mohammad 
Zafrullah Khan, chairman of the Indian delegation to the 
Third Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conference (London 
1945) and subsequently to serve as Foreign Minister of 
Pakistan, declared in his opening speech that ’The war has 
brought to India a forcible and vivid realisation of her own 
strategic importance and indeed of her own potential strat­
egic domination in all the vast area of oceans and lands
20that lie between Australia and the west coast of Africa’ 
Another prominent Indian stated in a book published at about 
this same time:
As a potential world power India has heavy obliga­
tions to discharge to any future world order. If 
she realises her potentiality, she must necessarily 
become dominant in the whole area from Australia 
to the West Coast of Africa and a vital factor in 
the protection of that area from internal or external aggression.21
This optimistic view was also reflected at the highest 
levels of the Congress Party. The deputy leader of the party, 
Asaf Ali, envisaged in early 1946 that an independent India 
would be capable of functioning as the ’policeman and arsenal
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of the East’ . While in prison in 1944f Nehru recorded the 
view that both India and China were potentially capable of 
joining America, the Soviet Union and Britain (if the re­
sources of the Empire were added to her own) as great powers 
and he estimated India’s potential resources as probably even 
more varied and extensive than China’s, Though he recogniz­
ed that India was not a Pacific power, he felt that she 
would inevitably exercise great influence there while devel­
oping as the centre of political and economic activity in the 
Indian Ocean area, in South-East Asia and up to the Middle 
East2 ,^ The All India Congress Committee declared in Septem­
ber 1945 that a free India would ’especially seek to develop 
common policies for defence, trade and economic and cultural 
development with China, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and Ceylon 
as well as the countries of the Middle East’2 ,^
Nehru made a number of subsequent references to the 
strategic indivisibility of the Indian Ocean region. In a 
message to the youth of Ceylon delivered from Bombay on 
9 October 1945» he declared that India ’is likely to become 
the centre for defence purposes and trade for Southern and 
South-East Asia, It is my hope that regional arrangements 
within the four corners of a world agreement will bind 
together all these countries of South and South-East A.sia’
In a speech in Karachi on 9 January 1946, Nehru claimed that
22
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the defence of the Indian Ocean could not be organized with­
out Indiafs co-operation and that in the natural course of
events these countries and India should come together for
26mutual protection as well as mutual trade • Speaking in 
Bombay on 15 March 1946, he stated that fThe Indian Ocean 
region depends for its defence greatly on India, which is 
strategically situated in the centre. Thus both South-East 
Asia and the Middle East defence arrangements will partly 
depend on India*2 .^ On 22 August 1946, he declared that the 
Middle East, Middle West, South-East Asia and China fall im­
pinge on India; all depend on India, economically, political­
ly or for defence purposes...India is also the centre viewed 
in terms of the defence of the countries of Western Asia.
It is obvious that India has to be some kind of base for 
defencef .
Though clearly cognisant that Indian security was close­
ly bound up with that of those countries contiguous by land, 
Nehru expressed the view at Bombay on 15 March 1946 that 
fThe whole question of defence in future warfare is so much 
in a fluid state, owing to scientific developments, that it 
is difficult to prophesy about the futuref2 .^ He declared 
that fIt is quite impossible for me to say what military or 
other alliances a free India may give approval of. Generally 
speaking, she would not like to entangle herself with other
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o opeoples’ feuds and imperialist rivalries’ • In any case,
as Nehru informed an audience in Bombay on 6 June 1946, if
India was threatened she would ’inevitably’ try to defend
herself by all means at her disposal - with the clear impli-
o 1cation that such means did not exclude atomic bombs0 •
In a broadcast from New Delhi on 7 September 1946, Nehru 
reaffirmed the intention of a free India ’as far as possible, 
to keep away from the power politics of groups aligned 
against one another.,.’0 and expressed the hope that India 
would develop close and friendly contacts with other nations, 
including England and the British Commonwealth, the United 
States, the Soviet Union and China. In accordance with its 
anti-colonial stance - but also reflecting a desire to divest 
India of external military commitments - the Interim Govern­
ment (which held office from 2 September 1946 to 14 August 
1947) ordered the withdrawal of Indian forces which remained 
outside the sub-continent - from Egypt and Palestine immed­
iately, from Japan as soon as it could be arranged and from 
Burma and Malaya after consultation with the parties concern­
ed. A small force was, however, permitted to remain in Iraq 
temporarily to guard military stores at the Shaiba base . 
Significantly enough Nehru, while stressing India’s geo-strat- 
egic importance in his inaugural address to the Asian Rela­
tions Conference in Delhi on 23 March 1947* denied any
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Indian pretensions to ’leadership* of Asia in the formal 
sense and made no reference whatever to any scheme for an
Asian federation^.
Demobilization continued, apparently towards the provis­
ional targets set earlier by the British authorities within
the limitations imposed by the serious communal rioting and
-5 rthe more general problems associated with demobilization •
On the recommendation of an Expert Committee on Ordnance 
Factories, the Interim Government decided to retain 15 of 
the existing ordnance plants as the peacetime Ordnance estab­
lishment and to dispose of the other 21 units as an integral 
part of the Government’s policy to divert opacity from war 
to peactime production"* • The Interim Government accepted 
the view adopted in Britain and other Western countries at 
the conclusion of World War II that there would probably be 
ten years before another general war and thus there was ’no 
question* of the Indian arms industry being developed on a 
crash basis - existing sources of armaments would continue to
'inbe utilized for the time being . An Armed Forces National­
isation Committee was set up to enquire into ways and means 
of speeding up the replacement of non-Indians in the armed 
forces. A National War Academy Committee was established to 
prepare a scheme for the creation of a military academy along 
the lines of West Point, and a National Cadet Corps Committee
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was convened to investigate the practicability of a cadet
corps scheme embracing schools and universities.
The Interim Government gave its early attention to the
problem of the strength and composition of India’s peacetime
armed forces. Its basic approach to the general question
was described by the Defence Secretary, G.S, Bhalja, during
the debate on the defence grants on 14 March 1947* He did
not propose to go into the ethics of maintaining armed
forces, ’I would only say’, he stated, ’that whatever our
ideology may be.,.as practical men, as wise men, as men on
whom the responsibility for the defence of the country lies,
it would be foolish, it would be imprudent on our part to
wildly cut down the forces to a figure which would put us at
the mercy of any i n v a d e r T h e  basis of planning for the
post-war armed forces was described thus:
The Indian Armed Forces have been built up as a 
whole for the defence of India as a whole, and so 
far at least as defence is concerned, planning can 
only proceed on the basis of an undivided India.
By reason of her geographical position, natural 
resources and great potentialities for future 
development, India occupies a key position in 
Asia. It is clear that in a major war no one 
power, however great, will be able to stand alone 
except for a short initial period. In present 
world conditions security can only be guaranteed 
by the maintenance of sufficient armed forces to 
encourage friends and deter possible aggressors, 
thus ensuring from all a healthy and friendly 
respect.
The minimum requirement to ensure this, he continued, was a
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highly efficient field army, a balanced air force and a suf­
ficient naval force to guard India,s long coastline and her 
seaborne trade^.
Although the Interim Government was unable to take firm 
decisions regarding either the size of the peacetime defence 
budget or the strength and composition of the armed forces 
(notwithstanding acceptance of the ’ten year1 rule), it 
appears to have reached certain tentative conclusions. It 
was envisaged that the annual outlay on defence might be 
fixed at about Rs 110 crores^ for a military programme 
which appears to have involved a reduction of the Army to a 
well-equipped and mobile force of about 200,000 men backed 
by a reserve and a large territorial Army, an Air Force of 
20 squadrons of all types and a small naval task force built 
around three light cruisers and including two aircraft car­
riers^1. The plans, in effect, represented a very slight 
modification in the Tlowest limit’ prepared by British 
planners prior to the end of World War II and apparently 
referred to by Field Marshal Auchinleck in his article on 
post-war defence planning for India’s armed forces published 
in October 1946^.
This planning would seem to reflect broad agreement 
with the appreciation of the post-war situation and India’s 
minimum defence requirements underlying the ’lowest limit’.
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Relations with the Soviet Union and China were likely to 
remain generally friendly for a few years while their ener­
gies were directed towards rehabilitation of their shattered 
economies, but aggression could not be ruled out thereafter. 
The problems of internal security and the North-West Frontier 
had undergone no radical change and required the maintenance 
of strong military forces^. In accordance with Indiafs weak 
finances and pressing internal development needs, her milit­
ary liability was restricted to the maintenance of law and 
order in India, the maintenance of order among the tribes 
and peoples of the North-West and North-East Frontiers, 
defence against Afghanistan (neither sicfe having allies) and 
the protection of India’s coasts, coastal merchant shipping 
and fisheries and assistance towards the protection of ocean 
shipping. In the event of an attack by a major power like 
Russia or China, Indian planning clearly envisaged the inter­
vention of friendly major powers including Britain to provide 
the necessary succour. It is probable that operational plan­
ning for the North-West Frontier reverted to some form of 
the Interim Plan of 1938.
The defence planning of the Interim Government was un­
dercut by the formation of the Moslem state of Pakistan 
simultaneous with the formal withdrawal of British power 
from the sub-continent at midnight on 14/15 August 1947*
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There was some recognition, however, of the need to arrange 
’some kind of permanent joint defence council of the two 
states, since the defence of India as a whole must be of 
supreme concern to both dominions1 The matter was discuss­
ed by Indian and Pakistani representatives on the Joint 
Defence Council^ in 1947 but, as Defence Minister Sardar 
Baldev Singh explained to the Indian Parliament in early 
1949» ’after careful consideration of the matter we came to 
the conclusion that the time was not ripe then to have an 
organisation of this kind. Both Pakistan and we were reluc-
A f\tant due to the intense feelings then prevailing’4 •
The ’intense feelings’ arose from the communal blood­
bath which both preceded and accompanied partition, related 
differences involving the division of the cash balances and 
military stores of an undivided India between the two new 
Dominions and a feeling of mutual suspicion and animosity 
provoked by the manner in which the princely states of 
Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir were integrated into the 
Indian Union^.
The forced accession of Junagadh was a small affair; 
when the Moslem ruler aceded the state to Pakistan on 15 
August an agitation was fomented and Indian troops proceeded 
to occupy the small Kathiawar states of Babariawad and 
Mangrol (both tributaries of Junagadah) on 1st November and
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Junagadh itself on 9 November. The ruler (Nizam) of 
land-locked Hyderabad resisted Indian pressures (including 
a total blockade of the state) to acede to the Union and the 
Indian Government used the excuse of internal disorders to 
initiate a ’police action’ on 13 September 1948 which was 
spear-headed by the 1st armoured division and supported by 
the RIAF. Individual columns struck eastwards from Sholapur, 
westwards from Bezwada, southwards from the Central Provinces, 
south-east from Bombay Province and north across the Tungab- 
hadra River. Despite some spirited resistance by the Nizam’s 
forces the issue was never in doubt and the Hyderabad author­
ities formally surrendered on 17 September.
The dispute over Kashmir, which has been well-document- 
48ed4 , grew out of a Moslem revolt in Poonch against the des­
potic Dogra-Hindu regime which escalated into an invasion by 
Pathan tribals on 22 October 1947* Desperate for military 
aid to stem the rapid tribal advance on his capital, Srinagar, 
the Maharajah, acceded to the Union on 26 October as the 
essential prerequisite of Indian aid.
In the early hours of 27 October, over 100 Indian civil 
and military aircraft were hastily mobilized to fly troops, 
equipment and supplies to Srinagar. The only unit immediate­
ly available, the 1/llth Sikh battalion (which was engaged 
in internal security duties in the Gurgaon District near
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Delhi), was flown to Srinagar and succeeded in imposing a 
brake on the tribal advance at Baramula (30 miles north-west 
of Srinagar) though forced back to within 17 miles of the 
capital. Reinforced to brigade strength and organized into 
a new divisional headquarters (Jammu and Kashmir Division) 
under Major-General Kalwant Singh, Indian troops counter­
attacked on 3 November and broke through tribal defences 
astride the Baramula road on 7 November, recapturing Baramula 
the following day. Advancing westwards along the Srinagar- 
Rawalpindi road against extensive demolitions and roadblocks, 
the steadily increasing Indian force occupied Mahura and Uri 
on 12 and 14 November, respectively. With the Vale cleared 
of hostile forces save for isolated pockets, the Indian 
drive proceeded in the direction of Pakistanfs frontiers and 
relieved Poonch (40 miles south-west of Srinagar) on 23 
November. Kotli (15 miles south-west of Poonch) was relieved 
three days later only to be evacuated on 1st December because 
of logistics problems.
The initiative thereupon passed to the tribal and Azad 
(Free) Kashmir forces who commenced, on 23 December, an of­
fensive in southern Kashmir along a 90-mile front extending 
from Jammu to the Jhangar-Naoshera area. In the severe 
fighting which ensued, Indian troops were driven from the 
important road junction of Jhangar on 31 December but managed
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to hold Naoshera against heavy attacks in early February 
1948.
With the return of better weather in the early spring 
the Indian forces, which had meanwhile been reorganized in 
Srinagar and Kashmir divisional commands, resumed their of­
fensive and recaptured Jhangar on 18 March. Localized ac­
tivities continued through the summer while a build-up of 
Indian forces proceeded to the equivalent of three divisions, 
plus State forces and a newly-organized Militia. In Novem­
ber, the Indian Army launched twin offensives in the south­
west and north-east supported by tanks, artillery and air­
craft. The Srinagar Division (Major-General K.S. Thimayya) 
forced Zoji La pass and recaptured Dras (22 miles north of 
Srinagar) on 16 November, entered Khalatse, the gateway to 
the Ladakh valley, on 23 November and recaptured the com­
munications centre of Kargil (85 miles north-east of Srinagar) 
on 24 November. The Jammu Division (Major-General Atma 
Singh) relieved Poonch on 22 November.
From the outset of the hostilities, the buildup of 
Indian forces in Kashmir had caused increasing alarm in 
Pakistan, which included the fear that the new nationfs 
defences in the Punjab would be hopelessly compromised by 
Indian control of the contiguous areas in Kashmir. The 
immediate despatch of Pakistani troops into the state was
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prevented only by the knowledge that such an act would lead 
to the immediate resignation of all British military person­
nel serving in the Pakistan armed forces - and whose services 
were essential to the development of an efficient military 
establishment. The result was that the involvement of the 
Pakistan Army was set back by at least several months and 
ultimately came about in an unobstrusive fashion. 1 Leave1 
was liberally granted to regular Army personnel who proceeded 
to take it with the Azad Kashmir forces and, early in 1948, 
the 7th (Pakistan) Division was deployed behind Azad Kashmir 
forces to forestall any sudden collapse which might enable 
Indian troops to drive through to the frontiers of Pakistan. 
On 17 March 1948, a battery of mountain guns with an infant­
ry escort went into action near Poonch and, on 10 May, the 
10th Brigade of the 9th Division advanced from Muzzaffarabad 
towards Tithwal and drove Indian troops back some distance.
In the latter part of June, Pakistan shifted its 9th Division 
to Abbotabad and into positions extending from Bagh to 
Tithwal. In response to the rapid Indian advances in Novem­
ber, the Pakistani Government pulled troops away from the 
vulnerable Lahore front - where India had deployed two 
armoured brigades - and concentrated the 10th Brigade, a 
parachute brigade, two field regiments of artillery and a 
medium artillery battery west of Jammu town. From this
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position they could threaten the tenuous communications of 
the Indian forces in Kashmir which extended from Amritsar 
through Pathankot and Jammu to Poonch,
It had early become apparent to the Indian Government 
that Kashmir could only be ultimately secured if Pakistan 
denied aid and refuge to the tribal and Azad Kashmir forces. 
India accordingly had taken the matter to the Security 
Council of the United Nations on 1st January 1948 with the 
request that it intervene to prevent further Pakistani 
interference in Kashmir. The efforts of that body to find 
a solution acceptable to India and Pakistan as a basis for 
negotiations proved unavailing until the progress of the 
conflict forced both parties into a more accommodating mood 
in December 194Ö. RIAF aircraft attacked a Pakistani arms 
dump at Palak on 13 December and, on the following day, 
Pakistani artillery commenced a 36-hour barrage of Indian 
lines of communications near Akhnur which shattered Indian 
ammunition dumps and communications and successfully searched 
out Indian divisional headquarters at Naoshera. The threat 
of general war loomed - a war which must have spelt disaster 
for both countries in the prevailing context of pressing 
internal problems, communal strife and military weakness.
It appears to have been just such a conclusion, arrived at 
independently by both Governments with the strong
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encouragement of high-ranking British officers serving with 
both armies, that led to the ceasefire effected on 1st Jan­
uary 1949 under United Nationsf auspices and the subsequent 
acceptance of a ceasefire line defined by U.N. observers.
The conclusion of the ceasefire coincided with the 
return of some degree of normalcy to the Indian internal 
scene and provoked fresh interest in the question of Indo-Pak 
co-operation in defence (and other spheres)^. The Governor- 
General of India, C. Rajagopalachari, called in early January 
for an end to the hatred and distrust which affected the 
relations of the two Dominions-*^, and Pakistani Foreign 
Minister, Sir Zafrullah Khan, emphasized the need for friend­
ly relations due to the strategic, policial and economic 
inter-dependence of the two countries^. Defence Minister 
Singh expressed the view in Parliament in March 1949 that he
felt confident that the proposal for joint defence would be
c 2examined when relations between the two countries improved • 
In April, the Governor-General of Pakistan, Khwaja Nazimuddin, 
declared that fA joint defence plan is a possibility when 
relations between India and Pakistan improve, or it may de­
velop as necessity may compelf and fhigh officials of the 
Indian Defence MinistryT were reported as having stated that, 
while the present moment was fpremature1, they envisaged 
joint Indo-Pakistan defence arrangements in the fnear
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53future* . Even after a crisis in March-April 1950 in which
Indian forces were concentrated near Pakistan’s borders in
the Punjab - seemingly as a deterrent to any hasty actions
contemplated by Pakistani politicians - Nehru expressed the
hope to an American correspondent that
...ultimately we [India and Pakistan] should sur­
mount the difficulties. Ultimately we should develop 
a common economic and defence policy. Forces may 
well be gradually driving us in that direction - 
joint policies for transportation, irrigation, com­
munications and national defence.54
It must have been clear to Indian leaders almost from 
the outset, however, that there was little likelihood of 
overcoming the deep suspicions with which the two Dominions 
viewed each other except over an extended period. In the 
prevailing context, prudence and the mood of the Indian 
public required that certain precautions be taken against 
a renewal of hostilities arising from the Kashmir dispute.
In an assessment of the military threat posed by Pakis­
tan undertaken in early 1949» Indian military planners are 
understood to have regarded the possibility of Pakistani 
attacks across the Punjab plains, the Rajasthan desert or 
from East Pakistan as extremely unlikely. Border incidents 
in all frontier areas contiguous to Pakistani territory were 
viewed as inevitable, but the only probable military contin­
gency was believed to be a ’tribal* invasion of the Indian- 
occupied portion of Kashmir more elaborate in scale and
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conception than had occurred in 1947-48 and built from the 
outset around a sizeable core of Pakistani regulars.
It was evident to the planners that the advantages in 
any renewed conflict limited to Kashmir would lie with 
Pakistan due to geographical reasons. Pakistan could easily 
provide arms and supplies to the tribals and thereby create 
a situation which would tie down considerable Indian forces 
at slight cost to itself and ease the imbalance between 
Indian and Pakistani military forces elsewhere along the 
joint frontiers. In the event that Pakistan chose to under­
take direct action in Kashmir, its forces would enjoy rela­
tive ease of access to the operational theatre and at a time 
and in places of its own choosing. India, on the other hand, 
would be forced to deploy large forces for an essentially 
police function to counter a tribal/Azad Kashmir threat 
along the lengthy ceasefire line in times of general Indo- 
Pakistan fpeace* or, in the event of regular Pakistani forces 
intervening in Kashmir, to engage these units in a manner in 
which Indiafs greater military power could be brought to bear 
only at disproportionate expense and inconvenience. Even 
then, India would not have the assurance of gaining a decisive 
decision in its favour of lasting value if Pakistani regulars, 
tribals and Azad Kashmir forces could retire to sanctuary in 
the territory of West Pakistan.
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The only practicable alternative was to refuse to make 
a distinction between tribal/Azad Kashmir and official 
Pakistani actions or to concede the possibility of another 
limited war in Kashmir at a time and on a scale determined 
by Karachi, Such a policy would place the onus on the 
Pakistan Government to deter large-scale tribal depredations 
against the Indian sector of Kashmir and to exercise similar 
restraint upon the Azad Kashmir forces^on the penalty of 
general war. In the event of general hostilities, it was 
clear that India would enjoy marked superiority in military 
resources, both in being and capable of mobilization over an 
extended period, and in material resources. Strategically, 
also, India had great advantages. Indian territory surround­
ed East Pakistan, whose nearest point was a thousand miles 
from West Pakistan) West Pakistan was long and narrow with 
few trunks roads, only one trunk railway and a single port 
(Karachi); and every centre of importance in Pakistan save 
Quetta was within 150 miles of Indian territory. Furthermore, 
Pakistan had no domestic source of modern arms and military 
stores and her ability to wage war could be severely restrict­
ed by an Indian blockade of Karachi and diplomatic efforts 
aimed at preventing, or at least minimizing, the possibility 
of Pakistanfs acquiring military aid from any other country 
or countries.
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The Indian Cabinet accepted the thesis advanced by its 
military advisers and contingency planning proceeded on the 
basis of possible operations in Kashmir, Punjab and Rajasthan 
with precautionary measures on the borders of East Pakistan. 
The plan was based on the hypothesis that Pakistan would have 
the initiative in launching an attack in Kashmir with poss­
ible diversionary attacks in other sectors. In the event of 
such actions, Indian troops in Kashmir would seek to contain 
the opposing forces while the main field army would make a 
determined and rapid advance towards Lahore and Siakhot from 
its deployment areas in the East Punjab. Such an advance 
would relieve the pressure on the garrison in Kashmir and 
release some formations in that theatre for offensive counter- 
actions in the direction of Lahore and Siakhot - with also a 
possible diversionary action towards Rawalpindi to prevent a 
concentration of Pakistani forces in the major operational 
theatre in the East Punjab. The primary aim of this strategy 
was to inflict a decisive defeat on Pakistan’s field army at 
the earliest possible time and by such an event, coupled 
probably with the occupation of Lahore, to compel the 
Pakistan Government to seek peace. The role of the Army 
would be decisive, with the other two Services providing sup-
r 41port^ . Simultaneous efforts would be made in the diplomatic 
sphere to prevent the supply of war material or the furnishing
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of credits to Pakistan by foreign powers. In the event that 
Pakistan did not seek an early peace, the Indian Government 
would appear to have placed its reliance upon the major 
powers to intervene and provide the necessary pressure on 
Karachi leading to a cessation of hostilities and some sort 
of political settlement. India’s strategy was punitive, 
there being no intention either to overrun large areas of 
Pakistan or to occupy Pakistani territory for any period 
following a ceasefire - either policy being clearly in excess 
of Indian military capabilities. This basic strategy remain­
ed unchanged right up to October 1962 as, despite Pakistan’s 
membership in CENTO and SEATO, it was assumed that Pakistan’s 
Western allies would provide her with no support for an 
’aggressive’ policy vis-a-vis India but would direct their 
efforts at effecting an early cessation of hostilities.
This strategy was conceived at a time when the Indian 
Government could regard the cold war - restricted up to late 
1949 to Europe - with certain detachment. With the estab­
lishment of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949> 
however, India could no longer be a distant onlooker. This 
was particularly true from October 1950> when Chinese commun­
ist troops entered Tibet to re-assert Chinese control.
India’s vital interests had remained basically unchanged 
by the withdrawal of British power from the sub-continent
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and the formation of Pakistan. While Pakistan had inherited 
responsibility for the historical problem of the North-West 
Frontier, India could not remain unaffected by Pakistanfs 
involvement in hostilities in this quarter or elsewhere. 
India’s location at the head of the Indian Ocean gave her a 
strategic stake in the power-political rivalries affecting 
all states in the Indian Ocean region. The fulfillment of 
the country’s ambitious social and economic goals required 
continued and unrestricted access to the raw materials and 
food surpluses of South-East Asia, the oil of Burma and the 
Persian Gulf, the markets of the world for her manufactures 
and products and the financial and technical aid of the 
developed countries. The Government could not ignore India’s 
dependence upon foreign (largely British) shipping, the rel­
iance upon Britain for military stores and equipment and 
reliance upon friendly powers for naval and air security 
pending the development of adequate Indian air and naval 
services. Indian politicians could also not remain unmindful 
to the fate of the Indian minorities in the various countries 
on the Indian Ocean littoral and of the effect of Indian 
policies upon the treatment accorded them in these countries.
There is little doubt that responsible Indian leaders 
were mindful of their country’s stake in the containment of 
communist expansionism by either covert or overt means.
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There is also no reason to suppose that there was not a 
genuine consensus among Nehru and his associates - many of 
whom were far more outspoken about communism than was the 
Prime Minister - that formal alignment with the Western bloc 
would not be to Indiafs advantage in the prevailing geo-pol­
itical context.
The foremost aim of the Nehru administration was to 
pursue rapid economic development and thereby provide the 
impoverished Indian masses with at least the basic require­
ments of life on a scale above the traditional one of bare 
subsistence. For purely practical reasons, therefore, India 
had to minimize military expenditure within the limitations 
imposed by prudence. The Indian Government publicly profess­
ed its intention to seek social and economic progress with 
due regard for individual rights, and it early dealt severely 
with the Indian Communist Party’s challenge to public peace 
and the foundations of democratic government. It was not 
prepared, however, to pick quarrels with the communist states 
or to embark in company with the colonialist-tainted Western 
powers upon any moral crusade against the adherents of a 
doctrine certain features of which held considerable attrac­
tion for many educated Indians-* Proud of their independent 
nationhood, convinced that India was a potential great power 
and was destined to play a major role in international
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affairs, Indians were zealous to exercise this independence 
to the maximum extent - and free of the suspected inhibitions 
imposed by membership of a bloc dominated by powers disposing 
of far superior industrial and military resources.
Acutely aware of the country’s economic and military 
weakness, Nehru viewed alignment as beyond India’s means and 
felt moreover that ’it would not be in consonance with dig­
nity... to interfere without any effect being produced’0 .^
In an article published in 1952 and entitled "India and the 
Balance of Power”, the influential G.S. Bajpai, the first 
Secretary-General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 
expressed the view that no immediate Indian interest would 
be served by the country’s implicating herself ’by artificial 
ties...in the ordinary combinations or coalitions of the 
friendships or enmities of the two camps in which the maj or 
part of the world is to-day unfortunately divided’^ .  He 
declared that in a world of power politics armed power con­
stituted the only safeguard against a threat to a country’s 
independence - a fact which India could no more ignore than 
Switzerland and Sweden. He felt that India must develop her 
strength as a sanction for her foreign policy, to safeguard 
her independence and so as to maintain an equilibrium in 
Asia. Expanding on the last contention, Bajpai argued that 
power developed by India in the defence of neutrality could
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help create an enduring balance of power for the reason 
that:
a certain equipoise between political combatants 
can introduce a certain element of caution regarding 
the attitude of neutrals into their calculations and 
thus prevent an outbreak of hostilities. But this 
can be true only of a potentially great Power like 
India...In Asia she alone can help to create and 
maintain a political equilibrium which no potential 
aggressor would lightly dare to disturb.
fThus viewed1, he concluded ’the idea of a balance of power
/  Ais nothing evil nor incompatible with India’s highest ideals’ ,
The adoption of a posture of non-alignment vis-a-vis the 
two power blocs was thus primarily conceived as a means of 
achieving a modus vivendi with the two Communist land powers 
and thereby afford neither with sufficient provocation to 
engage in hostile acts against India either in an isolated 
manner or as part of a general attack against the non-Commun- 
ist world^.
The adoption by India of a non-aligned posture did not
appear to involve unnecessary risks in the opinion of India’s
leaders. Pakistan had inherited the troublesome problem of
the North-West Frontier with probably a better chance of
resolving the vexatious issue posed by her co-religionists
62 • •among the tribes and Afghanistan . Pakistan itself posed 
more a serious nuisance than a mortal threat to Indian secur­
ity and could be handled without external assistance; in any 
event, the contingency of conflict with Pakistan was regarded
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in high military circles as remote^. The Western nuclear 
deterrent secured the countries lying on the peripheries of 
the Russian and Chinese states against overt aggression. 
RussiaTs severe losses in World War II appeared to necessi­
tate a lengthy pre-occupation with internal reconstruction. 
In the event of general war, the sub-continent would offer 
few if any economic enticements to an aggressor and would
zl jgenerally enjoy a low priority in Soviet war plans . In 
the event that India were attacked in strength by a major 
power like Russia or China, her leaders were probably con­
fident that the requisite Western aid would be speedily 
forthcoming. Writing in 1955> Colin Welch observed that 
Nehru was probably fully mindful of the fact that Indian 
neutrality would be worthless if the West withdrew its mil­
itary sanction: ’But he knows that the West can declare no 
such thing. India is of vital importance to us. Mr Nehru 
peacefully tills his plot in no-man’s land. It looks a
dangerous position. But he knows in the last resort that
65our guns still command the approaches’ • Or as The Econo­
mist commented on 12 May 1956: ’Its leaders calculate that
it is safe from any Western aggression and that if it were 
threatened by the Communist bloc, the West could not fail to 
stand by it, if for no reason than to prevent its vast re- 
sources from falling to the enemy’ . On the assumption
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that Moscow and Peking appreciated this fact, New Delhi 
virtually dismissed the possibility of an attack by either or 
both of the Communist powers, China nevertheless posed a 
problem requiring close attention.
Prior to the establishment of the People’s Republic of 
China on 1st October 19499 the Kuomintang had given notice 
that it meant to restore itself to its former primacy in 
Asia and to regard an independent India with certain conde- 
scension0 . Of immediate concern to Indian leaders, however, 
was the fact that no Chinese Government recognized the val­
idity of India’s treaty rights in Tibet or of the McMahon 
Line and the Kuomintang made it clear that they intended to
/: ogive both issues their attention0 . Even as the communists 
swept to victory over the Chinese mainland, however, New 
Delhi ’did not consider that it need apprehend any hostile 
activity’ from the north for the reason that the vast Tibetan 
plateau and the Himalayas posed a formidable barrier to ag­
gression from that direction^. This view was undoubtedly 
reinforced by the assumption that any Chinese Government
which emerged from the civil war must devote its entire
70energies to the massive task of reconstruction
The actual emergence of a People’s Republic in China, 
however, appears to have dispelled some of this complacency 
in the context of communist insurrections in India, Burma,
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Malaya and the Philippines and the ’hard line’ pursued by 
Russia towards the West. The Chinese Communist leadership 
of China was at least as dedicated to the restoration of 
China’s historical power and influence as the Kuomintang had 
been, and had the added motivation of communist ideology and 
the sense of purpose associated with a revolutionary move­
ment. Its attitude towards India was anything but friendly; 
Mao Tse-tung, in his book, The Chinese Revolution and the 
Chinese Communist Party, published in 1939, had listed Burma, 
Nepal and Bhutan (among other areas) as Chinese territory 
and, even before its actual triumph in China, the communist 
leadership had depicted India as a fsemi-colonialist country1 
requiring communist liberation through the establishment of 
a communist regime^. On 1st January 1950, Peking declared 
its intention to ’liberate* Tibet. In a written ultimatum 
to the Khampa leader, Topgay Pangdatshang, in the same 
month, the Chinese Communist Government allegedly declared 
its intention to ’liberate* Tibet and after that Nepal,
Sikkim and Bhutan and warned the Kham Tibetans to co-operate
72in this scheme or be annihilated' .
The emergency of a communist regime in China provoked 
considerable alarm in certain quarters in India. The Premier 
of Assam, Gopinath Bardolai, viewed the establishment of a 
communist regime in China and its repercussions in Tibet and
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Burma as constituting a ’grave danger to our country and 
particularly to Assam’/J. With obvious reference to Peking’s 
declared intention to ’liberate1 Tibet and to the communist 
insurrections in progress in South-East Asia, the parliament­
ary representative of the Anglo-Indian community, Frank 
Anthony, stated on 17 March 1950 that India’s borders lay in 
Tibet and Indochina^, Another member, M.R. Masani, warned 
on 4 August 1950 that ’if Indochina, Thailand and Burma fall, 
we shall be next on the Russian menu just as surely as 
chicken follows fish’ . Consequent on China’s actual 
re-entry into Tibet in October 1950, Basil Gould, a former 
British Political Representative in Tibet, wrote that the 
Chinese action had as its ultimate objective, India - the 
Chinese would establish themselves in south-east Tibet where 
they could develop ’serious nuisance value’ to India7 .
The implications of these developments were not lost
77upon the Indian Government and Panikkar claims to have 
expressed the view to Nehru in early 1950, prior to his 
departure as India’s first ambassador to Communist China, 
that ’with a communist China cordial and intimate relations 
were out of the question’ - a view with which Nehru allegedly 
agreed7 . The response to these developments, however, had 
necessarily to take note of geography and China’s superior 
power. The national Indian Government accepted the Tibetan
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policy of the British Indian Government to the extent that, 
while Tibetan autonomy was recognized, so was China’s 
suzerainty (as distinct from sovereignty). Thus, when an 
observer from the Chinese (Kuomintang) Foreign Ministry had 
protested to Nehru at the Asian Relations Conference held in 
New Delhi in March 1947 regarding a map displayed in the con­
ference hall on which Tibet was shown as a political entity 
separate from China, the map had been removed . Following 
Peking’s announced intention to ’liberate’ Tibet, a ’high 
official of the External Affairs Ministry’ informed an 
American correspondent in February that India would not 
commit troops to defence the regime of the Dalai Lama but
would employ only diplomatic means in defence of Tibetan
8 0autonomy • India defended the legality of the Chinese 
action at the United Nations, opposing any debate on the 
grounds that it was an internal affair of China, restricting 
her own response to criticisms of the Chinese resort to 
force - the method, not the right. Having conceded the 
Tibetan ’buffer’ of the Raj, the Indian Government moved to 
seek a modus vivendi with the new China.
The desire for close relations with China was a natural 
manifestation of the anti-colonialism and ’Asian-ness’ 
resulting from Indian colonial subjection, but the strategic 
motivation was perhaps an even more basic factor in
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determining the subsequent efforts of the Indian Government
to assiduously cultivate Chinese friendship. As the Deputy
Minister for External Affairs, B.V. Keskar, explained in
Parliament on 28 March 1951s
The Government is not unmindful of the protection 
of our frontiers adjoining Tibet. I may go further 
and say that the Government feels that the best way 
of protecting that frontier is to have a friendly 
Tibet and a friendly China. It is obvious that 
such a complicated and big frontier cannot be well 
protected if we have a border country which becomes 
hostile to us. Therefore, we feel that in tackling 
the question of Tibet and China, we should always 
keep in mind that a friendly China and a friendly 
Tibet are the best guarantee of the defence of our 
country.81
IndiaTs speedy recognition of the People’s Republic (30 Dec­
ember 1 9 4 9)> passive acquiescence to China’s forceful 
re-entry into Tibet in October 1950 , her defence of China’s 
legal right to assert her control of Tibet and her support 
for Peking’s claim to the Chinese seat at the United 
Nations were manifestations of this conclusion - if not 
solely provoked by it. A further corollary was the ’normal­
isation’ of relations with China regarding Tibet in the 
much-publicized agreement concluded, after lengthy negotia­
tions initiated by India, in Peking on 29 April 1954 in
8 2which India relinquished her inherited treaty rights . 
Significantly enough, Nehru regarded the preamble containing 
the five principles of panch sheel or peaceful co-existence^
as the most important, for ’though not formally stated as
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such, but practically speaking’ it was an agreement not to
commit aggression on each other^.
Certain sections of the press nonetheless sounded words
of caution regarding Peking’s bona fides, Pioneer felt that
’nothing has been secured to rule out further penetration of
8 ^Chinese communists into regions bordering on India’ . 
Tribune warned that ’the Central Asian borders of India need 
to be watched more attentively than ever before’00, and the 
Times of India declared that, while Nehru was justified in 
believing China to be too pre-occupied with internal prob­
lems to undertake aggression, ’that it is an assumption is
8 7something of which Mr Nehru himself is very much aware’ '• 
That the Prime Minister himself had doubts regarding the 
value of China’s professed friendship was evidenced by a 
circular on foreign policy addressed to presidents of the 
Congress Party’s provincial units shortly after the conclu­
sion of the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet. In this he 
stated: ’Surely it is better, with nations as well as indi­
viduals, to hope for and expect the best, but at the same
88time to be prepared for any eventuality’ . That his Govern 
ment was mindful of the implications of China’s occupation 
of Tibet had long been evident by its response in the 
Himalayan region.
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CHAPTER III
HIMALAYAN POLICY I
The long-term aspects of Himalayan security were inves­
tigated by a high-level North and North-Eastern Border 
Defence Committee established in February 1951 at the re­
quest of the Defence Ministry'*'• The report of the Committee
2was submitted to the Ministry in early 1953 and included a 
large number of recommendations. Among the major proposals 
were * the re-organisation and expansion of the Assam Rifles, 
the extension of administration in the NEFA, development of 
intelligence network along the border, development of the 
border areas, development of civil armed police, development 
of communications and check posts1 .
The recommendations were examined by an acl hoc committee 
of Secretaries from the Ministries concerned and finally by 
the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. The recommendations, 
with several exceptions, were accepted and implemented. The 
Ministry of Home Affairs took up the development of the 
border areas with the relevant State Governments and provi­
sion was made for the various schemes in the Five Year Plans 
with fsubstantial help1 being advanced by the Union
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Government. The construction of a number of roads was en­
trusted to Army engineers, while other road construction was 
undertaken by the Ministry of Transport. A few of the roads 
proposed by the Committee, however, ’were not accepted or 
proceeded with, either for tactical reasons or because expen­
diture on the construction of such roads was colossal and out 
of proportion to the good that they may doT^ .
The Indian Government appears to have viewed the immed­
iate danger from Chinese activities as presenting itself in 
the North-Eastern Frontier Agency (NEFA).
Following the formal transfer of power from Britain on 
15 August 1947, the Nehru administration had continued 
British policy vis-a-vis the tribals in north and north-east 
Assam in an unobstrusive manner. The NEFA and the remote 
tribal areas continued to be treated for administrative 
purposes as a responsibility of the Ministry of External 
Affairs, consistent with British practice and the special 
attention required by these areas for reasons of tribal wel­
fare and strategic considerations^. Regular administration 
was extended to the Subansiri Division in 1949, the Abhor 
and Mishmi Hills districts were set up as administrative 
areas in 1949-50 and regular administration was extended to 
Tawang in February 1951^* In 1953, a special section was 
established in the External Affairs Ministry to administer
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the NEFA and the Indian Frontier Administrative Service . 
(IFAS) was created for this purpose'7.
Although these measures were undoubtedly influenced in 
the later stages by Tibetan developments, their basic motiva­
tion was seemingly in accord with the explanation Nehru later 
made in a letter to the Premier of the People’s Republic of 
China, Chou En-lai, dated 26 September 1959:
Shortly after India attained independence in 1947 
the Government of India decided, as a matter of 
policy, to bring these frontier areas under more 
direct administrative control to enable them to 
share in the benefits of a welfare state, subject 
to the protection of their distinct social and 
cultural patterns.^
Following the Chinese entry into Tibet in October 1 9 5 0> how­
ever, strategic factors became paramount as the Government 
publicly declared its strategic interests in the area. 
Speaking in Parliament on 20 November 1 9 5 0, Nehru stated 
that, notwithstanding Chinese pretensions to sovereignty 
over areas in Assam south of the line fixed by the 19 1 4  
Simla treaty (i.e. the McMahon Line), ’The MacMahon Line is 
our boundary, map or no map. We will not allow anybody to
Qcome across that boundary’ . In an announcement released the 
same day, the Indian Defence Ministry declared that it was 
continuing to reinforce the northern border^. On 23 Novem­
ber, Nehru assured Parliament that northern border defences
Ill
were being kept ’constantly under review’ and that no invader 
would be permitted to cross that border .
In response to reports received by the Government late 
in 1950 of Chinese troops in some strength near the MacMahon 
Line, about 100 Army paratroops were dropped into unrecon­
noitred frontier areas to establish an Indian presence and 
thereby deter surreptitious Chinese intrusions . The Assam
Rifles were re-organized in 1953> albeit without any apparent
12increase in strength 0. In 1954> the Government approved a 
considerable expansion of the Security Intelligence Services'^ 
for the eastern and northern frontiers, with particular 
emphasis on the NEFA; the Director of the Intelligence Bureau 
invited applications for appointments in the Security 
Services from candidates from the 14 different tribes (in­
cluding the Nagas) who fulfilled the necessary educational 
qualifications^. Tribal youngmen were also encouraged to 
enter the Army as a career^.
Immediate steps were also taken to improve communica­
tions throughout the tribal areas, the NEFA containing only 
about 100 miles of road (including the first 30 miles of the 
projected Sadiya-Rima link) as of 1950 - and much of this
being badly damaged by the earthquake which struck Assam in 
17that year . A special five-year development plan for NEFA, 
sanctioned in 1953y included a provision of Rs 304*45 lakhs
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for roads’ and this allocation was increased in a subsequent 
revised plan to Rs 571*43 lakhs - as against a total develop­
ment outlay of Rs 950.4 lakhs^. in view of the difficulties 
of terrain and the thick forests, the Union Government con­
cluded that the construction of motorable roads would be an 
extremely difficult and expensive undertaking which would 
involve a disproportionate cost in money and effort. As an 
alternative, it was decided to develop air communications 
and to construct inexpensive bridle paths and mule tracks, 
and engineers from the Army and Air Force undertook a survey 
of prospective sites for landing strips. The committees set 
up for NEFA communications - which included representatives 
from the Ministries of Defence, External Affairs and Trans­
port and from the Army and the Air Force - worked out an 
integrated plan of airfields, motorable and jeepable roads, 
bridle paths and mule and porter tracks. Included in the 
programme was the construction of fair-weather airstrips at
Along and Ziro and of roads to link Dirrang Dzong with
20Foothills and Kimin with Ziro
Army engineers arrived in 1953 to commence construction 
of the proposed road links and by 1957 had pushed through a 
road from Tezpur half way to Bomdila and were almost all the 
way to Ziro. They were relieved in that year by the NEFA 
Public Works Development Organisation (PWDO) which carried
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out work in the Tirap Division and continued the Foothills- 
Dirrang Dzong link, completing the 28-mile stretch from 
Bomdila to Dirrang Dzong in 119 days late in 1959.
Related to the security of the MacMahon Line, though
the area involved did not lie immediately contiguous to it,
was the unresolved question of the Naga tribes. These 
21peoples inhabited the area astride the Indo-Burmese border 
and had been largely left alone by the British until the 
rapid Japanese advance through Burma in 1942 gave the area 
and its inhabitants considerable military significance. 
Taking advantage of the situation, the British had armed the 
Nagas and these tribesmen had quickly shown a capacity for 
skilled guerilla warfare.
The war gave an impetus to Naga fself-identity1. The 
Naga National Council was formed in 1946 and a delegation 
visited Delhi in early 1947 in an unsuccessful effort to 
persuade the British Government to declare independence for 
the Naga people when the Crown formally relinguished power 
in India. There was a reluctance by many Nagas - and an 
adamant refusal by some - to accept their automatic transfer 
from British to Indian rule on 15 August 1947« The Nagas 
boycotted the 1952 Indian elections and discontent steadily 
grew and, in early 1956, it erupted into open insurrection 
against Indian authority.
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The policy of the Nehru administration towards the 
Nagas had, up to this point, been basically a continuation 
of British policy - the minimum possible interference with 
the traditional society consistent with the maintenance of 
law and order and loose political control. The first attempt 
to administer the Eastern Nagas had occurred in 1951 when 
they were included in the Tuensang Frontier Division of 
NEFA, while the Naga Hills had remained a centrally-adminis­
tered autonomous hills district attached to Assam. The 
Indian Government would not tolerate any Naga demands for 
independence, however, and it replied to the insurrection by 
rejecting any possible negotiations and moving to crush the 
Naga revolt by force. A thick curtain of secrecy was 
clamped over the situation and the area was declared closed 
to all persons save those sanctioned by the Defence Ministry.
On the suggestion of the Political Officer (Tuensang 
Frontier Division), three companies of Indian troops had been 
moved into the southern sector of the Division in August 1955» 
In early 1956, however, the strength of the Assam Rifles and 
of the armed police units in the Naga Hills was augmented, 
security forces on the Assam-Burmese border were reinforced 
and elaborate precautionary measures were taken in the Naga 
area of eastern Assam. On 15 April 1956, army units, 
elements of the Assam Rifles and armed police units from
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various states initiated counter-actions under the overall 
command of Major-General R.K. Kocher, whose headquarters 
were sited at Kohima. The hard core of perhaps 1,500-2,500 
’effectives*, however, managed to elude all efforts aimed at 
their destruction while continuing their activities with 
skilful ’hit and run’ tactics.
The burden of this ’pacification’ campaign on the Indian 
Government steadily mounted as an increasing number of Army 
battalions were drafted to the area, police forces were 
strengthened and several fresh battalions of Assam Rifles 
were raised . In an attempt to conciliate Naga sentiment,
New Delhi responded to a resolution passed by a Naga Conven­
tion held at Kohima in 1957 and, on 1st December 1957> 
united the Naga Hills autonomous district and the Tuensang 
Frontier Division to form the Naga Ilills-Tuensang Area 
(NHTA). The new unit embraced approximately 6,100 square 
miles and 400,000 Nagas inhabiting 700 villages. The NHTA 
continued as a contrally-administered area under the control 
of the Ministry of External Affairs and administered by the
27President of India through his agent, the Governor of Assam . 
In 1959> the Indian authorities made an effort to associate 
’loyal’ Nagas with the pacification campaign by creating a 
force of Naga Home (Village) Guards as a military-cum-police 
force to be posted near ’troubled’ villages, i.e. those of 
suspect loyalty.
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In 1950, there were only two checkposts in the middle
sector (i.e. Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh) -
both on the Himachal Pradesh-Tibet border^. The number of
checkposts in the middle sector, however, was increased in
1951 and the posts were moved closer to the border with
Tibet in 1954^« At the beginning of 1954? the Uttar Pradesh
State Government voted a supplementary grant of over Rs
170,000 for expenses incurred on special police guarding
26the border with Tibet . It was announced in Lucknow in 
mid-October that the strength of the Statefs armed frontier 
constabulary was to be doubled and the force re-organized 
with a stronger headquarters^. In September, the Ministry 
of External Affairs created a new section under a Deputy 
Secretary, P.D. Roy, to extend the administered areas - the 
Centre thereby taking over or co-ordinating much of the ad­
ministration in the frontier areas of Kashmir, Punjab, Uttar
2 8Pradesh and Himachal Pradesli •
Improvements were made to communications in these areas. 
Work commenced in 1951 on the Hindustan-Tibet road which was 
eventually to extend from Simla to the Tibetan border^. in 
June 1954? the Uttar Pradesh authorities announced that a 
£ 2 million road-building programme financed by the Centre 
was shortly to be launched to link places of strategic im­
portance in the Kumaon Hills adjoining the borders with Nepal
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and Tibet^0. The first air link with the Kulu Valley was 
opened on 18 January 1956 when a Heron aircraft touched down 
at the newly-completed Bhunter airstrip located seven miles 
from Kulu town0 . On 25 May 1956, a seven-mile jeepable 
road linking Sainwala to Kandaiwala (ilimichal Pradesh) was 
officially inaugurated with plans envisaging the extension
of the road to the Tibetan border via Chini within three
8 2years . The opening of the Rohin bridge on 15 November 
1958 provided for an all-weather road between Gorakhpur 
(Uttar Pradesh) and eastern Nepal^. During the Second Plan 
period (1956-61), the Punjab State Government constructed a 
nine-mile road connecting Grampjoo and Keylong.
Indian attention on Ladakh had initially been provoked 
by the advances of Pakistani forces into the area early in 
the Kashmir conflict. Their capture of Kargil had temporar­
ily cut the 200-mile mule track linking Srinagar and Leh via 
the 11,500 foot-high Zoji La pass, forcing the Indian Army 
to improvise an airstrip at Leh and hastily construct an 
alternate and less vulnerable land route to Leh from Manali 
in the East Punjab via the 16,200 foot-high Bara Lacha pass. 
With the recapture of Kargul by Indian forces in November 
1948, Ladakh returned to Indian control. An infantry battal 
ion and supporting arms were thereupon permanently sited at 
Leh against the contingency of renewed conflict with 
Pakistan.
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The Chinese entry into western Tibet late in 1950 does 
not appear to have provoked any appreciable alarm in New 
Delhi as to the security of adjacent Indian territory - per­
haps because of a belief that the barren Ladakhi landscape 
constituted a physical deterrent to Chinese aggrandizement. 
Certain precautions were nonetheless taken to establish a 
more permanent Indian presence in this area. In 1950 posts 
were established at Chushul and Demchok^ and, in 1951*
Tarmyf units were purportedly stationed in various check- 
posts and ’expeditions1 were sent by the Army and the police 
to the farthest points of Indian territory^. In mid-1954* 
the Ministry of External Affairs assumed control of the 
300-mile Ladakh-Tibet border and re-organized the system of 
checkposts which had hitherto been manned somewhat haphazard- 
ly by the State police'5 . In response to successive Chinese 
intrusions after 1954, further posts were established -
except in Aksai Chin for the reason that it was a very diffi-
3 7cult area of access and the Government was ’busy elsewhere’0 .
Construction of a motorable road from Srinagar to Leh
commenced in 1954 and, in early 1956, it was reported that
work was being speeded up on the road which was designed ’to
provide a closer link with Kashmir’s northernmost strategic
areas of Ladakh whose 37*000 square miles border with Tibet
3 8on the east and Chinese Sinkiang on the north’ . Work on
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this project was suspended in 1958, however, following the 
discovery by the authorities of financial irregularities; 
the engineers were suspended and an enquiry was initiated.
In accordance with the dictates of national security - 
but in contradiction of his avowed policy of anti-imperialism 
and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states 
- Nehru adopted and pursued the former British policy of 
direct or indirect control over the Himalayan states of 
Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal.
Under the provisions of the Sino-British treaties con­
cluded in 1890 and 1893> the tiny state of Sikkim, which 
occupied a strategic position astride the main trade route 
between India and Tibet, had become a British protectorate.
On 15 August 1947 the Indian Union inherited these treaties 
and the right to send a political officer to assist the 
Maharajah in the administration of the country - Indo- 
Sikkimese relations being temporarily governed by a stand­
still arrangement.
In early 1949, considerable unrest and occasional riot­
ing developed throughout the state as a result of dissatis­
faction with the fuedal system. Acting on the request of
the Maharajah and ostensibly fin the interests of law and 
39order’ , the Indian Government intervened on 7 June through 
the despatch into the state of a company of troops, who
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functioned under the general direction of the political of­
ficer resident in Gangtok, the capital. Indo-Sikkimese rela­
tions were regularized in a treaty signed on 5 December 1950 
which re-affirmed the relationship in existence on 15 August 
1947» Sikkim was therein designated a ’Protectorate of 
India’ and India retained responsibility for the defence and 
territorial integrity of the tiny state with the right to con 
struct and maintain communications for strategic purposes 
and to take such measures as it considered necessary for the 
defence of Sikkim and the security of India, preparatory or 
otherwise and whether within or without the kingdom^.
In 1951, the Indian Government seconded an experienced 
political officer, J.S. Lall, to serve as dewan or chief 
minister of Sikkim and under his guidance extensive adminis­
trative, land and tax reforms were subsequently introduced. 
The Indian subsidy totalled £ 60,000 in each of 1951> 1952 
and 1953 and rose to £ 170,624 in 1954 and £ 399>375 in 
1955  ^L. The latter year marked the commencement of a seven- 
year development plan underwritten by India^ in which the 
emphasis was placed upon communications; included were such 
projects as a 12^ mile aerial ropeway from Gangtok to Nathu 
La pass on the Tibetan border and a road between the same 
two points which Nehru formally opened in September 1958
A 0while en route to Bhutan . The Government of India
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maintained the three strategic roads in the state, including 
the two main trade routes to Tibet. In the absence of either 
railroads or airstrips, Sikkim’s direct surface contact with 
the external world remained restricted to the narrow, twist­
ing, partly-paved and partly-gravel road linking Gangtok 
with the Indian railhead at Siliguri, seven miles to the 
south via Rangpo. The Rangpo-Gangtok link via Singtam was, 
however, closed to heavy traffic during the monsoon season 
during which period Sikkim was virtually isolated. Consist­
ent with the practice followed by the British Indian Govern­
ment, a permit from Indian authorities remained necessary for 
any foreigner wishing to visit Sikkim - and such permits were 
granted sparingly.
India also inherited the Anglo-Bhutanese treaties of 
1865 and 1910 and a standstill agreement was concluded, with 
effect from 15 August 1947, to govern Indo-Bhutanese rela­
tions pending discussions as to their future relationships.
In 1946, after the British Government had declared its 
intention to withdraw its authority from the sub-continent, 
a Bhutanese delegation had visited New Delhi for discussions 
with the Congress leadership concerning Bhutan’s status 
vis-ä-vis Britain and a sovereign India. These discussions 
continued into mid-1949. On 23 April 1948, a Bhutanese dele­
gation headed by D.S.T. Dorji visited Delhi and handed the
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Secretary to the Minister for External Affairs, K.P.S. Menon, 
a written document containing a request by the Bhutanese Gov­
ernment for revision of the 1865 treaty. Bhutan demanded 
return of 800 square miles of territory ceded to British 
India in the 1865 treaty and promised to forego claims to a 
subsidy or, as an alternative, requested the return of 300 
square miles of forest land adjoining Bhutan in West Bengal 
and Assam and an increase in the existing subsidy from Rs 
200,000 to Rs 800,000. Desirous of retaining a special posi­
tion in the strategic kingdom, New Delhi was able to effect 
a compromise arrangement in a treaty of friendship concluded 
at Darjeeling on 8 August 1949^^.
Under the provisions of the treaty, the Indian Govern­
ment guaranteed Bhutan’s internal autonomy and increased the 
annual subsidy to Rs 500,000 while obtaining the right of 
consultation on matters involving Bhutan’s external rela­
tions^ and supervisory privileges over the importation into 
Bhutan of warlike material or stores which might be required 
or desired for the strength and welfare of Bhutan. India 
also agreed to return to Bhutan 32 square miles of territory 
in the Dewangiri district of Assam, a cession sanctioned by 
Parliament on 8 August 1951^*
Following the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950-51* 
Indian-sponsored defence activities in Bhutan - such as the
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construction of road links and defensive posts - reportedly 
increased steadily both in tempo and scope^. The Reserve 
Bank of India undertook to meet all of Bhutan’s needs of 
foreign exchange for development purposes at request and 
with no fixed ceiling; fortunately for India, the Bhutanese 
authorities apparently felt no inclination to make other 
than modest requests. Bhutan continued, however, to regulate
A ftthe entry of outsiders' , including Indians, and India’s 
official representative continued, as in the past, to reside 
in Gangtok.
The isolation of the kingdom was a cause of increasing 
concern in New Delhi in view of Chinese activities in Tibet 
and the appearance of Chinese cartographic claims to portions 
of the state. In September 1958, Nehru accordingly undertook 
an arduous five-day journey to Bhutan by pony, mule and yak 
via Sikkim and Yatung (Tibet) - a visit ’intended to remind 
its feudal authorities that their lawful overlord is in 
Delhi and not Peking’^ .  Nehru also sought the Maharaja’s 
agreement to the construction of a direct road from India to 
Bhutan^. The Indian Prime Minister duly discussed the road 
issue with the Maharaja and his Prime Minister, Jigme Dorji, 
and it was announced in New Delhi on 7 October 1958 that 
steps were being taken to construct two direct road links 
between India and Bhutan. The two proposed projects would
tlink Jayanti (on the North Trunk Road in Bengal) with 
Sentula (on the Indo-Bhutan border) and Garubhada (Assam) 
with Hatisar on the Indo-Bhutan border. By the end of the 
1958 fiscal year, the Indian Government had commenced work 
on the construction of these approach roads and had also 
agreed to make available Rs 150,000 for road development 
within the Himalayan state^.
Nepal covers 600 miles of Indiafs northern frontier, 
and its stability and integrity are, therefore, of vital 
concern to any Indian Government. The Indian Union inherited 
the relationship laid down in the Anglo-Nepalese treaty of 
1923 wherein Britain recognized the complete independence of 
Nepal. Shortly after partition, New Delhi concluded a tri­
partite agreement with Britain and Nepal whereby she obtain­
ed the right to recruit Gurkhas for her army - a right 
previously restricted to Britain alone. During the troubled 
1947-49 period, India was also able to obtain the services 
of a Nepalese force of about one brigade for internal 
security duties . Unlike Britain in the past, however, the 
Indian Union could not hope to monopolize Nepalfs external 
relations. British-Nepalese diplomatic relations were 
raised to the level of an embassy, the United States and 
Nepal agreed on 25 April 1947 to exchange diplomatic repre­
sentatives and France recognized the sovereignty of the
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Himalayan state in 1949« Nepal subsequently entered into 
diplomatic relations with a number of other states.
The Union Government approached the issue of relations 
with Nepal with circumspection and not until it became clear 
that a communist victory in China was imminent did it state 
publicly, and in categorical terms, its deep interest in 
Nepalese affairs. In early 1950, immediately the intention 
of the newly-established Chinese communist regime to fliber­
ate’ Tibet was announced, the Indian and Nepalese Governments 
undertook bilateral discussions relating to defence matters-’'3. 
In a strongly-worded statement in Parliament on 17 March 1950, 
Nehru noted the ’identical interests’ of the two countries 
and declared:
It is not necessary for us to have a military 
alliance with Nepal...[but] the fact remains that 
we cannot tolerate any foreign invasion from any 
foreign country in any part of the sub-continent.
Any possible invasion of Nepal would inevitably 
involve the safety of India.
He also said, however:
I have not the slightest apprehension of any in­
vasion of Nepal. I do not think any such inva­
sion of Nepal is easy or possible, nor do I think 
it is at all likely’;
he only wished to make it clear to Parliament the official 
policy ’in such matters’^ .  Nehru visited Nepal in June.
The interdependence of the two countries was re-affirmed 
in a treaty of peace and friendship signed between
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representatives of the two governments in Kathmandu on 31 
July 1950~*5. In letters exchanged between the two govern­
ments on the same occasion, which Nehru described in Decem­
ber 1959 ns ’an essential operative part of the treaty’^ ,  
it was stipulated that TNeither Government shall tolerate any 
threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor.
To deal with any such threat the two Governments shall con­
sult together with each other and devise effective counter- 
measures’ . In apparent accordance with the provisions of 
the treaty Nepal, in response to Tibetan developments, tight­
ened its system of frontier guards on its northern border 
with the aid of Indian personnel5". The extent of these pre­
cautionary measures is reflected in the rise in the cost of 
these defence posts on the Nepalese-Tibet border from 
£15,000 (1952) to £100,000 (1954)59.
India’s deep interest in developments affecting Nepal 
was re-stated by Nehru following the outbreak (in late 1950) 
of a revolt against the feudal Rana regime by armed support­
ers of the Nepalese Congress operating from bases in India. 
Speaking in Parliament on 6 December, the Indian Prime 
Minister declared:
So far as the Himalayas are concerned, they lie on 
the other side of Nepal, not on this side. There­
fore, the principal barrier to India lies on the 
other side of Nepal. We are not going to tolerate 
any person coming over that barrier. Therefore, 
much as we can appreciate the independence of
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Nepal, we cannot risk our own security by any­
thing not done in Nepal which permits either that 
barrier to be crossed or otherwise leads to the 
weakening of our frontiers.60
This declaration was incompatible with the non-intervention­
ist pledge entered into by the Indian Government in the July 
treaty. The preparation and launching of the attacks into 
Nepal from Indian soil - and with the complicity of at least 
the Bihar Government - were also scarcely consistent with 
the same solemn undertaking. The Union Government continued 
to profess its neutrality in the entire affair but its 
actions were unmistakably anti-Rana.
King Tribhuvan and his family were granted refuge in 
the Indian Embassy on 6 November and were flown to Delhi in 
an Indian Air Force aircraft on 11 November. Deposed by an 
emergency session of the Nepalese Parliament on 7 November 
in favour of the three-year-old crown prince, the King was 
nevertheless received by the President of India on 13 Novem­
ber and the Indian Government continued to recognize him as 
the Nepalese head of state - and apparently influenced 
Britain and the United States into adopting a similar policy. 
Indian authorities gave constant advice to both parties to 
the dispute during the period of change-over in Nepal^, and 
Nehru acted as mediator in discussions held between the re­
presentatives of the Ranas and of the King Tribhuvan-Nepalese 
Congress alliance in New Delhi in January-February 1951*
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This culminated in an agreement which ended the lengthy 
(1846-1951) tenure of the Rana oligarchy.
Indiafs involvement in Nepal steadily deepened there­
after. In response to Dr K.I. Singhfs abortive coup on 22 
January 1952, Indian troops were despatched to Nepal to 
assist the authorities in suppressing this ostensibly 
communist-inspired peasant uprising and were instrumental in 
Singh’s capture. Alarmed at Singh’s relationship with ele­
ments of the poorly-armed, organized and equipped Royal Army 
6 2of some 25*000 , the Nepalese Government requested the
assistance of Indian Army officers to re-organize the force. 
An Indian military mission was accordingly established on 7 
April 1952^ and proceeded with a sweeping re-organization 
of the Royal Nepal Army into a light division of 6,000 men 
with better quarters, rations, pay and equipment (than there­
tofore) and dispersed from Kathmandu to garrisons in the 
provinces0 .^ In 1953-54* Indian troops and police were still 
sometimes involved in internal security actions in Nepal^.
The Indian aid programme to Nepal steadily increased in
6 6scope and involved the despatch of experts to improve the 
civil service, and irrigation projects, aerial geological 
surveys, the construction of schools and hospitals, training 
facilities for Nepalese in India and the development of 
communications internally and with India. In 1952, India
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pledged an annual subsidy of about Rs 800,000 and extended 
a loan of about Rs 1.35 crores. Following political and 
economic talks in New Delhi during the period 18-22 July 
1953 between Prime Minister M.P. Koirala and Nehru, the 
Indian Government agreed not to levy excise duty on Indian 
goods exported to Nepal and to provide Rs 1 million per 
annum over a five-year period for seven or eight minor irri­
gation projects. India pledged further aid totalling Rs 7 
crores in 1954 and made available Rs 10 crores towards 
Nepal’s first Five-Year Plan, which was announced on 21 
September 1956. When Nepal was struck by widespread drought 
in 1957, India rushed food from its own lean stocks and New 
Delhi continued to provide all of Nepal’s oil and petroleum 
needs for rupee payment although itself forced to expend 
scarce foreign exchange to acquire these items.
Indian Army engineers, aided by Nepalese labourers, 
constructed a temporary fair-weather airstrip at Gauchar in 
1951-52 and a daily DC-3 air service between Patna and 
Kathmandu commenced. Subsequent improvements to the airstrip 
culminated in the formal inauguration of the country’s first 
all-weather airport by King Mahendra on 13 June 1955« In 
1953 Indian Army engineers began construction of the 80-mile 
Tribhuvan Rajpath to link Thankot (near Kathmandu) with 
Bhainse Dhoban (near Amlekganj - the railhead close to the
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6 7Indian frontier) the project involved an estimated outlay 
of Rs 1 . 5 crores and had a target date of December 1 9 5 6. A 
narrow jeepable road was cut through in December 1953 but 
severe damage resulting from heavy floods in 1954 set the 
project back many months and forced the drafting of more 
engineers to the scheme. The road was opened in May 1955 by 
a special convoy of 20 Indian Army trucks carrying 50 tons 
of rice to Kathmandu and it was formally handed over to the 
Nepalese Government on 30 June 1 9 5 7« In a tripartite agree­
ment between the Governments of Nepal, the United States and 
India signed on 2 January 1 9 5 8, 900 miles of road were to be 
constructed in Nepal over a five-year period at an estimated 
cost of nearly $ 7»5 million, towards which the United States 
pledged $ 5 million, India promised $ 1 ,875>000 and Nepal 
agreed to allocate $ 525,000°^'.
These various Indian activities evidenced that New 
Delhi appreciated that Nepal was crucial to Indian national 
security. As one American observer aptly commented: f0nce a 
hermit, then a buffer, she has now become the meat of the 
sandwich* .
The Indo-Nepalese relationship, however, remained sub­
ject to a constant series of crises directly or indirectly 
attributable to the pervasive Indian influence and presence 
in the country. Nepalese were sensitive to their country’s
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total dependence upon India for markets and imports and the 
restrictions placed upon Nepal’s imports and exports by the 
trade agreement concluded in October 1950 merely made Indian 
intentions seem even more suspect. The large numbers of 
personnel demobilized from the Royal Nepal Army consequent 
on its re-organization by the Indian Military Mission, as 
well as civil servants affected by the presence of Indian ad­
ministrators, communists whose party was banned on 25 January 
1952 probably with Indian encouragement, opposition politi­
cians who viewed New Delhi as the main bulwark of any incum­
bent authority in Kathmandu - all possessed grievances which 
could readily be fanned into open demonstrations of ill-will 
towards India.
When the King passed over the strongman of the Nepalese 
Congress, B.P. Koirala, for M.P. Koirala as the first common­
er Prime Minister, the followers of the former blamed the 
move on the aggressive Indian Ambassador, C.P.N. Singh, and 
B.P. Koirala himself charged Singli with taking an ’undue 
interest’ in Nepal’s internal affairs. Anti-Indian feeling 
in the Kathmandu Valley was aggravated by a chronic budgetary 
and trade deficit. When Nehru visited Kathmandu in the 
summer of 1951* he was met with a black flag demonstration 
organized by Tanka Prasad’s Praja Pareshad party. An Indian 
parliamentary delegation on a goodwill visit to the Nepalese
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capital in May 1954 met with a hostile public reception 
organized by the Nepali Congress and protesting against the 
activities of the military mission^.
Following the conclusion of the Sino-Indian agreement 
on Tibet in April 1954, the Indian Government encouraged 
Nepal to ’regularize’ its own relationship with Tibet. Up 
to 1954y Nepalese-Tibetan relations had been governed by an 
1856 treaty whereby Tibet paid an annual tribute to Nepal. 
Payment of this tribute continued up to 1954> in which year 
no tribute mission arrived and Chinese authorities apparently 
suggested to the Indian representatives in Peking engaged 
in the treaty negotiations that Nepal’s relations with Tibet 
should also be ’regularised against a proper perspective’^ . 
In May, the Nepalese King and two of his Ministers held 
talks with Indian officials in New Delhi following which 
Foreign Minister D.R. Regmi announced that his Government 
would take up the question of Nepal-Tibetan talks ’very 
soon’ . Prime Minister Koirala had talks with Nehru before 
and after the latter’s visit to China in October and, at a 
press conference in New Delhi on 13 November 1954t the 
Indian Prime Minister stated that the question of diplomatic 
relations between Nepal and China was a matter for the 
Nepalese Government. On 1st August 19559 a joint communique 
issued in Kathmandu by representatives of the Nepalese and
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Chinese Governments declared that an agreement had been 
reached which affirmed panch shila as the basis of 
Sino-Nepalese relations and provided for the establishment 
of diplomatic relations.
New Delhi’s apparently passive acquiescence in the
establishment of Sino-Nepalese diplomatic relations was, in
the view of a leading Indian weekly, ’opening the sluice
gate to a veritable flood and unknowingly heading for tragic
consequences in her mistaken belief that such crumbs of
7 3friendship will keep Peking in good humour* . The Nehru 
Government could hardly have been unmindful of the dangers 
of formal relations between Kathmandu and Peking, but it 
probably regarded such a development as inevitable, and 
opposition as futile. Its attitude was probably similar 
towards the Nepalese-Soviet agreement in July 1956 regarding 
the exchange of diplomatic representatives.
Any hopes that India may have had that Chinese (and 
Soviet) penetration of Nepal could be restricted to a diplo­
matic presence were quickly dashed as both countries offered 
economic aid towards Nepal’s first Five Year Plan. The 
alarm with which the Indian Government viewed the Sino-Nepal- 
ese aid agreement of October 1957^ was revealed in several 
ways. The former rebel, Dr K.I. Singh, who on his return 
from exile in China had professed to hold the same views
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concerning his country’s future as did the Indian Govern-
ment , visited New Delhi in the second week of October and
was received by Nehru, the President of India and the Indian
Home Minister. Evidently voicing beliefs which he considered
would enhance his attractiveness to Indian officialdom,
Singh declared that he opposed Nepalfs accepting Chinese aid,
disapproved of Nepal’s receipt of foreign aid from any
country other than India and opposed the presence of other
than an Indian Embassy in Kathmandu7 . In the second week of
the same month, President Prasad visited Nepal and declared
in Kathmandu on 22 October 1956 that ’Any threat to the peace
and security of Nepal is as much a threat to the peace and
security of India. Your friends are our friends and our 
77friends yours’ . The resignation of Prime Minister Archarya 
on 9 July 1957 and his replacement by Singh could, therefore, 
be regarded as somewhat of a pro-Indian shift in Kathmandu 
which was not perceptibly affected by the King’s imposition 
of direct rule later in the year, on 14 November.
The significance of India’s activities in the Himalayan 
region during this 1947-59 period, though generally unnoticed 
by observers pre-occupied with studying Nehru’s global diplom­
acy in all its peculiar manifestations, did not pass without 
comment in the Western press. In later 1954y one observer 
declared that ’All along the frontier from Kashmir to Assam
doors are being guarded more closely than before. India’s
n Qsmall but efficient Army is watching the Himalayan passesr .
An American political columnist wrote in June 1956:
The dominantly realistic side of Mr Nehru’s foreign 
policy is Himalayan. Tibet’s great plateau with a 
southern border of no less than 2500 miles over­
shadows the Indian plain. India has taken care to 
put the intervening Himalayan countries of Sikkim,
Bhutan and Nepal under its protection. Included 
in the category of prudent diplomacy of course is 
exchange of words about co-existence with Teiping.
But roads and airfield construction which has 
marked Red China’s transformation of Tibet off­
sets all these assurances. Security rises superior 
to fine sounding phrases even in India.79
Or, as an English weekly commented in 1958:
Mr Nehru becomes more of a realist every day about 
the relationship between India and China. A large 
part of India’s growing military budget is being 
quietly spent on building strategic roads and 
strengthening patrols on the Tibetan border and 
not as is commonly supposed on the border of 
Pakistan.80
While fully aware of the strategic implications of 
China’s occupation of Tibet, the Indian Government had res­
ponded to the altered Himalayan situation in a manner that 
must be described as politically discreet, diplomatically 
cautious, economical of financial and material resources and 
projected over the long-term. The over-riding determinant 
of policy was to avoid giving provocation to Peking at 
almost all costs and to secure continued tranquillity in 
the Himalayan region primarily by astute diplomacy. Prudence
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dictated that certain precautionary measures had to be taken 
to deter surreptitious Chinese intrusions of the long and 
difficult Himalayan frontiers, subversion of the frontier 
tribes and inroads into India’s dominant position in the 
Himalayan kingdoms - but these measures were modest in 
scope. In the absence of a clearly recognizable challenge 
from China, priority had for understandable reasons to be 
given to national economic development in the allocation of 
very limited resources and certain risks had to be taken. A 
vigorous and publicised programme of Himalayan security 
measures was also virtually precluded by the fear that such 
activities would compromise the Government’s professions of 
friendship and goodwill towards China and provoke the very 
response from Peking which Indian diplomacy sought to pre­
vent - an overt challenge along the long Himalayan frontier. 
The measures actually undertaken by India in the Himalayan 
region, therefore, were diplomatic, administrative and 
police measures - anything which could be construed by 
Peking as indicating concerted preparations against future 
military contingencies was studiously avoided.
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CHAPTER IV
HIMALAYAN POLICY II
The inadequacy of such a cautious and limited response 
to Chinese policy should have become progressively more 
apparent to the Indian Government. Only a few short weeks 
after the conclusion of the much-publicized 1954 agreement 
Chinese patrols commenced a series of intrusions into 
territory claimed by Peking as terra irridenta^. Chinese 
maps continued to appear which showed large areas of the 
Himalayan region as within the international boundaries of 
the People’s Republic of China. Perhaps most ominous was 
China’s speedy development of an operational infrastructure 
along the entire Himalayan frontier.
By 1954, the Chinese had completed a road from Sinkiang 
to Golno and a motor road from Kashgar to Golno via Urumchi. 
A 362-mile motor road was built linking Lhasa to Phari (in 
the tip of Tibet between Bhutan and Sikkim) and the Phari- 
Yatung link of 55 miles, which extended Chinese communica­
tions to within several miles of the Indian frontier, was 
completed in November 1954* The North China-Chamdo-Lhasa 
road, capable of bearing three-ton lorries, was completed in
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January 1955 and work began shortly thereafter on a road 
from Lhasa towards Kuti Pass on the Nepalese-Tibetan border. 
Surveys commenced for the Aksai Chin road in 1955 and actual 
construction was carried out in 1956-57» The completion of 
the road was announced in the Peking press on 5 October 1957y 
its location being noted on a map appended to the announce­
ment^ .
The Indian Government was well-informed on Chinese border 
activities and could scarcely have regarded the new roads 
and airstrips being constructed throughout southern Tibet as 
having only an internal significance^. Nor were Peking*s 
actions elsewhere viewed with equanimity. The New Delhi 
correspondent of a leading English weekly wrote in early 1957 
that China*s support of the Soviet suppression of the 
Hungarian revolt and its attitude towards the Burmese 
frontier and Nepalese internal affairs *has dimmed the faith 
of the External Affairs Ministry in neutralism - at any rate 
as far as south-east Asia is concerned*; he claimed that 
*Senior officials in New Delhi have now reached a point at 
which they have written off the Panch Sheela as scraps of 
paper*^. The ’discovery* of the Aksai Chin road later that 
year must have served to confirm earlier suspicions.
In an aide memoire dated 24 September 1956 regarding 
the Shipki Pass incident, the Indian Government informed the
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Chinese Government that the border Security Force had been 
directed ’on no account to retire from their position or to 
permit Chinese personnel to go beyond where they are even if 
this involves a clash* and warned that if China did not take
immediate action to desist from such activities ’there might
£
be an unfortunate clash on our borders* . New Delhi was ap­
parently more fearful of such an eventuality than was Peking, 
however, and her response to subsequent intrusions of her 
northern frontiers remained restricted to the submission of 
diplomatic notes and the continuation of certain road projects 
in threatened areas* Persistent reports by traders, pilots 
and police officials regarding Chinese activity along the 
Aksai Chin route were either dismissed as unimportant or
7totally ignored . Excessive caution characterized the Indian 
Government’s response to China’s public revelation of the 
road’s existence (itself a blatant challenge from Peking); 
two patrols (one of which was subsequently captured by 
Chinese ’frontier guards’) were sent to check the co-ordin­
ates of the road in the spring of 1958 and not until 18 
October 1958 was a formal protest submitted through diplo-g
matic channels about the road .
The road could not be interpreted as other than a clear 
indication of Peking’s intention to assert her authority 
over terra irredenta in total disregard for the feelings of
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the Nehru administration. It also focused closer attention 
on other territorial claims which had been appearing period­
ically in a succession of Chinese (and Russian) maps. In 
October 1954> Nehru had raised the issue of such maps with 
Chou En-lai and claimed to have been told that they were 
merely freproductions of the old pre-liberation maps’ which 
the Chinese Government had not had time to revise^. Nehru 
appears to have accepted this as implying that corrections 
would be made in due course to accord with his own interpre­
tation of the Sino-Indian frontier*^ and to have chosen to 
regard subsequent intrusions as minor issues initiated by 
local Chinese authorities and resolvable by secret negotia­
tions. The Aksai Chin road, however, could not be rational­
ized in this fashion and the appearance of further maps 
challenging India’s conception of her Himalayan frontier, 
which appeared in both the China Pictorial and The New Times 
(Moscow) in July 1958> added to New Delhi’s growing alarm 
and provoked yet another protest note to Peking^. In a 
lengthy letter to Chou En-lai dated 14 December 1958, Nehru 
protested at the ’incorrect’ Sino-Indian boundary shown in 
an official Chinese journal and clearly sought a definitive
reply as to China’s position on the entire frontier question 
The reply of the Chinese Premier dated 23 January 1959 
could have left no illusions in Nehru’s mind that he was now
12
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faced with an unequivocal Chinese refusal to recognize the 
Indian conception of the Sino-Indian frontier almost in its 
entirety. Chou declared that his Government had never recog­
nized the MacMahon Line; that the Sino-Indian boundary had 
never been formally delimited; that the boundaries shown on 
Chinese maps were consistent with those on earlier maps; and
that the issue had not been raised previously because the
1 ^’time was not yet ripe’ . The Chinese Government thereby 
laid claim to over 40*000 square miles of territory which 
India regarded as within its own frontiers - over 15*000 
square miles in Ladakh, about 200 square miles in the middle 
sector and some 32,000 square miles in NEFA.
Scarcely had New Delhi been able to absorb the full 
import of ChouTs momentous letter than the border question 
was considerably aggravated by the eruption of the long-sim­
mering Tibetan revolt. Sporadic fighting had been in progress 
between Chinese troops and Tibetan guerilla bands* particu­
larly in Kham* since about 1955 and Peking’s cancellation of 
Nehru’s proposed visit to Tibet in July 1958 was a direct 
result of such activity. Desirous of avoiding provocation 
to China, Nehru persisted with efforts to play down the 
developments in Tibet. He told a Delhi press conference on 
7 March that press reports of events in Tibet were often 
’grossly exaggerated’"^  and, on 17 March, even as the Dalai
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Lama was fleeing from Lhasa towards asylum in India, the
Prime Minister referred to events in Tibet as Tmore of a
clash of wills at present than a clash of arms or physical
bodies’^ .  Such a posture in the face of credible evidence
to the contrary became subject to a rising tide of domestic
and foreign criticism and, in defence of his policy, Nehru
was forced to argue the primacy of the ’honour and dignity
and the interest of India’ over ’the honour and dignity of
the causes for which we stand’ 1. At a press conference on
6 April, he admitted that his Tibetan policy had to take note
first and foremost, of Indian security:
...we have to keep the various factors in view, the 
major factor being, of course, our own security.
After all, every Government’s first duty is to 
protect its country in every way. The second 
factor, our desire to have and continue to have 
friendly relations with China. The third factor, 
our strong feeling about developments in Tibet.
Now, sometimes there is certain contradiction in 
these. That is inevitable.
He concluded nebulously that ’One has, therefore, in so far
17as one can to make difficult choices’ .
The situation posed him with such a choice from which
the repercussions would be incalculable whatever choice was
made. But, as an English journal warned prophetically:
Mr Nehru must choose. There can be honour in 
neutrality, but people who truckle to bullies can­
not hope to lead their fellow men. On the contrary, 
it is all too likely that those who today ignore 
the cries of the oppressed will tomorrow themselves 
be the victims of the evil forces which they sought 
to ignore.1&
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Mr Nehru could not ignore Indian public opinion, whose 
sympathy for the Tibetans was unmistakably clear. Nor could 
he ignore India’s ’image’ in the world, based as his Govern­
ment had persistently claimed on a higher moral plane than 
was the case with other governments. Lastly, he could not 
overlook the symbolic importance of the Dalai Lama and the 
effect on the large Buddhist population throughout Asia of 
India’s treatment of this personage.
The result was the grant of political asylum in India to 
the Dalai Lama and thousands of other refugees from the 
Tibetan fighting - an act which Peking could hardly be 
expected to regard as other than an unfriendly one. The con­
tingency of such a flight by the Dalai Lama had been fore­
seen^. According to one usually well-informed source:
Mr Nehru was sounded, very discreetly, on the poss­
ibility of the Dalai Lama’s finding refuge in one 
of the border states: Bhutan, Sikkim or even Nepal.
These possibilities were all dismissed in favour of 
India itself as the lesser evil, presumably because 
of the possibility that China might over-run these 
countries in pursuit of the Dalai Lama.^O
That such fears were not entirely groundless was evidenced 
by the pursuit by Chinese forces of the Dalai Lama and 
ICIiampa refugees right up to the Indian border, Chinese air­
craft strafing and bombing up to the border in NEFA and 
Chinese troops at times crossing into Indian and Nepalese 
territory. The Dalai Lama and his party of eight crossed
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into NEFA on the evening of 31 March and were received by
the Assistant Political Officer of the Tawang sub-division
21of the Kameng Frontier Division .
The Indian Government stepped up its watchfulness on
the NEFA frontier; patrols of the Assam Rifles became active
by day and night, checkposts were strengthened and security
was tightened to include even the re-routing of messages
from Tawang from the military network to a special fre- 
22quency . But Nehru remained hopeful that if sufficient 
restraint were shown by his Government, Peking would recip­
rocate after the initial resentment at IndiaTs grant of 
asylum to the Dalai Lama eased. He ordered the Khampas to 
be disarmed as they entered Indian territory and made it 
clear that there was no question of a Tibetan Government-in­
exile being established on Indian soil and that Tibetans in 
India should refrain from political activities while ’guests’ 
of India^. He also re-affirmed his belief in panch sheel 
and rudely rebuffed informal suggestions from Ayub Khan for 
a joint Indo-Pakistan defence of the sub-continent on the 
grounds that such an arrangement was tantamount to a military 
alliance and contrary to non-alignment; he even asked, ingen- 
uouslj', defence arrangements ’against whom?’^
The Chinese Government was not prepared, however, to 
facilitate an easing of tension and extricate Nehru from the
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painful dilemma into which he had manoeuvred himself,
Chinese officers in Tibet talked of liberating Sikkim,
Bhutan, Ladakh and NEFA. Every conceivable obstacle was 
placed in the way of the proper functioning of the Indian 
trade agencies, consulate-general, traders and pilgrims in 
Tibet and new currency regulations suddenly introduced in 
Tibet in July made Indian currency illegal with consequent 
heavy losses to Indian traders and an immediate plummeting 
of Indo-Tibetan trade. China also commenced a new series of 
border intrusions. On 28 July, a Chinese party appeared in 
the eastern Pangyong Lake region of Ladakh, arrested six 
Indian policemen and established a camp at Spanngur. On 7 
August, another party ejected ten to twelve personnel of the 
Assam Rifles from the border post at Khinzemane in NEFA, 
provoking an Indian note dated 11 August which stated that 10ur 
security forces have instructions to resist trespassers and 
to use minimum force necessary for this purpose if warning 
given by them remains unheededT and warned that China remove 
its personnel as fotherwise this may lead to avoidable 
clasht_J . The contempt in which Peking held the warning was 
reflected on 26 August, when a Chinese force ejected twelve 
personnel of the Assam Rifles from the border post at Longju, 
located 3-4 miles south of the MacMahon Line and five days 
march from the larger post at Limeking and about three weeks
155
march from the nearest roadhead. An abortive attempt was 
made to air-drop supplies to the approximately 38 Indian 
personnel manning the picket and post but it was not con­
sidered desirable or worthwhile to attempt to drop para- 
troops in such terrain . The Indian detachment fell back 
to Gallen, about two days march from Longju.
Nehru was no longer able to maintain the secrecy of the 
previous five years relating to the border intrusions and, in 
reply to a series of questions and adjournment motions in the 
Lok Sabha on 28 August, he gave a full account of the Longju 
incident and revealed the years of Chinese perfidy which his 
Government had deliberately concealed from the public view 
in the hopes of a negotiated settlement free from public 
emotions . He declared that TWhile I do not wish to take 
an alarmist view of the situation, we should naturally be
prepared for any eventuality and without fuss or shouting 
28keep vigilant’ . In a note to China of the same date, his
Government warned that its frontier posts had been directed
29to use force to maintain the integrity of Indian soil y and, 
to lend substance to this determination, the Army was 
assigned responsibility for the NEFA-Tibet border.
Nehru was prepared for minor adjustments on the border 
but he stood by the watershed principle^. Unwilling to 
accept the Chinese challenge in all its reality, however, he
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persisted in the belief that somehow Peking would become more 
reasonable. For a brief period in late September-early Nov­
ember 1959> there were some indications of just such a shift 
by China; after weeks of frustration, the Indian Ambassador 
in Peking was received cordially by the Foreign Ministry and 
Chou replied with a very warm telegram to NehruTs congratu­
lations of the tenth anniversary of the PeopleTs Republic. 
Elated, the Indian Government made e\ery attempt to play down 
the dispute with China - but its hopes were quickly proven 
illusory. On 20 October, Chinese forces ambushed a patrol 
from the Indian Tibet Boundary Force in the Kongka Pass area 
of Ladakh, killing a number of the patrol and capturing the 
remainder.
The incident inflamed Indian public opinion and provoked 
an emergency meeting of the Cabinet, consequent on which the 
Army was assigned responsibility for the borders with Tibet 
of Jammu and Kashmir (Ladakh), Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and 
Uttar Pradesh. The security of the Sikkim-Tibet border was 
entrusted to the Army in November. Nehru gave assurances 
that chances would no longer be taken with the northern 
borders, that past mistakes would not be repeated and that 
his Government would not hesitate to employ force in defence 
of the country’s territorial integri t y S p e a k i n g  in the 
Rajya Sabha on 22 December 1959 during the debate on the
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correspondence exchanged in the past between himself and 
Chou En-lai, he declared:
We are committed from every point of view to defend 
our country, to preserve its integrity, to preserve 
its honour and self-respect. That is not a matter 
for argument... Opinions may differ as to how to do 
it...But the basic thing is clear, and in doing 
that, in the ultimate analysis, almost any price has 
to be paid. One cannot proceed on the basis of 
barter, haggling and the tactics of the market-place 
where a nation’s honour and self-respect are con­cerned. 32
Unlike in the past, substance had to be lent to such a deter­
mination beyond verbal pronouncements, and a re-assessment 
was made of the defence posture of the country which had, up 
to this point, been conceived to meet a military threat, 
however remote, from Pakistan.
The undisguised territorial designs of China had pro­
voked renewed public discussion of a possible defence arrange­
ment with Pakistan to accord with the strategic indivisibil­
ity of the sub-continent. Ayub had informally proposed such 
an arrangement in May 1959 and, on 22 June, he had declared: 
TThe North-West Frontier is not the frontier of Pakistan 
only but also of India. As such India owes us a great obli­
gation and we are entitled to claim a share of this enormous 
'i 0expense’ , Despite Nehru’s public rebuff of any Indo- 
Pakistan defence arrangement, Ayub repeated his offer to 
Nehru during his visit to Delhi on 1st September, arguing 
that the sub-continent’s internal strife had always invited
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invasion from the north and that to avert such a recurrence 
India and Pakistan should compose their differences on a 
lasting basis *to defend themselves against the common
r\ *
enemy* '" . He referred to the proposal again at a press con­
ference in Peshawar on 6 November1^  and repeated the offer
3 6during a tour of East Pakistan in January I960 .
Strong support for such a rapprochement came, signif­
icantly, from a respected former Commander-in-Chief of the 
Indian Army, General K.M. Cariappa. In a New Delhi inter­
view on 1st November 19599 he declared if immediate steps 
were not taken to dislodge the Chinese from Ladakh and NEFA 
Tit certainly will become a hundredfold more difficult and 
costly in all respects to do so later* as *delay and hesita­
tion on our part to act will encourage the Chinese to take 
more liberties, to keep on making more claims on our territ­
ory and to send forward more troops across the frontiers*.
He did not see how the political and military implications 
of the Chinese moves could be separated and favoured Indian 
initiative to bring about defence co-operation with Pakistan07.
He argued even more forcefully for such a rapprochement 
in an article published later in the same month. The solu­
tion of the Kashmir issue would, General Cariappa claimed, 
release large numbers of troops from both sides for use along 
the external borders and would help India to honour her
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promises when required to protect the security of Bhutan, 
Sikkim and Nepal.
The defence problems of India and Pakistan are in­
divisible ... So, we could with profit to both enter 
into a regional joint defence agreement against this 
Chinese aggression...Pride and prestige factors 
must be subordinated to achieving the actual need 
of the hour - which is the security and economic 
prosperity of the millions in our two countries.38
Support for a common defence pact with Pakistan was also ex­
pressed by Balraj Madhok, President of the Delhi State branch 
of the Jan Sangh - the Hindu communalist party^.
That there were many difficulties impeding such an 
arrangement was clear - the Hindu fear of the ’historical 
ghost’; Pakistani fears of being ’submerged’ by the Hindu 
majority in the sub-continent; Pakistan’s declared sectarian­
ism as opposed to India’s professed secularism; Pakistan’s 
military alignment with the West as against India’s avowed 
devotion to non-alignment almost as an end in itself. 
President Ayub dealt with the latter aspect at his Peshawar 
press conference on 6 November 1959y at which time he con­
tended that joint defence did not necessarily mean associa­
tion in foreign policy as it was a ’simple and straight-for­
ward matter’ which meant ’simply defending the frontiers* 
and involved no politics"^. Although such a contention 
lends itself to extensive debate, the important fact is that 
not only did New Delhi show no interest but it chose to
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regard the question, publicly at least, with that air of 
superiority and arrogance all too characteristic of the 
Nehru administration during the 1947-62 period^'. Thus, for 
example, NehruTs response to General Cariappa’s well-reasoned 
viewpoint of 1st November was to inform a press conference 
on 5 November that ’There is such extraordinary little sense 
in it that it amazes me. I think General Cariappa is com­
pletely of f the track mentally and otherwise’^ .
The incident evidenced Nehru’s extreme sensitivity to 
implicit criticisms of his own viewpoints, particularly on 
matters of foreign policy. It also reflected the Govern­
ment’s view that Pakistan still posed a threat^ and that a 
serious Chinese assault against the Himalayan frontiers was 
neither likely nor feasible in the near future^ - the 
latter view being shared by the Army on logistical grounds4“*. 
The need for closer relations with Pakistan was not, there­
fore, viewed by the Government as pressing. Nehru may have 
felt that any concerted effort to effect a reconciliation 
with Pakistan, though basically desirable, would at such a 
juncture entail a strategic re-alignment against China, who 
would interpret it as such and adopt an even more bellicose 
attitude in which a peaceful settlement of the border dispute 
would be impossible. He may also have feared that such a 
direct alignment with a member of the Western alliance
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against Peking would have alienated Moscow, towards whom he 
looked as a restraining influence on ChinaTs rulers and as a 
diplomatic counter-weight.
The Prime Minister’s response to the Himalayan challenge 
posed by China was cautious - the double policy of defence 
against further intrusions and demanding a withdrawal of 
Chinese forces from Indian territory while seeking a settle­
ment of the border issue by conference^°. This approach 
was, in effect, a restatement of the policy adopted in 
1950-51 with the notable exception that there was no longer 
any attempt to conceal the fact that military preparations 
were being undertaken to counter Chinese designs. This new 
attitude was dictated by prudence, domestic politics, and 
the international attention focused on the dispute (and 
involving Indian prestige), as well as by considerations of 
national honour and self-respect to which the Nehru adminis­
tration was no less responsive than any other national gov­
ernment .
Simultaneous \\rith certain military precautions which 
did not basically alter defence policy vis-a-vis Pakistan^'7, 
steps were taken to strengthen the administration in the 
strategic border areas, accelerate economic development in 
these areas and improve communications.
Six border districts, modelled more or less on the 
pattern of the political divisions in NEFA, were established
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in I960 - Pithoragarh, Chamoli and Uttarkashi in Uttar 
Pradesh^; Lahaul-Spiti in Punj'ab^; and Kinnaur in Himachal 
Pradesh. Senior Indian Frontier Administrative Service 
(IFAS) officers were deputed from NEFA to head the new dis­
tricts in the capacity of Deputy Commissioners and were given 
wide administrative and financial powers^. A retired Chief 
of Army Staff, General S.M. Shrinagesh, was appointed on 14 
November 1959 to succeed Saiyad Fazl Ali as Governor of 
Assam consequent on the latterfs death, thus becoming the 
first Indian military leader to hold the post as a represen­
tative of the Union Government^, In early i960, NEFA, the 
Naga Hills and the Tuensang area were united under a single 
administration headed bj' N.K. Rustomji, Adviser to the Assam 
Government and the former head of the NEFA unit^.
The police patrolling the Indo-Tibetan border in the 
middle sector were placed under overall military control in 
late 1959 and steps were taken to strengthen this constabul­
ary and to raise their efficiency to something approaching
53that of the Assam Rifles . Security measures were further 
tightened in January I960 when the Centre extended the 
Punjab Security of the State Act 1954 to Himachal Pradesh^. 
Following the outbreak of disorders in the Anini area of the 
Lohit Frontier Division (which had caused troops to be tem­
porarily diverted to deal with the disturbances), it was
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decided in December I960 to establish a NEFA police force of 
about twelve platoons to deal with the increasing lawless- 
ness in the AgencyJ~ . In an order published in the Gazette 
of India on 31 March 1962, the Indian Government declared 
most of the districts of Pitnoragarh, Chamoli and Uttarkashi, 
the whole of the Darjeeling district in West Bengal, and 
what is known as the area beyond the finner lineT in the 
Kinnaur district to be ’notified areas’ under the Criminal 
Law Amendment Act 1961 - an action clearly aimed at facili­
tating control over the movements of persons suspected of 
being engaged in activities prejudicial to Indian security.
Further efforts were undertaken to restore tranquility 
in the Naga areas, where Naga dissidents were tying down 
nearly 30,000 troops and police. Pursuant to the demands of 
a Naga convention held in 19599 Nehru sanctioned the creation 
of a state of Nagaland - which was inaugurated on 15 February 
1961. Development of the Naga area was accelerated; whereas 
Rs 4 crores had been spent on the area during the Second 
Plan, the Planning Commission allocated Rs 7*15 crores for 
development schemes in Nagaland during the Third Plan 
(1961-66)'^ . A major reshuffle of the Nagaland administra­
tion was made in late 1961 following the assassination of Dr 
Imkengliba Ao, the head of the Nagaland Interim Body (viz. 
Legislative Assembly).
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In early I960, a committee was set up in the Cabinet
Secretariat to ensure effective co-ordination by the Union
Government of development programmes in the strategic border
areas towards which it undertook to provide financial aid.
Development schemes prepared by the states concerned were
examined at the Centre and authority was given the State
authorities to proceed with urgent schemes in anticipation
5 7of approval from the Centre . For the period of the Third 
Plan, an outlay of Rs 5 crores was envisaged for roads,
r o
buildings and irrigation works in Ladakh- . The Punjab State
Government increased its allocation for development schemes
in the Lahaul-Spiti district for fiscal I960 to over Rs 2
crores (as against less than Rs 1 crores for 1 9 5 9 and it
planned for the development of 100 miles of roads at an
estimated cost of Rs 68.38 crores in this area during the
Third Plan^. The Government of Uttar Pradesh undertook
twelve road projects in the hill regions bordering Tibet
which would ultimately involve an outlay of Rs 65.84 crores,
the Centre bearing half the cost^, The expenditure on NEFA
for the Third Plan was estimated at Rs 7.21 crores (double
6 2the amount expended during the Second Plan) , while plans 
were drawn up for the construction of further airport and 
landing-ground facilities and for greatly increased expendi­
ture on roads'^ .
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A high-level Border Roads Development Board (BRDB) was 
created in March i960 to co-ordinate the various state con­
struction projects with the Armyts own hastily-conceived 
road-building programme in the strategic border areas^h 
The scheme involved the construction of 2,500 miles of new 
roads and the improvement of 1,500 miles of existing roads 
at an estimated cost of Rs 120 crores over a three-year 
period^. The implementation of the programme was assigned 
to various project units - Vartak (Tusker) in Assam and 
NEFA^°; Dhantok in Bhutan; Dragon in Sikkim; Deepak in 
Himachal Pradesh; and Beacon in Ladakh. The heavy burden on 
the Army engineering corps was partially alleviated through 
the recruitment, in mid-1960, of a semi-military construction 
force designated the General Reserve Engineering Force (GREF) 
at bonus rates 50 per cent above the usual level; this force
was assigned responsibility for primary work, leaving Army
67engineers to concentrate on the vital bridging . Extra 
supplies of bulldozers and excavators were diverted from the 
armed services and national development projects and scarce 
foreign exchange was expended for United States-made helicopt­
ers and transport aircraft to supply these projects.
Soviet-made helicopters and transports were also secured for
,68rupee payment
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From its inception up to June 1963* the BRDB carried
out the cutting of nearly 1,600 miles of road, developed
land communications over 600 miles and surveyed and did a
complete reconnaissance of about 2,700 miles*'^.
The 95-niile Dirrang-Along road was completed in I960 and
new roads were constructed in the foothills north of Sadiya,
the military rail junction in northern Assam. The 79-mile
70Mokokchung road was nearing completion in March 19627 . The
track to Gangtok was improved to accomodate truck convoys
and work began in 1961 on an alternative Rangpo-Gangtok link
via Pakyang, suitable for uninterrupted heavy vehicular
traffic during the monsoon season. In October 1958, the
Central Public Works Department (CPWD) had begun work on the
150-mile North Sikkim highway extending from Gangtok to
Phodan and thence to Mangan and Singhih, at which point it
forks towards Lachen and Lachung villages and onwards to the
border areas. In October I960 the CWPD, having completed
about 50 miles of the project, was relieved by the BRDB which
71proceeded with the completion of the last 100 miles .
On 13 January I960, construction commenced on the 107- 
mile road from Phuntsholing in West Bengal to Paro, Bhutan’s 
combination fort, Buddhist monastery and winter capital in 
the western sector of the state. The project was formally 
completed on 13 February 1962 and the road, which is twelve
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feet wide and sufficient for one-way traffic with occasional 
turn-outs to permit a controlled two-way flow of traffic^ 
reduced the travelling time between the two points from six 
days by mule and on foot to ten hours by jeep. The Dirrang- 
Tashigang project was initially undertaken by the Bhutanese 
authorities who turned it over to the BRDB for completion in 
early 1961' ; the road was expected to be completed in mid-
1962. At the request of Bhutan, the Government of West 
Bengal undertook in 1961 to improve the old road from 
Jalpaiguri to the Indo-Bhutan border suitable for vehicular 
traffic . Communications were also improved along the 
Indo-'Tepal border.
Work on the 153-mile Kargil-Leh pilot road was re-started 
in early 1959 consequent on a special request made by Nehru 
to Premier Bhakshi Ghulam Mohammed of the Indian-administered 
portion of Kashmir. Army engineers were deputed to assist 
the state authorities and the road, which passes over Kapi 
La (11,000 feet), Namika (12,000 feet) and Fote La (13*432 
feet), was opened to traffic at ICargil on 1st August I960. 
Improvements were made to the 6l-mile long motorable road 
linking Leh and Baltal, the 67-mile Baltal-Kargil section 
was rendered suitable for three-ton vehicles and work pro­
ceeded on a road to connect Leh with Nubra via Khardung La.
A 75-mile jeepable track was completed from Leh to Chushul
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via Hemis and Changa on the eve of the border conflict, by 
which time work had also begun on a jeepable track from 
Chushul to the border post at Dungti.
The developments in Tibet and China’s aggressive border 
policy caused the Indian Government to develop even closer 
relations with the strategic hill-states of Nepal, Bhutan 
and Sikkim. On 24 August and 26 November 1959, Nehru 
re-stated the intention of his Government to defend Bhutan 
and Sikkim against any act of aggression and, on 27 
November, he declared again that any attack on Nepal would 
be regarded as an attack on India^.
In August 1959, India gave to Sikkim a grant equivalent
to $ 6 million, over half of which was allocated for trans-
ycportation and communication . A former Indian Consul- 
General in Lhasa, Major S.L. Chibber, was appointed First 
Secretary at the Indian Political Office in Gangtok and a 
military officer was appointed to the important post of ad- 
ministrative officer in the Kalimpong district . In res­
ponse to a request from the Maharajkumar, an expert team 
from the Planning Commission visited Sikkim in April 1961 
and drew up a five-year plan of economic development which 
involved the expenditure of an estimated Rs 8.2 crores on 
the expansion of agriculture, development of power, exploita­
tion of forests, improvement of communications and transport,
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and the establishment of village and small-scale 
77industries . The entire plan was to be underwritten by
India, Nehru apparently insisting that India provide the aid
as a grant although it had been envisaged as a loan when the
78plans were being drawn up' .
During his visit to Delhi in January 1961, the
Maharajkumar proposed that a militia be raised in the
northern frontier areas of the state as a means of associat-
79ing the Sikkimese people with the defence of their country . 
The proposal met with a cool reception from the Indian Gov­
ernment, however, for both military and political reasons.
It would represent some derogation from the sole responsibil­
ity for Sikkim’s defence exercised by the Indian Army and, 
as such a militia would consist of Lepch^äs and Bhutias 
while excluding the important Nepalese community in the 
south, it was feared that Indian support for the proposal
would involve her in an internal political issue and exacer-
S 0bate relations with Nepal • New Delhi was, however, able 
to effect a compromise scheme in an agreement formally con­
cluded on 9 June 1961 whereby the Maharajkumar’s palace 
guard of 60 men under a Junior Commissioned Officer would be 
expanded to two companies and commanded by an officer of the 
Indian Army. One of the companies was to function for normal 
palace duties and the other was to be attached to the Indian
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Army for border security duties. The Indian Government 
agreed to finance the expanded guard and to assist in its
O lrecruitment, training and equipment0’1'.
An interesting sidelight to Indo-Sikkimese relations
was provided by the engagement of Prince Palden Thondup
Namgyal to an American, Miss Hope Cook of New York City, in
late 1961. The announcement was preceded by six months of
8 2negotiations between the Governments of India and Sikkim , 
and evidenced Indian concern at the presence of a foreigner 
(perhaps particularly a citizen of one of the major aligned 
powers) so close to the source of authority in strategic 
Sikkim. Perhaps more significant, however, is that the 
Indian Government was unable to prevent the marriage - if it 
did, indeed, attempt to do so.
Bhutan’s reaction to the Tibetan revolt and its after- 
mat^h was initially very cautious, Tibetan refugees not 
being welcomed in the country, and China’s seizure of 
Bhutan’s eight Tibetan enclaves in July appeared to instill 
in some Bhutanese officials a belief that there was a need 
to enter into closer relations with Peking.
Prime Minister Dorji did not apparently regard the sit­
uation as requiring such a dramatic step (which would have 
required re-negotiation of the treaty with India) and visited 
India in August-September in search of further economic aid
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and, according to one observer, a written guarantee of
Indian support in the event of a Chinese attack^. At a
Delhi press conference on 15 September, he undoubtedly
relieved Indian anxieties concerning a possible divergence
from the intimate relationship with India by placing great
stress on the untroubled amity between India and Bhutan and
making it clear that his Government had not contemplated
asking for aid from any other country * An announcement
released in New Delhi on 17 September stated that India had
agreed to increase its annual subsidy to Bhutan from
Rs 500,000 to Rs 1,200,000 - the increase to replace ad hoc
8 Kgrants for development schemes- - and would bear the estim­
ated Rs 15 crore cost of five all-weather roads to link the 
8 6two countries0 • Dorji also revealed the intention of his
Government to raise a standing army of 2,500 men equipped
with modern rifles, sten and bren guns to augment the
country fs 5,000 strong militia as soon as finances permitted^'7,
Indo-Bhutanese relations subsequently underwent some
strain due to Bhutanese sensitivities towards Indiafs often
over-bearing postures, and Pekingfs indirect overtures to
Dorji via some ’private persons’ in I960 for direct Sino-
88Bhutanese talks on their border dispute clearly sought to 
capitalize on such feeling. The approach was ignored, how­
ever, and, in response to Chinese maps claiming 300 square
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miles of territory in north-east Bhutan and north of
Punakha, the Bhutanese Government proceeded in early 1961 to
completely seal the border in the disputed area and to
increase its checkposts there^.
In January 1961 the Maharajah made his first trip to
India since 1954* Speaking to the press at Calcutta on 30
January, he declared that the Chinese proposal for direct
talks on the border dispute had some merit in view of the
present stalemate in Sino-Indian border discussions and that
90he might raise the issue with Nehru . He stated, however,
that Bhutan had not received offers of aid from any country
save India and did not propose to seek aid from other sources
91at the present time • Either possibility was something 
which the Indian Government clearly meant to prevent so as 
to preserve its position of dominant influence in the state.
A high-level meeting held in February, presided over by 
Nehru and attended by the Maharaj’ah, Defence Minister V.K. 
Krishna Menon and the three Indian Chiefs of Staff, reported­
ly worked out a new programme for the discharge of Indiafs 
responsibility for the defence of Bhutan. Provision was 
made for a substantial increase in the strength of the 
Indian forces available for speedy despatch to Bhutan in a 
crisis, more modern helicopters were made available to 
Indian forces for possible operations in Bhutan, and an
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intensive study of the facilities for Indian Air Force oper­
ations over the state was undertaken. At the invitation of 
the Bhutanese Government, senior Indian military officers 
visited Bhutan in 1961 and made an elaborate survey of 
defence requirements; following their advice the Bhutanese 
Government proceeded with the strengthening of its militia^.
Nehru successfully persuaded the Maharajah not to seek 
direct talks with China. A press statement issued by the 
Bhutanese ruler on 15 February prior to his departure from 
Delhi revealed that his Government had requested the Govern­
ment of India to fnegotiate or take up any questions with 
China* relating to the kingdom’s northern border^.
In response to the Maharajah’s request for the assist­
ance of experts to formulate development plans, a team from 
the Planning Commission visited Bhutan in June 1961. The 
result of its visit was a five-year development plan estimat­
ed to cost Rs 17.5 crores - which India agreed to underwrite 
- of which Rs 12 crores was allocated for roads^. A Survey 
of India team joined local authorities in the preparation of 
a detailed map of the state, including the hitherto unde­
limited and undemarcated (i.e., to China’s viewpoint)
190-mile Bhutan-Tibet border^-*. In September 1961, Bhutan 
and India signed a pact to harness the Jaldhaka River for 
hydro-electric power, Bhutan to receive 250 kilowatts free
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per annum and also a royalty from India of Rs 8 per kilowatt 
per annum from a project which will generate 18,000 kilowatts 
of power annually,
Nehru visited Nepal in June 1959 where, even while ex­
pressing the view that he did not envisage a threat to Nepal 
from the north due to developments in Tibet, he stated that 
Indian troops had been sent to man 18 posts on the Nepal- 
Tibet border at the request of the Nepalese Government^,
In August, Nepal announced a 14 per cent increase in its
97outlay on defence and accepted an Indian offer equivalent 
to $ 20 million worth of technical and economic aid, includ­
ing equipment and training for the 10,000 strong Royal Nepal 
98Army • In November, the two governments reached agreement
on the Gandak irrigation project after three yearsf negotia-
qotion, with Kathmandu reportedly driving a hard bargain .
Nehru’s declaration of 27 November that any attack on 
Nepal would be regarded as an attack on India, though rightly 
described as ’nothing more than recognition of physical 
imperatives and,addressed as much to the people of India 
as to foreign p o w e r s t o u c h e d  off anti-Indian resentment 
in Nepal and forced Prime Minister Koirala to publicly stress 
Nepal’s sovereignty. At the same time, however, he declared 
that Nepal would provide such assistance as New Delhi might 
seek in the event of India being attacked - an assurance
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viewed by a leading Indian daily as Welcome evidence that 
the Government of Nepal is fully aware that the vital inter­
ests of the two countries coincide*'^ '*'. Koirala visited New 
Delhi in January I960 and secured an Indian pledge of Rs 18 
crores in economic aid^^^. A communique issued on 28 January, 
at the conclusion of the visit, attested to the vital inter­
est of each country in the otherTs Tfreedom, integrity, sec­
urity and progressf, their similarity in approach to inter­
national problems and desire to co-operate with regard to
them, and their agreement on the need to maintain close
101consultation in matters of common interest
King Mahendra and members of his Government visited New 
Delhi in April I960 for further talks, and a joint communique 
issued at their conclusion declared that fIndia and Nepal 
have a vital interest in each otherfs sovereignty, indepen­
dence and territorial integrity and re-affirmed their inten­
tion to consult together on appropriate measures of mutual 
assitance at the request of either party t-^4# King Mahendra 
returned to New Delhi for a four-day private visit for the 
period 3-20 July and Prime Minister Koirala held talks with 
Nehru in New Delhi on 9 August while en route to Israel, In 
an agreement signed in Kathmandu on 31 August, India extend­
ed a further Rs 91*5 lakhs in economic aid^~* and the two 
governments concluded a trade and transit treaty in the same 
place on 11 September.
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Indian aid could not, however, prevent, nor Indo-Nepali 
professions of mutual interest conceal, a perceptible and 
deliberate shift by Kathmandu into a neutral posture on the 
Sino-Indian border dispute and into closer diplomatic and 
economic relations with both of IndiaTs suspect neighbours - 
China and Pakistan. Prudence dictated neutrality as regards 
the respective merits of Chinafs and Indiafs opposed border 
claims and the conscious efforts to promote closer economic 
and political relations with China and Pakistan reflected a 
desire to lessen Nepalfs economic (and, by consequence, pol­
itical) dependence upon India.
Prime Minister Koirala visited China in April I960 and
agreements were concluded involving a delimitation of the
Nepal-Tibet border favourable to Nepalfs viewpoint and a
Chinese pledge of economic aid worth Rs 10 crores. Chou
En-lai returned the visit between ZL-29 April, during the
course of which the two governments reached agreement on the
establishment of a commission to demarcate the boundary and
concluded a Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Nepal declined,
however, to include in the treaty an undertaking not to join
a military alliance on the grounds that this was rendered
superfluous by the 1956 treaty and by the fact that panch
10 6sheel constituted the basis of Nepalfs foreign policy1" •
The appearance of Chinese claims to Mt Everest and Chinese
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military operations against Khampa rebels near Nepal’s 
northern borders in the spring of I960 - which resulted in 
clashes between Chinese and Nepalese frontier guards with 
loss of life to the latter - momentarily caused concern in 
Kathmandu regarding Chinese intentions and led to a strength­
ening of the posts on the northern border. The Chinese Gov­
ernment was quick to apologise for the incidents, however, 
and paid compensation with the result that relations were
cordial at the time of King Mahendra’s coup in December I960.
107The coup provoked a tactless response from New Delhi 
and directly led to a concerted effort by King Mahendra to 
loosen the somewhat oppressive tie with India. The action 
may well have seemed, as one Indian daily described it, f0ne 
step forward, two steps backward* but the attitude adopted 
by Nehru understandably provoked intense resentment in Nepal. 
On 16 December, while admitting that it was not for him to 
criticize the King’s action, Nehru stated that ’obviously, 
it is a matter of regret for all of us that the democratic 
experiment or practice going on there has suffered a set­
back Initiating the debate on foreign affairs in the
Rajya Sabha on 20 December,moreover, the Indian Prime Minis­
ter came out in sharp criticism of the coup^^ and persisted 
with such comments in subsequent weeks.
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In response, Radio Nepal blacked out NehruTs references 
to Nepal in his Rajya Sabha speech and an anti-Indian press 
campaign began in Nepal. As each side criticized the atti­
tudes of the other, relations were further strained by the 
beginning of a campaign in the fall of 1961 by armed follow­
ers of the Nepali Congress, which involved raids on district 
arsenals and treasuries in Nepal and clashes with Nepali 
police and army units. Many of the raids were launched from 
Indian territory, as in 1 9 5 and the absence of effective 
action by New Delhi to prevent such activity suggested at 
least tacit official support of or acquiescence in the rebel 
activity. The refusal of the Indian Government to detain 
and hand over rebel leaders to the Nepalese authorities as 
per the latter’s request was legally defensible. The refusal,
however, to restrain rebel epokesmen from making statements
111against the Mahendra Government from Indian soil was in­
consistent with the attitude adopted towards refugee Tibetan 
leaders, including the Dalai Lama, and certain Western cor­
respondents (particularly George Patterson) concerning their 
expression of views on issues relating to Tibetan develop­
ments. It is not at all surprising, therefore, that the 
King should have considered it to be in his country’s short- 
and long-term interests to bring about closer ties with 
neighbouring China and Pakistan. He visited Pakistan in
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September 1961 and, during a visit to China in October 1961,
signed an agreement for the construction with Chinese aid of
a 45-mile road from Kathmandu to Koderi Pass via Bhadgaon,
112Banepa, Panchkhal, Dolalght and Barabesne • In October
1962, Nepal signed a trade agreement with China.
The strategic implications of the road were self-evident;
it would link up with the Tribhuvan Rajpath and provide China
with an all-weather highway through Nepal to the Indian
plains. The Indian Government informally communicated its
• inviews to Kathmandu on the subject 0 but to no apparent 
avail. Notwithstanding this setback, India continued her 
policy of economic aid to Nepal with the pledge of the equi­
valent of $ 40 million towards Nepalfs second (but three-year) 
Plan which commenced in 1962.
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CHAPTER V
THE INDIAN ARMY 1947-1962
The decision to partition British India into two 
sovereign states resulted in the division of the existing 
army1 on a roughly 2:1 basis, with the larger share going 
to the Indian Union. Indiafs share comprised the equivalent 
of 15 infantry regiments, 12 armoured regiments, 18^ artil­
lery regiments and 61 engineer units totalling about 280,000
2personnel of all categories • The infantry units consisted
of the 2nd Punjab Regiment, Madras Regiment, Indian Grenad-
3iers , Mahratta Light Infantry, Rajputana Rifles, Rajput 
Regiment, Jat Regiment, Sikh Regiment, Dogra Regiment,
Garhwal Rifles, Kumaon Regiment^, Assam Regiment, Sikh Light 
Infantry, Bihar Regiment and the Maher Regiment. The armour­
ed formations included Skinner’s Horse, Gardner’s Horse, 
Hodson’s Horse, King George V’s Own Light Cavalry and King 
Edward’s Own Light Cavalry. Under the provisions of a tri­
partite agreement concluded between the Governments of Nepal, 
Britain and India in November 1947y India retained the 1st, 
3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th and 9th Gurkha Rifles totalling 16 
battalions^•
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Xn the immediate aftermath of partition, it was found
impossible for the Defence Ministry to undertake long-term
planning for the armed forces. In his presentation of the
budget to Parliament in early 1948, Finance Minister R.K.
Shanmukham Chetty explained that
the recrudescence of communal disturbances and the 
necessity in present circumstances of having to 
retain substantial forces till normal conditions 
return have made it impossible to undertake the 
long-term planning of the Armed Forces so as to 
keep the expenditure on them at a level appropriate 
to the financial resources of the country.
Pending the return of fnormal conditions* and decisions as to 
the future strength and composition of the armed forces, the 
Army was expected to be maintained at its existing level?.
The onerous needs of internal security and the military 
operations against the princely state of Hyderabad (which 
was spearheaded by the 1st armoured division) and against 
Pakistani tribals and ultimately regular units of the 
Pakistan Army in Kashmir necessitated, however, a consider­
able strengthening of the security and defence forces. The 
Army was augmented by fresh recruitment for both temporary 
and permanent service, larger numbers of personnel from the 
State Forces were inducted and troops were loaned by Nepal
ofor internal security duties .
In accordance with the recommendations of a special 
committee appointed in 1946, the Indian Government established
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a National Cadet Corps in 1948. The Corps consisted of
three divisions (Senior, Junior and Girls) and was designed
to stimulate interest in the defence of India and to develop
character, ideals of service, comradeship and leadership
oqualities in the countryfs youth . Enrolment was voluntary, 
but the Government early made it clear that it would consid­
er conscription if the expected good response to the scheme 
did not materialize"^ •
A Territorial Army was constituted by an Act of Parlia­
ment in 1948 and was officially inaugurated on 9 October 
1949 with an initial target of 130,000 personnel"^. Modelled 
on the British organization, this force was designed to 
create a reserve of citizen soldiers which would function as
the second line of defence and, in times of emergency,
12release regular troops for field service •
In early 1949, the ceasefire in Kashmir and the return 
of the internal situation to general normalcy permitted the 
Government to give its first serious consideration to the 
question of the size and composition of the peacetime Army. 
Faced with the need for maximum economy in defence expendi­
ture simultaneous with the development of an Air Force and 
Navy, the Defence Ministry proposed to effect economy at the 
expense of the Army . The authorities are understood to 
have envisaged a highly mechanized and mobile force of about
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150,000 men backed by a large reserve, a Territorial Army and 
various para-military formations^•
No decision was taken regarding the peacetime establish­
ment of the Army, however, due to the communist insurrections 
in progress within India and throughout South-East Asia, and 
the emergence of a united China under militant communist 
leadership dedicated at least to the restoration of ancient 
glories and domains. President Rajendra Prasad admitted the 
concern with which the Government viewed developments in his 
first address to Parliament delivered on 31 January 1950.
He declared that, while it was the Government’s desire to 
reduce defence expenditure fas a measure of economy as well 
as a gesture of peace’,
With all the desire to reduce defence expenditure, 
they could not take the risk of putting the 
country in jeopardy at a time when evil forces 
were endangering its security both within and from 
outside.
’The first essential of freedom’, he concluded, ’is the 
strength to preserve it and no country can take any risk in 
such a vital matter’^ .
This prudent attitude was reinforced by the continuance 
of poor relations with Pakistan. A sharp deterioration in 
this relationship in February and March 1950 followed 
serious communal rioting in West Bengal, a mass exodus of 
Moslems from that state to East Pakistan and the resulting
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outbreak of anti-Hindu riots in the area. As a precaution­
ary measure against the possible outbreak of war, Indian 
forces were moved towards the borders of West and East 
Pakistan and a crisis was only averted by talks held in New 
Delhi in April between Nehru and the Prime Minister of 
Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan. Further caution was warranted
by developments outside the sub-continent - the invasion of
16South Korea by North Korean communist armies in June 1950 ,
the Chinese re-entry into Tibet in early October and major 
intervention in Korea in November.
Shortly after the entry of Chinese troops into Tibet, 
however, it was reported by a leading Indian daily that the 
Government was considering a proposal to progressively reduce 
defence expenditure on the assumption that the Korean War 
would soon end and would not, in any case, develop into a 
world war1 .^ Such an intention was officially confirmed on 
17 November, when Nehru intervened during question period in 
Parliament to declare that he had directed the Defence Min­
istry to reduce defence expenditure and the size of the Army
- his Government desiring a highly efficient and mobile Army
18which, he claimed, did not depend on numbers .. Referring to 
the subject again in the same forum on 21 December, the 
Prime Minister stated that the Government preferred a highly 
mechanized and relatively small Army to a large and
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ill-equipped ’foot’ force and intended to effect a reduction
in its size for economy reasons^.
In accordance with this policy, about 50,000 personnel
were demobilized in early 1951* Announcing the move in
Parliament on 26 March 1951y Defence Minister Baldev Singh
declared that further demobilization would depend on many
factors including the internal situation, the international
20situation and, above all, the question of Kashmir • Osten­
sibly because of Pakistan’s ’war propaganda’ and the absence 
of any corresponding reduction in her armed forces, a further
reduction proposed for 1951-52 (which it is understood would
21have involved some 100,000 men) was not proceeded with 
With reference to this issue, Nehru informed the Rajya Sabha 
in September 1963 that the Government had decided after the 
ceasefire in Kashmir to reduce the size of the Army, in the 
belief that no country was going to attack her* He claimed 
that this policy had been pursued for ’a couple of years’, 
at the end of which time the Government had accepted the 
advice of its ’military advisers’ that Pakistan’s postures 
made further reductions unwise •
Too much significance should not, however, be attached 
to the release of the 50,000 personnel in early 1951 or of 
other personnel between 1949 and 1953* Speculating on the 
demobilization on the eve of its occurrence, Deputy Defence
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Minister, Major-General Himmatsinghji, stated that the reduc­
tion ’might’ be possible by continuing the demobilization of 
World War II personnel and by dispensing with such units as 
’reserve and garrison’ battalions which he described as more
or less semi-police forces required during the period of par- 
23tition • The actual reduction was indeed effected in this 
manner - by the demobilization of the Defence Battalions and 
Pioneer Corps, the return to Nepal of those forces borrowed 
from it, the release of ’unsuitable’ officers and men from 
the States Forces and the resumption of demobilization of 
personnel from the Second World War who either desired to 
return to civil life or were considered unsuitable for the 
peacetime establishment, but whose release had been deferred 
following partition.
These releases were more than offset, however, by fresh 
enlistments, the integration of the States Forces into the 
regular Service effective 1st April 1950^, and the re-induc— 
tion between 15 August 1947 and March 1953 of 441 officers 
and 121,322 other ranks who had been demobOLized following the 
end of the Second World War2 .^ The rate of the aggregate 
increase in the size of the Army between 1949 and 1953 is 
indicated by the outlay on pay and allowances during this 
period: Rs 32.56 crores (1949-50)* Rs 37*71 crores (19,50-51), 
Rs 42.15 crores (1951-52) and Rs 44*75 crores (1952-53)^*
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As of this last date, the Indian Army comprised 
325-350*000 personnel of all categories, organized into the 
4th, 5th, 10th, 19th, 26th and 27th infantry divisions, 1st 
armoured division, 1st independent armoured brigade, 50th 
paratroop brigade (comprised of the parachute regiment of 
three battalions plus support units) and several unattached 
battalions and brigades2'7* Three infantry divisions were
28sited in the Vale, Jammu and the Poonch-Mendhar-Rajaori area) 
with an infantry battalion and supporting arms at Leh, The 
main counter-strike force against Pakistan, designated Punjab 
Force, comprised a corps which consisted of two infantry 
divisions based at Ferezpore, Ambala, Jullundur, Amritsar, 
Khasali and Gurdaspur and the armoured division, sited in its 
training area at Jhansi, south of Delhi and 72 hours removed 
by train from its operational ftake-offf point in the East 
Punjab. The independent armoured brigade was based at 
Patiala in the East Punjab and an infantry brigade group was 
located at Jaipur (Rajasthan) with one battalion at Jodhpur. 
There was an infantry brigade and a light armoured regiment 
in the vicinity of Calcutta; an independent infantry brigade 
group in Kutch; one infantry brigade at Secunderabad; one 
infantry battalion in each of Madras, Bangalore and 
Trivandrum; and the paratroop brigade at Agra.
198
The deployment of these forces at this time indicated a 
compromise between likely operational contingencies, the 
continuing demands of internal security and financial strin­
gency. From the purely military viewpoint, the concentration 
of the field army in a 100 square mile area in Madhya 
Pradesh enclosing Agra and Gwalior would have resulted in 
the most effective defence posture, permitting rapid aid to 
the civil power whenever and wherever required and a speedy 
concentration of the requisite forces against any threat to 
Indiafs long land frontiers from west to east. For financial 
reasons, however, the Government was not prepared to sanction 
such a measure, and considerations of civilian morale in the 
areas contiguous to Pakistani territory and the military 
sanction required for the administration of Indian-occupied 
Kashmir resulted in a Ttight* defence of the Indo-Pakistan 
frontiers, particularly in the west. Since the main opera­
tional theatre remained in the north-west, no major re-deploy­
ment of the Indian Army was required - except as regards 
Kashmir. Thus, pre-1947 cantonments were utilized to a 
large extent.
The size and deployment of the Army remained fairly 
static from 1953 to 1956. In early 1956, however, its com­
mitments were expanded to encompass an active role in the 
pacification campaign against rebellious Naga tribesmen in
199
the existing checkposts from the Central Reserve Police^
and forward patrol bases were established in areas where
logistics permitted - i.e. along the Shyok Valley up to
Daulet Beg Oldi, near the southern entrance to the Karakoram 
32Pass • Chushul was conceived of as the anchor for this 
system of posts, which were designed to check further surrep­
titious Chinese advances, and was flanked by about ten posts 
extending towards both the east and west for a distance of 
some 40 miles in each direction. Leh and Chushul airstrips 
were speedily re-commissioned.
In the Sikkim-Bhutan sector, planning envisaged the 
ultimate deployment of an infantry division with one brigade 
and divisional headquarters at Siliguri, one brigade at 
Kalimpong and one brigade at Gangtok with its forward elements 
extending up to Natu La pass on the Sikkim-Tibet border. A 
force deployed in this manner was considered to afford 
defence in depth against any attack from the north while 
simultaneously covering the narrow corridor lying between 
the northern tip of East Pakistan and Bhutan from interfer­
ence from the former state. As the initial stage of this 
plan, an infantry brigade was shifted from Lucknow during 
the period December 1959-January i960 and sited with brigade 
headquarters and one battalion at Siliguri, one battalion at 
Kalimpong and one battalion at Gangtok with its forward 
elements extending up to Natu La pass.
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the strategically important region of eastern Assam. Ini­
tially, units were drawn from Eastern Command but, as the 
Armyfs involvement deepened, it was necessary to draft bat­
talions from the Punjab and Kashmir and replace them through 
the raising of fresh units. The outlay on pay and allowances 
in the Army budget accordingly rose from Rs 45*11 crores 
(1956-57) to Rs 49.07 crores (1957-58) and Rs 52.61 crores 
(1958-59)29.
In August-November 1959* the Army’s responsibilities 
were greatly increased when they were directed to secure the 
Himalayan frontiers against hostile actions by China. In 
their assessment of the Chinese military threat, India*s 
military leaders viewed NEFA, the Sikkim-Bhutan sector and 
Ladakh as the likely fdanger areas’ - although it was felt 
that serious attacks were, for the present, precluded by 
logistical factors. Large-scale re-deployment of troops to 
these areas was, in any case, prevented by the paucity of 
communications. The extent of immediate military prepara­
tions was, therefore, primarily determined by the logistics 
factor.
Planning for Ladakh envisaged the development of an
eventual brigade group consequent on the development of a
suitable operational infrastructure. As immediate measures,
10the battalion at Leh was strengthened , the Army took over
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With regards to NEFA, the 4th infantry division was 
shifted from Ambala during the period December 1959-January 
I960 and sited with divisional headquarters at Tezpur, two 
brigades in the foothills and one brigade forward at Tawang. 
This force was assigned the task of undertaking a thorough 
reconnaissance of the area. The Army Command at Jorhat, 
which exercised overall command of the border force with an 
advance command post at Foothills, was expanded and devel­
opment of a base at Misamari began3 .^ Provision was made
for the Army to gradually take over border security duties
35from the Assam Rifles but this semi-military force, though 
strongly reinforced3^, was not immediately replaced by regu­
lar troops - ostensibly so as to avoid unrest among the 
tribals37.
In the event of a serious Chinese assault against these 
forces, it was decided to concede the untenable forward 
areas and retire to more defensible positions where artillery 
and tank support could be utilized to effect'3 •
Further military contingency planning was undertaken by 
Army leaders in January 1961, at which time a sand-model 
exercise concerned with the defence of the MacMahon Line was 
held in Lucknow (or Tezpur). The ’Chinese syndicate’ employ­
ed as the most likely Chinese strategy a three-pronged attack 
basically similar to the one actually employed by Peking in
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October-November 1962. The force required to defend against 
such an attack was estimated at three infantry divisions, 
with two on the line and one in reserve. For contingency 
purposes, the units allotted to the plan were the 4th 
(already in NEFA), the fNagaf division of approximately 14 
battalions in three brigades deployed against the Nagas, and 
the 5th division from the Punjab. If and when an attack 
seemed imminent, it was proposed to implement the plan immed­
iately. In such an event, the forward brigade at Tawang was 
to fall back and join the other two brigades of the 4th in 
the main defensive position in the vicinity of Bomdila with 
all forward checkposts being abandoned; two brigades from 
Nagaland would fall back to positions near the 4th, picking 
up a brigade from Ranchi or Calcutta to replace the formation 
left in Nagaland and the 5th division would be rushed to act 
as the reserve at Bomdila - the main defence anchor. The 
main defence line would be strengthened with light tanks 
drawn from the armoured regiment at Calcutta and artillery 
drawn from the most readily available source, such as the 
50th paratroop brigade at Agra.
Contingency planning for the Sikkim area remained un­
changed, although some provisions, details of which are not 
in the writer’s possession, were made to counter any 
Chinese attack on Bhutan.
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As regards Ladakh, the military authorities remained of 
the view that the existing logistics deficiencies severely 
limited the preparation of a successful defence against a 
serious and sustained Chinese attack. In the event of such 
an attack, it was recognized that the troops in the area 
could only fight as best they could and would, in all prob­
ability, be forced to concede a major part of Ladakh.
All contingency planning was based upon the assumption 
that Pakistan would not seek to take advantage of any major 
Indian military involvement against China in the Himalayan 
region, thereby permitting the re-deployment of the requisite 
forces against China in any emergency.
To enable the Army to meet its new Himalayan commit­
ments, an expansion programme was undertaken which involved 
an increase in the establishment of existing combatant and 
support arms and the raising of a new infantry division - 
the 17th - to replace the 4th in Punjab Force. Although a 
shortage of officers and equipment limited expansion to one 
division at a time, the fact that only one was raised during 
the three years preceding the border war in October 1962 sug­
gests that the Government was not seriously concerned with 
the prospect of open war with China.
This relative complacency about a Chinese military 
threat was virtually characteristic of the Government’s atti­
tude towards the country’s security as a whole.
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Although Nehru had early declared his preference for
well-equipped forces, he was strongly disinclined to concede
qrequests from the Army for a phased re-equipment programme 
for reasons of finance. Speaking in the Lok Sabha in August 
1963, the Prime Minister admitted that ’repeatedly demands 
were made from the Defence Ministry or the Army Headquarters 
for more expenditure, but we discouraged them; sometimes, we 
might have cut them down, too; they were in such fantastic 
figures, in geometrical proportion1. Such expenditure, he 
claimed, was ’always difficult except when you are faced with 
a war situation, when the country and Parliament and every­
body thinks differently’^ .  Referring to the matter in the 
Rajha Sabha the following month, he declared:
When you are faced with extreme difficulty, like 
the Chinese invasion, you have to do it whatever 
happens. You can get it too from friendly 
countries. You can tax your people much more than normally you could. But, imagine in peacetime, 
how far can you create that atmosphere? How far 
will people bear such heavy burdens of taxation 
and how far will other countries be prepared to 
help you to that extent? It is only when danger 
comes and shakes you up that you can get more 
money by taxation, loans, credits and gifts from 
outside•
Thus, Nehru concluded, requests from Army authorities when 
referred by the Defence Ministry to the Defence Committee of 
the Cabinet were ’possibly’ agreed to by the Committee to 
the extent of one-tenth what was asked^.
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The Government was sympathetic to the provision of 
tanks, in the belief that this arm would be decisive in any 
Indo-Pakistan war. The need for newer tanks had been illus­
trated during the Kashmir conflict, when the obsolete Stuarts, 
Churchills and obsolescent Shermans had been kept operational 
(in the context of the Anglo-American embargo on arms ship­
ments to both the disputants) only by the despatch of teams 
to acquire available spares from World War II theatres of 
action. At least 30 Shermans were purchased from the United 
States in 1953 as a stop-gap measure while enquiries were 
made regarding the availability of modern tanks and brief 
consideration was given to the possible indigenous manufac­
ture of a foreign design under licence^. The latter pro­
posal was shortly discarded as premature, given India1s tech­
nological backwardness, and negotiations commenced with 
Britain and France which culminated in the purchase of 200 
British Centurion heavy tanks in 1956-57 and of 150 French 
AMX light tanks in 1957-58. Following a subsequent decision 
to undertake the manufacture of a modern tank during the 
Third Five-Year Plan (1961-66), assessments were made of the 
AMX and a light Panzer tank of West German design but it was 
ultimately decided to accept an offer by the British company 
of Vickers-Armstrong which involved a medium tank based on the 
Chieftain design and modified to Indian specifications^.
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The vehicular fleet was augmented by a small number of 
jeeps purchased from private British firms in the 1948-51 
period^ and by an unknown number of general service trucks 
acquired from American sources in subsequent years. General 
reliance continued to be placed upon the large stocks of 
vehicles left from World War II, however, in the belief 
that the consequent heavy burden placed upon the Electrical 
and Mechanical Engineers (EMEs) was preferable to the expen­
diture of scarce foreign exchange. A phased programme of 
replacement of vehicles was drawn up in 1956 but could not 
be implemented at that time due to the acute shortage of 
foreign exchange experienced by India in 1957-58 and inade­
quate indigenous capacity for the manufacture of 4-wheel 
drive vehicles^. Sanction was thereupon given for the 
long-overdue streamlining of the vehicle fleet. Some 20,000 
vehicles were reconditioned by Army engineers^ and, in May 
1959* 3>630 units (three-ton and 15 cwt 4x2) were declared 
for disposal as surplus to Army needs^. In the 1959-61 
period, the Government sanctioned indigenous production 
schemes to meet the Armyfs requirements of light and medium 
vehicles with Japanese Nissan patrol jeeps and one-ton 
trucks and West German three-ton trucks^. Throughout the
1947-62 period, policy was to retain one-ton and three-ton
49vehicles for about 15 years and two major overhauls
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Serious consideration was not given by the Government 
to the replacement of the .303 rifle, the Army»s standard 
infantry weapon in two world wars, until the Himalayan situ­
ation sharply deteriorated in late 1959. Army interest was 
considerable in the Colt AR-15f an American design which had 
first appeared in 1958, although it was regarded by some 
officers as lacking sufficient »punch1 and requiring a 
divergence from the standard .303 bore with consequent supply 
problems. The Belgian FN was highly regarded and lesser 
interest was also shown in Army circles in a West German 
design and the indigenous Ishapore model then undergoing 
development^ ®.
A number of models of each of the four types were 
acquired and were subjected to extensive tests by frontline 
units under all conditions. According to an informed source, 
the tests revealed a consensus in favour of the AR-15 and 
Army Headquarters accordingly submitted its recommendation 
for the adoption of the American rifle in late I960.
The Government, however, was not inclined to act upon 
the proposal; it remained very reluctant to expend the 
foreign exchange involved in such a measure, certain of its 
hierarchy were emotionally opposed to dealing with a private 
arms supplier in the »arms racket» and there was a 
long-standing aversion to the acquisition of »offensive»
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armaments from either of the two major participants in the 
cold war. As an alternative, which appeared to be far more 
attractive, consideration was given to the possible licensed 
manufacture of the FN. While it is not known to what extent 
the proposal was pursued, the alleged involvement of the 
particular Belgian firm in a 1scandal1 apparently confirmed 
the strong predelictions of certain influential members of 
the political executive concerning the immorality of private 
arms manufacturers. With the encouragement of the Defence 
Minister, V.K. Krishna Menon, the decision was taken to pro­
ceed with the development and production of the Ishapore 
design - despite the fact that Army circles regarded it as 
but a fpoor copy of the FNf, too heavy and too bulky, and 
were not happy with the further delay inherent in the de­
cision. Their fears were well-founded as a satisfactory 
prototype of the Ishapore design was not forthcoming until 
mid-1962 and production had not commenced when the border 
conflict erupted.
Requests by the Army for new mortars met with no posi­
tive response from the Government. The proposed purchase of 
the French Brandt heavy mortar in the early ’fifties was 
rejected on the grounds that it was too expensive and that 
it was preferable to develop an indigenous type. Profession 
al interest was shown in a Finnish mortar which appeared in
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1959 or I960 but enquiries were apparently inhibited for 
political reasons: Israel was the only country licensed to 
produce it, and direct or indirect purchase from this source 
was considered by the Government as a possible source of 
offence to the Arab bloc, with whom there was a strong and 
continuing desire to maintain close relations.
Persistent requests from Army Headquarters for consider­
ation to be given the early replacement of the 25-pounder 
field artillery and the acquisition of modern mountain 
howitzers provoked a qualified response from the Government. 
It viewed the items as having a relatively low priority, 
rejected external purchase on financial grounds, and was 
content to await the development and production of designs 
undergoing development in the research sector of the Defence 
Ministryfs ordnance establishment.
The problem of Indianization of the officer corps had 
posed an acute issue even prior to partition and the loss of 
the greater part of the Moslem component. India emerged 
from World War II with an indigenous Army officer cadre 
totalling 8,340, exclusive of the medical services^. Many 
of these wartime entrants were, however, either below the 
desired peacetime standard or were disinclined to seek a 
career in the Service. The Commander-in-Chief, Sir Claude 
Auchinleck, informed the Council of State in New Delhi on
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8 April 1946 that there were only 5,100 suitable officer 
personnel available against a tentative estimated need of 
9,000. He also stated that the quality of the individuals 
offering themselves for the cadet course was relatively poor; 
only 126 of the 1,236 applicants for the 300 vacancies in 
the first postwar course in the Indian Military Academy were 
considered acceptable and there were only 900 applicants for 
the second course beginning in May^.
Partition considerably aggravated the situation by remov­
ing most of the Moslem element, who were particularly promin­
ent in the infantry arm; 2,110 commissioned officers and 
3,424 VCOs of the Moslem faith went to Pakistan plus 177 
commissioned officers and 223 VCOs who, though non-Moslem, 
were of Pakistani domicile, while only 215 commissioned 
officers and 339 VCOs of the Moslem faith opted for India"0. 
The resulting situation, as revealed by a statement tabled 
in the Constituent Assembly on 4 March 1948, was the expecta­
tion that the Army would be 400 officers short of establish­
ment by 31 March - 40 armour, 100 artillery, 150 engineers,
40 ordnance and 70 EMEs^^. This figure excluded 182 British 
officers who had volunteered to serve with the Army for 
periods in excess of three months.
For political and psychological reasons, however, the 
decision on rapid Indianization was proceeded with, and only
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selected British personnel were retained for varying periods. 
Thus, whereas at independence Indians held only six brigade and 
sub-area commands, one area but no division or army com­
mands^ , by April 1948 all battalion and regimental commands 
save three regimental centres were held by Indians. By the 
end of April, the three army and all division, area, sub-area 
and brigade commands had been Indianized and General K.M. 
Cariappa became the first Indian Commander-in-Chief on 15 
January 1949« British personnel were progressively replaced 
thereafter as qualified Indians became available. The number 
of British officers, which totalled 244 on 1st April 1948 
and comprised six generals, twelve brigadiers, 21 colonels,
58 lieutenant-colonels and I46 major and below had been 
reduced to 57 by March 1953 > of which 52 were specialists^.
By 1955 it was intended that there would only be a few British
r 7EME technicians remaining on the strength of the ArmyJ'.
This target appears to have been adhered to although statis­
tical confirmation is not readily available.
There continued to be an acute shortage of officers, 
however, due to the Armyfs inability to attract the required 
number of suitable applicants. The Director, Selection of 
Personnel at Army HQ, Brigadier N.D. Bilimoria, declared at 
a Bombay press conference on 1st April 1949 that the res­
ponse for vacancies at the newly-established Inter-Services
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Wing of the Armed Forces Academy (Khadakavasala) had been 
’disappointing*. Only 75 per cent of the vacancies for the 
first course in January had been filled and, of the 250 
applicants for the second course examinations conducted by 
the Public Service Commission, only 45 had passed and only 
35 of these were expected to be accepted by the selection 
boards. In an effort to retrieve the situation, a supple­
mentary examination for the 237 places in the July course 
was to be held in May, but the most optomistic estimate was 
that only 100 candidates would qualify, leaving a deficit of 
about 137^ *
Even more disturbing in Brigadier Bilimoria’s view was 
the disparity in the response of the various provinces. Of 
the approximately 180 cadets in the Wing at the time he 
spoke, over 50 came from the East Punjab, about 40 from Delhi 
Province, and about 36 from Uttar Pradesh, leaving only 
about 50 from the rest of India. In further illustration of 
his contention, Bilimoria noted that, of the 300 applicants 
received to that date for the second course beginning in 
July, about 80 were from each of the Punjab, Uttar Pradesh 
and Delhi Province with fan insignificant number of 60 candi­
dates* from the rest of India - 18 from Bombay, eleven from 
Madras, eleven from Bengal, ten from Central Provinces and 
Berar and four from Bihar. He felt that if this ’very
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serious state of affairs1 continued and over 75 per cent of 
the officer recruits came from northern India ’we will be 
faced with the problem of a martial class again’^ .
There continued to be a poor response, however, to the 
courses at the Joint Services Wing. Only 166 of 1,423 candi­
dates were admitted to the January 1951 course, 159 of 1,940 
candidates to the August 1951 course, and 145 of 2,095 to 
the course beginning in January 1952^. The situation for 
the Military Wing Course was even more disturbing; only 30 
of 3>214 applicants were found suitable for admission to the 
January 1951 course, only 64 of 1,940 applicants to the 
August 1951 course, and only 52 of 1,820 applicants for the 
course commencing in January 1952^. The number of cadets 
admitted to the Indian Military Academy further attested to 
the inability of the Army to attract qualified cadets in the 
required numbers - 247 for the second course, 274 for the 
third course, 202 for the fourth course, 182 for the fifth, 
147 for the sixth and 156 for the seventh^.
The initial shortage of officers was partially eased by 
the granting of Short Service Permanent Regular Commissions 
to former officers*^, and the employment of civilian engin­
eers on a contract basis in certain technical services^.
As the required number of recruits failed to come forward, 
various other measures were introduced to alleviate the
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deficiency. Special List commissions were introduced in
1953 with the primary aim of utilizing the services of those
Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) and Non-Commissioned
Officers (NCOs) who had acquired specialized knowledge in
their respective trades and capacities0 . In mid-1957>
2,000 officers holding temporary commissions were granted
6 6permanent ones and the decision was taken that retired 
officers could be re-employed for a maximum of three years.
In 1959t this period of re-employment was extended beyond 
three years so long as no officer was retained beyond 55 
years of age.
By I960 the officer cadre was about 3,000 short of 
establishment with some infantry battalions having only 
eleven or twelve officers out of an establishment of 35-40. 
The situation was rendered more acute by the expansion pro­
gramme begun in late 19599 and by the release of World War II 
entrants who were nearing the maximum age limits for which 
majors and below had already been extended by several years. 
The 1956-60 period had witnessed the virtual disappearance 
of the war-experienced NCO cadre and the rural background 
and low educational standards of most of the recruits in the 
combatant arms precluded undue haste in the training of NCOs 
without damaging the efficiency of the Army0/.
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The situation prompted further actions by the respons­
ible authorities to augment the officer corps. The intake 
to Dehra Dun (the Indian Military Academy) was increased by 
50 per cent and standards were lowered for entry to the 
National Defence Academy at Khadakvasala^ # Five Sainik^  
schools were established in 1961 and six in 1962 with the 
dual aim of providing educationally qualified young men for 
the armed forces and reducing the imbalance of representa­
tion from the Punjab. The Special List cadre was substan­
tially increased, promotion for certain categories of NCOs 
was liberalized and an unspecified number of JCOs were employ­
ed as Administrative Officers in National Cadet Corps units. 
The World War II Army Cadet College at Nowgong (Madhya 
Pradesh) was re-established in May I960 with a capacity of 
260 cadets to train suitable JCOs and NCOs possessing the 
minimal educational qualifications so as to enable them to 
compete successfully with others for entry into the Indian 
Military Academy and for regular commissions.
The character, organization and ’outlook1 of the Army 
remained largely unchanged during the 15 years from the re­
constitution of the Service in 1947 to the border war with 
China in 1962.
Shortly after independence, the Government announced 
that thenceforth recruitment to the Army would, as an explicit
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policy, be open to all persons of Indian domicile irrespec­
tive of class, creed or religion. Furthermore, no definite 
proportion would be allotted to any class or creed^. The 
practice introduced during the Second World War of ’mixed 
artillery, signals, administrative and other ancillary and
support arms and services was retained and a Brigade of
72Guards and a Parachute Regiment were formed as ’mixed’ 
units. The class/caste basis of the infantry regiments was, 
however, not tampered with in recognition both of the effects 
of such a policy on esprit de corps and the peculiar social 
patterns of India. This tradition was applied to the Jammu 
and Kashmir Regiment raised after partition, this unit re­
cruiting only Sikhs, Dogras and Moslems from that state.
The Gurkha Rifles, once despised by Congress politicians as 
despicable mercenaries, were retained and are coveted .
The Viceroy’s Bodyguard was retained as the President’s Body- 
guard‘d ' and kept its gold and scarlet uniforms, high boots 
and lances with the Asoka Lion replacing the imperial crown 
and insignia on the breastplate. The only structural change 
occurred with the conversion of the Mahar Regiment from an 
infantry to a machine-gun formation. Thus, while the 
so-called ’non-raartial’ classes are well represented in the 
non-combatant arms, the frontline infantry remained dominated 
by the ’martial’ classes of the north and north-west - Sikhs,
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Jats, Rajputs, Dogras, Garhwalis and Gurkhas. Indiafs large 
Moslem community contributed only a few thousands to the 
successor of the Army in which their community (albeit large­
ly from the north-western areas incorporated in West 
Pakistan) were once so prominent^.
Various suggestions were put forward from time to time 
regarding beneficial changes in the organization and charac­
ter of the Army. One Indian military writer suggested a 
reduction in the logistical branches for reason that the 
order of battle contained a number of administrative and 
engineer units required for operations in ’Eastern theatres 
of war where administrative backing would be poor, and the 
line of communication long and indifferent* but not required 
for the ArmyTs existing commitments to defence of India’s 
frontiers. He proposed that the divisional organization 
could be replaced by ’brigade groups with fixed organisations, 
including an allotment of armour•••[and] grouped under divi­
sional headquarters for co-ordination or, should the necess-
7 Aity arise, for fighting concentrated as a division’' •
Another proposal advanced with minor variations periodically
concerned reliance upon large militia-style forces as either
a temporary arrangement pending the development of indigenous
77sources of modern costly armaments or as a permanent 
78policy' . The latter proposal envisaged a militia force,
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trained in mass tactics for guerilla warfare and organized 
around a small and well-equipped regular force which would 
serve as a hard-hitting offensive force and as a nucleus 
for training and organization.
The brigade group proposal provoked some discussion in 
Army circles, but it was ultimately decided that ’by and 
large’ it was best to retain the divisional organization 
while altering the infantry battalion in favour of greater
7qfirepower, mobility and fewer frills . The establishment 
of the Lok Sahayak Sena (viz. National Volunteer Force) in 
May 1955 with the declared aim of reducing dependence upon 
the standing Army (the Army being given no control over the 
force) suggested a political desire to prevent a concentra­
tion of authority in Army Headquarters. It is doubtful, 
however, if the position of the standing Army was ever 
threatened for either political or economic reasons - India’s 
responsible political leaders undoubtedly agreed with the 
observation of one Indian military commentator, recorded in 
1955, that a regular Army with a little streamlining and
modern equipment was far better than any large and
8 0half-trained peasant militia
The need for some units to be trained and equipped for 
operations in the mountainous and jungle terrain of the 
Himalayan region was advanced by a British officer in an
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Q Iarticle published in early 1947 . In the aftermath of
China’s occupation of Tibet in 1950-51* at least a section 
of the Army leadership appreciated that it would be prudent 
to form a small specialized force to maintain a constant 
surveillance of the Himalayan frontier. Political disinter­
est was primarily responsible for the proposal not being 
pursued. Army Headquarters also felt the need to make at 
least some preparations against the contingency of future 
operations in this area, and decided in 1951-52 on the pre­
paration of a manual on Chinese infantry tactics, organization 
and equipment; material was to be obtained from British and 
American sources and based upon the experience of British 
and American forces in Korea. Upon learning of the project, 
however, Nehru ordered it to be dropped. Political attitudes 
towards military precautions in the Himalayan region during 
this early period were in accordance with Nehru’s strong 
belief (which virtually amounted to a conviction) that the 
Chinese military threat to India’s Himalayan frontiers and 
interests in the hill-states was distant and should not be
stimulated by any Indian actions or attitudes which might be
82regarded by Peking as provocative
As the Himalayan situation steadily deteriorated after 
1954* there was increasing concern in military circles at 
the seeming refusal by the political authorities to
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8 'Jappreciate the need for phased adjustments to the situation
The Army moved to acquaint personnel with the problems of
mountain and jungle warfare by establishing a Jungle Warfare
School at Dehra Dun in 1958 and introducing a course on
guerilla tactics at the Infantry School (Mhow) in the same
year. In the latter part of I960 the Chief of Army Staff,
General K.S. Thimayya, was permitted to make a long-desired
study of alpine troops, organization and tactics in the
Mount Blanc area at the invitation of the Italian Govern­
ed Ament° . Upon his return to India, General Thimayya is under­
stood to have recommended to the Defence Ministry the rais­
ing of some mountain divisions and to have made proposals 
regarding the organization, training and equipment of such 
formations. The resulting scheme of Himalayan defence would 
consist of lightly equipped and mobile infantry deployed in 
forward areas backed by a strong and highly mobile mechaniz­
ed force based in the plains.
The proposal was rejected by the Government for reasons 
which had become quite irrelevant. Defence Minister Menon 
and Prime Minister Nehru would seem to have felt that the 
formation of such divisions would constitute a basic shift 
in strategic policy with far-reaching repercussions on 
foreign policy - an eventuality which was to be avoided if 
at all possible. The cost of such a measure would also
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increase the countryfs already heavy defence burden. Desirous 
of an eventual peaceful settlement of the border dispute and 
having ruled out the possibility of large-scale Chinese 
attacks in the immediate future and even beyond, the politi­
cal leadership of the ruling Congress Party viewed the expen­
sive response proposed by the Army as not warranted^. The 
only adjustment to the Army training programme after 1959 
that related to Himalayan operations was the establishment 
of a High Altitude Warfare School in March 1962, although 
the need for mountain formations deployed in the Himalayas
Q Z
continued to be advanced in responsible journals0 .
On the eve of the border conflict in October 1962, the 
Indian Army comprised some 550,000 personnel, including 
about 35,000 unenrolled (civilian) personnel and a substan­
tial body of enrolled non-combatants. The Service was organ­
ized in three Commands (Western with headquarters at Delhi, 
Eastern based at Ranchi and Southern based at Poona) with 
sub-areas. Field formations consisted of eight infantry 
divisional organizations (2nd fNagaf, 4th, 5th, 10th, 17th, 
19th, 26th and 27th), the 1st armoured division, 1st inde­
pendent armoured brigade, 50th paratroop brigade and various 
unattached formations. There were approximately 1,000 tanks 
(150 AMX, 200 Centurions, 600 Shermans and Stuarts and a 
number of Churchills) spread in operational, training and
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reserve categories. This regular force was backed by a 
Reserve of 250,000 officers and men serving seven-year en­
gagements (of which only about 30,000 could be regarded as 
first-line reserves), two battalions of the Jammu and 
Kashmir State Militia, the semi-military Assam Rifles organ­
ization of perhaps 15,000 personnel, 15 battalions of the 
Central Reserve Police and a number of battalions of Armed 
Police from the various states0'•
Para-military organizations embraced several million 
civilians. The Territorial Army consisted of 177 units with
an actual strength of 419*580 as against an authorised estab-
88lishment of 468,970 • The Lok Sahayak Sena scheme, which
had imparted elementary military training to 435*083 civil-
89ians by December 1959 and had been re-organized effective
1st January I960 with increased stress on border areas^, had
imparted training to 470,000 by March 1961^ and to 619*114 
92by March 1962 . The National Cadet Corps scheme had been
93expanded by the creation of the NCC Rifles and an Auxiliary 
Cadet Corps (ACC)^ and all schemes were reported to be mak­
ing satisfactory progress. On 31 March 1962 there were 2,403
officers and 127*667 cadets in the Senior Division, 3*794
officers and 170,730 cadets in the Junior Division, 1,400
officers and 280,000 cadets in the NCC Rifles and 20,214
teachers and 1,212,840 cadets in the ACC^ ~* •
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The regular Service continued to reflect its development 
as an adjunct to the imperial British military system.
British weapons, drill manuals, unit tables of organization 
and British-style uniforms remained in use. There was ex­
tensive stress on the regimental tradition and the infantry
arm continued to be recruited largely from the so-called
96’martial classes’ . Although plans envisaged the eventual
97replacement of English by Hindi as the language of command , 
English remained the vehicle of administration, operation 
and training, and Hindustani continued to be the lingua 
franca of the Service. The distinction between the senior 
(KCO and ICO) and junior (JCO) forms of commission remained 
in vogue and the JCOs (formerly designated Viceroy’s Commis­
sioned Officers or VCOs) remained as a liaison - albeit a 
less significant one than hitherto - between the ranks and 
the senior (i.e. ICO) commissioned officers. By virtue of 
their long service and their conservative and rural origins, 
the JCOs continued to knit together the regimental struc­
ture and to perpetuate the traditional flavour of the 
Service. The formal regimental mess remained in prominent 
use, complete with traditional taboos and ceremonies like
q Othe ’Loyal Toast’ to the head of state7 • Formal ceremonies 
like ’beating the retreat’ and the presentation and trooping
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of the colours continued to be performed with meticulous 
care for tradition.
The weapons and ancillary equipment of the Army dated 
from World War II and, in some cases, before - the bolt 
action .303 Lee Enfield rifle of various numbers and marks, 
fStenT machine carbines, TBrenf light and ,Vickersf medium 
machine guns, 2-inch, 3-inch and 4*2-inch mortars, 75 nun. 
pack howitzers, 25 pounder field artillery and 4*5-inch and 
5.5-inch medium artillery. Armoured units were equipped with 
Centurion and Sherman heavy tanks and AMX light tanks, with 
obsolete Churchill and Stuart models still to be found in 
training formations and the latter frequently utilized in an 
internal security role. Communications equipment was old 
and suited for static conditions. The vehicular fleet was 
generally old and well-worn, the proportion of units acquired 
prior to 194^ representing 15 per cent (jeeps), 38 per cent 
(3-ton general service) and 68 per cent (1-ton general 
service)^.
Combat formations were deployed to meet the demands of 
frontier defence against Pakistan in the west and east and 
China in the north-west and north-east, of internal security 
(including the internal security-cum-frontier security cam­
paign against the Naga dissidents) and certain international 
obligations voluntarily assumed by the Government:
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Kashmir - Three infantry divisions along the ceasefire line 
as in 19539 each brigade supported by mortars and 
one battery of mountain guns; two battalions of 
the Jammu and Kashmir Militia; approximately two 
brigades in Ladakh; perhaps a squadron of Stuart 
light tanks in the Vale.
Punjab - Two infantry divisions (5th and 17th) each with a
regiment of AKX tanks and sited as in 1953; 1st in­
dependent armoured brigade at Patiala.
Delhi-Rajasthan - One infantry brigade based at Jaipur with 
one battalion at Jodhpur as per 1953; 1st armoured 
division at Jhansi as in 1953*
NEFA/Assam - One infantry division (4th) based at Tezpur with 
two brigades in foothills and one brigade along the 
Tawang-Dhola axis; 14 infantry battalions in three 
brigade groups in Nagaland and immediately contig­
uous areas of Assam.
Sikkim/Bhutan sector - One infantry brigade based at
Siliguri with one battalion at Siliguri, one bat­
talion at Kalimpong and one battalion along the 
Gangtok-Natu La axis.
Miscellaneous internal - One infantry brigade at Ranchi;
one infantry brigade and one armoured regiment 
equipped with Stuart tanks in the Calcutta area;
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one infantry brigade group in Kutch; one infantry 
brigade in Secunderabad; one infantry battalion in 
each of Madras, Bangalore and Trivandrum; the 50th 
paratroop brigade at Agra.
External - A 5 y000-strong brigade group plus about 500 ancil­
lary personnel with the United Nations in the 
Congo; one infantry battalion plus support units 
totalling about 1,200 personnel with the UNEF in 
Gaza; and several hundred personnel with the Inter­
national Supervisory Commission in the Indo-Chinese 
states.
Contingency planning had been prepared to meet the re­
quirements of operations against Pakistan in Kashmir, Punjab 
and Rajasthan with precautionary measures along the borders 
of East Pakistan, and to counter possible Chinese attacks in 
Ladakh, the Sikkim-Bhutan sector and the Tawang area of NEFA.
The Army was reasonably well-prepared for conventional 
operations against a markedly weaker Pakistani adversary 
possessing similar organization, training and equipment and 
deployed in a defensive posture^^^. In the event of attacks 
by tribals, Azad (Free) Kashmir forces or Pakistani regulars 
across the ceasefire line in Kashmir, the garrison in that 
area (with possible support from the armoured brigade at 
Patiala) would seek to contain the attacks and to regain the
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initiative by means of offensive operations directed towards 
Sd-akhcrfc and perhaps also Peshawar and Rawalpindi. In the 
meantime, Punjab Force would strike towards Lahore and seek 
decisive action with the opposing Pakistani forces. The 
resultant pincer movement, coupled with India’s superior 
military power, was regarded as adequate to deal a crippling 
blow to Pakistan’s field army and force an early peace. Only 
watch and ward duties appear to have been envisaged vis-a-vis 
East Pakistan.
For the contingency of Himalayan operations against 
China, however, the Service was ill-prepared.
The forces in Ladakh consisted of an infantry brigade 
based on Leh with perhaps two other battalions dispersed 
among 40-43 small posts spread over nearly 400 miles of dif­
ficult terrain extending from the Karakoram Pass to Demchok 
with Chushul as base and anchor strongpoint. The primary 
purpose of these posts was to demarcate the forward line and 
discourage by their presence further Chinese advances; they 
were not designed to withstand any serious attack and had 
strict orders not to engage in any offensive action'*'^.
102Srinagar and Leh were linked by road via Kargil and Dras 
and Leh was connected by road with Chushul and thence to 
Deinchok and also to Manali. Air supply originated at 
Chandigarh (Punjab) with airfields of variable capacity at
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Srinagar, Kargil, Leh and Chushul. The forward outposts were 
almost exclusively dependent upon this source of supply which, 
for reasons of weather, was operative for only about 180 days 
of the year.
The frontier in the middle sector (i.e. Punjab, Uttar 
Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh) was guarded by a number of 
small police checkposts under Army control linked to rear 
areas only by bridle paths and mule tracks. As of mid-1961, 
light vehicles could proceed no further towards the border 
than Dharchula (60 miles from Lipulek Pass), Joshimath (42 
miles from Mana Pass and 52 miles from Niti Pass) and Uttar- 
kashi (38 miles from V/alang Pass) and the remaining stretches 
to the frontier posts were not expected to be completed until 
March 1963'U)3.
In the Sikkim area, the approach route from Natu La was 
covered by a brigade deployed in staggered fashion from north 
to south and assisted by two companies of Sikkimese militia 
totalling about 280 men. Supplies and transport for this 
meagre force were dependent upon the road extending north 
from Siliguri over the Tista River at the frontier town of 
Rangpo and thence to Gangtok and beyond to Natu La on the 
border with Tibet.
In NEFA, there were two brigades in the Tezpur-Bomdila- 
Dirrang Dzong area with a third brigade deployed from Tawang
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to Dhola, near the tri-junction of NEFA, Bhutan and Tibet.
The frontier was watched by a series of small posts manned 
chiefly by the Assam Rifles, which were backed by several 
strongpoints garrisoned by regulars; these strongpoints con­
stituted bases between which a communications system was be­
ing developed. Positions on the Namka Chu River were only 
15 miles from the Tibetan border but five days march from 
Tawang. The defensive positions in this most threatened of 
areas were weak: heavy entrenching tools had only begun to 
arrive shortly before the major Chinese attack, there were 
no wire obstacles, ammunition was in short supply, the troops 
were not acclimatized to the 14-17>000 feet altitudes and 
warm clothing was generally conspicuous by its absence. The 
logistical support in the Kameng Division was restricted to 
the newly-completed 220-mile road linking Tezpur with Tawang 
via Se La (13,700 feet) Dirrang Dzong and Bomdi La (9>000 
feet) which was barely capable of taking one-ton traffic. A 
series of defensive posts were in the process of being estab­
lished along this route.
The remaining forward posts extending eastwards along 
the MacMahon Line were isolated and, although in some cases 
inter-connected by goat/mule tracks, were dependent for their 
main requirements upon air supply. The border post at Kibi- 
thoo in the Lohit Division was 15 miles (at least two days
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march) from Walong with forward positions on a 15,000 feet 
high ridge near the banks of the unfordable Lohit River. 
Walong was 100 miles (or about two weeks march) from the 
nearest roadhead and was dependent for supply upon an Otter 
airstrip.
Contingency plans prepared in 1960-61 envisaged a 
general retirement from the systems of small posts in Ladakh 
and NEFA to more defensible positions which were to be rapid­
ly reinforced to permit of a successful defence followed by 
counter-actions at the appropriate time. The capacity of 
the Army to carry out successful defensive and offensive 
actions against sizable Chinese forces on a major scale was, 
however, virtually non-existent.
The shortage of officers had inevitably led to a deter­
ioration in the quality of the corps which was aggravated by 
its apathy and complacency arising from the Governments 
efforts to project a pacific image in international affairs, 
from low pay as compared to the civil service and private 
industry, obsolete equipment and the conduct of the Defence 
Minister towards the Service in general and promotions in 
particular. Few officers evinced serious interest in tech­
niques useful for operations against a Chinese opponent who, 
according to the politicians, really posed no serious threat. 
The shortage of qualified officers had inhibited Army
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Headquarters from establishing a Planning Group, and the 
Governmentfs refusal to allocate suitable training areas had 
limited the ability of the Army leadership to ascertain 
Service effectiveness on a continuing and useful basis and 
under various physical conditions. There was an inadequate 
appreciation of the logistics requirements of modern warfare: 
supplies were located in scattered depots sited often with 
only marginal relevance to likely operational needs and to 
the delays in despatching them to frontline formations occa­
sioned by weather, mechanical and human errors, etc.
Many of these deficiencies had been illustrated by 
operation VijayT, launched against Goa on 17 December 1961. 
The action had been used by the Defence Ministry as a tac­
tical exercise on a tri-Service basis on a scale which was 
lavish relative to operational needs'*'^. According to 
reports, the 17th division took nearly a month to prepare 
for the operation and the troop movements so disorganized 
the railway system in central India that the steel mills at 
Ahmedabad ran out of coal and had to temporarily shut down.
On D + 4f the roads leading into Goa from Savantvadi,
Maneri, Colemn and Polem were choked with columns of medium 
artillery, trucks and tank transport. A considerable number 
of troops arrived for action equipped only with canvas shoes 
due to a shift in the contract for army boots from a major
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recognized firm to a smaller company which failed to fulfil 
its obligations. Some troops were without field rations for 
48 hours due to a breakdown in the supply system, and inade­
quate co-ordination between the air and ground forces result 
ed on one occasion in aircraft being nine miles off target 
and discharging their bombs onto Army transport-*-^ #
It is understood that the exercise was subjected to 
considerable scrutiny and comment in Service (particularly 
Army) circles, and that various proposals were made to the 
Defence Ministry regarding their correction. As the events 
of October-November 1962 were to reveal, however, little 
action was sanctioned in the interim period to enhance the 
Armyfs operational effectiveness.
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CHAPTER VI
THE INDIAN AIR FORCE 1947-1962
India retained at partition roughly two-thirds of the 
Royal Indian Air Force. This comprised seven fighter squad­
rons equipped with Tempest 2s and Spitfires, one transport/ 
communication squadron of Douglas C-47s and de Havilland 
Devons, one artillery observation post flight of Auster 5s 
and miscellaneous Tiger Moth, Percival Prentice and Spitfire 
training aircraft. Most of the prewar training establish­
ments and permanent air force stations went to Pakistan by 
virtue of their location within the territory embraced by 
West Pakistan'*'. The development of the Service had necess­
arily to be a phased and expensive undertaking and its size 
and composition were dependent upon the strategic role 
assigned it by the Government.
Partition and the altered strategic requirements conse­
quent on the existence of less than cordial relations with 
Pakistan does not appear to have altered New Delhi’s concep­
tion of the type and size of the air force required by the 
Union. The Indian Defence Minister, Baldev Singh, informed
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Parliament in early 1949 that it was the Government’s inten­
tion to create a balanced air force of 20 squadrons by 
1960^. This programme involved, as the initial phase, the 
organization of the units retained at partition into one jet 
fighter and six reciprocal-engine squadrons, a photo/recon­
naissance and two observation units, and the expansion of 
training, maintenance and administrative facilites. Phase 
two involved the re-equipment and expansion of the Service 
up to the force-level decided upon by the Government0.
One hundred Spitfire and Tempest fighter aircraft - 33 
constituting India’s share of the old RIAF and 67 represent­
ing purchases from surplus British stock^ - were shifted 
from Royal Air Force bases at Karachi to Bombay in the 
spring of 1948^ . Three Vampire F.3 fighters were obtained 
in late 1948, 52 Vampire F.B.9s and N.F.54s in 1949-50^ and 
71 Dassault MD-45O Ouragan fighter-bombers in 1953-54^• 
Several heavy bomber and reconnaissance units were formed 
from about 40 B-24J ’Liberator’ heavy bomber aircraft recon­
stituted by Hindustan Aircraft Limited (HAL) from World War 
II salvage yards at Kanpur . The C-47 (viz. DC-3) transport/ 
communication unit was expanded to perhaps 40 aircraft short­
ly after partition, a number of de Havilland Devon light 
transports were purchased in 1948-49 and, in 1953-54, the 
transport arm of the Air Force was augmented further through
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purchase of 26 Fairchild C-119G short- and medium-range 
otransports and six Sikorsky S-55 twelve-seat mtility heli­
copters.
Simultaneous with the acquisition of new aircraft, 
training establishments were set up to replace the facilities 
of the old RIAF which had been located within the boundaries 
of the new state of Pakistan. A Staff College was opened 
at Ootacamund in May 1949. No. 1 Flying School, initially 
sited at Ambala, was moved to Hyderabad and equipped with 
Tiger Moths and Prentices, and No. 2 Flying School was set 
up at Jodhpur equipped with Prentices and Harvards. Colleges 
were organized at Jodhpur, Begrumpet and Coimbatore for the 
training of navigators, signallers and ground officers. The 
Prentice was selected in 1948 as the interim trainer pending 
the availability of the Hindustan HT-2 primary trainer then 
undergoing development at HAL and 62 units were received 
from a production scheme at HAL during the period from 1948 
to 1953.
Indianization of the Service proceeded within the limit­
ations imposed by the need to maintain efficiency and the 
acute shortage in the immediate post-partition period of 
officers - which in March 1949 amounted to 207 general 
duties branch, 68 technical, 27 equipment, 42 education, two 
legal, eleven medical and 33 accounts’^®. To alleviate the
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shortage, civilians were recruited to the general duties
branch, senior NCOs possessing the requisite qualifications
and experience were commissioned and British personnel were
retained in key posts for which qualified Indians were not
immediately available. By March 1953> however, only nine
officers and 54 civilians of British nationality remained in
the Indian Air Force^ and the top post of Chief of Air
Staff was assumed by Air Marshal Sobrito Mukerjee in April
1954* The Service continued to experience difficulties,
however, in attracting suitable recruits and the problem was
further aggravated by the introduction by various States of
local languages as the medium of instruction in preference
to English - the knowledge of which was important in such a
12highly technical Service
The appointment of Air Marshal Mukerjee coincided with 
the general completion of the first phase of the Air Force 
programme. The implementation of stage two involved the 
re-equipment of the existing units and the phased expansion 
of frontline operational strength to the target of 20 squad­
rons envisaged as early as 1946 - and confirmed in 1949 - 
with such adjustments, if any, that might be regarded as 
warranted by the regional strategic situation and advances 
in aircraft and weapons technology.
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The XAF appears to have been initially interested in 
procuring 80 Dassault Mystere IVA sweptwing interceptors 
with the manufacture under licence of the Folland Gant 
lightweight fighter-bomber as a possible alternative; it was 
believed, however, that the Ouragans in sercice with the IAF 
gave the Mystere the edge in future orders . In the event, 
the Government purchased another 33 Ouragans^ and decided 
to proceed with both the Mystere and Gnat projects simultan­
eously. One hundred and ten Mysteres were ordered as re­
placements for the Ouragans"^ and negotiations commenced 
with Folland Aircraft for a licence to produce the Gnat in 
India. Discussions appeared to be nearing completion in 
February 1956, at which time it was reported that an Indian 
mission would shortly proceed to Britain to conclude an 
agreement for about 60 aircraft - of which three-quarters 
would be built in India'1' . Indiafs hesitation to sign a 
firm order over the summer provoked speculation that Russia 
had made an attractive offer of MIGs, but in September the 
Indian Government contracted for 20 ’whole1 Gnats, 20 sets
of components for assembly in India and the licensed manu-
17facture of 100 units by HAL at Bangalore '• Even as the
18first Mysteres and further Ouragans were arriving and the 
Gnat project was getting underway, India placed an order for 
160 Hawker Hunter Mk 56 FGAs and 22 Mk 66 two-seat trainers'^.
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Negotiations with Britain for the English Electric 
Canberra as a replacement for the obsolete B-24J *Liberator1
in the bomber and reconnaissance units began in 1954 and 
continued through 1956. Although Russia reportedly offered 
the Ilyushin-28 bomber (which is roughly comparable to the 
Canberra) at one-quarter to one-half the market price of the 
latter , the Indian Government decided in principle on 1st 
April 1956 to obtain the Canberra . The number of aircraft 
desired by India was initially believed to total about 40 
but, in January 1957* the Government placed an order for 54 
B(l).58 light bombers, eight P.R.57 photo/reconnaissance
aircraft and six T.4 dual-control trainers' A supplement­
ary order for twelve more B(l).58s was placed in September
231957 and it is understood from a reliable source that a 
further 20-30 Canberras of all types were ordered in 1961,
with deliveries of this latter order continuing through
241962 .
The transport capacity of the Air Force was substan­
tially increased during the 1955-62 period. Twenty-six de 
Havilland DHC-3 Otter utility transports were purchased in 
1956 to augment and replace the Devons, and four Bell 47G-2 
three-seat utility helicopters were acquired in 1957. Two 
Vickers Viscount 730 commercial transports were obtained for 
VIP use in 1955-56 (one of which represented a British gift
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to the Indian President) and the Soviet Union presented
India with two Ilyushin 11-14 commercial transport airctaft
at about the same time - one of which represented a gift for
Nehru. Both the Viscounts and the Ilyushins are believed to
have been tested by the IAF in order that their respective
suitabilities for military use could be assessed, but neither
was regarded as a satisfactory replacement for the aging
DC-3s. By early 19599 the Avro-748 had been selected as the
DC-3 replacement. Although the managing director of Hawker
Siddeley, Sir Roy Dobson, stated publicly in early May that
India was expected to order a ’considerable number’ of 
2 cAvro-748s " , an agreement signed in Delhi on 7 July 1959 
provided only for the licensed production of the Avro-748 in 
India.
The Army’s commitment to Himalayan security operations
in late 1959 caused the Defence Ministry, in November 1959,
to initiate a search for helicopters and transport aircraft
26capable of high altitude operations . Six companies quickly 
entered bids, which involved the Bell 204 Iroquois, Sikorsky 
S-62, Kaman H-43B, Westland Wessex, Saunders-Roe P.531 and 
Sud Aviation's Alouette II and III2  ^- with Sikorsky, who 
demonstrated the S-62 in New Delhi in December 1959> seeming­
ly having the initial edge. In May I960 India was reportedly
2 8examining a Sikorsky proposal to build the S-62 in India
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and an Indian technical delegation visited the Sikorsky plant
in June during the course of a United States tour in which a
2Qfurther 29 C-119G transport aircraft were purchased . The 
placing of an order for two S-62s in August appeared to pre­
sage a larger order with provision for licensed production 
30in India but India subsequently obtained from American 
sources only six S-62s and six Bell 47G-3 units in mid-1961^^ 
and six further Bell 47G-3s in August 1962^. For the great­
er portion of its increased transport requirements, New 
Delhi turned to the Soviet Union which had reportedly offer- 
ed the Mi-4 helicopter on attractive terms00. An eight-man 
Indian mission led by the Scientific Adviser to the Defence 
Ministry, Dr D.S. Kothari, visited Moscow in October I960 
for discussions regarding the possible purchase of Soviet 
transport aircraft, helicopters and road-building equipment 
and negotiated the purchase of ten Mi-4 1 Hound1 general pur­
pose/transport helicopters, 24 11-14 transports and eight
Antonov An-12 heavy air freighters'3 . A further order for
o reight An-12s and 16 Mi-4s was placed in early 1962° despite 
reported Indian dissatisfaction with the performance of the 
Soviet aircraft at the high Himalayan altitudes'3 • To con­
serve foreign exchange, the Defence Ministry also purchased 
a number of aircraft (probably DC-3s) from Indian civil and
3 7private sources .
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At about the same time as the Government was engaged in 
augmenting its transport capacity, it was reportedly making 
enquiries of the availability of air-to-air missiles from 
American sources'3 . The Defence Mission which Defence 
Secretary 0. Pulla Reddy led to the United States in June
1960 reportedly discussed with American officials the poss­
ibility of obtaining Sidewinder air-to-air missiles for the
IAFfs subsonic fighter arm, but their request was evidently
39refused . A similar request was reportedly made again in
1961 with the same result^, and three separate requests to 
the State Department for permission to obtain detailed data 
on the Hughes HM-55 air-to-air missile system were apparent­
ly rejected on each occasion^. Mr NehruTs claim in the 
Rajya Sabha on 23 August 1961 that India could have 1easily1 
bought some guided missiles from America, Britain or Russia 
but preferred to develop her own would, therefore, appear to 
be as misleading as another claim made by him on the same 
occasion - that India was reaching the stage where she could 
produce such missiles in abundance - was premature^.
In any case, by early 1962 the HF-24 project continued 
to make only slow progress as the search continued for a 
suitable engine to power the Mk 2 (supersonic) version. At 
some point in the early spring of 1962, the Indian Government 
accepted the view - which the IAF must have been putting
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forward for some time previously - that several squadrons 
must be re-equipped as quickly as practicable with a 
world-class supersonic fighter comparable to the Lockheed 
F-104 Starfighter in service with a number of Western air 
forces and Pakistan - the latter having obtained twelve of 
these aircraft in 1961-62. In May 1962, several Indian news­
papers reported that the Government was interested in the 
Soviet MIG-21 fighter. The Indian Express stated on 8 May 
that India was to buy two squadrons of MIGs and cited 
’defence experts’ as believing that India was also likely to 
buy guided missiles and radar equipment for the MIGs from 
Russia. The Times of India had reported several days earlier 
that the Defence Ministry had negotiated for the purchase of 
two squadrons of MIG-21s and their licenced production even­
tually^. A correspondent of yet another Indian daily denied 
in an article published on 9 May that any agreement for 
MIGs had yet been signed and suggested that, as India’s 
interest was in the production of a supersonic fighter under 
licence, ’Immediate orders may be placed for about two squad­
rons as an inducement with that country which would satis­
factorily fulfill, [India’s stated requirements as regards, 
price, etc.]^Z’.
The reports provoked immediate reactions in the United 
States where Congress happened to be engaged in discussion
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of the Administrationfs request for economic aid to India.
On 11 May, the United States Foreign Relations Committee 
voted 8-7 to cut aid to India by some 25 per cent (i.e. over 
$ 200 million) for the fiscal year beginning 1st July. This 
action was rescinded by a 9-7 vote of the Senate Committee 
which, however, rejected the proposed $ 90 million rise in 
the fiscal 1.963 funds requested by the Administration. In 
its turn, the House of Representatives Committee over-ruled 
the Senate action on the proposed increase and voted an $ 88 
million increase in aid to India in fiscal 1963^.
Following the appearance of the first press reports 
concerning its interest in the MIG - reports which were 
probably inspired - the Government maintained a discreet 
silence for reasons that were clearly not unrelated to Con­
gressional discussion of economic aid to India. Nehru left 
for a Kashmir vacation on 16 May without comment on the MIG 
issue while MenonTs only remark to newsmen after seeing the 
Prime Minister off was to declare that India had the right
Ato purchase arms wherever she wished' . With the passage of
the aid bill through the United States Congress, Indian pol­
itical leaders became more ready to offer opinions regarding 
the relative merits of the MIG. Menon admitted publicly, 
for the first time, during the debate on the defence demands 
in Parliament on 23 May that the Government was indeed
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weighing the purchase of Soviet jet aircraft and he listed 
price, ease of maintenance, etc. as advantages which the MIG 
possessed over comparable Western types4'7. At a press con­
ference on 13 June, Nehru expressed the view that he was 
leaning towards acceptance of the Soviet ’offer’ for reason
I o
that MIGs were most suited to India’s needs' but he admitted 
in the Rajya Sabha on 20 June that Russia had actually made 
no ’formal offer’ to supply MIGs and that his Government had 
only stated its ’intention’ to obtain them^.
While the attitude of the Government remained ambiguous 
and seemingly aimed largely at convincing the public that 
their political leadership would assert its independence of 
judgement, considerable concern was aroused in British and 
American official circles at the possibility of India ac­
quiring Soviet military aircraft. Prime Minister Macmillan 
and President Kennedy reportedly undertook urgent bilateral 
consultations involving an attractive counter-offer to India 
of British or French jets~*^ . The British Secretary of State 
for Commonwealth Relations, Duncan Sandys, flew to New Delhi 
on 15 June and held talks with Nehru and Menon over a period 
of three days during which time ’diplomatic sources’ revealed 
that Nehru had assured Sandys that India would consult 
Britain and the United States before making any decision on 
the purchase of MIGs~^. Sandys announced on 19 June that
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Britain would make ’precise proposals’ to counter the MIG
offerJ which, according to one press source, was believed
to involve provision of the Lightning at a unit cost of
$ 750,000 (about one-half the market price) and a willingness
to discuss the production of the model under licence in 
53India . Another report stated that the British had offered 
one squadron of Lightnings (i.e. twelve aircraft) to India 
but on the condition that the Royal Air Force immediately 
receive an equivalent number of F-104s from the United 
States'*.
’Informed sources’ reported the Defence Ministry as 
’inclined’ to shelve tlie MIG deal indefinitely or at least 
until Britain’s counter-proposals could be evaluated'*-’ and 
a tnree-man mission led by Air Vice-Marshal Harjinder Singh, 
AOC Maintenance Command, left for Britain on 7 July osten­
sibly to evaluate the Lightning. Simultaneously, the Indian 
Government reportedly made an exploratory approach to the 
U.S. State Department for McDonnell F-101 ’Voodoos’^  and 
enquired of the Dassault Company concerning possible purchase 
of about 50 Mirage Ills-*'7. Nothing was to eventuate from 
Western sources to the satisfaction of New Delhi, however, 
and an Indian evaluation team led by Dr S. Bhagavantam, 
Scientific Adviser to the Defence Ministry, left for Moscow 
on 31 July to discuss the possible purchase of two squadrons
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(24 planes) of operational MIG-21s, their production under 
licence in India, and the purchase of air-to-air missiles to
r Qarm them3 . An agreement was subsequently concluded in
August which provided for Indian purchase of twelve MIG-21s
and for Soviet technical assistance in the establishment of
production facilities for this model in India^^.
On the eve of the border conflict with Communist China
in October 1962, the Indian Air Force constituted the largest
and most effective national air force in the Indian Ocean
region. As nearly as the writer has been able to ascertain,
the IAF comprised about 30,000 regular personnel and about
400 frontline and 600 reserve, training and miscellaneous
aircraft organized in 25 regular and seven reserve squad-
61rons
The composition of the regular Service was thus:-
a) fighters - four squadrons of Dassault Mystere IVAs, two
squadrons of Folland Gnat Mk Is.
b) fighter/bombers - six squadrons of Hawker Hunter Mk 56
FGAs, two squadrons of Ouragans, one squadron 
of de Havilland Vampire F.B. 9s.
c) light bomber - three-four squadrons of Engli^i Electric
Canberra B(l).58s.
d) reconnaissance - one squadron of Canberra P.R.57s.
e) transports - six squadrons comprised of Fairchild C-119Gs,
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Douglas DC-3s (C-47s), de Havilland Devons, 
Ilyushin Il-14s, de Havilland DHC-3 Otters, 
Antonov An-12s.
f) helicopters - about 60 units comprised of Bell 47G-2s and
47G-3s , Sikorsky S-55s and S-62s. Mi-4s.
g) trainers - Ilawker Hunter Mk 66s, English Electric Canberra
T.4s, de Havilland Vampire T.55s, North 
American T-6G Texans, Hindustan HT-2s, Dassault 
Ouragans, Douglas DC-3s, Percival Prentice T.3s.
h) air observation post - Auster A.O.P. Mk 9s.
i) miscellaneous - Convair B-24 Js, Vickers Viscount 730,
Harvards.
The XAF was organized in four commands. The two opera­
tional commands were Western Air Command based at Palam (New 
Delhi) and Eastern Air Command, formed at Calcutta in I960 
to meet the growing commitments of the IAF for air defence 
and support operations in the areas bordering China, Burma 
and East Pakistan. Maintenance Command, which had been 
formed on 26 January 1955> was located at Kanpur and was 
responsible, among its duties, for the Avro-748 project. 
Training Command comprised the Air Force Flying College at 
Jodhpur, the two Flying Training Wings at Hyderabad and the 
various training colleges. In addition to the Auxiliary Air 
Force, the reserve included the Air Defence Reserve,
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consisting of technical and flying personnel associated with 
aviation, and the Regular Reserve of IAF personnel who had 
either retired or been released from the regular Service.
The development of the Service had been affected less 
by financial stringency than was the case with the Army and 
Navy. The first phase of the programme conceived at inde­
pendence was implemented within the limitations imposed by
the availability of trained personnel and suitable aircraft
6 2rather than money . The re-equipment and expansion compris­
ing stage two began uneventfully with the placing of the 
orders for Canberras, Gnats and Mysteres. The Hunter pur­
chase and the supplementary orders for further Duragans and 
Canberras, however, represented an expansion in the bomber 
and fighter-bomber formations which does not appear to have 
been envisaged in the original scheme^. As the Hunter pur­
chase followed upon reports of Pakistani impending receipt 
of North American F-86F Sabre day fighters from the United 
States, leading Indian newspapers were inclined to view the 
order as directly attributable to American provision of the 
Sabres to Pakistan0 ' or as Tlargely’ reflecting official 
anxieties regarding PakistanTs intentions0 .^
The actual motivations leading to the expansion of the 
bomber and fighter formations would seem to have been 
several. It is understood that the initiative for the
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Hunter order came from Defence Minister Menon and was not 
even referred to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, The Army 
and Navy were of the view that Pakistan’s receipt of the 
Sabres did not warrant a further and unplanned allocation of 
scarce foreign exchange for the IAF, and the Finance Minister 
argued against the purchase on financial grounds. In the 
circumstances, Menon’s motives was apparently related to the 
political advantages to be gained by countering Pakistan’s 
increased capabilities in a sphere where information about 
developments was readily available to the general public. 
Nehru’s reasons for sanctioning a further drain on foreign 
exchange reserves depleted by other aircraft and tank pur­
chases are less clear. He was certainly not insensitive to 
the public mood which was easily alarmed by any strengthen­
ing of the power of the ’historical ghost’ - Moslem Pakistan 
- and he may have viewed the Hunters as necessary reassurance 
to the Indian people of the Government’s determination to 
protect the country. He may also, however, have had an eye 
to the deteriorating regional situation (trouble in Laos, 
instability in Burma, strife in Viet Nam and Chinese policies 
in Tibet) and felt it prudent to strengthen the ultimate 
sanction behind Indian diplomacy - her armed forces. Public 
emphasis upon this factor may have raised doubts internally 
and externally as to the Government’s sincerity about panch
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slieel and its persistent criticism of power diplomacy and 
the arms race. It was expedient, therefore, for Nehru to 
leave the Indian public to arrive at its own conclusions - 
i.e. Pakistan.
The subsequent orders for more Ouragans and Canberras 
would also seem to be explainable on these more general 
grounds with the added aspect regarding the Ouragans that 
they were probably obtained at extremely favourable prices 
due to their virtual obsolescence in the more sophisticated 
European operational theatres. It was reported at the time 
that the IAF felt that an even larger bomber force was re­
quired if India was to possess fsecure superiority’ over
Pakistan00 and the possibility of Pakistan acquiring American
6 7B-57 (Canberra) bombers ' undoubtedly strengthened the 
Service’s argument with Cabinet. The factor of national 
prestige, however, must not be overlooked and New Delhi 
placed far greater reliance upon at least the image of strong 
military forces than it was prepared to publicly concede.
The inter-play of prestige and prudence, particularly in 
view of Chinese policies in the Himalayan region and South- 
East Asia, is also apparent with regard to the order for 
Canberras placed in 1961 and the almost frantic search for 
supersonic fighter aircraft in the spring of 1962. The 
’sudden’ interest in several squadrons of supersonic fighters
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in the spring of 1962 followed upon Pakistan’s receipt of
twelve F-104 supersonic fighters and was generally regarded
at the time as a direct reaction to that issue and was
publicly explained as such by official spokesmen.
For political considerations, upon which the Air Force
must have played, the Government may have been disinclined
to concede superiority to Pakistan in such a prestigious
68weapons system . However, at the same time it must also 
have recognized that ’the preponderant strength of India, in­
dustrially as well as militarily, would outweigh Pakistani 
superiority in any single weapon if it came to the issue’
More important motivation for the MIG agreement would seem 
to lie with the continued delays in the proposed re-equipment 
of the fighter arm with the IIF-24 and the rapidly worsening 
situation along the long frontier with China. Continued 
reliance upon the HF-24 to re-equip the Air Force would have 
entailed the maintenance of an increasingly obsolescent 
fighter arm for at least two years, with serious doubts as 
to whether the Ilf-24 project would come to fruition at all 
and whether the model would be world-class if it did reach 
the production stage. New Delhi was well aware of the numer­
ous intrusions into Indian air space in the Himalayas by
70Chinese aircraft and, viewed against this background, the 
desired purchase of some operational world-class fighters
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and their ultimate production in India suggests a desire to 
maintain an efficient and effective fighter arm against any 
contingency that might arise. While China did not at that 
time possess operational aircraft faster than the MIG-19 
(maximum speed 900 mph), Indian officials were probably con­
cerned that only marked superior aircraft would suffice to 
offset the quantitative superiority of the Chinese People’s 
Armed Forces Air Forces (CPAFAF).
The purchases of transport aircraft and helicopters from
I960 onwards was directly related to the commitment of the
IAF to supply Army troops deployed in Ladakh and NEFA - a
71contingency for which the IAF was not prepared7 . As the 
C-47s were not suitable for operations at Himalayan altitudes, 
the Indian Government was forced to procure such an addition­
al capacity as was deemed necessary. Even then, however, no 
provision had been made for possible large-scale operational 
commitments in NEFA; the C-119s, An-I2s and various heli­
copters - particularly the Mi-4s - were acquired for, and 
primarily committed to, supply operations in Ladakh.
The IAF as of October 1962 possessed an extraordinary 
complexity of aircraft - some 30 types of British, French, 
Russian, American, Canadian and indigenous manufacture. It 
is hard to see the reasons for such a policy in a country 
seriously short of technically-qualified personnel. British
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aircraft were generally preferred and were acquired despite 
the availability of comparable types from other sources. The 
Ouragan purchase in 1954 only followed an inability to obtain 
Gloster Meteor F.4 fighters from Britain^ and apparently 
Sabre Mk 30s from Australia/0 while Canberras and Mysteres 
were purchased despite the availability of Soviet MIG-17s 
and I1-28s at far cheaper prices'^, The Hunters were acquir­
ed despite IAF preference for the Mirage. The Mystere order 
would seem to have constituted a deliberate decision to ease 
excessive dependence upon a single source (i.e. Britain) 
which might not always be able or willing to meet Indian 
requests for aircraft of a particular type. The disinterest
in Soviet aircraft until 1959 probably reflected a technical
75desire to adhere to Western weapons systems and, perhaps m 
more importantly, to avoid provoking misinterpretations in 
the West (on whose support India’s economic plans were heavi­
ly dependent) and particularly the United States (by far the 
greatest contributor of aid) concerning the political impli­
cations of such a deal.
India’s purchase of Soviet equipment during the 1959-62 
period is partly sustainable on practical grounds: the Mi-4 
possessed advantages over the Sikorsky S-62 of capacity, 
ease of maintenance and price'7'"' while the An-12 was compar­
able in performance for Himalayan conditions to any similar
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Western aircraft with the probable advantage of price and 
rupee payment. The decision in favour of the purchase and 
manufacture under licence of the MIG-21 possessed certain at­
tractions in price, rupee payment and the willingness of the 
Soviet Union to meet Indiafs request for licence rights and 
technical aid in establishing the facilities - arrangements 
which Western manufacturers and governments were apparently 
not prepared to meet for a variety of financial, political 
and technical reasons. Technically, however, the MIG possess­
ed no operational advantages over the Lightning, Mirage or 
F-104; it was essentially a day fighter with a more limited 
operational radius and less versatility than either of the 
three Western types and is understood to have provoked 
little enthusiasm in IAF circles beyond the negative view 
that, if Western types could not be acquired, the MIG-21 was 
at least a decided improvement upon the existing aircraft in 
frontline service with the IAF.
Such factors had been ignored previously, however, with 
respect to the Il-28s and MIG-17s and MIG-19s and it was no 
more coincidence that the political interest in Soviet air­
craft followed the appearance of a recognizable Chinese 
threat to India*s territorial integrity. In such a context, 
it must have appeared highly advisable to Indian political 
leaders to obtain at least symbolic assurance of Russian
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friendship with the possibility that such a demonstration 
would impose a brake upon any hasty action which Peking 
might otherwise contemplate. Moscow’s sale of aircraft and 
helicopters for obvious employment in the Himalayan region 
against China thus fulfilled a very useful diplomatic purpose.
The political implications of the MIG deal are less easy 
to assess as official spokesmen made few references to the 
need to counter Chinese air power in Tibet^ and this aspect 
appears to have gone largely unnoticed by the public and 
press. Convinced of the need for supersonic aircraft and 
for indigenous production of such a type under licence, New
Delhi appears to have taken up the Soviet offer as the only
. 79one that met the desxred conditions of price and manufacture .
The Government and the Indian public may have felt satisfac­
tion with the conclusion of such a deal as reinforcing 
non-alignment, exerting an ’independent’ line in the face of 
undisguised Western concern and perhaps indicating resentment 
at Western support for another United Nations resolution 
involving the question of a plebiscite in Kashmir.
The general effectiveness of the Indian Air Force in the 
performance of its assigned responsibilities was compromised 
in various ways. The multiplicitity of aircraft, each with 
different maintenance schedules, spare requirements and 
service requirements, necessitated continual retraining of
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ground and air crews. Technical and equipment procedures had 
been largely adopted from other air forces and little effort 
had been made to devise procedures more in accordance with 
Indian conditions; little allowance was made for the delays 
involved in obtaining spares from external sources and in 
transporting them internally at short notice and in unfavour­
able weather such as during the monsoon. There was little 
appreciation of logistics procedures and of the need for 
detailed and accurate forecasting and records of spares 
requirements. This Service lethargy was aggravated by Gov­
ernment reluctance to provide funds enabling the stocking of 
reasonable supplies of spares and was particularly dangerous 
for an air force equipped with many aircraft (e.g. C-47s,
Harvards, Ouragans, Vampires) no longer in service in other
*
countries and for which spares were difficult to obtain.
The result was, as one Indian newspaper has observed, that 
during the border war with China the aircraft base repair 
depot at Kanpur could not perform its basic function of 
repair for lack of spare parts; the depot had sufficient 
foreign exchange for new projects but not for its primary 
needs of repair^
The operational squadrons were deployed and trained for 
actions against Pakistan in primarily a tactical role in 
support of the Indian Army in the Punjab and Kashmir. The
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air defence system appears to have been rudimentary in view 
of the absence of any radar warning system - only the Delhi 
and Calcutta airports possessed radar of any kind - and 
reliance would seem to have been placed upon early strikes 
against the bases of the Pakistan Air Force at Mauripur,
Drigh Road, Peshawar, Kohat, Lahore, Risalpur and Sargodha
with the aim of delivering a crippling blow to the effective-
81ness of the PAF . The bulk of the activity of both air 
forces, however, would probably be closely related to the lane 
battle upon which the outcome of any Indo-Pakistani conflict 
would depend. The almost 2:1 superiority enjoyed by the IAF 
over the PAF would have left little doubt as to the outcome 
of any prolonged clash between the two air forces.
The contingency of war with China on even a limited 
scale, however, had been almost completely ignored in prac­
tice, if not in theory. Defence of the densely populated 
northern Indian plain and its heavy industries, particularly 
in the Calcutta area, was non-existent, although China, 
unlike Pakistan, could not be expected to be deterred from
such action for fear of much more destructive reciprocal 
8 2counter-action . The air squadrons were not deployed to 
put up any effective defence against an air attack launched 
from Tibetan bases. The possible employment of the bomber 
and fighter-bomber units in tactical support of the Army in
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NEFA was precluded by the inability of the IAF to deploy and 
maintain at short notice more than four or five squadrons 
and by the fact that the Service lacked training in support 
tactics in the rugged jungle and mountain terrain which - 
characterized the NEFA-Assam theatre* Even transport capac- 
iti was fully committed to supply operations in the secondary 
Ladakh theatre and thus unable to provide appreciable assist­
ance to the forces in NEFA. Against China, the IAF provided 
no deterrent, had little if any strategic role (in view of 
the need to avoid any escalation of a military conflict with 
China from which India could hardly benefit) and was so 
deployed and trained as to be of marginal value in either a 
tactical or supply role.
Notes
1 Pakistan received as her share of the old RIAF Nos 5 and 
9 fighter squardrons, No. 6 transport squadron, one air ob­
servation post flight, one communication flight, all the pre­
war training establishments and permanent stations and the 
only repair and maintenance workshop - which was located at 
Drigh Road, Karachi.
2 Cited, Flight, 27 January 1949> p. 119.
3 Aviation Week (hereinafter referred to as AW), 16 August 
1948, p. 36.
4 The purchase of surplus British aircraft followed a trip 
to Britain by the British C-in-C of the Indian Air Force,
Air Marshal Sir Roy Elmhirst, in April 1948.
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5 AW, 5 April 1948, p. 39. The delivery of 30 Tempests from Pakistan had been delayed by the Pakistan Government in 
retaliation for India’s withholding delivery of Pakistan’s 
allotted share of army stores and equipment. See The Times.
12 January 1948.
6 This purchase resulted from another trip to Britain by 
Elmhirst in early 1949.
7 See statement by the Minister of Defence Organisation, 
Mahavir Tyagi, LSD, pt 1, vol. 5-6, 18 November 1953, col.
118. These planes, purchased according to Tyagi at a unit 
cost of Rs 6.53 lakhs, are understood to have replaced the 
piston-engined Tempests in three fighter squadrons. Four 
Ouragans, renamed Toofanis in the IAF, were flown out to 
India and arrived on 24 October 1953, another lot were being 
unloaded at the time the Minister spoke and the remainder 
arrived in 1954.
8 The Indian Government reportedly held Rs 21 crores worth 
of surplus United States aircraft and equipment left from 
World War II which it desired to sell because it did not feel 
India could either afford or utilize such stocks. AW, 26 
February 1951, P» 172.
9 The Times. 27 February 1954; 13 March 1954. This order would seem to have followed India’s inability to obtain trans­
ports from Britain. The Times reported on 30 June 1952, with 
reference to the order for Sealand amphibians, that other 
Indian orders were being placed in the United States because British delivery dates were too long. According to Robert 
Trumbull, India was ’understood’ to have followed up the 
C-119G purchase from Fairchild Engine and Aircraft Corporation 
with negotiations for purchase of more C-119s through the 
United States Air Force. New York Times. 5 March 1954.
Such negotiations as may have been undertaken were clearly 
inclusive.
10 Defence Minister Singh, CAD, vol. 2, 4 March 1948, p. 1586.
11 Tyagi, LSD, pt 2, vol. 1, 25 March 1953, col. 2815.
12 See K. Rangaswami in Hindu, 1st April 1962.
13 AW, 4 July 1955, P. 7. Special correspondent Philip 
Deane had stated in The Scotsman on 16 February 1954, how­
ever, that the Ouragans had not given complete satisfaction
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to India and that the IAF had Tlet it be known’ that orders 
for new types would likely go to Britain if India could get 
satisfaction on delivery limits and prices. AW also reported 
(26 July 1954, p. 7) that India had been interested in pur­
chasing 50 Australian-built Sabre Mk 30 fighters but that 
the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation had been unable to 
accept such an order due to its complete commitment to pro­
duction for the RAAF for ’some years’ hence.
14 This order appears to have resulted from the visit to 
India in February 1954 of the French Air Minister, M. Louis 
Christians.
15 Aeroplane and Astronautics (5 April 1957* p. 465) refers 
to 125 units but it is believed that the figure cited is 
correct.
16 AW, 20 February 1956, p. 23.
17 Aeroplane and Astronautics, 26 October 1961, p. 548a.
AW (24 September 1956, pi 31) referred to an order being 
placed for 25 ’whole’ Gnats worth $ 8.4 million. Aeroplane 
and Astronautics (3 September 1964* p. 74) reported that the scheme involved 25 ’whole’ units, 15 in component form and 
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to place an order for the Gnat and only Finland was subse­
quently to join her in operational employment of this model. 
Delivery of the ’whole’ units from Britain commenced in April 
1957 and was spread over a two-year period.
18 AW (8 April 1957, p. 37) reported that the French air­
craft-carrier Dexmunde was then en route to India with 13 
Ouragans and the first shipment of 23 Mysteres.
19 Aeroplane and Astronautics (13 September 1957, p. 398) 
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that the figures given in the text are correct. Deliveries 
of the Mk 56 began in October 1957 and of the Mk 66 in 1959.
20 Ibid, 15 February 1957, p. 222.
21 The Times, 2 April 1956.
22 Aeroplane and Astronautics, 13 September 1957, P» 298; 
ibid, 8 February 1957, P« 190; AW, 18 February 1957, p. 89. 
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craft being flown out to India.
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the IAF of a world-class fighter with supersonic capabilit­
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39 See report on the Reddy mission in New York Times, 11 
June I960,
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44 K. Rangaswami in Hindu, 9 May, 1962.
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also mentioned an American proposal whereby, in return for 
Indian purchase of Lockheed C-130 transports, the United 
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more advantageous financial terms. According to K.S. 
Shelvankar (Hindu, 5 August 1962) India was never offered a 
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54 K. Rangaswami, Hindu, 7 July 1962.
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56 AW, 23 July 1962, p. 24.
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were not pressed due to fIndia*s inability to pay the arrears 
still outstanding in respect of the Mystere jet fighter ac­
quired by the IAF some years ago and her unwillingness to 
offer an economic price for the Mirage aircraft1.
58 AW, 6 August 1962, p. 32.
59 The nature of the agreement was not revealed at the time, 
but it was apparently largely one of principle and required 
extensive further negotiations. A press release by the 
Soviet Information Service in Britain in early 1963 stated 
that the agreement provided for twelve MIG-21st to be shipped 
to India - six in early 1963 and six in 1964 - and for Soviet
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ilities in India. See Flight, 4 April 1963, p. 452. See 
also statement by the Indian Minister of Economic and Defence 
Production, T.T. Krishnamachari, to a New York press luncheon 
on 27 May 1963. Cited, Hindu, 29 May 1963.
60 Aircraft in service with the IAF or available to it com­
prised roughly 110 Mysteres, 60-75 Gnats, 182 Hunters, 100 
Vampires, 104 Ouragans, 100 Canberras, 53 C-119gs, 30 C-47s,
26 Otters, 12 Devons, 16 An-12s, 62 Prentices, 30 Texans, 26 
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61 The Auxiliarj' Air Force comprised squadrons Nos 51 (Delhi), 
52 (Bombay), 53 (Madras), 54 (Allahabad), 55 (Calcutta), 56 
(Bhubandeshwar) and 57 (Chandigarh) - the latter two units 
being added in i960. All squadrons were equipped with 
Texans and IIT-2 trainers with jet training being introduced
to the Delhi, Madras and Calcutta squadrons in 1959-60.
62 The British C-in-C of the RIAF, Air Marshal Sir Thomas 
Elmhirst, was reported to have stated at a New Delhi press 
conference on 19 February 1949 that Britain had given higher 
priority to Indiafs aircraft needs than it had to any other 
Commonwealth country, including Pakistan. Cited, Hindu, 20 
February 1949*
63 The Hunter order apparently surprised even the usually 
well-informed British aircraft industry. See Aeroplane and 
Astronautics, 13 September 1957, p. 398.
64 Hindu Weekly Review leader, 15 December 1958.
65 The Eastern Economist, 13 March 1959.
66 Rawle Knox, The Scotsman, 9 February 1957»
67 Pakistan submitted a request to the United States for 
15-20 light bombers in early 1958 and made no attempt to 
disguise the fact that the aircraft were desired to offset 
India’s recent Canberra purchase. Secret talks ensued in 
Washington between American Defence Secretary McElroy,
American Service leaders and a Pakistani mission headed by 
Finance Minister Ali Amjad and including the Pakistan Army 
and Air Force Cs-in-C. The first six of 26 B-57 (Canberra) 
jet bombers were delivered to Pakistan in i960 and the 
remainder subsequently to equip two bomber squadrons and one 
reconnaissance unit.
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clared that India must obtain an aircraft comparable to the 
F-104s which Pakistan was acquiring.
69 The Times, 8 August 1961.
70 India charged China with 127 intrusions of her air space 
between 19 September 1959 and 3 June 1961, and China charged 
India with 38 intrusions of her air space between 14 July 
1959 and 17 July 1961. For Indian charges, see notes dated
5 December 1959, III, p. 101; 4 April I960, pp. 21-3, IV;
22 August I960, IV, pp. 29-30; 24 October I960, IV, p. 39;
13 February 1961, V, p. 40; 29 April 1961, V, p. 42; 5 July 
1961, V, p. 47» For Chinese charges, see notes dated 7 
September 1959, II, p. 54; 16 September 1959, II, p. 56; 20 
December 1959, III, p. 102; 2 July I960, IV, p. 25; 27 
August I960, IV, p. 30; 2 June 1961, V, p. 44; 12 August 
1961, V, pp. 48-9.
71 The proposed Avro project constituted only a normal 
re-equipment scheme to replace the aging C-47s.
72 Britain was unable to supply these aircraft at the time 
due to the priority given its own needs and those of its 
NATO allies. See, for example, the comment in The Times, 15 
December 1953*
73 See footnote 13.
74 See, for example, Aeroplane and Astronautics. 15 
February 1957, p. 222;_5 April 1957, P^  465: AWT 24 September 1956, p. 31. The decision in favour of the Canberras may 
have been partly influenced by Britain’s willingness to 
release the ’blue study’ radar bomb-sight. See statement by 
the Minister of Defence Organisation, Mahavir Tyagi, cited
in The Times, 9 May 1956. This factor alone, however, would 
not seem to account entirely or even largely for the rejec­
tion of the comparable 11-28 at one third to half the price 
in the context of a particularly acute shortage of foreign 
exchange.
75 Despite press speculation in February 1957 that Nehru’s 
conference with the visiting Soviet Defence Minister,
Marshal Zhukov, possibly indicated a re-examination of the 
earlier Soviet offer of Il-28s with the aim of augmenting 
the Canberra order (see James Cameron in News Chronicle, 22 
February 1957), India ordered further Canberras subsequently.
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76 The Mi-4 can carry a 3500 lb load, is powered by a 
piston-engine and was available for the equivalent of $ 150- 
200,000 and rupee payment, whereas the S-62 has a capacity
of 2950 lbs, is powered by a turbine engine and was available 
for $ 260-360,000 and in foreign exchange only. See New 
York Times. 11 June I960; AW, 23 May I960, p. 37. The two 
S-62s purchased by India in August I960, for example, 
reportedly cost India $ 308,000 per unit excluding spares.
See AW, 15 August I960, p. 23; 23 December i9 6 0, p. 6 3.
77 In view of India’s subsequent difficulties with the 
Soviet Union over implementation of the project, however, it 
may well be that Moscow sought to obtain short-term political 
advantages with no intention of pursuing the matter in more 
concrete fashion; it may have shared Western doubts as to 
India’s ability to implement such a sophisticated project 
and relied upon eventual Indian recognition of this fact to 
halt the project before it began.
78 At Calcutta on 29 July 1962, however, Nehru described 
the desire for supersonic aircraft as motivated by the 
Pakistan threat and China’s ’grasping’ part of India’s 
mountain territory. Cited, The Nation, 31 July 1962.
79 The usually well-informed Prem Bhatia charged in an 
article published in late 1962, however, that while the IAF 
mission was in London in July the manufacturers of the 
Mirage III offered to set up a production line in India to 
match the Soviet offer but were turned down by Menon on the 
grounds that he was ’committed’ to the Russians. T,The Harvest of Menonism”, The Reporter. 22 November 1962.
80 Overseas Hindustan Times. 30 April 1 9 6 4. It is also 
understood from a confidential source that, at the time of 
the Chinese invasion, the Harvards and a majority of the 
Vampires were grounded for lack of spares and that the 
Hunters escaped a similar fate only by the narrowest of 
margins.
81 The PAF comprised about 15,000 personnel manning eight 
squadrons of F-86 F Sabre subsonic fighter-bombers, one 
squadron of F-104 supersonic strike fighter-interceptors, 
one-two squadrons of B-57 (Canberra) tactical bombers and 
reconnaissance, transport and coastal search units.
82 The Chinese Communist Air Force comprised about 90,000 
personnel manning about 3 , 0 0 0 aircraft, including 2 , 0 0 0 sub­
sonic MIG 15s, 17s and a few 19s and 500 subsonic 11-28 tac­
tical bombers comparable to the Canberra. Chinese bases in 
Tibet included Nagchuka, Kampa Dzong, Tingri, Tsonadzong, 
Rima and Zumutsungrth but the writer has no information on 
the size and composition of the formations based in Tibet.
CHAPTER VII
THE INDIAN NAVAL PROGRAMME
At partition, the Royal Indian Navy was divided between 
India and Pakistan in the rough proportion of 2:1. India 
retained four sloops, two frigates, one corvette, twelve 
fleet minesweepers, four trawlers, four motor minesweepers, 
four motor launches, one survey vessel, the naval dockyard 
at Bombay and approximately 1,000 officers and 10,000 rat­
ings"*'. The naval establishment was completely unbalanced in 
almost every respect and the development of a modern navy 
had necessarily to be a long-term process that would require 
the full co-operation of an advanced naval power like the 
United Kingdom.
Differences concerning Indiafs naval requirements appear 
to have arisen at the very outset between the Indian Govern­
ment and British naval planners assigned by the Indian Gov­
ernment to the task of developing the Indian Navy. According 
to one writer, who preferred to use a pseudynom, the Admiral­
ty wanted the Navy to conform to some Commonwealth pattern. 
They visualized a force of escort vessels and local
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flotillas of minesweepers, the extension of base facilities 
at Bombay and possibly Calcutta so as to afford repair 
facilities for large units from the Commonwealth navies, and 
the development of considerable assembly and supply arrange- 
ments for escort forces at Cochin .
The leadership of the Indian Government, however, pur­
portedly made it clear that they wanted a navy which in the 
event of a war would not provide merely the ’missing bits’ 
of a larger naval scheme. They felt that India, by virtue 
of its location, potential wealth and vast population must 
inevitably be of immense strategic significance in world 
problems and could be centrally influential in local ones. 
India accordingly desired
a preponderance of naval power vis-a-vis her 
Asiatic neighbours to ensure that (though she 
herself firmly and truly disclaimed any aggres­
sive policy) where they were concerned she would 
have a reasonable assurance of freedom of the 
seas through the Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and 
Bay of Bengal for her own shipping.3
The Nehru administration would therefore appear to have sub­
scribed to the view expressed by a leading Indian daily in 
late 1955 that ’it is only commonsense to see to it that our 
Navy is never overtaken in strength by the navies of neigh­
bouring nations’'. Such a strategic role necessitated a 
navy possessing the nucleus of a striking force, including 
cruisers and an air component, escort vessels and local
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flotillas to safeguard base areas. With direct reference to 
the threat that would be posed to communications and shipping 
in the Indian Ocean by the Soviet-bloc submarine arm, the 
Indian Navy was to be developed with primary emphasis on 
anti-submarine warfare.
In accordance with an official directive, Indian Naval
Headquarters under the direction of Vice-Admiral W.E. Parry
drew up a ten-year plan of naval expansion in late 1947»
The proposed programme involved the Indianization of the
Navy as soon as was practicable and its gradual development
into a carrier task force comprising two light fleet aircraft
carriers, three light cruisers, eight to nine destroyers and
the necessary support vessels^. The force was to be capable
of expansion when the necessity arose and, though designed
primarily for a strictly defensive role, it was to possess
the capability for offensive action against an enemy in the
6Indian Ocean . Its specific wartime roles were defined in 
March 1949 as the protection of merchant convoys, assistance 
to the Army in amphibious operations and offensive operations
7against enemy ports and installations .
The naval programme was accepted by the Indian Govern­
ment in 1948 and implementation of its initial stages was 
undertaken. A few samples of landing ships and craft - one 
LST and six LCTs - were retained ’ready for the day when we
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gcan prepare for any landing operations needed in the future1 . 
The light cruiser Delhi (ex-Achilles) and the *RT class des­
troyers Ran a (ex-Raider) , Raj put (ex-Rotherham) and Ran.j it 
(ex-Redoubt) were purchased from Britain in 1948, the Delhi
arriving at Bombay in September of the same year and the des-
.9troyers in January 1950 following refit . The oilers Chilka 
and Sarubhar were acquired in 1948 and the four trawlers and 
six of the twelve fleet minesweepers retained at partition 
were discarded by 1950» A directorate of Naval Aviation was 
established in 1948 and, as the Royal Navy was unable at that 
time to meet an Indian request for suitable fleet aircraft, 
it was decided to form a nucleus for the future. Provision 
for the establishment of a fleet air arm was accordingly made 
in the defence budget for 1949-50* As of late March 1949, 
it was expected that the first aircraft carrier would 
1 probably1 be purchased from Britain in 1955 and the second 
in 1957 - by which time it was hoped that the fleet air arm 
would comprise 300 modern naval fighters, fighter-bombers 
and anti-submariene aircraft with a frontline strength of 54 
units in two carrier groups. The first 40 naval aircraft 
were expected to arrive in India before the end of 1950"^.
The deterioration in the international situation during 
the 1948-51 period, as manifested in the Berlin blockade, 
the formation of NATO, the Korean War, etc., introduced
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uncertainties regarding the availability of the required 
naval vessels. During a visit to Britain in the summer of 
19499 Vice-Admiral Parry was unable to make definite arrange­
ments for further ships due to the inability of the Admiralty
to specify the types of ships that would be available for 
11sale . The shipping position became even tighter in 1950- 
1251' , presumably as a result of the Korean War, but a pause 
was in any case required for the recruitment and training of
iqfurther personnel needed to man future acquisitions .
In the meantime, the Government had reconsidered the 
naval programme from a financial standpoint and had reached 
the conclusion that it was beyond the country’s immediate 
needs and resources. Details of the revised programme were 
revealed by Vice-Admiral Parry at a Bombay press conference 
on 21 January 1950. He stated that the Navy envisaged the 
development of a small carrier task force of the fhunter- 
killer’ (i.e. anti-submarine) type that would comprise one
light fleet carrier, three light cruisers, eight to nine
Iddestroyers and the necessary support vessels
The slightly revised scheme was proceeded with in 1953 
with the purchase of the fleet replenishment vessel, Shakti, 
from Italy and the loan from Britain of three ex-escort des­
troyers of the ’Hunt’ type 2 class - the Ganga (ex-Chidding- 
fold), Godavari (ex-Bedale) and Gomati (ex-Lamerton)^^. A
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second light cruiser*, the Mysore (ex-Nigeria) , was purchased
in April 1954 for £ 300,000 and underwent extensive refit
before joining the Indian fleet in 1957. The inshore
minesweepers Dassein (ex-Littleham) and Bimlipitan (ex-
ILildersham) were transferred from the Royal Navy in 1955 «
The details of a six-year building programme for the
Navy in British shipyards were revealed by the Chief of the
Indian Naval Staff, Admiral Sir Mark Pizey, in Delhi on 11
July 1955« he stated that, during the 1955-61 period, the
Navy envisaged the receipt of twelve anti-submarine and
anti-aircraft frigates as replacements for the ’R’ class
destroyers and older frigates, eight coastal minesweepers
to replace the obsolete types then in service and an unspec-
16ified number of inshore minesweepers . The delivery of 
ships from this programme proceeded as the individual units 
were completed. The ’Ton’ class coastal minesweepers Karwar 
(ex-Overton), Cannamore (ex-Whitton), Cuddalore (ex-Wenning- 
ton) and Kakinada (ex-Durweston) were transferred from the 
Royal Navy in 1956. The ’Whitby’ class anti-submarine 
frigates Talwar and Trishul were received in May and August 
I960 respectively and the ’Blackwood’ class anti-submarine 
frigates Khukri, Kirpan and Kuthar arrived in Bombay in 
1958, 1959 and i960 respectively. The ’Leopard’ class 
anti-aircraft frigates Brahmaputra, Beas and Betwa were
received in 1959, I960 and 1961 respectively.
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No further ships were acquired for the ambitious modern­
ization and expansion scheme which thus fell considerably 
short of the initial proposals: four coastal minesweepers, 
one T Leopard’ class anti-aircraft frigate, two ’Xvliitby’ 
class and one ’Blackwood’ class anti-submarine frigates and
an unknown number of inshore minesweepers had been cut from 
17the scheme 1. The third cruiser envisaged from an early date 
also failed to materialize. The reasons for not purchasing 
these vessels would seem to be financial stringency and the 
acute foreign exchange problem, which involved a deficit of 
$ 650 millions in 1957-58 and threatened to ruin any pros­
pects that the Second Five-Year Plan would be fulfilled. The 
Indian naval programme underway in British shipyards was 
clearly an early casualty of Indian efforts to reduce exter­
nal procurment of what were regarded at the time as ’non-es­
sential’ items.
The Indian Government subsequently purchased the three
’R’ class destroyers hitherto on loan from the Royal Navy and
envisaged ultimately constructing minesweepers, frigates and
18destroyers in Indian shipyards^ , which were already build­
ing minor craft for the Navy. The mooring vessel Dhruvak 
and the survey vessel Darshak were commissioned from Hindustan 
Shipyard Limited (Calcutta) in November and December 1959"^*
The repair ship Dharini was commissioned in May i960 and the
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seaward patrol craft A;j ay, Abhey and Akshay were commissioned 
in September I960, November 1961 and January 1962 respective­
ly. The diesel tugs 3him and Dali were handed over to the 
Navy by their builders, Alcock and Ashdown and Company Limit­
ed (Bombay) in February 1962. Miscellaneous water-boats, 
ferry craft, ammunition barges and pontoons were also acquir­
ed from local sources.
The development of the fleet air arm progressed slowly
for reasons that seem to have been both financial and due to
a lack of suitably trained personnel. The first naval air
station, INS Garuda, was commissioned on 13 May 1953 at
Venderuthy, Cochin. A Fleet Requirements Unit was formed in
the same year upon the receipt of ten Short Sealand light
amphibians which had been ordered in 1952; the first units
were handed over to Indian officials at Rochester, Northern
Ireland, on 13 January 1953^°. Five Fairey Firefly T.T.l
and five T.T.4 target-tug aircraft were acquired for the 
21Unit in 1955 • The formation was augmented several years
later by a flight of Vampire jet trainers taken over from 
the Indian Air Force and by a number of locally-produced 
Hindustan IIT-2 jet trainers.
The Government was for some time apparently undecided 
as to whether to proceed with the acquisition of an aircraft 
carrier. Defence Minister Gopalaswami Ayyangar stated in
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1952 that no specific date could be given. He argued that, 
in any case, the Navy did not then possess the trained 
personnel required to man such a complex unit . Defence 
Minister N.N. Katju informed the Lok Sabha on 5 April 1955 
that, while a beginning had been made on the establishment 
of a fleet air arm, no proposal had yet been made regarding 
the purchase of a carrier; he claimed that he could not fore­
cast future developments^. Further evidence of Government 
indecision on the matter was revealed by a statement made by 
Admiral Pizey at INS I lamia in June 1955 in which he declared 
that perhaps his last big job with the Indian Navy would be 
to convince the Government of the need for carriers and fast 
modern aircraft^.
The matter was subsequently taken under consideration 
and the hulk of the light fleet carrier Hercules was purchas­
ed in January 1957* The unit was modernized and completed 
at Belfast and was commissioned on 4 March 1961. The pur­
chase of jet aircraft for the carrier was under consideration
by August 19582;> and 24 Sea Hawk FGA Mk 6 jet fighter-
26bombers were ordered in late 1959 • British-built Gannet
anti-submarine/reconnaissance aircraft and Westland Wessex 
anti-submarine helicopters were initially favoured but the 
decision was ultimately taken to obtain roughly comparable 
French types; 15 Breguet 1050 Alize turbo-prop
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anti-submarine/reconnaissance aircraft were ordered early in
1960 and four Alouette 3 helicopters in 1962. Naval air 
squadrons 300 (equipped with Sea Hawks) and 310 (equipped 
with Alizes) were commissioned on 6 July i960 and 9 January
1961 respectively and joined the Vikrant (ex-Hercules) in 
August 1961.
The establishment of a submarine arm was envisaged in 
the original naval plan, but with a lower priority than air­
craft carriers^. Official spokesmen persistently refused 
to clarify policy concerning submarines on the grounds that
28it was not in the national interest to do so" . It seems 
clear, however, that financial priorities precluded the ac­
quisition of any submarines during the period under discus­
sion and forced the Indian Navy to rely upon periodic visits 
by British submarines for training in anti-submarine opera­
tions. In a statement at Bombay on 9 May 1962, the retiring 
Chief of Naval Staff, Vice-Admiral R.D. Katari, indicated 
the Navy’s dissatisfaction with such a reliance upon the
Royal Navy’s submarines by public!}7 advocating the estab-
29lishment of an Indian submarine ’fleet’
Simultaneously with the acquisition of new ships and 
aircraft, the Navy developed training establishments to re­
place those of the old Royal Indian Navy retained by 
Pakistan at partition and as required by a modern naval
28 7
establishment. Until 1952, all naval officers were sent to 
Britain for training^0 but, by 1955, India possessed ten 
training centres which were adequate to meet most of the 
Navy’s general needs. Personnel were subsequently sent 
abroad only for specialist training in communications, gun­
nery, torpedo and anti-submarine, navigation, direction, 
survey, ordnance, naval construction and road conversion.
The numbers of personnel sent to British naval training 
centres accordingly declined from 108 (1954-55) to 76 (1955- 
56), 52 (1958-59) and 42 (1959-60)31.
The replacement of British with Indian personnel in the 
Service proceeded within the limitations imposed by the 
availability of qualified Indian officers and technicians.
By January 1948, all naval ships were commanded by Indians 
and there were only nine non-Indian officers at Naval Head­
quarters. The acute shortage of officers - 40 executive,
44 engineering, 18 electrical, two shipwright and seven in- 
structor as of March 1948° - necessitated, however, the
retention of former British officers of the Royal Indian
33Navy and the loan of officers from the Royal Navy
The 120 British naval officers and Admiralty civilians 
employed as of July 1949 were progressively replaced by 
Indian personnel as the latter attained the necessary stand­
ards, and by March 1953 only 46 naval officers and ten
288
civilians of British nationality remained. During 1953 the 
posts of Naval Secretary at Naval Headquarters and Commodore- 
in-Charge (Cochin) were assumed by Captain A. Pereira and 
Commodore B.S. Soman respectively. Nineteen further posts 
were Indianized during the course of 1954> including the 
position of Deputy Chief of Naval Staff to which Captain R.D. 
Katari was appointed on 18 March, and the post of Commodore- 
in-Charge (Bombay) which was taken over by Captain A. 
Chakravarti on 28 March. By early 1955} Indians had assumed 
the senior posts of Chief of Material, Director of Armament 
Supply and Director of Naval Engineering. During 1955-56, 
the posts of Chief Inspector (Navy) at the Defence Services 
Staff College at Wellington, Chief Ilydrographer (Navy) and 
Director of Stores at Naval Headquarters were taken over by 
Indian personnel. The posts of Director of Naval Education, 
Director of the Naval Signals Division, Flag Officer (Indian 
Fleet) and Dockyard Apprentice School were Indianized during 
the period March 1956-December 1957 and Vice-Admiral Katari 
became the first Indian Naval Chief of Staff in April 1958. 
Two Admiralty civilians holding the posts of Senior Technical 
Assistants reverted to the Admiralty in early 1959 and the 
post of Director of Naval Armament Inspection was taken over 
by an Indian naval officer in May 1961. With the appointment
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of an Indian as Chief of Naval Aviation in April 1962, the 
Indian Navy became an entirely Indian-staffed Service,
The commissioning of the Vikrant in the latter half of 
1961 completed the existing re-equipment and expansion pro­
gramme of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Staff, Vice-Admiral 
B.S, Soman, informed a press conference at Coimbatore on 17 
August 1962 that there were no existing plans to add new 
ships to the Fleet^' , At the moment he spoke, the Indian 
Navy constituted the most effective naval force possessed by 
any country located within the Indian Ocean region - some 50 
warships of all typed manned by about 1,450 officers and
3514>550 ratings . The vessels comprised:
1 TMajesticf class light fleet aircraft carrier (Vikrant) 
with an air complement consisting of one squadron each 
of Sea Hawk FGA Mk 6 fighter-bombers and Alize anti­
submarine reconnaissance aircraft and four Se-3160 
Alouette 3 helicopters.
1 TLeanderf class light cruiser (Delhi)
1 fMauritius1 class light cruiser (ilysore)
3 fRf class fleet destroyers (Rana, Ra.jput, Ran.jit)
3 THuntT class type 2 frigates (Ganga, Godavari, Gomati)
2 fWhitbyT class anti-submarine frigates (Taiwan, Trishul)
3 ’Blackwood* class anti-submarine frigates (Khukri,
Kirpan, Kuthar)
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3 ,LeopardT class anti-aircraft frigates (Brahmaputra t 
Beas, Betwa)
2 TKistnaT class frigates (Cauverv, Kistna)
2 fRiverT class frigates (Tir, Investigator) employed as 
a training vessel and a survey vessel respectively.
2 TSutlej* class frigates (Jumna, Sutlej) employed as 
survey vessels 
1 survey vessel (Darshak)
1 TBangor* class fleet minesweeper (Konkan)
4 TTonT class coastal minesweepers (Cannamore, Cuddalore, 
lakinada, Karwar)
2 ,Hamt class inshore minesweepers (Bassein, Bimlipiyan)
5 Seaward Patrol Craft (3110, 3112, 3117, 3118 , 6420)
9 Seaward Defence Boats (Ajay, Abhay, Akshay , Savriti,
Sharayu, Sharda, Subhadra, Sukanya, Suvarna)
1 LCT (4294)
1 LST (Magar)
1 repair ship (Pharint)
1 fleet replenishment ship (Shaleti)
1 ocean-going tug (Ilathi)
2 oilers, 5 motor minesweepers and 1 LCT employed as yard 
craft.
In addition to the VikrantTs shipboard complement, the fleet 
air arm included a Fleet Requirements Unit designated as
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Squadron 550 and based at INS Garuda (Cochin); the Unit con­
sisted of ten Short Sealand light amphibians, five Fairey 
Firefly T.T.l and five T.T.4 target-tug aircraft and several 
Hindustan HT-2 jet trainers. There was also a Vampire jet 
flight designated INS Hansa at Sulur (near Coimbatore), which 
shared the airfield with the Indian Air Force. The Naval 
Reserve and Naval Volunteer Reserve, both of which were 
formed after 1955, were of unknown size but the regulations 
governing recruitment to both reserves had been revised in 
1960-61.
The Service functioned under four operational and admin­
istrative commands - one afloat (Flag Officer Commanding the 
Indian Fleet) and three ashore (Flag Officer, Bombay; Commo- 
dore-in-Charge, Cochin; and Commodore East Coast, Vizagapat- 
nam). The fleet was based at Bombay and Cochin on Indiafs 
west coast.
The vessels were entirely of British construction with 
the exception of various minor craft - the fleet replenish­
ment ship, Shakti, was acquired from Italy; the fSavritif 
class seaward defence boats (Savriti, Sharayu, Sharda, 
Subhadra, Sukanya and Suvarna) were of mixed Italian,
Yugoslav and Dutch origin; the Portuguese frigate Afonso De 
Albuquerque had been seized during the Goa operation; and
miscellaneous craft had been built in Indian shipyards. The
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reliance upon Britain for vessels, equipment and training 
facilities was attributable to the origin of the Service and 
the co-operation of the Royal Navy in its development. The 
Sea Hawk fighter had been chosen not least for the reason 
that at the time of purchase it was the cheapest proven 
carrier-borne jet fighter in existence. The choice of 
French-built Alize and Alouette units had only followed 
initial consideration of comparable British types and would 
seem to have been based primarily upon technical considera­
tions .
The Service was responsible for the defence of Indiafs 
coasts and coastal trade in co-operation with the Air Force 
and the Army and for the protection of Indiafs maritime trade 
and communications.
Its basic rationale was seemingly as an implicit part 
of a Commonwealth-United States naval defence of the lines 
of communications passing across the Indian Ocean. Although 
the Indian Government had every desire to avoid involvement 
in any East-West conflict, it clearly appreciated that 
neutrality in such an eventuality would be almost impossible 
due to Indiafs heavy dependence on maritime-borne commerce 
largely carried in ships of the Western bloc maritime 
countries to and from Western ports. Thus the Indian Navy 
had been conceived and developed as an anti-submarine force
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aimed at countering the submarine arm of the Soviet Navy in 
at least implicit co-operation with Western and regional 
Commonwealth non-aligned states. While India entered into 
no contingency planning with prospective allies and probably 
declined even TunderstandingsT for political and diplomatic 
reasons, the annual naval exercises with other Commonwealth 
navies in the Indian Ocean facilitated co-operation in 
defence of communications in the region lying between Aden 
and Singapore in the event of an East-West conflict.
The Indian Navy’s operational planning during the period 
1947-62, however, seems to have contemplated operations if 
at all only against Pakistan; the contingency of conflict 
with Communist China or Indonesia involving naval actions 
appears to have been ignored in practice although it is not 
unlikely that either or both countries may have figured in 
staff exercises. The naval threat posed by Pakistan was 
marginaland could have amounted to littl.e more than one 
foray by the fleet from Karachi against Indian coastal ship­
ping and perhaps involving a short bombardment of Bombay. 
Following this the Pakistani vessels would have had to con­
cede India’s superior naval might and retire to Karachi and 
be ’bottled up’ pending the outcome of the land campaigns, 
which would be decisive, or continue on to face the same fate 
in Chittagong under constant attack from Indian carrier and
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land-based planes or perhaps internment in a neutral port.
Any serious challenge to IndiaTs maritime shipping interests 
would be effectively precluded by the above course of events 
and by the difficulty in making attacks on short notice and 
under pressure against shipping lanes in which Indian-regis­
tered vessels would be inter-mingled with a variety of 
foreign-owned ships. Uninterrupted Indian access to Middle 
Eastern oil would be further assured by the fact that India’s 
oil imports are carried almost exclusively in foreign 
bottoms - only two Indian oil tankers being in existence in 
1962.
The very complacency with which the contingency of 
naval operations against Pakistan were viewed, however, had 
led to financial considerations becoming of paramount import­
ance in determining budgetary allocations for the Navy. The 
Government failed to provide the necessary ships and facilit­
ies without which the responsibilities of the Navy were con­
siderably in excess of its actual operational capabilities. 
There was no continuous refit of units of the fleet and a 
rapid deterioration in either the regional or global situa­
tion culminating in an outbreak of hostilities would have 
found few ships of the Indian Navy able to quickly take up 
stations or to maintain them for any useful period of time. 
The absence of adequate docking or repair facilities aside
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from Bombay and Cochin - both on the west coast - virtually
precluded any sustained action in the Bay of Bengal against
isolated or concerted actions by Indonesian, Soviet or
Communist Chinese surface or undersea craft. Government
refusal to provide funds for the maintenance of adequate
o 7stocks of spare parts faced the fleet with progressive 
immobilization in a crisis in which external sources of 
supply were interfered with or cut off. India had absolutely 
no answer to the powerful Irian, IndonesiaTs Sverdlov 
cruiser.
In operations conducted against submarines or surface 
ships, many of the Indian ships would have been liabilities 
rather than assets to the more modern units of the Fleet and 
allied navies. The cruiser Delhi, though refitted in 1955 > 
possessed little operational value and rarely left harbour 
even in its training capacity. The three tR t class destroy­
ers and the three THuntf class frigates were obsolete and 
quite incapable of detecting or destroying modern convention­
al submarines - much less nuclear-powered ones. The cruiser 
Mysore would have been exceedingly vulnerable to submarine 
attack and incapable of undertaking action against a 
Sverdlov cruiser. As true in 1962 as in 1953 - when it was 
made - was the observation of one Indian commentator that
Tthe most comforting thing about our navy... stout-hearted
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though...officers and...ratings are, is that the British and 
American fleets guard the Western and Eastern entrances to 
the Indian 0cean,o°.
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297
See report of an interview with Captain II.C. Ranald by a 
correspondent in Hindu, 26 March 1949* Ranald was a Royal 
Navy fleet air arm expert deputed to organize such an arm 
for the Indian Navy.
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CHAPTER VIII
DEFENCE PRODUCTION 1947-1962
The ordnance establishment remained unaffected by 
partition as all functioning plants happened to be located 
within the political boundaries of the Indian Union . The 
factories came under the direct control of the Defence 
Ministry on 1st December 1947* The Government was conscious 
of the fact that the country’s industrial base was narrow 
and its manpower deficient in many of the specialized skills 
required in modern armaments production. While striving to 
rectify these inadequacies as an integral part of economic 
development , official policy was; firstly, to ensure the 
indigenous production of basic items of military equipment 
that were likely to be required in sufficient quantity to 
make their production economically feasible; and secondly, 
to produce items of which the overall requirement, though 
small, was essential. It was considered to be wiser to con­
tinue to purchase those items of military equipment which 
were extremely costly and in which new developments were 
taking place rapidly and unceasingly, such as fighter and
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bomber aircraft, gunsights and guided missiles0. Planning 
envisaged the use of spare peactime capacity in the ordnance 
factories for the manufacture of civil items but it was 
intended to maintain close contact with the development of 
civilian industry to enable future planning for defence 
production to proceed on a realistic basis^.
The Government proceeded to prepare a scientific organ­
ization upon which to base its proposed modern ordnance 
establishment. Following discussions with British scientists 
experienced in operational research, the Government estab­
lished a Science Research and Development Organisation in 
1948 under a Scientific Adviser0. The organization was ini­
tially comprised of a body of 50 scientists and was designed 
to undertake research on such aspects of defence science as 
operational research, ballistics, communications, explosives, 
food, training methods and military physiology. A Board of 
Scientists was set up to advise the Defence Ministry on all 
scientific matters and, in 1952, a Defence Science Service 
was created to attract young scientists who were interested
in undertaking scientific research of value to defence as a
6career .
Also established in 1952 was the Institute of Armament 
Studies at Kirki which was designed to provide selected 
officers of the armed forces with an 18-month basic training
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course in science and technology as applied to armaments, to 
maintain contacts with universities and other civilian 
research institutions, and to promote, in all possible ways, 
the dissemination of basic knowledge on defence • A factory 
was set up at Ambrarnath in 1954 to serve as the foundation 
of an armaments plant aimed at enabling establishments to 
design and adapt existing types of equipment in small quan­
tities. It was also designed to produce, as required, 
highly specialized machine tools and to provide a training 
ground for promising workers; in accordance with the latter 
aspect, a training school was established with the capacity 
to train 300 first-class tool makers and designers at any 
one time for the ordnance factories and industry. Training 
schemes were also initiated in a number of other ordnance 
plants and supplementary schemes provided for numbers of 
technically-qualified personnel to be sent abroad for further 
training in specific types of work.
A reorganization was effected in January 1958 in which 
the technical development establishments of the three 
Defence Services and the Defence Science Organisation were 
replaced by the Defence Research and Development Organisa­
tion. In 1959-60, to step up the tempo of research and 
development work, the Government constituted the Defence 
Minister1s (Research and Development) Committee to consider
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all policy matters affecting the DRDO. A Research and Devel­
opment Advisory Committee was also created to replace the 
Defence Research Policy Board and the Defence Science Advisory 
Committee. During the 1959-62 period, existing establish­
ments and laboratories were expanded and a number of new 
establishments and laboratories were set up to extend 
research activity to further fields of defence interest not 
hitherto attempted.
In 1959, the Government further increased defence 
research and development activity by approving three schemes 
aimed at attracting young persons to carry out research in 
defence science problems. The schemes comprised: a defence 
research fellowship scheme; grants to universities, colleges, 
etc. imparting scientific/engineering/technological training 
for undertaking specific research projects of defence 
interest; and stipends to research students and others work­
ing on defence subjects in universities, technical institu-gtions and defence establishments .
During the period ending in 1954, the existing ordnance 
factories were apparently balanced and brought up to a sat­
isfactory state of efficiency, * one or two1 were expanded 
and several new factories were planned and approved by the 
Defence Committee of the Cabinet but were not proceeded with 
at the time * f or one reason or a n o t h e r * I n  1952, however,
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the Government approved the establishment of a factory to 
manufacture electronic equipment, vacuum tubes, components 
and radar, A ten-year agreement was signed in December of 
the same year with the Compagnie Generale de Telegraphie sans 
Fils of France for technical assistance in the project. The 
company, Bharat Electronics, was registered in April 1954 as 
a limited company in the public sector under the control of 
the Defence Ministry^.
During this early period, 60 new items were developed 
in the ordnance sphere and a further 40 items were undergo­
ing development as of 1953* Production by value increased 
five-fold from Rs 5 crores (1947) to Rs 8.3 crores (1948) and 
Rs 27.5 crores in 1953^. The increases were primarily due 
to deficiencies in supplies resulting from the division of 
stores with Pakistan and the demands arising from the mil­
itary operations in Kashmir.
By 1953, the requirements of the armed forces obtain­
able from local sources were such that the Government was 
considering the retrenchment of semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers. The aim continued to be T to expand civil produc­
tion in directions which will be helpful also to meet the 
defence requirements of the country in an emergencyf J but 
the Government had started a drive to use the surplus capac­
ity to produce goods for other Government departments and
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for civil industry - provoked partially by progress ’some­
times’ being held up by the inability of civil production to 
provide sufficiently advanced basic materials, components 
and semi-manufactured parts'^.
In mid-1954> the Government reportedly considered an 
offer from Daimler-Benz of Stuttgart which involved a joint 
enterprise with the Tata Iron and Steel company. The propos­
ed project was to have commenced with the production of light 
(3^ ton) armoured vehicles and to be augmented in phases with 
other branches of assembly and production with the ultimate 
manufacture or assembly of a range of items including passen­
ger vehicles and light tanks'^ “*. Serious consideration of 
this proposal was kept in abeyance due to the reorganization 
of the ordnance factories which followed the submission of 
the report by the Ordnance Factories Re-organisation Committee 
headed by Baldev Singh.
The Committee was appointed in early 1954 to examine the 
existing organization, procedure and methods of ordnance pro­
duction with a view to expanding activities and ensuring 
economic administration. The report of the Committee was 
submitted to the Government in 1955 and, while not a secret 
document'1' , has for some unexplained reason never been made 
public. According to informed sources, however, the report 
included recommendations for the establishment of a Defence
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Production Board, modernization of equipment, civil trading 
and retrenchment of semi-skilled and unskilled workers.
With the exception of equipment modernization, which appears 
to have been deferred for financial reasons, the Committeefs 
proposals seem to have been implemented subsequently.
About 5,000 workers were retrenched by September 1956 and 
the production of civil items was extended to include such 
things as coffee percolators, pressure cookers and meccano 
sets. It was announced in August 1955 that a Defence Produc­
tion Board had been created to assume management of all 
ordnance factories, co-ordinate research and development in
the three Armed Services and secure effective liaison with
18civil industry to meet defence requirements .
Tenders were invited for tractors, a clause inserted in 
the contracts making collaboration for the manufacture of 
such units in Ordnance an essential pre-requisite to the con­
clusion of any agreement. Replies were received from two 
firms - Messrs Marshalls of Britain and Messrs Komatsu of 
Japan. The British firm did not make the heavier-type trac­
tor which was a necessary stepping-stone towards heavier 
fighting vehicles and the Japanese company was therefore 
selected. The reputation of Komatsu was attested by the 
fact that it provided the Japanese defence forces with 70 per
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19cent of their vehicular needs • The scheme was sanctioned 
in March 1959*
A scheme for the production of three-ton fShaktimanf 
trucks was signed with Messrs Maschinenfabrik Augsburg- 
Nurenberg AG (M.A.N.) of West Germany in September 1958.
The agreement resulted from Government dissatisfaction with 
the performance of private Indian suppliers. Since 1949> 
the Defence Ministry had placed substantial orders with 
Premier Automobiles and Hindustan Motors with hopes of ulti­
mately obtaining military vehicles with a 100 per cent indig­
enous content. This hope was not realized, after eight years 
Premier being able to achieve not more than a 30 per cent 
local content in their military vehicles. The firm which 
manufactured Studebaker trucks (largely through assembly) 
had supplied 4,000 old units to the Army and then, in 1957> 
had abandoned their manufacture, leaving the Army with a 
large number of trucks for which they were not assured of 
spares. The Army had then sought to place an order for 1,000 
three-ton trucks with TELCO, which raised the unit price by 
Rs 8,000 apparently to fall in line with the other manufac­
turers; despite protracted negotiations, the firm would re­
duce their demand price by only Rs 650 per truck. The ques­
tion of manufacture of trucks by Ordnance, which had been 
considered several times previously but had not been pursued
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so as to enable private firms to stabilize themselves, was 
taken up following the 1957-58 experience with the private 
suppliers in which it had become clear that Defence could 
not rely upon the private firms to supply Army trucks at a 
reasonable price. Following extensive tests conducted by the 
Army, the agreement was signed with M.A.N.^0.
The first Shaktiman truck rolled off the assembly line 
at the Gun Carriage Factory (Jubbulpore) on 21 June 1959 with 
a 39 per cent indigenous component. The Machine Tool Proto­
type Factory at Ambrarnath produced the transfer cases, and 
the ordnance factory at Kanpur supplied the road springs 
from a special quality of steel which it produces. Main 
assembly was subsequently undertaken at Jubbulpore with 
proposals to establish the engine assembly line at Kanpur 
and castings from the ordnance factory at Muradnagar.
Expenditure on the manufacturing and research establish-
21ment remained fairly constant for the period ending in 1959 
but the output of the ordnance factories by value, which 
totalled Rs 27*5 crores in 1953> fell to Rs 14*57 crores 
(1956-57) before recovering to Rs 18.38 crores (1957-58) and 
Rs 19.57 crores (1958-59) . The gradual increase in produc­
tion was accompanied by a decrease in idle capacity from Rs 
63 lakhs (1956-57) to Rs 11 lakhs (1957-58) and Rs 9 lakhs
(1958-59)23.
The nature of production eased India1s dependence on 
foreign (primarily British) sources which accounted for no 
less than 90 per cent of her military equipment and stores in 
1950^‘. By March 1953> India was reportedly self-sufficient 
*generally* in non-lethal stores and equipment, less so with 
respect to non-technical stores and equipment and self-suf­
ficient to only a small degree as regards lethal stores and 
specialized military equipment and weapons^, The Commander- 
in-Chief of the Army, General M, Rajendrasinjhi, declared in 
Calcutta on 22 June 1953 that 80 per cent of the Armyfs light 
equipment was then being produced in India and that the Gov­
ernment proposed to make the Service self-sufficient in 
26stages . By the end of 1959> it was claimed that about 95 
per cent of the Services1 general stores - clothing, textiles 
mechanical and chemical stores, steel and other ferrous and 
non-ferrous materials, petrol, etc. - was being produced 
indigenously^.
The deteriorating border situation with Communist China, 
however, prompted the Government in late 1959 to undertake 
an ambitious modernization and expansion programme in its
n  Oordnance establishment^ • The Prime Minister stated in the
Lok Sabha on 18 December 1959 that, while self-sufficiency
was a big word and never completely obtainable, fbroadly
29speaking, that is our wish, that is our attempt* . At a
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New Delhi meeting of the Congress Parliamentary Party on 8 
February I960, Nehru claimed that fWe are becoming more and 
more self-reliant in the manufacture of defence requirements.
We are advancing in the field of atomic energy and we have
30made rapid progress in the manufacture of defence equipment1 • 
About Rs 20 crores were sanctioned for the modernization 
and expansion of the defence factories in the 1960-61 fiscal 
year as * part of a phased programme of raising defence pro-
31duction1 . The plan envisaged the production of new items, 
renovation of old plant and equipment to raise the capacity 
and efficiency of the factories, establishment of a new ex­
plosives factory at Bhandara, and development of steel and
3 2special alloy-making capacity in the ordnance factories •
These plans provoked one Indian daily to comment that fthe 
year I960 has all the portents of coming off as a signifi- 
cant landmark in the history of the Defence industries1 .
In February I960, the production of one-ton trucks was 
undertaken in collaboration with the Nissan Motor Company of 
Japan. Projects sanctioned during fiscal 1961 included a 
clothing factory at Avadi and an alloy and special steels
O  Aplant0 . In an agreement made public on 16 December 1961, 
Nissan agreed to collaborate with the Defence Ministry in the 
assembly in India of small (8 cwt) patrol jeeps, and the 
first of these jeeps, which were given the name 1Jonga*, was
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pressed into service on 24 January 1962. On 1st February 
1962, the foundation stones of a cable factory and base 
repair depot were laid at Chandigarh; the cable factory, 
which was to be established with the assistance of a Japanese 
firm, was to manufacture a special variety of cables, special 
motor and electrical equipment and fire-control equipment, 
while the repair depot was to manufacture helicopters in 
addition to its normal repair and maintenance of aircraft.
Renewed interest was shown in the indigenous production 
of tanks. On 2 October I960, the Defence Ministry issued a 
statement to the effect that the manufacture of tanks would 
be undertaken in the ordnance factories during the Third 
Five-Year Plan . A team of defence experts headed by the 
Chief of the Army General Staff, Lt. General L.P. Sen, 
visited Britain and West Germany in January 1961 to assess 
several possible types'^. The West German firm involved, a 
subsidiary of Daimler-Benz, was prepared to design a panzer 
tank suited to Indian conditions. However, as has been 
noted earlier in this paper, the offer by Vickers-Armstrong 
of Britain to modify the design of the Chieftain medium 
tank - which had been adopted by the British Army - to meet 
Indian specifications proved the more attractive^?. The 
conclusion of an agreement between the Government and the 
British firm was revealed in a London announcement on
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21 August 1961 which stated that 1,000 37-ton medium tanks 
were to be manufactured and a heavy vehicles factory was to 
be established for this purpose at Avadi, near Madras. The 
first 40 units would be built in Britain, the components of 
subsequent units would be shipped to India for assembly and, 
ultimately, there would be complete fabrication and manufac­
ture at Avadi with the minimum of imported components consid-
o oered feasible"'0 . According to a statement by the Minister
of Defence Production, A.M. Thomas, at Wellington (Nilgiris)
on 7 November 1964* the Avadi plant would have the capacity
39to manufacture 100 units per annum .
Even before independence, the nationalist political 
leadership indicated a desire for the country to attain 
self-sufficiency in the manufacture of aircraft for the 
Indian Air Force and civil aviation within 20 years, i.e. by 
about 1967^* In 1946, the Interim Government invited a 
British technical mission to India to advise it concerning 
the establishment of an aircraft industry. The Committee 
duly recommended the utilization of the repair and overhaul 
plant of Hindustan Aircraft Limited (IIAL) at Bangalore as 
the nucleus for the industry and its advice was considered 
and accepted by the Government.
While a modern design and development department was 
being established, HAL undertook the assembly of various
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aircraft required by the IAF. Fifty Percival Prentice basic 
trainers were assembled for the Air Force during the 1947-50 
period^ and twelve were produced for the Indian Navy between 
1951 and 1953* Some 150 de Havilland D.H.82 Tiger Moth 
two-seat primary trainers were turned out up to 1951« A 
licensing agreement was concluded with de Havilland Aircraft 
of Canada in 1950 and a scheme for the assembly of Vampire 
F.B.9 single-seat fighter-bombers and T.55 conversion train­
ers was initiated. The assembly of the fighter-bomber began 
in 1953 and of the two-seat advanced trainer in 1956 and, 
when production ceased during the 1959-60 year, a total of 
230 fighter-bombers and 50 trainers had been produced.
Negotiations were undertaken in 1955 with Folland Air­
craft and Bristol Siddeley Aero-Engines of Britain for a 
licence to produce the Folland Gnat lightweight fighter and 
its powerplant, the Orpheus 701 turbojet. The licences were 
acquired in September 1956 4 , new factory buildings for the 
project were completed in 1959 and production of the airframe 
commenced in 1961 from imported components. The first 
Orpheus 701 came off the production line on 21 November I960 
and type approval was granted by the Defence Ministry nine 
months later^. Following the conclusion of a licence agree­
ment with Hawker Siddeley Aviation in Delhi on 7 July 1959> 
the Indian Government initiated a project for the manufacture
314
of a military version of the Avro 748 Series 2 short- and 
medium-range transport at an Aircraft Maintenance Depot 
established for this purpose at Kanpur as a unit of Mainten­
ance Command of the IAF^. In an agreement signed in London 
on 30 December 1959, India also acquired a licence for indig­
enous production of the Rolls Royce Dart RDa7 turboprop, the 
proposed powerplant for the Avro series to be produced. In 
the spring of 1962, the Indian Government obtained a licence 
for indigenous production of Sud-Aviation*s SE-3160 Alouette 
III general-purpose helicopter^.
Simultaneous with the assembly and production of 
foreign aircraft under licence, UAL developed its own design 
section under the appointed chief designer, Dr V.M. Ghatage. 
In September 1948, the Government decided that HAL should 
proceed with the development of three aircraft types desig­
nated the HT-2 primary trainer, the HT-10 three-seat advanced 
trainer and the HT-11 advanced trainer^.
The first prototype of the IIT-2 all-metal two-seat 
trainer flew on 13 August 1951 with a 145 h.p. Gipsy Major 
10 powerplant. The flight of the second prototype followed 
on 19 February 1952 with a 155 h.p. Cirrus Major 3 engine.
A total of 160 units were subsequently produced for the IAF, 
Indian Navy and civil aviation training centres until lack 
of orders caused the production line to be virtually closed
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, A ldown in early 1962 . Development of the HT-10 and HT-11
trainers was not proceeded with for some unknown reasons 
while the proposed development for the Navy of an amphibian, 
which was to have been similar in design and power to the 
Short Sealand^, was also not pursued^.
Several light monoplanes were developed for civil and 
military purposes - the two-seat Pushpak for flying clubs 
and private owners^ and the more powerful four-seat Krishak 
for artillery observation and spotting'*'*'. A light communi­
cation aircraft, the Kanpur» was designed by Air Vice- 
Marshal Harjinder Singh and the first prototype underwent 
flight trials in September I960. The first demonstration 
flight took place on 4 February 1961.
Under the Second Five-Year Plan (1956-61) HAL undertook 
the design and manufacture of a jet trainer, an advanced jet 
fighter, and aero-engines. The trainer was envisaged as a 
single replacement for the HT-2, Harvard and Vampire, while 
the fighter was to be produced in two series to meet the Air
Force’s requirements for a transonic ground attack fighter-
r obomber and a Mach 2 interceptor^ •
Official approval for the development of the HJT-16 
two-seat basic/intermediate jet trainer was given in December 
1959 - the first jet design to be undertaken in India without 
the help of non-Indian consultants. Detailed design work
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began in April 1961 when Dr V.M. Ghatage, HALfs chief 
designer, assembled a group of 15 designers headed by Mr Raj 
Mahindra. The team was increased to 35 personnel the follow­
ing year, mainly through the recruitment of graduates from 
the Indian Institute of Science and other technical colleges^.
Development also commenced on the HJE-2500 turbojet 
engine for the trainer, on a six-cylinder piston engine for 
the Krishak, and on the PE90H four-cylinder piston engine for 
the Pushpak. The latter engine was developed in four and 
one-half months and the first production model was started 
up by Defence Minister Menon on 11 March 1959«
The development of the HF-24 fighter commenced in 1956 
under the direction of Dr Kurt Tank, the former technical 
director of the famous Focke-Wulf organization and designer 
of the Kondor maritime bomber and F.W. 190 fighter. The 
team was initially comprised of 18 German engineers, three 
Indian senior design engineers and about 22 other Indian 
engineers with design experience. Initial plans envisaged 
the use of two Orpheus 703 turbojets for the transonic Mk 1 
version and of a single Orpheus 12 turbojet, with dry and 
simplified reheat ratings of 6,740 lbs and 8,170 lbs respec­
tively, for the supersonic Mk 2. The latter engine was 
undergoing development by Bristol for the NATO competition
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and its completion by the company was conditional on its 
acceptance for this market.
Within 22 months of the projects commencement, glider 
trials were begun to test, in free flight, the full-scale 
wings and fuselage of the design, which had previously been 
model-tested in wind tunnels and been tested for low-speed 
behaviour in the tunnel of the Indian Institute of Science 
at Bangalore. By this time the staff had increased to 80 
Indians, the German complement remaining static. Assembly 
of the first prototype began in April I960 and was completed 
in eleven months. In March 1961, the prototype (serial 
number BR 462) was completed and ground trials commenced.
The maiden flight of the aircraft followed on 24 June 1961, 
powered by two Orpheus 703 t ur bo je t s ' * T h e second Mk 1 
prototype flew in October 1962.
Indian technicians had reportedly built some 25 Orpheus 
12s virtually by hand-*“’ when it became clear that NATO no 
longer had any interest in the engine. Bristol Siddeley was 
thereby faced with a further expenditure of about $ 10 mil- 
lion to complete development of an engine^ for which India 
alone offered a market, and a limited one at that. Although 
under no obligation, contract or otherwise, to India to com­
plete development of the model, Bristol Siddeley - which had 
already spent some $ 7 million on the engine - was prepared
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r nto expend up to $ 1 million further on development3 ' but 
advanced the perfectly reasonable suggestion that the Indian 
Government either accept further financial liability or re­
quest a subsidy from the British Government^. For reasons 
that can only be ascribed to pique, New Delhi not only 
refused to assume the costs of further development but, 
according to a well-informed aviation magazine, fAn effort 
by Britain to compromise by offering India a loan for the 
general purpose of aviation development and not specifying 
the Orpheus project as beneficiary was rejected by Indiafs 
Defence Minister, Krishna MenonT^ .  India reportedly showed 
no interest in Snecma’s offer of the Atar 9 turbojet (which 
powers the Mirage III and IV)^ but turned to the Soviet 
Union for a suitable power-plant.
Several Klimov VK-7 turbojets, which develop a thrust 
comparable to the Orpheus 12, were obtained and subjected to 
evaluation tests at Bangalore. The centrifugal flow VK-7 
could not, however, be readily fitted to the existing HF-24 
airframe without major design changes and India shifted its 
attention to the RD9-F axial flow engine; six of this type 
were imported in late 1961 and bench-tested. This power- 
plant had a small frontal area but its use was still depend­
ent on a modification of either the engine or airframe. 
Reasons of prestige and the problems of time and finance
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involved in a redesign of the airframe strongly inclined 
the Indian Government against undertaking such a measure 
except as a last resort. In an apparent volte-face, however, 
Moscow finally agreed to modify the engine to fit the exist­
ing HF-24 airframe^ and an agreement was concluded in the
Russian capital in July 1962 which provided for the licensed
62manufacture of the Mach 1.4 engine in India . The Soviet 
authorities agreed to supply a few models by the end of 1963 
and production was envisaged in 1963 - subsequently deferred 
to 196403.
Indian enquiries concerning the feasibility of acquir­
ing a Soviet powerplant for the HF-24 indirectly led to 
interest in the MIG-21 - Russia reportedly proposing that it 
provide the whole airframe and engine of a supersonic
64fighter .
The indigenous construction of naval craft and warships 
was evidently allocated a lower priority than aircraft and 
little serious consideration was publicly evidenced in such 
projects until 1955* In that year, an order was placed with 
Hindustan Shipyward Limited (at Vizagapatnam) for a survey 
vessel, and consideration was given to proposals for the 
local construction of a mooring vessel, seaward patrol craft 
and some inshore minesweepers^.
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The Government gave renewed and serious consideration
/ •  /to the construction of naval vessels in India in early 1960OC
and, in pursuance of this objective, purchased in April the
entire assets of Garden Reach Workshops Limited (Calcutta)
and Mazagon Dock Limited (Bombay) . It was envisaged that
these newly-acquired yards, hitherto concerned with civil
projects only, would initially build small naval vessels
6 8like minesweepers and, later, destroyers0 . Orders were sub­
sequently placed with these yards for various yard craft
like water-boats, ferry craft, ammunition barges, fast
69motorboats and other items like pontoons • Three seaward 
patrol craft were acquired in 1960-61 and approval for the 
construction of three more such craft was given in 1960-61
70with a firm order being placed with Garden Reach in 1961-62 •
Firm orders for two inshore minesweepers were placed with
Mazagon Dock in 1960-61 and it was reported as ,likelyt
that an order would be placed with the same yard in the
near future for a destroyer that was expected to cost about 
71Rs 6.4 crores . The managing director of Mazagon according­
ly announced on 2 February 1962 that his company was ’soon’ 
to commence the construction of two minesweepers for the 
Navy and would build the first destroyer before long7 . Neg­
otiations were also undertaken with Britain for technical and 
financial assistance in the proposed construction of three
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y)’Leander’ class frigates at Mazagon Dock , but discussions 
were still in progress at the time of the border war.
On the eve of the border war, India’s defence industries 
were occupied with diverse and ambitious production schemes. 
The aircraft industry comprised Hindustan Aircraft 
Limited at Bangalore and the Aircraft Manufacturing Depot 
operated by the IAF’s Maintenance Command at Kanpur, Under­
way or in the planning stage were the production of Pushpak 
and Krishak light monoplanes, the Kanpur Logistics Air Sup­
port type, Gnat transonic fighters, HF-24 transonic fighter- 
bombers and supersonic fighters, MIG-21 supersonic fighters, 
the HJT-16 advanced jet trainer, Avro-748 medium-range trans­
port, Alouette III helicopter, Orpheus 701 and 703, Dart RDa7 
and PE90II aero-engines.
The State-owned Mazagon Docks and Garden Reach shipyards 
were engaged in the construction of yardcraft and patrol 
vessels and contemplated the construction of minesweepers and 
destroyers in the near future.
The ordnance establishment comprised 22 factories - 
seven general engineering, five metallurgical, five clothing 
and leather, two chemical, two chemical-cum-engineering and 
one cable//. These factories were engaged in the production 
of small arms and ammunition, artillery, sea mines, depth 
charges, bombs, one-ton and three-ton general service
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vehicles, eight cwt patrol jeeps, tractors and a variety of 
items for other Government Departments and civil trade in­
cluding pressure cookers, meccano sets and hair clippers.
The research organization had undergone a considerable 
expansion and consisted of 25 research laboratories and tech­
nical establishments, two training establishments and three 
field research stations* Its efforts were reflected in such 
projects as the development of a mountain gun, the semi-auto­
matic Ishapore rifle, anti-tank grenades and mines, mine- 
clearing equipment, universal gun and mortar-sights, col­
lapsible assault boats, L.74 anti-aircraft guns, etc.
India had made substantial progress in developing local 
sources of defence equipment, particularly after 1959, but on 
a foundation built up in less spectacular fashion between 
1947 and 1958. Production projects sanctioned had risen from 
Rs.34 crores to Rs .93 crores (1957-58), Rs 1.49 crores 
(1958-59), Rs 19.32 crores (1959-60), Rs 24.5 crores (1961-62) 
and totalled Rs 7 crores (1962-63)^. The value of produc­
tion, which had fluctuated during the first decade, rose to
Rs 25.14 crores (1959-60), Rs 30*36 crores (1960-61) and Rs
7641.5 crores (1961-62; . The value of production for civil
trade varied from Rs 3*2 crores (1958-59), Rs 3*45 crores
(1959-60), Rs 2.03 crores (April-November i960) and Rs 7*21
77crores (1960-61) , and covered ferrous and non-ferrous
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materials, metal products, leather and textile stores and
7 8chemical and general engineering articles' • The savings in 
foreign exchange resulting from projects undertaken was 
estimated at Rs 16 crores (1957-58 to 1958-59), Rs 14*22 
crores (1959-60), Rs 11.6 crores (April-November I960) and 
Rs 4*07 crores (1960-61)^ .
IIALfs Aero-Engine Division had achieved the distinction 
of being the first organization in non-communist Asia to 
manufacture a gas turbine aero-engine. The HJT-16 represent 
ed the first time an Afro-Asian country had designed a jet 
aircraft without help from either of the two power blocs.
The HF-24 project gave India the fdistinctionf of being one 
of only four or five countries to proceed with the develop­
ment of a supersonic fighter aircraft.
India was still far from achieving self-sufficiency to
even a general degree, however, and officially-inspired
80claims to the contrary were grossly misleading. India re­
mained dependent upon external sources of supply for designs 
vital armaments components, all sophisticated equipment and 
many of the basic chemicals and intermediates required for 
the manufacture of ammunition and explosives.
The production schemes for trucks and jeeps were consid­
erably behind schedule. By December 1962, only 459 Komatsu 
tractors had been produced for a foreign exchange saving of
3 24
Rs 112.50 lakhs as against a targeted output of 750 units 
and a saving of Rs 3«2 crores in foreign exchange. Despite 
a reduction in the target for 1962, production had fallen
Q  *1
from the 1961 level of 16 per month to about nine • The
production of Shaktiman trucks against targets totalled
739/1200 (1959-60), 1201/1200 (1960-61) and 803/2000 (I96I- 
3 26 2 ) . Only 1192 Nissan trucks were produced against an
81expected 2400 and the scheme for Nissan patrol jeeps,
which had initially envisaged 5000 per annum, had completed
only 1847 up to the end of 1 9 6 3^ .
These schemes were also heavily dependent upon foreign
components. The indigenous components of the Komatsu tractor
was only 34*35 per cent as of December 1962; of the patrol
jeep, only 28 per cent as of March 1 9 6 4 . As of March 1962,
46 per cent of the Shaktiman truck was of indigenous origin
as against an expected 70 per cent. By March 1964* the
indigenous content of the Nissan truck was 28.15 per cent as
opposed to an initial target of 80 per cent and a revised
8target of 50 per cent .
Bharat Electronics was geared almost solely to the pro­
duction of ground units such as single-band receivers and 
transmitters, transistorized megaphones and ’walkie-talkies’, 
and its output by value in I964 was comprised of imported 
components and specialized raw materials to the extent of
or ,863 0 - 3 5 per cent
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The situation in the aircraft industry was even more
misleading as, in reality, the industry largely functioned
as an organization geared to the assembly of imported com- 
81ponents '• Neither special quality steel nor aluminium - 
both vital to aircraft production - was manufactured in 
India, and all instrumentation, undercarriage, braking 
systems, communications and electronic equipment had to be 
imported. The superficiality of the industry was perhaps 
best illustrated by the fact that HAL had been able to 
undertake the repair and overhaul of jet engines only in
1960 while the first major overhaul and inspection of a 
Canberra bomber was only completed in 1961. The HF-24 pro­
ject was proceeding in a halting fashion; the first proto­
type of the Mk 1 had been flight-tested with great fanfare 
in June I96.I but had been unable to attain a supersonic 
speed in level flight while the second prototype had only 
been flight-tested in October 1962. The future of the Mk 2 
remained indefinite as no decision had yet been taken on a 
powerplant and it was at least four years removed from the 
stage of full production. The Avro scheme was virtually 
chaotic. The test flight of the first unit on 26 November
1961 had been hailed by Government and project authorities 
with the claim that three or four units would be produced 
each month by 1962 - but the second unit was not in fact to
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8 8be flight-tested until March 1963 . Furthermore, most of
HAL’s equipment was of pre-1945 origin and AMD’s tools and 
jigs had been fabricated from World War II equipment. The 
fabricating machines at AMD were largely salvage from stores 
left behind by the United States Army Air Force in 1945 with 
some additions from the Punjab and Hindustan Machine Tools 
plants.
India’s defence production organization was also af­
flicted with a series of other ills which inhibited effic­
iency and the establishment of soundly-based defence 
industries consistent with the country’s resources and 
immediate needs. India remained badly deficient in technical 
capabilities and very short of first-rate design engineers 
and scientific workers despite the considerable efforts of 
the Defence Science Organisation. The modernization of the 
ordnance establishment undertaken in I960 was making only 
slow progress and efficient operations were being seriously 
compromised by the absence of proper cost accounting and 
depreciation which concealed the heavy costs being absorbed 
for moderate gains. Low pay scales and slow promotions were 
continuing to be reflected in the flight of sorely-needed 
personnel to the greater attractions afforded by civil and 
private industry. Bharat Electronics was involved in such 
diverse production as to preclude either economic production
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or concentrated development research. A country which 
remained dependent on gifts of American grain to meet per­
sistent shortages and on massive foreign aid to underpin its 
economic development plans was committed to two supersonic 
plane projects - for an air force which was of relatively 
modest size and at a time when nations possessed of greatly 
superior financial, technological and industrial resources 
were engaged in limiting the types of fighter aircraft in 
service.
Planning for defence production must always be related 
to existing and potential capabilities, to a careful evalua­
tion of likely military requirements and their projection 
over a period of time. Its ramifications are so extensive 
as to call for the most careful and integrated planning. The 
available evidence suggests that New Delhi, in the latter 
half of the 1947-62 period, generally ignored these truisms.
Maximum self-sufficiency in military needs was desir­
able to enable the country to pursue its foreign policy 
objectives free of the limitations imposed by the applications 
of virtual arms embargoes by external powers as during the
8qKashmir conflict '. Desired armaments could not always be 
acquired when needed or at a price which was deemed to be 
reasonable*^. Acutely conscious of India’s size, convinced 
of its importance and great potential, and sensitive to the
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country’s economic weakness and dependence upon the goodwill 
(or to put it more bluntly - charity) of the more prosperous 
and committed countries of both the Soviet and Western blocs, 
India’s political leadership developed what amounted to an 
obsession to achieve the maximum possible self-sufficiency 
in defence equipment and thereby provide substance to the 
policy of non-alignment'^.
The approach to broadening indigenous defence produc­
tion facilities during the first decade would appear to have 
been a considered one and in accordance with India’s needs 
and capabilities. From about 1955> however, planning embark­
ed on ambitious schemes which were not warranted either by 
India’s immediate military requirements or by the capacities 
of local technology and industry. The IIF-24 project and the 
decision to initiate a MIG-21 scheme were quite premature 
and involved the actual or proposed diversion of scarce funds
and technical skills to projects which have been described
q oas ’nothing short of a huge fraud on the gullible public’ 
Professed official beliefs notwithstanding, there is really 
little difference between dependence upon external weapons 
systems and dependence on them for blueprints and vital 
parts, as both require the co-operation of a foreign company 
and the at least tacit approval of the particular foreign 
government. From the standpoint of time, external purchase
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from a substantial production programme enables faster 
acquisition of items undergoing progressive and revolution­
ary development. Such external purchase is also far less 
expensive than the establishment of a limited local produc­
tion line at great cost for a very limited domestic market. 
The popular argument that indigenous production enables 
appreciable savings of scarce foreign exchange is not partic­
ularly relevant in the Indian case in view of the massive 
foreign aid which India was receiving from the very countries 
from which she obtained military stores and equipment.
It is apparent that politics emerged as a primary deter­
minant in defence production during the period which coincid­
ed with Krishna Menonfs tenure at the Defence Ministry. The 
vigour with which he approached the issue of defence produc­
tion, and the constant stress he placed upon the supposed 
progress being made, suggests that he perceived that only in 
this sphere could political capital be made from a portfolio 
which was, from the viewpoint of domestic politics, hardly a 
stepping-stone to higher political office. The Avro project 
affords an example of his approach. According to one polit­
ical commentator, Menon wanted the first Indian-assembled
Avro to fly even before it was thought fit for the first pro-
93totype to do so in Britain . The result was that project 
officials set out to manufacture a full production model to
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certification standards instead of via the normal stage of a 
pre-production development prototype. Work began in January 
I960 but sanctions for the buildings were not given until 
30 months later with the result that equipment arrived but 
could not be installed. As late as January 1964* production 
and construction were going on simultaneously in some 
hangars^.
There would also appear to be sufficient evidence to 
support the widely-held view that Menon deliberately sought 
to create a private industrial empire within his ministerial 
control. Although the production of various items for civil 
trade was undertaken by the Defence Ministry prior to Menon1s 
tenure, the items involved at this early stage appear to 
have complemented existing civil government and private fac­
ilities - road rollers, rail carriages, etc. Following 
MenonTs appointment, however, production was undertaken of 
such items as film projectors, brief cases, mail bags, micro­
scopes, meccano sets and coffee machines^. The production 
of such items in Ordnance could scarcely be considered to be 
warranted by the absence of such capacities in the private 
sector and the expense involved in a limited production of 
such items could not possibly have been competitive with the 
larger capacities of the private sector if proper cost 
accounting and depreciation methods were followed^0. The
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argument that such production was required to preserve spare 
capacity against the contingency of war would also appear to 
have been ’over-worked’; the private sector could employ the 
same argument even more effectively. Ordnance would have 
undoubtedly been more effective in its essential task - the 
development and production of military items - if it had not 
diverted its attentions to petty items of civil trade in com­
petition to established private facilities.
The production schemes for one-ton and three-ton trucks 
allegedly resulted from the unsatisfactory performance of 
private suppliers as regards deliveries and price. Defending 
these projects during the defence debate on 9 April I960,
Menon claimed that two of the three manufacturers of trucks 
in India had delivered ’almost nothing’ of the orders placed 
with them by the Defence Ministry while the third, although 
his deliveries were more regular, had increased his prices 
’very considerably’. He claimed that the types of trucks 
under production in Ordnance were better than those supplied 
by the private sector (50 per* cent more carrying capacity 
and 35 per cent more cruising speed) and that a three-ton 
truck produced by Ordnance cost only Rs 36,000 or about Rs 
7500 below the price quoted by the cheapest manufacturer; 
the savings resulting from the placement of an order for 
4500 three-ton trucks and 1200 one-ton vehicles with Ordnance,
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rather than with private Indian manufacturers, totalled 
97Rs 5 crores .
It would have been cheaper, however, to have resolved 
the issue through penalty-clause contracts with the private 
manufacturers than to have established such facilities inde­
pendently in the Ordnance sector. As the annual requirements 
of the Army at the time amounted only to about 2000 trucks, 
it seems highly doubtful if an ordnance scheme of say 2000 
vehicles per annum could be operated as efficiently or as 
economically as private production lines serving a market of 
40,000 civilian vehicles per annum. This is particularly so 
when one takes into account the profit motive underlying the 
efforts of private manufacturers - an incentive not likely 
to be so compelling in a miniature ’ordnance empire’ where 
the input-output efficiency scale method of computation is 
much more difficult to ascertain and where production schemes 
were undertaken on various items in the ’national interest’ 
even if it was not economical to do so. Menon’s well-known 
bias against the private sector was not absent from defence 
production policy and, it can be argued, it did not facili­
tate the formulation and execution of policy calculated to 
achieve maximum results for the human, financial and material 
resources expended. Insofar as policy was reflected by the 
IIF-24 and MIG-21 projects, efforts were directed seemingly
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towards the projection of an image of industrial power and 
technical skill which in fact did not exist - and which con­
tributed very little, if at all, towards alleviating Indiafs 
pressing social and economic problems. The contradiction 
between a supersonic aircraft from an Ordnance factory and 
emergency grain shipments from the West (over and above the 
massive PL 480 shipments which the United States has been 
providing since 1951) needs no elucidation.
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CHAPTER IX
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
The pattern of civil-military relations in India during 
the period 15 August 1947-20 October 1962 closely approximat­
ed the accepted norm in the English-speaking countries of the 
West. There was a stable subordination of the military es­
tablishment to the civil power in which the channels of 
advice from the military to the civil authority were institu­
tionalized in a manner compatible with a democratic policy­
making process. In this achievement, India provided a rare 
exception among the newly-emergent states'*" and a useful com­
parison with neighbouring Burma and with Pakistan, where the 
inheritance of a similar military tradition did not preclude 
an army coup d fetat after just over a decade of civilian 
government2.
Under the Raj, the armed forces had constituted a pro­
fessional body which, though regarded by Indian nationalists 
as an instrument of sectionalism in internal politics^, and 
as a mercenary force loyal to an alien rather than to a pop­
ular indigenous authority, evoked genuine national pride by
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its exploits in two world wars and countless minor ones.
Its contribution to Indian independence from British rule, 
though generally ignored by publicists, was an important one 
and perhaps of greater significance than the frequently ir­
responsible actions and attitudes which characterized the 
nationalist movement.
The contribution of the armed forces to an independent 
and bifurcated India has also been extensive. Amid the 
chaos of partition the Army - though it failed to remain as 
impartial to communal strife as was hoped - nonetheless con­
stituted the only sanction for official authority^. It was 
the symbol of national purpose in the Hyderabad, Junagadh, 
Kashmir and Goa operations. In Korea, Gaza, Indo-China and 
the Congo, Indian military personnel have given expression 
to their country*s support for peace-keeping activities and 
symbolized her international role. The image of military 
power projected by the British Indian Army prior to 1947 and 
inherited by the Indian Army at independence has been a major 
(if frequently overlooked) contributor to the status which 
has been accorded to the country and its representatives in 
a power-conscious world. The Army, and to a lesser extent 
the Navy and Air Force, have continued to be the ultimate 
sanction of civil authority in a country that has remained 
at least as prone to civil disturbances as during the era of
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British rule* The armed forces have provided a model of 
discipline, efficiency and resource for a civil Indian defic­
ient in these very respects.
The Government indicated its appreciation of the need 
for an efficient and non-political military (and civil) es­
tablishment following independence when it rejected proposals 
from less responsible sections of opinion to prosecute 
members of the civil and military hierarchies for their loy­
alty to the Raj during the period of nationalist activity 
aimed at securing the removal of that alien authority. It 
readily accepted the vital need to retain the existing civil 
and military bureaucracies, rejected proposals to replace 
the professional Army with a more politically-conscious force 
along the lines of the wartime Indian National Army~* and 
made no attempt to interfere with the traditional recruitment 
patterns.
Congress leaders paid tribute to the patriotism which
they felt (genuinely, it seems) had motivated the man and
6officers of the Indian National Army - but these personnel 
were barred from re-employment in the armed forces. Explain­
ing the official policy towards these men in Parliament on 
29 March 1948, Nehru stated that ex-INA personnel would re­
ceive pensions wherever due, that orders of dismissal issued 
by the former government would be superceded by discharges
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designed to remove the stigma which accompanied the former 
orders, and that Rs 3,000,000 would be set aside for distri­
bution to widows of ex-INA personnel and to disabled persons* 
Ex-INA personnel would be permitted to join the police, the 
State Forces and the civil service subject to merit and suit­
ability - but not the Army because of the long break in their 
service and the fpsychological effect1 that such a move would 
have on an Army already subjected to considerable strain^.
The status of the armed forces nevertheless declined 
after independence, both in society and state*
The traditional aversion of Hindu society to regard the 
military as superior either to royalty or the priestly order 
was strengthened by the post-independence context* The ab­
sence of any apparent real threat to Indian security during 
at least the first decade of independence reinforced the illu­
sion that Gandhi had shown the superiority of moral over 
physical force and that such an approach was applicable even 
in the post-1947 era to a significant degree; there was thus 
a philosophic barrier to attaching undue glamour or import­
ance to the military uniform* This attitude was reinforced 
by the Governmentfs moralistic postures, anti-militarist at­
titudes, non-aligned stance and stress on economic develop­
ment as the ultimate source of a nationfs strength* In the 
sociological sense, Indiafs inheritance of able political
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leadership, a well-trained bureaucracy and a capable middle 
class with increasing competence in administration, medicine, 
engineering, law and business served to lessen the value of 
the military as a vehicle of modernity and progress. The 
relatively modest stature of the military in Indian society 
was partly reflected in the marriage market (a useful baro­
meter of career status in a society where marriages are still 
arranged) which rated young men in the armed forces in third 
place behind those in foreign firms and in the Indian foreign 
and administrative services. In the view of one Indian pol­
itical commentator, »nowadays, young men give first prefer­
ence to commercial and engineering services and then to the 
civil service, while the Defence Service is given the last 
place»^ •
The relative status of the military officer in society
was confirmed by the Government»s various measures directed
at reducing the position of the armed forces in the state and
the privileges and benefits given to military personnel. The
Commanders-in-Chief of the three Services were re-designated
as Chiefs of Staff (a much less prestiguous title) with effect
from 1st April 1955 and the comparative position of military
oofficers in the Warrant of Precedence was sharply lowered . 
Lieutenant-Generals lost their former entitlement to gun 
salutes. Military officers» leave and travel concessions,
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family and other allowances and accommodation scales were 
terminated or reduced. A new Pay Code, introduced in 1948, 
reduced the pay scales of Indian Commissioned Officers or 
ICOs (who comprised the vast bulk of the officer corps) to 
the levels prevailing in 1939> although the pay scales of 
the small but senior group of King*s Commissioned Officers 
(KCOs) remained untouched"^. Some military observers evidenc­
ed a strong conviction that the Government was indifferent 
to the welfare of ex-servicemen^. There appears to have
been a deliberate effort by Government to keep military
12officers out of the public spotlight .
The position of the armed forces in the state apparatus 
underwent a sharp reduction from 1946. With the formation 
of the Interim Government in September of that year, the 
Commander-in-Chief of an integrated Service command ceased 
to function as Vice-President of the Executive Council, being 
replaced in the Interim Cabinet by a civilian Defence 
Minister, Sardar Baldev Singh. On 15 August 1947> the integ­
rated Service command was broken up with each Service passing 
under a separate and independent head designated Commander- 
in-Chief, Indian Army; Flag Officer Commanding Royal Indian 
Navy; and Air Marshal Commanding the Royal Indian Air Force^. 
In 1950* under Article 53(2) of the new Constitution, the 
President of India became the Supreme Commander of the armed
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forces in a ceremonial supercession which symbolized civilian 
control.
From a position of direct access to the highest level 
of the British Indian Government, the military were reduced 
to a position in the executive machinery in which they con­
stituted the base of a hierarchical structure of committees 
arranged in a pyramid pattern with the Defence Committee of 
the Cabinet as the apex^^.
The system afforded, in theory, a co-ordinated approach 
with a measure of consistency being ensured by all branches 
being served by the Military Wing of the Cabinet Secretariat, 
Proposals relating to the annual defence grants are initiated 
by the respective Services who assess their needs in terms 
of personnel, money, supplies and equipment. These estimates 
are scrutinized by the appropriate apparatus of the individ­
ual Service branch under the scrutiny of Deputy Financial 
Advisers. The revised estimates are then discussed in the 
Defence Ministers Army, Navy and Air Force Committees and in 
the Defence Ministerfs (Inter-Services) Committee, following 
which they are subjected to the scrutiny of the Defence Min­
istry, The resulting estimates are then, sent to the Defence 
Committee of the Cabinet for consideration, and the conclu­
sions of this body are forwarded to the full Cabinet for 
approval. The assessment of military needs which emerges
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from this process is presented in the form of the Defence 
Estimates'^ to Parliament for discussion and approval. The 
funds are thereupon expended under the constant observation 
of the Deputy Financial Advisers who are responsible for 
checking the progress of expenditure against budgetary grants 
and allotments and examining irregularities'^.
As revealed by the preceding paragraph, financial con­
trols are pervasive, inside of the defence organization yet 
independent of it. The annual and supplementary estimates 
cannot be submitted to Parliament without the prior approval 
of the Ministry of Finance and audit supervision of expendi­
ture is exercised through the Comptroller and Auditor-General 
and the Public Accounts Committee.
17The Financial Adviser to the Defence Services has a 
triple responsibility. He must scrutinize all proposals 
involving defence expenditure and advise whether they should 
be accepted, possessing direct access to the Finance Minister 
for this purpose. As Financial Adviser to the Defence Ser­
vices, he has direct access to the Defence Minister and may, 
at his discretion require that any case in which he thinks a 
decision contravenes financial principles be submitted to the 
Finance Minister direct or via the Defence Minister. He is 
also a member of various committees on defence matters and 
the Chief Accountant officer for defence expenditure,
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responsible to internal audit and accounting for all monies
18voted by Parliament for defence purposes • Lastly, in his 
capacity as Chief Accounts Officer to the Defence Services, 
the Financial Adviser prepares the annual appropriation 
accounts.
In the opinion of a former Defence Secretary, *The
policy-making organisation of the Defence Ministry is thus
made sufficiently flexible to ensure that every relevant
point of view has a chance of being presented at appropriate
level and to have it considered at the highest level if nec- 
19essary* . The theory is rarely if ever translated into prac­
tice, however, and this has been true of the formulation and 
implementation of Indian military policy to the detriment of 
the nationfs defence preparedness.
The system of financial control met with the satisfac­
tion of financial officials. Speaking in 1955* one of the 
Financial Adviserfs staff declared that fthe coat is a little 
more stylishly cut and stitched if a friendly and well-inform­
ed critic helps the tailor at various stages before the 
finishing touch is given to itf. He admitted that occasional 
differences of opinion had existed but claimed that the 
system worked well in practice • His claim would seem to 
require some qualification, however, in light of the conclu­
sions arrived at in an officially-sponsored investigation of
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Indian public administration published in 1953 and the 
annual reports of the Public Accounts Committee . Noting 
that the Financial Adviser has a virtual right of veto over 
military expenditure, H.M. Patel has himself implicitly 
criticized the system of financial controls with the admis­
sion that fmany difficulties ensue from this [Financial 
Adviser’s] position.••’^
The military contribution to policy was further vitiated 
by the fact, noted in the 1958 report of the Estimates Com­
mittee, of the ’considerable duplicate effort involved in the 
Service Headquarters and the Ministry of Defence, and the 
possibility of proposals emanating from a senior level at 
Services Headquarters being examined by officials in the Min­
istry who are either junior or lack the necessary expert know-
9 Aledge’ “r. The report also drew attention to ’an imbalance in 
the distribution of responsibilities between the Ministry and 
the Services Headquarters and also a lack of sufficient del­
egation of authority and powers to the Services Headquarters
which are presided over by officers of the status of the
25Chiefs of Staff’ D. The reception accorded to Service views 
in the Ministry was further compromised by the tendency of 
senior bureaucrats to regard the outlook of the Indian milit­
ary leadership as being excessively coloured by prevailing 
thought in British military circles. As H.M. Patel once
21
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cautioned: 1Unconsciously we tend to think along those lines
and do not allow sufficiently for the differences in our
resources, nor also, and this is most important, for the
differences in our respective objects. We shall have to
26guard against this very real dangerT
It is perhaps not surprising, then, that it has been 
charged by an Indian military writer that the civilian offi­
cials in the Defence Ministry have sometimes put a new com-
27plexion to a position as appreciated by the Chiefs of Staff • 
Confirmation of this is suggested by H.M. Patel who claimed 
in 1953 that the Air Force and Navy obtained ffair play1 on 
several occasions only as a result of their being able to 
present their respective cases 1 fully and franklyf450 - i.e, 
to the appropriate civilian officials like himself who clearly 
made the decisions, The ability of the average civilian 
official to take such decisions, however, must be judged 
against Patelfs own admission that the ignorance of civilian 
officials (to which may properly be added that of the politi­
cians) about military matters is so complete as to be re-
29garded as a self-evident and incontrovertible fact •
Efforts to correct this deficiency bore fruition very belat­
edly for reasons, it would appear, of general apathy, Patel 
claims to have proposed the establishment of an Indian coun­
terpart of the Imperial Defence College in 1949 only to have
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the Chiefs of Staff reply that they could not spare suffic­
ient officers and instructors of the right calibre^, In 
1955 9 a modest beginning was made with the introduction of 
an experimental scheme in Southern Command involving mutual 
liaison visits by civil and military officers aimed at 
encouraging closer understanding of each otherfs organiza­
tional and administrative problems; the scheme was subse-
1^quently extended to Western and Eastern Commands • The 
Estimates Committee proposed the establishment of an insti­
tution modelled on the Imperial Defence College in its 26th 
report (1958) and the support given the proposal by the 
incumbent Defence Minister, V.K. Krishna Menon, is understood 
to have greatly facilitated the ultimate establishment of 
the National Defence College in New Delhi in 1960^. The 
scope and/or timing of these schemes, however, was such as 
to contribute little to the relationships between the civil 
and military bureaucracies during the 1947-62 period under 
review.
The advisory function of the military leadership was 
further compromised by the absence of a unified Service com­
mand, which virtually precluded a reasonable consensus per­
mitting forceful professional arguments regarding budgetary 
allocations. Instead of a single Commander-in-Chief as in 
the British period, there were three autonomous Services,
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each formulating its own policy, competing with each other 
for budgetary allocations from an economy-minded and marked­
ly apathetic political executive, and maintaining parallel 
bodies with the most scrupulous canons of parity. Instead 
of common instruments for joint action, there were various 
inter-Services committees which tended to swell into even 
further committees with the result noted by the military 
correspondent of the Indian Express in early 1963: fWhat is 
particularly marked, as in the case of the committees and 
boards of the Defence Ministry, often the same men rotate 
from one meeting to another in an endless swirl, and they 
are overworked and exhausted, unless they become bored and 
infertilef^ .
Such a system placed a heavy responsibility upon the 
Defence Ministry to effect compromises within the budgetary 
ceilings laid down by the Cabinet, As the Defence Secretary 
and the Financial Adviser are primarily concerned with 
matters of administration and financial procedures within 
the budgetary allocation, the key figure in the Defence 
machinery should be the Minister, It is he, and he alone, 
who is responsible for balancing the Services in a manner 
consistent with their respective operational roles through 
the apportionment of available resources. This person must 
face the demands of each Service separately in his Army,
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Navy and Air Force Committees and resolve conflicting Service 
interests and force compromises in his Inter-Services Com­
mittee, He thereby inevitably constitutes the focus of 
Service resentments over budgetary allocations and this is 
bound to be particularly true with respect to a poor country 
desirous of possessing effective armed forces relative to 
its size but reluctant to expend the sums required to achieve 
the desired level of military power. In such a context, the 
maintenance of a satisfactory working relationship requires 
that the Minister be possessed of a congenial but business­
like manner, willing to recognize the experience of subordin­
ates, capable of making reasonable assessments of conflicting 
Service representations, and able to subordinate personal 
ambitions, pre-delictions and prejudices to the larger res­
ponsibilities of his office. The situation also requires 
that the Minister be prepared and able to present convincing 
arguments to the Defence Committee of the Cabinet and to the 
full Cabinet as and when he is convinced of the need for 
adjustments in military policy. The available evidence 
strongly suggests that not a single holder of the Defence 
post during the 1947-62 period managed to combine the desired 
assets.
The Defence portfolio seemingly carried little weight in 
Cabinet, perhaps for reasons advanced by a former officer in
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an article published in I960, The officer, Major-General
Y.S. Paranjpe, expressed the view that the appointment in
Defence was not politically attractive because the appointee
has to get into something that he knows nothing 
about; secondly, everything done in the Ministry 
is of a secretive nature and he cannot advertise 
himself, except occasionally by showing a rise in 
the production on the Defence Factories and, 
thirdly, he always faces criticism if anything 
goes wrong with nothing to compensate for it.o4
He thus felt that it was not surprising that such a Ministry
should always get persons who possessed neither the necessary
qualities nor aptitudes, and charged:
It remains a neglected ministry, run mainly by the 
civilian secretariat staff. The minister in such 
cases remains a nonentity influenced by party 
politics and guided by his secretaries with whose 
intimate assistance he must function. His decisions 
are due more to political and financial considera­
tions than to a mature understanding of military 
problems. He cannot therefore be convincing enough or force an issue amongst his colleagues.35
In the complacent atmosphere towards defence which 
characterized India at least up to 1959y the post was certain­
ly not one in which an individual could appreciably enhance 
his political stature. On the contrary, the post was subject 
to persistent criticism for the heavy expenditure it incurred 
at a time when, by official admission, India was secure 
against attack. Nevertheless, the individuals who occupied 
the portfolio during the period were persons of considerable 
political stature. Sardar Baldev Singh (1946-52) occupied
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it by virtue of his political standing in the Punjab and the 
heavy Sikh representation in the armed forces and was not 
re-appointed to it following the 1952 general elections for 
reasons that probably reflected both a relative decline in 
his political stature and a desire by Nehru to shift the post 
away from a representative of an important military class 
and from the volatile Punjab, Gopalaswami Ayyangar was an 
important political figure and Nehru’s assumption of the 
post consequent on Ayyangar’s death on 10 February 1953 
placed Defence for two years under the nominal control of 
the most important political figure in the country. Dr 
Nailus Nath Katju came to the post in 1955 with the experience 
acquired in the portfolios of Home and Law (1950-51) and 
Home and States (1952-55) and his appointment appeared to 
suggest Nehru’s belated recognition that Defence was a major
a  /Ipost'3 • The ’impression created was that the department 
would enjoy a fairly stable and continuing guidance’0'.
For various reasons, however, none of these individuals 
appears to have been a forceful Ministerial representative 
in the Cabinet, Singh was widely regarded as amiable but 
lacking both in initiative and administrative skill, with 
the result that the able Defence Secretary, H.M, Patel, vir­
tually ran the Ministry to the point even of submitting 
briefs to Cabinet, Ayyangar was regarded as a good
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administrator but his tenure was very brief - from May 1952 
to 1st February 1953* Katju’s capabilities varied with each 
person whose views were solicited by the writer but, in any 
case, his tenure was also relatively brief and it is doubtful 
if it enabled him to acquire other than a superficial under­
standing of the Ministryfs functions. Nehru’s assumption of 
the portfolio from 1953 to 1955 should have augured well for 
a sympathetic hearing for military requirements but, while 
he retained overall Cabinet responsibility for the Ministry, 
the actual running of the Defence was assigned from 15 March 
1953 to Mahavir Tyagi, the (junior) Minister for Revenue and 
Expenditure from Uttar Pradesh. In view of the latter’s 
minor status, it is probable that, during this period, the 
Ministry was largely run by the Secretary, M.K. Vellodi.
Consequent on Dr Katju’s departure for the more attrac­
tive post of Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh in February 
19579 there was speculation that Morarji Desai might assume 
the Defence portfolio. Commencing on this possibility, one 
journal admitted that it would bring the office high polit­
ical prestige, but that ’it appears the department is still 
not being looked upon as a very important one...what is even 
more depressing is that Mr Nehru and his colleagues seem to 
apply no strict test of qualification to such as appoint- 
ment’ . The journal regarded S.S. Majithia as an eminent
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Sikh second to none in popularity and felt that he had
acquitted himself well as Katju’s deputy and was the best
choice: ’As a Defence Minister he can prove an effective
rebuttal to the suspicion, unjustifiably entertained in some
quarters, of minority representatives being deliberately
kept from important portfolios’^ .  It concluded that ’it is
time the portfolio of Defence was recognised as of major
importance, undeserving of whimsical improvisations1
What then was the significance of Krishna Menonfs
appointment to the post in April 1957? One English observer
41described the post as ’India’s key portfoliof , thereby 
implying that the appointment was significant, while the 
Delhi correspondent of the Daily Telegraph referred to the 
’surprise announcement’ of Menon’s appointment^. Other 
observers were inclined to view it as in the form of a 
’gentle kick upstairs’. The Daily Express viewed the 
appointment as a demotion from foreign affairs to ’what
A OIndians pretend to regard as a junior post’ v • An American 
press source interpreted the appointments of Menon and S.K. 
Palit - the latter to Irrigation/Power - as a balancing act 
between Right and Left in the Cabinet: ’Mr Krishna Menon,
as Minister of Defence, will continue to deal with the scene 
of India’s main military preparedness, the Kashmir land...It 
will doubtless make him available as an even closer advisor
359
to the Prime Minister than he has been in the past...’ The 
source concluded, however, that it was felt thereby that 
Menon was likely to circulate less in international circles, 
where many Indians felt he had not advanced Indiafs rela­
tions^* Expressing a similar view, the Montreal Gazette 
stated that the appointment fmight have been labelled a 
gentle kick upstairs1 for the reason that, in his relation­
ships with the West as Foreign Affairs Adviser, Menon was 
often too extreme even for Nehru^•
The Defence post, however, did not cause any apparent 
decrease in Nehrufs employment of his confidant in interna­
tional diplomacy - nor was it, in all likelihood, ever 
intended to do so. At the same time, the appointment was 
clearly not in response to any crisis or impending crisis in 
defence as official complacency about the nation’s security 
had probably reached its zenith by this time* Quite to the 
contrary, the appointment appears to have been a device 
whereby Nehru could utilize Menonfs experience in foreign 
affairs while providing him an office of greater prestige 
than was attached to the position of Minister without Port­
folio to which he had been appointed on 3 February 1956* 
Politically ambitious, Menon must have long desired a port­
folio in which he could acquire national exposure and the 
fillup to his political stature thereby which escaped him as
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a consultant and roving ambassador. In view of the hostility 
which Menon generated in Congress, Nehru had from the outset 
of independence proceeded to ease his confidant into offi­
cial office, first as High Commissioner in London, and then 
to head Indiafs delegation to the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1953* The domestic acclaim which greeted Menon1s 
presentation of the Indian case on Kashmir in early 1957 was 
clearly regarded by Nehru as offering the atmosphere in which 
to elevate Menon to a senior portfolio - despite the fact 
that he did not have the normal credentials for one - i.e. a 
political base of sufficient importance in India^.
The range of senior posts open to Menon was, however, 
limited by the need for a position that would both permit 
him sufficient freedom to remain an adviser and special 
envoy of the Prime Minister in the field of foreign affairs 
and which would not involve matters requiring extensive ad­
ministrative experience. This ruled out every post of import 
ance aside from Defence which, at that time, appeared to be 
one that could easily be left to the civil secretariat. It 
was subsequently rumoured that Menon would revert to his 
former portfolio so as to permit of more freedom to move on 
the international scene^ but this, and a later rumour to 
the effect that he had agreed to become High Commissioner in
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A RLondon on condition that the jeep scandal was buried4 , were 
evidently without foundation.
In the context of national complacency about defence, 
financial stringency and civilian fpin-pricksf regarding pay, 
benefits, etc., there was understandable resentment on the 
part of military officers. One officer wrote in 1953 that 
the armed forces fwere to be tolerated only so long as condi­
tions made it advisable to do so. Some even thought of them 
as parasites who lived on the people and, as such, something 
to be done away with as soon as p o s s i b l e A n o t h e r  officer 
charged that the fcombatant•..is treated not as a symbol of 
the security of the country but as a drain on the countryfs 
resources*^. In such circumstances, there was a strong 
desire among officers to seek better-paying and more person- 
ally-satisfying civilian employment whenever the opportunity 
presented itself'*"*'. Even the Minister for Defence Organisa­
tion, Mahavir Tyagi, admitted in the Lok Sabha on 25 March 
1953 that fa feeling is growing among our men that they are 
not paid the same attention which they had under their alien
employers. It may be an unfortunate impression, but the im-
ir opression is t h e r e .
Less apparent was the reaction of the officer corps to 
issues of policy. By October 1962, the officer corps com­
prised perhaps 13*000 in the Army and 6-8000 in the other
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two Services combined. The officer cadre of the Army con­
sisted of a small hierarchy of Sandhurst-trained KCOs of 
pre-1939 origin, a middle echelon dating from a crash re­
cruitment scheme from the universities during World War II, 
and a junior element which had entered the Service after 1947 
following completion of the training programmes at the mil­
itary academies. The KCOs were generally of well-to-do 
family backgrounds, drawn from all parts of the country and 
strongly non-political; the middle echelon was less grounded 
in tradition and perhaps inclined towards a mild radicalism 
in outlook; and the junior officers were largely from poorer, 
more urban, politically-minded and bourgeois origins - but 
steeped in military tradition by virtue of their training in 
the military academies. While there were undoubtedly some 
differences of outlook among the various class, caste, region­
al and generational groups, the corps appears to have been 
fairly cohesive, disciplined and professional. The officer 
cadres of the Navy and Air Force were probably better 
educated than their Army counter-parts by virtue of the more 
technical orientation of their Services, of middle-class and 
largely urban backgrounds and with closer social and working 
relationships with the urban middle classes who comprised 
articulate public opinion.
Although reliable generalizations concerning the atti­
tudes of the officer corps are difficult, certain conclusions
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seem permissible from the nature of the corps and from 
interviews with various members of i t ^ .
The Services are the most westernized element in a 
society with strong conservative tendencies and embody 
modernity in organization, operational planning, general 
efficiency and technical knowledge. They are not rooted in 
an indigenous military tradition and do not appear to have 
either sympathy for Gandhian precepts or for ideologies of 
the extreme Left or Right. They have a vested interest in 
stability and order, in national unity, development and 
technological progress.
The comradeship of the old Indian Army survived parti­
tion and the clash in Kashmir-^, resulting in a less emo­
tional view of Pakistan than held by many civilians - although 
this is less so of the post-partition recruits and of the 
Sikhs, who cannot be expected to forget the events surround­
ing partition easily or quickly. The * old Commonwealth* is 
well-regarded and the British tie remains strong with the aid 
of training courses in Britain, attendance of senior officers 
at the Imperial Defence College and British staff colleges, 
the annual conference convened by the Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff, service literature, weapons systems and regi­
mental and unit links developed over a period of association 
spanning two centuries for the Army - albeit several decades
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with regards to the Navy and Air Force. There is no real 
anti-Americanism and the various bitter exchanges between 
the two governments from time to time do not appear to have 
left any lasting impression; there is even a desire to turn 
to American military experience and methods in a moderate 
way. There is also an acute awareness that close relations 
with the United States is essential in view of India’s 
ultimate reliance upon American military aid in any major 
conflict with China. Russia has never been viewed as a 
reliable friend, much less an ally, but there is no desire 
to unnecessarily stimulate hostility on the premise that good 
relations are prudent. China was from the outset viewed with 
a mixture of contempt and disinterest and there was little 
sympathy for the political view that intimate ties between 
India and China was a natural goal. Non-alignment was 
regarded as not detrimental to national security per se on 
the assumption that Western military aid in a crisis was 
axiomatic. Its manner of implementation was regarded with 
some concern, however, in the belief that it strained rela­
tions with India’s sincere friends in the West for only 
short-term advantage among the non-aligned and communist 
states, made the Kashmir issue even more intractable, sapped 
the will to maintain defence preparedness, enhanced the 
attraction of the ’naive’ Gandhian legacy, led to the policy
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of refusing military aid as incompatible with non-alignment 
(although such aid was viewed in military circles as basical­
ly indistinguishable from the economic assistance which the 
Government eagerly solicited) and afforded no credible de­
terrent to a communist attack nor to communist policies 
designed to extend Soviet, and particularly Chinese, power 
and influence at the expense of India and her implicit Western 
allies.
During the decade following independence, however, 
civilian complacency about defence would seem to have been 
shared by the military to a considerable degree. This view, 
coupled with the recognition of the need for rapid economic 
development and the apparent belief that larger appropriations 
would eventually be made for defence, clearly inhibited the 
military leadership from arguing too forcefully for sharply 
increased grants. Also, in the absence of a clearly identifi­
able threat from China until the later Tfifties, Pakistan 
provided an expedient strategic rationale without which, 
given the pronounced non-aligned posture of the Government, 
sound and efficient military policies would have been diffi­
cult to formulate and implement. The civilian fear and dis­
trust of Pakistan thus appeared as a »blessing in disguise» 
in preventing further economies in defence outlay than 
actually occurred^, and was used to good effect-^.
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While the military were not unduly concerned with a
threat from China arising immediately following the re-absorp-
tion of Tibet in 1950-51 - for reasons of logistics - they
were professional enough not to allow their opinions to be
coloured by wishful thinking based on predelicitions as to
the intentions of other states - which are, in any case,
57political in nature, hard to assess and unpredictable .
Thus, while acutely aware of the severe difficulties in pre­
paring a cautious response to the extension of Chinese power 
into Tibet - the Indian military professional had necessarily 
to conceive of the possibility of eventual military conflict 
with China in the Himalayan region and to support measures 
aimed at making adequate preparations against just such a 
contingency, however remote it was believed to be. Concern 
with Chinese intentions slowly increased from 1954 and the 
Aksai Chin road project confirmed the suspicions of at least 
the senior officers informed of events that India*s territor­
ial integrity was being threatened at the very least and that 
a situation was developing in which an Indian military pres­
ence would be required as a deterrent to further Chinese 
intrusions in the short-term and to defend against at least 
minor overt attacks over a longer and indefinite period. 
Dissatisfaction with the continuing passive response of the 
Government was a major contributing factor to the controversy
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revealed by banner headlines in leading Indian dailies on the 
morning of 1st September 1959 which announced the resignation 
of the COAS and the impending resignation of the other two 
Service heads. According to the political correspondent of
r oone paper1* , there was discord between the COAS and the 
Defence Minister over recent promotions in which considera­
tions other than merit may have prevailed and also other areas 
of disagreement; the *resignationsf were attributed to the 
1 result of prolonged and evidently unsuccessful efforts to 
keep politics out of the army, navy and air force*.
Nehru*s pre-occupation in meeting Ayufe Khan at Palam 
airport and a discreet silence by the three Chiefs of Staff 
stimulated intense press speculation and New Delhi was rife 
with rumours. The Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, declined 
to comment on the issue in Parliament and a Press Trust of 
India (PTI) release in the afternoon announced MenonTs resig­
nation - only to be withdrawn late that evening. At 4 P*m. 
a report from London revealed that the Chief of Air Staff,
Air Marshal Subroto Mukerjee had denied knowledge of, and 
involvement in, the affair.
In Parliament the next day, the Prime Minister offered 
an explanation which characteristically left the matter 
clouded. He admitted that the COAS, General K.S. Thimayya, 
had tendered his resignation but declared that he had
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withdrawn it when requested by himself (Nehru) to do so, 
Nehru claimed that the issues involved were ’rather trivial 
and of no consequence’, arose from temperamental differences 
and did not include promotions-^. He implied otherwise when 
he conceded that, while the civil authority is and must 
remain supreme, it should pay due heed to the expert advice 
it receives and this statement, coupled with his refusal to 
table a copy of Thimayya’s letter of resignation - which 
specified the contentious issues - added to the speculation.
Press comment revealed a common reaction. Swara.jya
argued that ’There can be no doubt that General Thimayya
acted from a sense of personal dignity in resigning and of
unselfish impersonal duty in withdrawing his resignation’ .
The Times (London) commented: ’He is not the kind of soldier
who can easily be imagined trying to relinguish his post for
reasons that could be described as "trivial and of no conse-
61quence"’ • The New York Herald Tribune expressed the view
that ’with all due respect to Mr Nehru, it is difficult to 
believe that a gallant and experienced officer (Nehru’s own 
description of Thimayya) would at a time when war threatened 
India, try to resign over a trivial issue’ . Available 
evidence suggests that, Nehru’s claim notwithstanding, more 
basic issues were involved which centred around the conduct 
of the controversial Defence Minister and close confidant of 
Nehru, Krishna Menon.
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Given Menon’s intelligence and energy, his administra­
tive drive and his intimate relationship with Nehru, his 
appointment to the Defence portfolio in early 1957 should 
have augured well. Chinese actions on the northern frontiers 
and with regards to South-East Asia required a fresh perspec­
tive on defence, and Menon’s influence with the Prime Minis­
ter should have facilitated achievement of such a goal. His 
tenure was indeed to coincide with increased budgetary allo­
cations for the Services, increases in Service pay and bene­
fits, some new equipment and an accelerated programme for the 
expansion of ordnance plant and production - achievements 
which, though not primarily due to his personal initiative
(save the acquisition of Hunter fighter-bombers), apparently
63received his full support . Unfortunately, Menonfs strong 
predelictions in foreign policy, his vested interest in 
maintaining a posture in which reliance upon the West for 
military support was not required, his political ambitions 
and his universally-acknowledged arrogance were to exert a 
negative influence on defence during the very period when 
clear-thinking and close co-operation between the political, 
military and civil arms of government were required as never 
before. The military circles who viewed his appointment with 
coolness and misgivings because of his Leftist views and 
difficult temperament were quickly to have their suspicions 
confirmed.
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Almost from the moment he took up the Defence portfolio, 
Menon revealed an attraction to the public spotlight not 
apparent in his predecessors. He began to hustle around the 
country inspecting Defence installations, accompanied by 
considerable photographic and press coverage. He consistent­
ly drew attention to the achievements being effected by 
Ordnance and advanced questionable claims regarding the actual 
significance of the progress being made in this sphere. He 
proceeded to show an unusual interest in cultivating contacts 
in the officer corps to the point, it appears clear, of ad­
vancing the careers of those individuals to whom he took a 
liking through the manipulation of appointments. As all 
appointments, promotions and postings of and above the rank 
of Colonel (or its equivalent in the Navy and Air Force) 
require the prior approval of the Defence Minister, the 
opportunities for ’ministerial mischief’ are almost unlimit­
ed - particularly if the Minister enjoys the complete confi­
dence of the ultimate authority - the Prime Minister - as 
Menon did.
The main figure in the ’promotional storm’ which was to 
be a recurring feature of Menon’s tenure in Defence was Brij 
Mohan Kaul, a Kashmiri Brahmin, scion of a wealthy family 
and a relation of Nehru by blood and marriage^.
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Self-confident, well-educated, charming yet ruthless,
ICaul shared in common with the fold guard* in the Army hier­
archy a Sandhurst training, a good family background, an 
appreciation of the class and caste infantry organization as 
the basis of its esprit de corps, and a strong view of the 
Army as a disciplined force in an otherwise undisciplined 
country. In other respects, however, he was distinctive among 
the Sandhurst cadre. He regarded a popular mandate as unreal 
in an underdeveloped and largely illiterate nation, viewed 
the military take-overs in Burma and Pakistan with no misgiv­
ings and was believed to have no inhibitions about an Army 
seizure of power in India in the event that civil authority 
proved unable to function effectively or a communist bid for 
power appeared imminent or possible. An early participant 
in student demonstrations against the British and widely 
suspected in later life of harbouring political ambitions, 
he retained a strong affection for the British developed as 
a cadet at Sandhurst.
He served on the North-West Frontier and in the Burma 
theatre during World War II, but first attracted public 
notice in 1946 when Nehru appointed him as military adviser 
in Washington and he concurrently served as military adviser 
to the Indian delegation during the Kashmir debate in the 
Security Council. Returning to India later in the year, Kaul
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organized and led irregulars in Kashmir until he had differ­
ences with Sheikh Abdullah - whom he was to arrest in a mid­
night episode five years later on Nehru*s orders. His ac­
tivities as Chief of Staff to Thimayya on the United Nations* 
Repatriation Commission in Korea (in which he allegedly was 
less than impartial to the communist v i e w p o i n t s a p p e a r s  
to have led to differences with his superior culminating in 
his re-posting to India as commander of the 4th division in 
the Punjab, a post he was to hold for three years.
It is quite conceivable that Kaul may not have risen 
much further in rank and responsibility thenceforth had not 
Menon assumed the Defence portfolio. When his efforts to 
cultivate the *old guard* at Army Headquarters proved unavail­
ing, the Defence Minister proceeded to try to play off one 
Service against another by playing upon the inferiority com­
plex of the Navy and Air Force vis-a-vis the Army and making 
arbitrary decisions regarding military priorities aimed, 
primarily it would seem, at promoting his popularity in the 
Air Force0 • At the same time, Menon cultivated contacts 
with more junior officers who were susceptible to his influence 
or prepared to *play along* in the hopes of faster promotion; 
one of these was Major-General Kaul. The two men do not 
appear to have met prior to 1957j but their friendship 
clearly blossomed after their first meeting. Desirous of
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making the armed forces as fproductivef as possible to answer
his political critics, Menon was attracted by Operation Amar
I, an Army housing project undertaken at Ambala by Kaul’s
command with the enthusiastic support of the Defence Minis-
67ter and the somewhat reluctant permission of the COAS •
The first step in the promotional ’storm* occurred in 
early 1959 when the COAS, after consultation with the Army 
Commanders as per the usual practice, presented to the Minis­
try for advancement to the rank of Lieutenant-General the 
names of Major-Generals P.S. Gyani, P.S. Kumaramangalam and 
B.M. Kaul - in that order, Kaul incidentally being the 
junior of the three. The Cabinet, however, clearly acting 
upon the recommendation of the Defence Minister elevated 
Kumaramangalam and Kaul only - in June - the latter having 
in the meantime been appointed Quarter-Master General at 
Army Headquarters, replacing Lieutenant-General Daulat Singh 
who proceeded to a Corps command. KaulTs appointment to QMG 
was consistent with his seniority, but the supercession of 
Gyani naturally provoked comment both in and without Parlia­
ment and in the Service. At issue was not the fact that 
Gyani’s seniority had been ignored, as such must inevitably 
be the fate of many officers in the course of a military 
career. In this case, however, an outstanding artillery 
officer with extensive experience and senior commands in
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that branch and of the UNEF in Gaza had been superceded by an
/■ Qofficer of very limited experience00. The politicians had 
clearly interfered in a promotional issue for reasons that 
have strong political overtones and it is perhaps signifi­
cant that, shortly thereafter, Gyani was promoted Lieutenant- 
General commanding an infantry division.
The June promotions affair provoked considerable comment 
in the Army at all levels with open discussion of Menon’s 
1 interferencef in promotional matters and speculation as to 
why Thimayya was permitting it to continue without protest.
An immediate and natural result of the issue was to damage 
Army morale and the discipline and respect for superior rank 
which are the foundations of an efficient Service. It was 
evident to senior officers that further political interfer­
ence of this type could not but have serious effect on the 
Army.
The promotions issue was aggravated by Menonfs persist­
ent misrepresentations of Service views on military policy tc 
Nehru. The Akasi Chin road discovery required, in the eyes 
of the military authorities, immediate counter-actions so as 
to avoid a further deterioration and the inevitable dangers 
that must accompany a flast-minutef panic action to compen­
sate for years of neglect. The Tibetan revolt and its out­
come were foreseen by Army Headquarters in an appreciation
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prepared in early 1959 in which they proposed specific 
counter-preparations^. Nehru and Menon remained convinced, 
however, that Peking must under no circumstances be provoked 
and Indiafs response was thus limited to stepped-up policing 
by the border police and Assam Rifles and fresh consultations 
with the hill-states. Such a response added to the frustra­
tions of the armed forces (particularly the Army) who felt 
that the politicians were refusing to accept the fact that 
even minimal military precautions in the Himalayan region 
could not be effected at a ,momentts noticef. There was 
concern that, while India talked, the Chinese were develop­
ing such a powerful position along the Himalayan front as to
70be able to act in the area with virtual impunity •
The three Service Chiefs had often discussed general 
policy in accordance with their professional responsibilities 
and also the matter of Menon1s conduct. In July 1959# they 
decided to bring the whole question to the attention of the 
Prime Minister who, they believed, was not being properly 
briefed by Menon. To avoid the image of a tri-Service ulti­
matum, it was agreed that Thimayya - as the party whose 
Service was most concerned - should make the approach and 
call upon support only if such a step was necessary to con­
vince Nehru of the seriousness of the matter. Vice-Admiral 
Katari and Air Marshal Mukerjee were prepared at that time,
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however, to support their Army colleague even to the point 
of submitting their resignations - if such an admittedly 
drastic step was required. Various Cabinet Ministers, who 
were aware of the situation and had few reasons to like 
Menon in any case, advised the COAS to discuss the issue 
directly with Nehru and promised such support as they person­
ally might be able to give.
The opportunity for a meeting between the Prime Minis­
ter and the COAS apparently occurred through a chance meeting 
at a garden party in late August. It was the first meeting 
between the two men for some time and Nehru invited Thimayya 
to his house the following day. During the course of the 
conversation on this occasion, Thimayya informed the Prime 
Minister of his concern with Menon1s interference in Army 
matters, the effects of this interference on Service morale 
and the fact that it was an ’impossible situation’ which 
could not continue. Nehru was apprised of the fact that the 
other two Service Chiefs were available by telephone to con­
firm Thimayya’s contention, but he professed no need to con­
tact the two men and promised that he would speak to Menon 
about the issue the next day.
What transpired in the Nehru-Menon talk must remain 
speculative but that the Defence Minister heard of Thimayya’s 
complaints was attested two days later (i.e. three days after
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the Nehru-Thimayya conversation) when he sent for the COAS. 
In a highly-excited state of mind frequently exhibited on 
the world stage, Menon criticized Thimayya for taking such a 
matter to Nehru while referring to the possible political 
repercussions of the issue if it became public; he argued 
the need for such differences to be resolved privately and 
on a bilateral basis. Thimayya replied by making his views 
fabundantly clear1 to the Minister and regular meetings with 
Menon at 2.30 p.m. on subsequent days revealed that he had 
no intention of amending his conduct. Faced with this situ­
ation and the apparent indifference of Nehru, Thimayya 
decided to tender his resignation on the assumption that it 
would be accepted but with the hope that it might focus the 
Prime MinisterTs and general attention on tiie seriousness 
with which Menon*s conduct was viewed.
The letter of resignation, which specified the com­
plaints about Menon1s interference in internal Army affairs, 
was drawn up on the morning of 31 August 1959 and typed in 
Thimayya*s residence by his Personal Assistant. The letter 
was shown to Katari and Mukerjee, who now unsuccessfully 
sought to dissuade the COAS from pursuing the matter, and 
then delivered by one of Thimayya*s military assistants to 
Nehru*s residence where it was left with a member of the 
Prime Minister’s staff. During the course of the 2.30 p.m.
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meeting with Menon that afternoon, Thimayya informed him of 
the letter and refused Menonfs furgent requestf to withdraw 
it before it came to Nehru’s attention. The Prime Minister 
appears to have read the letter at about this time (2.30) 
and summoned the COAS at 7 p.m. that evening. He stated that 
such an action must add to his already heavy burdens of 
office - with Ayub’s visit scheduled for the next day - and 
that he wanted no issue of this magnitude to become public.
He requested Thimayya to withdraw his resignation on the 
grounds that Menon was scheduled to leave for the United 
Nations several days hence (and would thus be out of the way 
for a time) and promised that he would look into every one 
of ThimayyaTs complaints after the meeting with Ayub. Con­
vinced that Nehru sincerely meant to investigate the matter 
and take action to confine Menon’s conduct to the proper 
scope of a Minister, Thimayya withdrew his resignation - a 
serious error as quickly became apparent.
What might have transpired had the issue remained from 
public knowledge must remain conjectural. Nehru was certain­
ly aware of Menonfs arrogance and inability to work well 
with subordinates and his almost obsessive ambition to domin­
ate those with whom he came into contact. He would know that 
a first-class professional and non-political soldier like 
Thimayya could not be provoked to such drastic action at a
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time when China was threatening the northern frontiers for 
other than the most serious reasons. He could conceivably 
have cautioned Menon to avoid contentious actions - although 
Menon may have regarded even a mild caution as a rebuke and 
resigned. Extraneous factors entered into the entire 
matter, however, and probably affected Nehru1s ultimate res­
ponse. The existence of Thimayya*s letter of resignation 
had been leaked by a member of Nehru*s staff to a source at 
The Statesman who secured confirmation from Thimayya himself 
in an accidental fashion. The reporter accosted the COAS 
outside his home with the query *Have they accepted?* and 
Thimayya replied *No* before realising that the fcat had 
been let out of the bag*. The matter was the subject of 
banner headlines the following morning - 1st September.
Menon*s suitability for the Defence portfolio provoked
extensive press comment. The Manchester Guardian declared
that, for all his talents, Menon’s resignation *can only
71strengthen the Indian Government* • The Statesman carried 
a PTI report that 84 Calcutta High Court barristers had 
issued a joint declaration that *we are firmly of the opinion 
that in the interest of our national defence the Prime Min-
72ister should himself assume charge of the Defence Ministry* • 
Referring to Menon, the News Chronicle stated: *However
great his efficiency and his services to India when she was
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struggling for her independence, his reputation and record 
are a grave handicap to the Indian Government at this timef 3^.
The actual extent to which MenonTs position was threat­
ened by the public disclosure cannot be readily ascertained.
A release by the semi-official PTI (which generally accurate­
ly reflects official views) on the afternoon of 1st September 
announced Menonfs resignation, but the report was withdrawn 
for unexplained reasons that same evening^. it is also 
understood that a PTI representative called at Thimayya’s 
residence at 5 p.m. the same day with the information that 
the Cabinet was against Menon, who was going to be sacked; 
only Pandit Pant, according to this source, was believed to 
be in a position to save Menon and he was not regarded as so 
inclined. Late in the afternoon, reports began to circulate
that Menon had resigned and lobby opinion tended to accept
7 cthe view that his resignation would be accepted .
Press sources also speculated that Menon was to be 
removed from the Ministry. The Manchester Guardian felt 
that he might be sent off to the United Nations as Minister 
without Portfolio, with Nehru taking over Defence^. The 
Hindustan Times expressed the view that Nehru would Tundoubt­
edly1 relieve Menon of the Defence portfolio following the 
latterfs return from the United Nations'7. An Associated
Press despatch from New Delhi stated that fsources close to
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the official residence of President Rajendra Prasad1 had 
revealed that Nehru might announce a Cabinet shake-up that 
would oust Menon or give him another ministerial post^.
With the advantage even of several weeks* hindsight, one 
Indian weekly stated that Nehru1s handling of the issue (as 
against Menon’s silence), and Menon’s impending departure 
for New York at a time when border events required the clos­
est attention of the Defence Ministry, ’seems to point to a 
kind of disengagement being pursued between the armed forces 
and the personality of Shri Menon* The process should lead 
to his ultimate departure from the Defence Ministry*
What passed between Nehru and Menon or between Cabinet 
Ministers concerning this issue is unclear, but it is improb 
able that Menon was ever in danger of losing his position - 
even if Nehru privately doubted the wisdom of some of his 
colleague’s actions, his admiration for, and reliance upon, 
Menon were too strong. Also, Nehru had fiercely defended 
lesser colleagues on previous occasions even in the face of 
damning public evidence. The issue of civil authority had 
to be upheld and a shift of Menon from Defence at this time 
would undoubtedly have been widely interpreted as a conces­
sion to military pressure. Even a public rebuke of Menon*s 
activities would have provoked such general delight among 
the Minister’s legions of enemies, and a blow to his stature
382
that Menon may well have warned the Prime Minister that he 
would have to resign if he was not strongly supported. It 
is most unlikely that, Pant excepted, any Cabinet Minister 
or collection of Ministers possessed sufficient influence 
with Nehru to have swayed his opinion on such an issue. The 
role of Pant in the matter is not known, but it would appear 
from the outcome either that he did not feel disposed to 
exert his influence in favour of Menonfs removal or that he 
intervened at Menon1s request on his behalf - as one person 
interviewed by the writer alleged.
Nehru’s public rebuke to Thimayya caused the latter to 
consider submitting his resignation again - and finally - 
but there appeared to be no sense in taking such a step at 
this stage, particularly as the matter had been publicly 
aired in a fashion and the issue had revealed strong public, 
press and Service support for the highly-regarded and popular 
COAS. But as the Daily Telegraph noted, Nehru’s attitude 
fdoes credit to Mr Nehru1s personal loyalty and it may cover 
up - for the present - the departmental row, but it perpet­
uates a dangerous state of affairs for India1
The assignment to the Army, in August-November, of res­
ponsibility for securing the Himalayan frontier against 
Chinese intrusions appears to have removed that aspect of 
policy from being a source of strain between the military
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and political arms of government, both sectors agreeing - 
albeit for somewhat different reasons - on the need for pru­
dence while gradually developing communications in the 
region. The Government remained unresponsive to Army re­
quests for equipment and special mountain formations, how­
ever, with the result that Army circles continued to regard 
the politicians with some distaste. Nor did Menon show any 
signs of having been inhibited by the September furore as he 
continued to cultivate contacts with ambitious officers and 
strengthen his relationship with Kaul. He even attempted to 
have Thimayya take the eight months’ leave due him prepara­
tory to retirement and, while the COAS resisted such efforts 
and stayed on until two months short of retirement, the 
intervening period was characterized by minimal contact with 
Menon. The September affair also resulted in cool relations 
between Thimayya on the one hand and Katari and Mukerjee on 
the other due to the manner in which the Navy and Air Force 
Chiefs of Staff had sought to dissuade Thimayya from an 
action with which they had earlier pledged support, and the 
manner in which they had dissociated themselves from it - 
Mukerjee at a London press gathering and Katari in a radio 
message to the Fleet.
Thimayyafs retirement in early 1961 was followed almost 
immediately by more controversial appointments with Kaul
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again a central figure. About one week before ThimayyaTs 
departure from the top post, Menon informed him of his 
desire to assign Kaul the post of Chief of General Staff - 
the third ranking post behind the COAS and Deputy COAS. 
Thimayya refused to make such a recommendation on the 
grounds that Kaul, who was not considered to possess the 
requisite qualifications, would thereby become a virtual 
’laughing stock’ in the Service and thereby lower the pres­
tige of the post. Furthermore, Thimayya recommended that 
his own successor be Lieutenant-General S.P.P. Thorat, then 
GOC of Eastern Command and a former commander of the Korean 
Custodian Force. Thorat would thereby supercede Lieutenant- 
General P.N. Thapar, then GOC-Western Command and three 
months junior to Thimayya and two months senior to Thorat. 
Thorat was considered to be the more qualified and experienc 
ed of the two. Menon proceeded to completely disregard 
ThimayyaTs recommendation and professional opinions, however 
and arranged for Thapar’s elevation to COAS and Kaul’s ap­
pointment as CGS, thereby forcing the able Thorat - who had 
just completed his four-year term as Lieutenant-General - 
into retirement.
The elevation of Thapar and the retirement of Thorat 
left vacant the Western and Eastern Commands, the aspirants 
for which in order of seniority were Lieutenant-General
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S.D. Verma (commander of the Jammu and Kashmir theatre), 
Lieutenant-General Daulat Singh, Lieutenant-General Lionel 
Protip Sen, Lieutenant-General Kumaramangalam and Lieutenant- 
General Kaul. Singh (two and one-half years junior to Verma) 
was assigned Western Command, Sen was posted to Eastern Com­
mand and the superceded Verma applied for premature retire-
81ment. The supercession of such an experienced officer re­
newed suspicions that Menon aimed to clear the way for 
Kaul’s appointment to COAS and the suspicions were aired in 
a sensational letter, clearly written by a group of high- 
ranking Army officers, which appeared on the front-page of 
the Bombay English-language weekly, Current» on 6 April 1961. 
The letter accused Menon of using promotions to create 
cliques in the Army loyal to him personally and aimed at an 
eventual coup d ’etat. The view was expressed that Menon 
proposed to have Kaul succeed, as COAS, either Thapar or 
Thapar’s senior subordinate, Lieutenant-General J.N. 
Chaudhuri, after the latter served in the top post for a 
brief period; as Chaudhuri was due for retirement in May 
1963 if not elevated in rank, the possibility of his super­
cession was very strong. Kaul would also have to supercede 
Kumaramangalam and Daulat Singh while Sen would be forced 
to either accept the post of Deputy COAS (actually a demo­
tion from Eastern Command in terms of prestige) when the
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incumbent, Lieutenant-General Mohinder Singh, retired in 
January 1963 or be retired.
The promotional issue once again became the subject of
some heated debate in Parliament. Menon advanced statistics
in defence of his argument that there was nothing unusual
8 2about supercessions , and noted that superceded officers
8 ^had the right of appeal . He claimed the right to overrule
recommendations of the COAS on promotions but stated that he
had exercised this right only once and ’that one instance
8 4was an instance in which I had no other option’ . Also, he 
declared that no officers had resigned over promotions and 
that there had been only one application for premature re­
tirement^ .
Having apparently cleared the way for Kaul’s eventual 
elevation to COAS, Menon facilitated the placing of officers 
close to Kaul into the key posts of Director of Military 
Operations and Director of Military Intelligence. Menon and 
Kaul are also understood to have increased their long-stand­
ing effort to force from the Service Major-General S.H.F.J. 
Manekshaw, the highly regarded and outspoken Parsee Command­
ant of the Defence Services Staff College (Wellington).
Their previous efforts to have Manekshaw disciplined for
making statements critical of themselves had been rebuffed
8 6by Thimayya , but his successor, though undoubtedly a
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conscientous officer, was content to remain a somewhat pas­
sive bystander to the activities of his civilian superior 
and Service subordinate.
The attention focused on Manekshaw would appear to have 
been attributable to various factors resented by Kaul and 
Menon either individually or in concert. Manekshaw made no 
effort to conceal his dislike of both men, of promotions 
policy in particular or of military policy in general. He 
is believed to have been critical of the politically-inspired 
external troop commitments as in the Congo at a time when 
the northern frontiers were so weakly manned. He apparently 
also regarded the official eschewment of atomic weapons 
under all circumstances as unrealistic and, under his direc­
tion, the implications of nuclear warfare were studied on 
the premise that future Staff Officers must be familiar with 
the subject regardless of any moral objections.
His actions and statements were closely observed by 
officers close to Kaul and Menon and several *stooge* offic­
ers were persuaded to bring trumped-up accusations against 
him at a time when his third star had been announced but not 
yet awarded. The general charge was that he was impugning 
constituted authority, and the *evidence* presented in sup­
port of this charge is understood to have included his 
resurrection of a picture of Clive from the College basement
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and its display in a prominent position on his office wall. 
Manekshaw was prepared to resign in disgust but was persuaded 
by some of his colleagues (including Thimayya) to call his 
accusers’ bluff. He was completely vindicated by a three-man 
Service board of enquiry in New Delhi in December 1961 which 
recommended, furthermore, that his accusors be made to 
answer for their own conduct. The enquiry’s verdict did not 
relieve the pressure brought to bear by Menon and Kaul, how­
ever, who sought to provoke Manekshaw into conduct which 
would warrant disciplinary action. Manekshaw refused to be 
goaded into such action but it was generally believed that 
he would have been denied further promotion normally due in 
late 1962 - at which time he would be retired.
The efforts of Menon and Kaul to manipulate Army promo­
tions raises the question of motivation.
Menon was politically ambitious but lacked popular sup­
port in the Congress Party and his intimate relationship 
with Nehru only served to increase the dislike which he pro­
voked among other aspirants for power and influence. His 
leftist outlook also alienated him from the more conservative 
sector of Indian politics. It was thus widely felt that, 
through the Defence portfolio, Menon sought to acquire a 
favourable domestic image and a basis of support in the 
Services against the possible scramble for power in Congress
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upon Nehru’s passing from the scene. Indian publicists 
tended to dismiss the possibility of a military or military-
Obacked coup almost out-of-hand , but more impartial foreign
88observers did not share this view .
Menon’s cultivation of Kaul was completely consistent 
with any political ambition he may have aspired to advance 
with military support, whether implicit or explicit. In the 
event that chaos followed any sudden passing of Nehru, the 
Army would certainly be called upon to restore order in many 
parts of the country and perhaps impose martial law. In 
such an event, were it accompanied by a serious threat from 
Pakistan or China and ineffectual political leadership at 
the Union level, the Army in particular would inevitably be 
drawn into the political arena and its support would undoubt­
edly be crucial for any prospective head of government. The 
combination of two ambitious men - Menon and Kaul - heading 
the Defence Ministry and the Army respectively at such a 
crucial juncture could probably exercise decisive influence 
on developments. It would seem doubtful, however, if any 
such ’alliance of convenience’ between two such men of 
sharply different backgrounds and political leanings could 
have long endured, particularly as Menon would have needed 
Kaul more than Kaul would have needed him. Whatever his 
political ambitions and susceptibilities Kaul was a Brahman
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and by no means shared Menonfs political orientation or pas­
sively acceded to MenonTs will on policy issues. He favoured 
a strong line against China to the point of being dangerously 
provocative,opposed the purchase of Soviet An-12 transports, 
favoured serious consideration being given to Western air­
craft before any decision was taken on the MIGs, generally 
preferred Western to Soviet arms and may have dissuaded Menon
from such further purchases of Soviet equipment as the latter
8 omay have contemplated As COAS, Kaul may well have proven
to be far more independent of Menonfs influence than was 
commonly supposed and the relationshp between them subject 
to considerable strain.
The conduct of the two men, however, had served to 
erode the professionalism of at least a segment of the Army 
officer cadre even as the country was moving almost inexor­
ably towards a crisis in the defence sphere. Summing up the 
situation in May 1962, the well-informed Frank Moraes wrote:
there is no denying that a great deal of simmering 
discontent and frustration exists among the officers 
of our Armed Forces at various echelons...Individual 
ambition, prejudice and predeliction apart, the main 
grouse among the officers seems to be that promo­
tions, particularly in the higher grades, often 
ignore merit and are not seldom dictated by personal 
or political likes and dislikes. Moreover, the 
present Defence Ministerfs habit of bypassing or 
ignoring senior commanders, of consorting with and 
counselling their juniors more susceptible to his 
influence and with a tendency to Tjee-hazoorT him 
makes for indiscipline and dissatisfaction.
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He concluded that fAll is far from well with and within the 
Services and it is time the people of India knew it’^ O.
Whether the professionalism and the non-political tradition 
of the Indian armed forces could have escaped severe and 
even irreparable erosion given several more years of general 
apathy in the defence sphere and Menonfs apparent efforts to 
encourage political conformism and personal loyalties to his 
person among senior military officers must remain speculative. 
Developments in the Himalayas were, in the meantime, leading 
to a crisis which was to have far-reaching consequences for 
the civil-military relationship in India.
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65 Kaul was invited to pay a visit to China during his 
Korean engagement and claims that he did so because Nehru 
felt that it would be impolitic to refuse and that his 
answers to reporters’ questions on his return were misinter­
preted. See ibid, p. 254»
66 Menon ordered the Hunter aircraft for the IAF, for 
example, shortly after assuming the Defence portfolio without 
prior consultation with either the Air Force or the Chiefs
of Staff Committee. Furthermore, the Army and Navy consider­
ed the purchase as unwarranted by the strategic situation 
and the Finance Minister opposed the further heavy drain on 
foreign exchange reserves already sadly depleted.
67 The reluctance of Army HQ was due to a belief that em­
ployment of frontline troops in such tasks was scarcely 
cheaper than civilian labour and detrimental to morale.
68 Gyani had not commanded a division which was normally a 
desired pre-requisite for promotion to Lieutenant-General 
but Army Headquarters clearly did not regard this factor as 
an obstacle to Gyani’s promotion,
69 Information obtained from an informed Indian military 
source. The measures envisaged are believed to be very 
similar to those implemented from late 1959 and included recruitment of special units from the Khampa refugees expect­
ed to seek asylum in India against future contingencies.
70 The head of the Army at this time, General Thimayya, was 
by no means an advocate of seeking conflict with China; as 
he wrote in mid-1962:I cannot even as a soldier envisage India taking on 
China in an open conflict on its own. China’s 
present strength in manpower, equipment and air­
craft exceeds our own resources a hundred-fold with 
the full support of the USSR and we can never hope 
to match China in the foreseeable future. It must 
be left to the politicians and diplomats to ensure 
our security.
"Adequate insurance", Seminar, No. 35 (July 1962), p. 14.
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erated, or if India was confronted by a grave exter­
nal threat which was pusillanimously met by the 
politicians. Military governments in Hyderabad and 
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CHAPTER X
HIMALAYAN CONFLICT
The cautious and limited deployment of Indian troops in 
Ladakh proved inadequate as either a deterrent to or a bul­
wark against further Chinese advances. In the autumn of 
I960 China pushed a patrol to within ten miles of Daulet Beg 
Oldi, to the south of Karakoram Pass, and in May of the 
following year the Chinese were again pushing forward towards 
Chushul. Shortly thereafter Chinese troops occupied Dehra 
Compass and their establishment of a post on the Chip Chap 
River 17 miles south-east of Daulet Beg Oldi in the late 
summer brought them to their I960 claim line in this quarter. 
Other Chinese posts were established at Niagzu and Dambu 
Guru and the Chinese occupied Hot Springs1.
In response to these further indications of Peking1s 
intention to continue its advances in Ladakh, the Indian 
Government took the momentous decision to challenge the 
Chinese actions by establishing small and generally isolated 
outposts in the disputed areas. The objectives of this •for­
ward policy1 were apparently several: to block potential
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lines of Chinese advance; to undermine Chinese control of 
the disputed areas through the interposition of Indian 
posts and patrol activities between Chinese posts; and, 
thereby, to threaten and disrupt Chinese lines of communica­
tion and supply.
It is still unclear as to whom this policy can be attri­
buted. It was attractive from a political viewpoint and, 
from the military viewpoint, it was practicable although 
imposing a disproportionate additional burden upon the exist­
ing system of supply and communication. It was apparently 
based, however, on the premise that the Chinese had been 
moving only where there was a vacuum and that they would not 
challenge Indian posts by force of arms. New Delhi may have 
hoped that such a modest display of its determination not to 
concede the area by default would make Peking amenable to 
some sort of negotiated settlement.
By April 1961, Indian patrols were probing forward 
around the long-established Chinese post on the Chip Chap 
River and perhaps six posts were set up in Ladakh by the end 
of the year. Several all-year barracks and supply posts were 
also established in forward areas to permit an Indian pres­
ence to be maintained in the inhospitable area throughout the 
winter. The developments were viewed with optimism by the 
Indian Prime Minister. Speaking in the Lok Sabha on
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28 November 1961, Nehru declared that 1progressively the
situation had been changing from the military point of view
and we shall continue to take steps to build up these things
so that ultimately we may be in a position to take action to
recover such territory as is in their possession*. He
explained that the Government regarded Ladakh as presently
of greater importance than NEFA and that Longju would be
reoccupied when the time was appropriate.
We cannot take adventurist actions which may land us 
in greater military or other difficulties. It is 
not an easy matter to conduct warfare in these reg­
ions. But it may have to be done and therefore we have to prepare for it if necessary.2
The despatch of an infantry brigade group to the Congo in 
March-April 1961 and the operation against Goa in December 
of the same year, however, suggest that no sharp deteriora­
tion of the situation in the Himalayan region was contemplat­
ed at that time.
In the spring of 1962, Nehru sanctioned a more provoca­
tive phase of the forward policy in Ladakh which involved 
direct attempts to cut Chinese lines of communications to 
their forward posts. According to one report, Menon ordered 
the spring advances to answer election criticism that he was 
,softt towards China, while letting it be discreetly known 
that he was more realistic and tougher towards China than was 
Nehru - being neither optimistic about successful negotiations
407
with China nor under any illusion of Soviet support in the 
event of a Sino-Indian clash^. In the view of another 
writer, it was Kaul who took the initiative to argue the 
need for such action with Nehru on the grounds that the Army 
had to have self-respect.
Menon was hamstrung* He could not openly oppose a 
policy aimed at reclaiming lost Indian territory.
Menon*s long-standing orders that Indian patrols 
should not engage the Chinese under any circum­
stances were revoked. Indian troops were told to 
hold their ground and open fire if the Chinese 
sought to dislodge them from any position on Indian soil.4
The latter version would seem to have been the more accurate$ 
Kaul is known to have favoured a tough line against the 
Chinese whereas Menon*s career and excessively apologetic 
stand on the issue of Chinese actions in the Himalayas 
would have rendered problematical his political survival or 
diplomatic usefulness in the event that China was provoked 
too far and large-scale conflict ensued.
Several further Indian battalions were shifted into 
Ladakh to provide the means with which to implement the new 
phase of the *forward policy* and a number of new posts were 
established, including ones at Spanggur Lake and on both the 
north and south banks of Pangyong Lake“* • With a confidence 
that betrayed an increasingly firm attitude on the border 
question, Nehru claimed in the Lok Sabha on 29 June that
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India now had the military initiative and that new Indian 
posts were outflanking and endangering Chinese posts^.
In furtherance of her previous policy and in response to 
the increasingly forceful Indian policy, Peking established 
further posts in the disputed area^ while the Chinese press 
warned New Delhi of the possible consequences of its ♦aggres­
sive* actions. An editorial in Jenmin Jihpao in April hinted
at a plot between Nehru, the Dalai Lama, Chiang Kai-shek and
othe United States to re-initiate *interference* in Tibet -
presumably by supplying arms to the rebels. India was also
warned to withdraw its *aggressive posts* and discontinue
its provocations against Chinese posts on penalty of Chinese
ofrontier guards being *compelled to defend themselves* • 
Peking announced that it was resuming ’patrols* in the area 
between the Karakoram and Kongka passes and would commence 
patrolling the entire Sino-Indian frontier if India continued 
to invade and occupy Chinese territory"*^. A Chinese note 
dated 2 June 1962 warned that the country’s frontier guards 
would not acquiesce in continuing Indian provocations'^ and 
an editorial in Renmin Ribao on 9 July warned the Indian 
Government to ’rein in on the brink of the precipice* •
In a show of strength on 10 July, some 400 Chinese 
troops encircled an Indian post which had been established a 
few days before astride the supply line to a forward Chinese
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iopost in the Galwan River valley . After hurried discussions 
in New Delhi, the Indian troops were ordered to stand firm 
and to meet force with force* After several tense days, the 
Chinese detachment withdrew but Indian and Chinese troops 
exchanged fire on 16, 19 and 21 July.
In retrospect, this incident in the Galwan River valley 
appears to have been of great significance. To Peking, it 
must have indicated that the Indian Government was now pre­
pared to risk an armed clash to maintain its positions and 
that Chinese posts would either have to be abandoned, as 
the supply lines to the individual forward posts were cut, 
or be secured through offensive action against the opposing 
Indian forces. From the standpoint of New Delhi, the 
Chinese withdrawal was seemingly interpreted as confirming 
the view (hitherto held with less conviction) that China 
would not risk an open clash but would respect demonstrations 
of Indiafs determination to maintain its territorial integ­
rity by force of arms, if that was required. Thus embolden­
ed, the Indian authorities decided on an even bolder course 
of action in NEFA, where Chinese occupation of Longju remain­
ed an open challenge. The scope of the challenge was consid­
erably broadened when Chinese forces seized the Dhola post 
and Thag La ridge in the Kameng Frontier Division on 8 
September. As a former Chief of the Indian Army Staff,
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General K.S. Thimayya, aptly commented in retrospect: fthese 
actions in overrunning our post in Dhola Ridge and in occupy­
ing Thag La Ridge must have been with the specific aim of 
forcing us to react so as to give them a good excuse for 
launching an attack on usf^ ^*
New Delhifs response could hardly have been more to 
Peking1s satisfaction as it could later be argued that it 
was the faggressivef actions of India which necessitated the 
fdefensive* actions by the so-called Chinese frontier guards. 
Thus, Nehru stated in London on 10 September that the border 
dispute could *develop suddenly into a c o n f l i c t • In res­
ponse to the establishment of another Chinese post ten miles 
inside the MacMahon Line near Tawang on 12 September, troops 
from the 7th brigade of Indiafs 4th infantry division began 
to move from Tawang towards the Thag La-Dhola area and there 
were sporadic clashes between Indian and Chinese forces near 
Dhola on the night of 20-21 September and at the Che Jao 
bridge on 29 September. According to one press source, the 
decision to resort to direct action against the Chinese 
forces encamped on territory claimed by India was taken on 
17 September^.
Nehru returned from his overseas trip on 1st October 
but made no immediate comment on the NEFA situation. On 5 
October, however, the Defence Ministry announced that the
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Chief of the General Staff, Lt* General B.M. Kaul, had been
transferred to command of a new Corps in NEFA and that he
had already left for Tezpur^. Despite official efforts to
represent the new Command as merely a re-organization having
18no wider significance , its implications were correctly
noted by sections of the press* The Economist expressed the
view that the move reflected a Government decision fto put
Chinese intentions to the test especially in the MacMahon 
19Line Region1 * The Times of India declared that the Army
was poised for an 1all-out effort to expel the Chinese in-
20truders from the Thag La area* .
The drift to war quickened as Indian troops delivered a
small probing attack north-west of Dhola on 10 October and
it became fairly clear that Indian forces were preparing to
eject the Chinese from the area. Official and unnecessarily
dramatic confirmation of such an intention was given by Nehru
in New Delhi on 12 October when, just prior to his departure
for Madras and thence Ceylon, he declared to the press that
21the Army had been ordered to eject the Chinese from NEFA •
On 15 October, Defence Minister Menon stated at Bangalore
22that the Chinese would be thrown from Indian soil •
A temporary lull in the NEFA skirmishing was broken by 
an Indian claim on 16 October that their Dhola post had been 
fired upon* In reply, Peking charged that Indian troops had
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attacked on 17 October all along the Kechilang River, ad­
vancing northwards between Hatung Pass and Pangkangting and
23towards Sechang Lake • The stage was appropriately set for 
the defensive actions1 by Chinese ’frontier guards’, and a 
leading Indian daily reported on 19 October that there were 
elaborate Chinese preparations for an offensive along the 
borders of Sikkim, Bhutan and NEFA2 ,^
The conflict erupted early on the morning of 20 October 
at both extremities of the Sino-Indian frontier, Indian and 
Chinese reports differ as to the manner of the actual com­
mencement of hostilities bu the preparedness of the Chinese 
forces was unmistakeable. The so-called ’defensive actions’ 
by their ’frontier guards’ were delivered in brilliant fash­
ion by large numbers of infantry supported by artillery, 
mountain guns, mortars and, on at least one occasion in 
Ladakh, by tanks2-* •
In Ladakh, Chinese infantry attacked south of the 
Karakoram Pass at the north-west extremity of the Aksai Chin 
plateau and in the Pangyong Lake area 100 miles to the 
south-east, Indian forces were speedily ejected from perhaps 
eleven posts in the vicinity of Karakoram Pass and from 
several in the Pangyong Lake district but held firm at the 
vital posts of Daulet Beg Oldi (near the entrance to the 
Pass) and Chushul (immediately south of Pangyong Lake and at
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the head of the vital supply road to Leh). On 27 October, 
other Chinese forces attacked in the vicinity of Demchok 
(100 miles south-east of Chushul) and quickly overran the 
Demchok and Jara La posts but were otherwise contained* In 
one instance, they conceded some ground to a counter-attack 
by elements of the Jammu and Kashmir Militia.
In NEFA, the Chinese forces advanced almost at will des­
pite Indian resistance at several key points. The Tsang Le 
post on the northern side of the Namka Chu River, the 
Khinzemane post and the Indian brigade near Dhola were over­
run on the first day and the Chinese proceeded with a general 
offensive at both ends of the MacMahon Line. In the western 
sector, Tsang Dar fell on 22 October, Bum La on the 23rd and 
Tawang - headquarters of the 7th infantry brigade under 
Brigadier-General J.P. Dalvi - was lost to a three-pronged 
Chinese divisional assault on the 24th* In the centre, 
Chinese troops re-occupied the undefended frontier post at 
Longju (which they had evacuated during the summer due to 
the outbreak of an epidemic) and captured the Asafila border 
post 25 miles to the south-west* In the Lohit Frontier Divi­
sion, a strong Chinese force captured the frontier post at 
Kibithoo (located only 20 miles from the Indo-Burmese border) 
on 22 October and advanced 15 miles down the Lohit Valley to 
Walong, reaching the vicinity of the town on 25 October. A
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Chinese offer of negotiations was advanced on 24 October 
and was rejected by the Indian Government — as it was undoubt­
edly expected to be^ - and a lull set in on the battlefront 
as both sides prepared for the resumption of the next phase 
of hostilities.
The Indian Army made desperate efforts to strengthen 
its defensive positions in NEFA and Ladakh and to prepare 
against possible Chinese attacks through Sikkim and Bhutan.
The measures were in general accordance with the contingency 
planning prepared in 1961 but their effectiveness had been 
largely destroyed by the time of implementation by the rapid­
ity of events. Two brigades were withdrawn from Nagaland 
and sited at Rangiya (south of Bhutan) and a brigade of four 
battalions was rushed up to defend Walong. The 5th division 
from Jullundur-Ferezpore was shifted piecemeal to Misamari 
(near Tezpur) and three brigades drawn from the 4th and 5th 
divisions were hastily deployed into positions astride the Se 
La-Dirrang Dzong-Bomdila axis, supported by light Stuart 
tanks from Calcutta and paratroop artillery from Agra. The 
17th division was shifted from Ambala to Goyerkata (in 
northern Bengal between Bhutan and East Pakistan), two bri­
gades were rushed to Siliguri from Amritsar and Khasali and 
the Natu La-Gangtok-Siliguri-Kalimpong axis was further rein­
forced by two brigades drawn from Calcutta and Ranchi. A 
divisional organization was formed at Dibrugarh.
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In Ladakh, the military response to the initial Chinese 
attacks involved the creation of a divisional organization 
at Leh and the reinforcement of Chushul by air with several 
battalions, a battery of 25-pounders and two troops (normally 
32 units) of AMX light tanks which had been detached from 
the 5th and 17th divisions. In early November, the Daulet 
Beg Oldi post was abandoned as untenable and its defenders 
withdrawn over the 17,500 feet high Sasar Brangsa Pass to 
more defensible positions.
The armoured division at Jhansi and the independent
armoured brigade at Patiala were not disturbed and events
appear to have developed too rapidly for other formations in
south and south-west India to be disturbed. The Punjab was
thus left almost denuded of combatant formations, suggesting
that Army headquarters proceeded on the assumption that
Pakistan would not take advantage of Indiafs predicament.
The Reserve was activated and 100 units of the Territorial
Army were embodied; most of the TA personnel were assigned
to their previously designated anti-aircraft and coastal
defence duties but some were absorbed into technical units
28of the regular Army ,
The adjustments in Ladakh proved adequate to enable the 
Chushul perimeter to be successfully defended against repeat­
ed shelling and assault, but the outlying posts at Rezang La
416
and Gurung Hill and four posts in the Spanggur Lake area 
were overwhelmed by Chinese troops.
The situation in NEFA, however, quickly assumed the 
proportions of a debacle.
Indian troops counter-attacked in the Walong area on 
13 November and captured a hill feature on a ridge north-west 
of the town, but were unable to hold it against determined 
Chinese attacks. With the loss of the vital Otter airstrip, 
the defending garrison had no choice but to commence on 16 
November a general retirement down the Lohit Valley to a new 
defensive position about twelve miles distant. The retire­
ment was effected under heavy Chinese pressure.
In the Kameng Frontier Division, a force of about six 
Chinese brigades thrust across the Tawang Chu River near 
Jang and advanced ten miles to the south-east to attack for­
ward Indian positions at Nurang, eight miles below Se La, on 
the evening of 17 November. At nightfall, the Indian force 
withdrew to the main defensive position at Se La which, al­
though a strong physical position, was held by only about 
five battalions. The defences were frontally assaulted that 
same night by perhaps four Chinese brigades while simultane- 
ous attacks were made against Dirrang and Bomdila by a 
Chinese force which, under cover of a heavy snowfall, had 
executed an undetected outflanking movement on 16-17 November
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over a mountain range 20 to 30 miles east of Se La. Both 
towns fell after some hard fighting in which upwards of a 
dozen Stuart tanks were destroyed. The force at Se La aban­
doned its positions on 18 November in an attempt to break 
out to the south but was dispersed before a strong Chinese 
roadblock north of Bomdila. Effective Indian resistance in 
the Kameng Division thereupon virtually ceased to exist and 
Chinese troops swept south a further 30 to 40 miles to the 
vicinity of Foothills, a small town on the edge of the Assam 
plains.
At this point, the Chinese were in possession of all
30the territory which they claimed in Ladakh and, in NBFA, 
they had advanced to within 40 miles of Tezpur and to within 
100 miles of the important Digboi oil fields. Private civil­
ians and government officials were fleeing Tezpur, prepara­
tions were being made by British officials to evacuate their 
nationals from the areas north of the Brahmaputra River, and 
New Delhi seemed almost paralysed by the collapse of the NEFA 
defences and the fear that the Chinese meant to overrun all 
of Assam. Lt. General Kaul had been replaced by a ffighting 
general1, Lt. General Manekshaw, and posted to the Punjab 
(then virtually denuded of troops) while the Chief of Army 
Staff, General P.N. Thapar, had gone on indefinite sick leave 
and the former G0C, Southern Command, J.N. Chaudhuri, had
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assumed the onerous responsibility of directing the Army 
through the crisis • The 4th division had ceased to exist 
as a fighting formation and the badly-mauled 5th division 
had been withdrawn from the line for re-organization under a 
new commander* Over 10,000 troops were cut off in the Kameng 
Frontier Division and the 2500 troops in the Lohit Frontier 
Division were facing a desperate supply situation nearly 100 
miles from the nearest roadhead* In Ladakh, the former fpol­
itical * deployment in small posts was being readjusted to a 
more realistic military posture astride the highly defensible 
approaches to Leh. In the Kameng Division, Indian forces 
were hastily constructing new defensive positions to the 
north of Foothills, while a fairly strong Indian force 
remained deployed against possible attacks in the Sikkim- 
Bhutan sector.
Indiafs unpreparedness in the military sphere was even 
more pronounced in the non-military sphere, the confused res­
ponse of the Prime Minister reflecting his bewilderment at
3 2the totally unexpected turn of events • Apparently not 
alarmed by the initial attacks, Nehru soon swung to the 
opposite extreme of acclaiming the Chinese actions as a 
’major invasion* in which the fate of Asia and the world was
33at stake * In an address to a conference of State Informa­
tion Minister on 25 October, he drew an unreal parallel with
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Dunkirk, declaring that the Indian people must respond with 
the same determination as had the British people in the 
aftermath of that famous evacuation^•
In the absence of any production mobilization scheme,
the sales of new cars, new jeeps, station-wagons, trucks,
steel products and stocks were frozen with a consequent
serious and quite unnecessary disorganization of the civilian
economy* The sudden increased demand for blood plasma could
not be met from the only two existing plants in the country
i rfor freeze-drying of this vital requirement0 .
A state of emergency was signed into force by the 
President on 25 October and proclaimed the following day 
under Article 352 of the Indian Constitution. The Defence 
of India Ordinance 1962 was promulgated, conferring emergency 
powers on the Government for the duration of the Emergency'3 * 
Press censorship was invoked and a veil of secrecy was 
clamped upon developments with the result that both civilian 
and soldier alike were forced to rely upon Radio Peking for 
news of developments of the fighting • Chinese nationals 
and pro-Peking members of the Indian Communist Party were 
hustled into internment camps and jails* A National Defence 
Fund was established to which the public were requested to 
donate cash and valuables* Public appeals were also made 
for warm clothing to correct a shocking shortage of this
420
essential item for which the Army was being forced to endure 
unnecessary hardships and to suffer considerable losses 
through exposure and frostbite.
The Chinese attacks provoked immediate demands from
broad sections of Indian opinion for the removal from the
Government of the controversial Defence Minister, V.K. Krishna
39Menon • A strong move developed within the Congress Party 
itself which crystallized around important persons^. Senior 
members of the Party, including the deputy leader, Dr 
Harekruchna Mahatab, U.N. Dhebar, Mahavir Tyagi, B.K.P. Singh 
and the general-secretary of the Party, Raghunath Singh, met 
privately a fortnight before the scheduled session of Parlia­
ment and agreed upon the need for Nehru to dismiss Menon and 
assume the Defence portfolio himself. Dr Mahatab conveyed 
the views of the group to the Prime Minister and was virtual­
ly snubbed, but the group maintained its pressure. At a 
meeting of the Executive Committee several days later, Nehru 
was made completely aware of the strong feeling within the 
Party over Menon1s failure as Defence Minister. The Prime 
Minister’s effort to assume personal blame for the Himalayan 
situation failed to provoke the usual passive acquiescence. 
Faced with the mounting public clamour and Party pressure, 
Nehru had little choice but to take over the Defence post on 
31 October. In an obvious attempt to lessen the significance
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of the demotion of his intimate friend, Nehru retained Menon 
in the Cabinet in the newly-created post of Minister for 
Defence Production - but with limited responsibilities^.
The demotion, which undoubtedly dealt a deep personal 
blow to Menon, only appeared to increase his arrogance, how­
ever, as he proceeded to declare at Tezpur that really nothing 
had changed4 • Although he probably recognized the fallacy 
of such a claim, which constituted more of a defensive strat­
agem than a statement of fact, the remark enhanced his unpop-
43ularity both within and without the Congress Party • The 
second meeting of the Executive Committee, held on the morn­
ing of 7th November, was stormy. Members had resorted to 
the novel (by Indian standards) procedure of collecting sig­
natures to a demand for Menonfs complete dismissal from the 
Government and some of the members even made direct charges.
Nehru made an unsuccessful attempt to convince the 
members of Menonfs sincerity by reading the latterfs letter 
of resignation dated 30 October^, and the meeting ended 
without any indication from the Prime Minister concerning his 
subsequent course of action. His attitude towards the whole 
issue was undoubtedly based to some extent on the recognition 
that he himself was indirectly being attacked^. He could 
not ignore the plain fact, however, that his views could no 
longer command unquestioning support and that continued
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refusal on his part to meet the widespread demand (from all 
but the extreme political Left) for Menonfs removal from the 
Government must inevitably weaken his own position and cul­
minate in even more concerted actions leading to direct 
attacks upon himself. It is believed that he approached the 
President, Dr Radhakrishnan, on the matter and that the 
latter, although personally friendly to Menon, advised that
46he would have to be dismissed for the good of the country • 
Shortly before the evening general meeting of the Congress 
Party on 7 November, Nehru announced in Parliament that he 
had accepted Menonfs resignation: fI feel that Mr Krishna 
Menon has done good work but the controversy will not rest
A *7until he quits and controversy is bad for the war effort1 • 
The crisis had also provoked the establishment of an 
Emergency Committee of Cabinet and of a variety of other 
emergency committees within the Defence Ministry* On 6 
November, a 30-member National Defence Council was set up to 
1 advisef the Government on matters directly or indirectly
48affecting the defence of India • As the crisis deepened, 
the Cabinet was re-organized in a manner designed to illus­
trate the Governmentfs determination to meet the challenge 
to the countryfs territorial integrity and prestige. The 
youthful and vigorous Chief Minister of Maharashtra, Y.B. 
Chavan, was appointed to the Defence portfolio on 14
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November and, on the same day, it was also announced that 
K. Raghuramaiah had been shifted from Minister of State in 
the Defence Ministry to the post of Minister of Defence Pro­
duction, T.T. Krishnamachari had been transferred from 
Minister without Portfolio to the newly-created portfolio of 
Minister for Economic and Defence Co-ordination, and V.R.P. 
Rao had replaced 0. Pulla Reddy as Defence Secretary^.
On 15 November Major-General Sardanand Singh (retd) was ap­
pointed to the newly-created post of Director-General of 
Civil Defence.
The situation had, in the meantime, also forced the Gov­
ernment to appeal for immediate military supportfrom Britain 
and the United States cloaked in a general appeal for support 
to all governments excepting Portugal and South Africa. New 
Delhi sent an urgent request to London and Washington on 26 
October and received an immediate response from both of these 
governments; the first consignment of British aid arrived in 
two Royal Air Force Britannias on 29 October and the first 
American aid arrived from depots in Western Europe on 1st 
November. As the NEFA debacle grew in extent, the Indian 
Government submitted, on 19 November, an urgent and specific 
request for American fighting air support'*'*"• Washington had 
not replied to the request when the Chinese announced their 
unilateral ceasefire^.
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The surprise Chinese announcement was broadcast over 
the New China News Agency on 20 November. It declared that 
China would terminate the conflict at midnight of the follow­
ing day and, from 1st December would commence a withdrawal 
of her forces to 20 kilometres (12^ miles) north of the 
MacMahon Line and to a similar distance behind the ’line of 
actual control’ in existence in Ladakh as of 7 November 1959. 
The broadcast stated China’s intention to proceed with her 
withdrawal regardless of the Indian reaction but warned that 
China reserved the right to strike back in the event that
India attempted to re-occupy any of the territory occupied
53by Chinese troops during their advance . The withdrawal 
appears to have proceeded as planned and was completed in 
both sectors by about 15 January 1963^ •
The official Indian reaction to the announcement was to 
declare that it was a unilateral action and that a pre-condi­
tion to Indian agreement to enter into discussions with the 
Chinese Government regarding the border dispute was restora­
tion of the status quo as of 8 September 1962. New Delhi 
had little choice but to respect the Chinese warning against 
attempts to re-occupy with troops the areas lost to the 
advancing Chinese. Immediate attention had necessarily to 
be given to preparations against renewed fighting in the 
following spring with the aid of emergency shipments of
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military equipment and stores offered, ironically enough, 
only by the countries of the Western bloc whose approach to 
the ’Chinese problem’ had been subject to such heavy criti­
cisms by the Indian Government up to this point. The Soviet 
bloc, whose friendship India had so assiduously cultivated, 
remained studiously non-committal^ and India’s non-aligned 
colleagues chose to treat the issue in accordance with the 
well-known ’Indian approach’ - i.e. on its merits with 
priority to realpolitik and ’reducing tension’ rather than 
to legal or moral niceties^.
The brief and limited conflict had exposed many defic­
iencies in India’s defence posture.
The performance of senior Army officers charged with 
NEFA defences left much to be desired, with confusion, un­
certainty and lack of initiative being widespread. Kaul had 
attempted to direct operations from the front instead of his 
headquarters with the result that he exercised little control 
over operations which proceeded without coordination; the 
removal and subsequent return of Corps headquarters from 
Tezpur to Gauhati merely aggravated an already confused sit­
uation. Officers were generally left to their own devices - 
a situation for which more than a few were not equipped.
The commander of the Indian force at Se La made only a 
half-hearted attempt to break through a Chinese roadblock
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north of Dirrang Dzong but chose to abandon his roadbound 
equipment and bypass the roadblock; the result was that the 
approximately two brigades comprising his force lost cohesion 
and any effectiveness as a fighting formation. The attempt 
to hold both principal Chinese thrusts as far forward as Se 
La and Walong in the face of poor logistics disregarded the 
prudent contingency planning prepared for meeting a Chinese 
attack as early as 1961 and enabled the Chinese to destroy 
two divisions in almost piecemeal fashion. A nervous brigade 
commander is understood to have contributed to the Bomdila 
debacle when he effected a disorderly withdrawl of his com­
mand (believed to be the 48th Brigade of 4 Div.), thereby 
exposing two other brigades who proceeded to adjust their 
own dispositions with general confusion ensuing.
Tactics were too conventional, forces tending to be 
roadbound both in tactical and logistical movement and unable 
to cope with the unorthodox procedures so skilfully employed 
by the Chinese. Officers, many of whom had obviously shown 
little interest in unorthodox warfare right up to the out­
break of the war, were unable to provide the necessary leader 
ship at company and platoon level and were, furthermore, 
totally unfamiliar with Chinese tactics, equipment and capa­
bilities. The troops under their command were deficient in 
battle training and in training required for operations in
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the jungles and mountains in which they found themselves, 
and were also not acclimatized to fight at the heights to 
which many of them were exposed^. Patrolling was poor, 
enabling the Chinese to retain the initiative throughout.
There was an overall shortage of equipment, while much 
of what was in existence was obsolete. Although the 
bolt-action .303 rifle remained an effective weapon in the 
hands of a trained soldier, it was incapable of off-setting 
Chinese automatics, superior artillery support and a 
longer-range mortar. The almost total absence of mines and 
wire in the forward positions precluded any chance of Indian 
troops holding positions against *human seaf tactics. Stocks 
of supplies in forward areas were inadequate for operational 
requirements by augmented forces and the absence of a 
well-thought-out logistics plan for Himalayan operations pre­
vented the rapid despatch of stores and equipment from depots
r gto frontline areas3 . The communications equipment proved 
almost completely useless under the conditions to which it 
was subjected, with a general failure of certain key compon­
ents. There was an extensive shortage of high-altitude 
clothing for which the Army suffered hundreds of cases of 
exposure•
The inability of the Army to cope with limited attacks 
attest to the complacency which affected Indian military
428
preparations in the Himalayan region. Committed to secure 
the Himalayan frontiers and the Himalayan kingdoms against 
Chinese attacks, the Army had not been allocated the addi­
tional resources with which to perform its new commitments 
nor had the Government felt the need to seek some sort of 
understanding with Pakistan for co-operative action to meet 
the challenge posed by China. The contingency was clearly 
regarded as so remote that New Delhi continued to base its 
military strategy against her weaker neighbour and restricted 
her measures on the northern frontier to counter little more 
than local intrusions - notwithstanding contingency planning 
against possible divisional attacks which amounted to little 
more than staff exercises.
The decision to challenge the Chinese in the forward 
areas of Ladakh in the spring of 1962 and the extension of 
this policy to NEFA in September 1962 was clearly based on 
the political assumption that the Chinese would not risk a 
major conflict with a country of India’s size and internation­
al stature just for the sake of a few square miles of front­
ier territory. It tended to ignore the fact that Chinese, 
as well as Indian prestige, was at stake and that actions 
such as Nehru’s public announcement that he had ordered the 
Army to clear the Chinese from Indian territory merely ensur­
ed that, if only for sake of prestige, Peking could not
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passively retire under increasing Indian pressure. Nehru’s 
determination may well have been ’the accumulated result of 
affronted pride, reflected in the clamour to do something, 
and real concern about the possible effect of failure to 
maintain Indian sovereignty in the north-east f r o n t i e r , 
but his determination revealed itself too late to have the 
desired effect but in a fashion that ensured the very occur­
rence which Indian diplomacy had counselled other nations 
against, placing China in a situation where she had no cred­
ible recourse but force of arms.
The extent to which the military (essentially Army) 
leadership must share blame for the debacle is difficult to 
ascertain. Nehru claimed that decisions relating tc 
Himalayan defence ’were taken by Government in full consulta­
tion with the Chiefs of Staff and other senior Army officers 
concerned and in the light of their expert advice. This 
applies particularly to the decision that the Army should 
not withdraw in October-November 1962 from its forward posi­
tion in NEFA’^. He also claimed that his public statement 
that the Army had been ordered to eject the Chinese was ’not 
my decision alone; it was the viewpoint of the military 
people too. They wanted to do it. Otherwise I would not 
have dared to say anything like that’ . Although some sen­
ior officers are known to have viewed the ’forward policy’
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with some concern, in view of the Army’s inability to counter 
any substantial military reaction by China in these forward 
areas, other high-ranking officers and perhaps even a major­
ity shared the mood noted by A.M. Rosenthal:
Everyone knew it could not happen. Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru knew it, his recently dismissed 
Defence Minister, V.K, Krishna Menon knew it, and 
even Indian generals knew it, nWe thought it was 
a sort of game’*, said one officer of high rank 
recently, "They would stick up a post and we would 
stick up a post and we did not think it would come to much more'*.62
This smugness did not extend, however, to the proposal 
apparently advanced by the somewhat impetuous Kaul that the 
Army eject the Chinese from the Thag La-Dhola area. The 
proposal was regarded with dismay by more responsible offic­
ers, including Lieutenant-General Sen (GOC-Eastern Command) 
and the luckless Brigadier assigned to effect the dislodge- 
ment with a brigade of poorly-acclimatized and ill-equipped 
troops at the end of long and primitive communications with 
nothing in reserve to provide support. Even Kaul began to 
doubt the feasibility of the operation following the 10 Octob 
clash, which revealed without any doubt that the Chinese
were in the area in far greater strength than was hitherto
61believed to be the case . According to an informed Indian 
military source, Kaul thereupon returned to New Delhi to 
stress the need for a far stronger force if the plan was to 
be carried out. Thapar called Sen (Kaul’s superior in theory
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although not in p r a c t i c e i n  for consultations and the 
three Generals discussed the matter with the Defence Minister 
The decision as to the course of action to be followed in the 
Thag La-Dhola area in the light of the altered situation was 
referred to Nehru who declined to interfere in what he 
clearly felt to be a fmilitaryT problem. The decision was 
then taken in NehruTs presence and with his concurrence, to 
Tsit tight1 until spring as far as further military activit­
ies in the Himalayas were concerned - at which time the 
entire situation could be reviewed. For some unexplained 
reason, however, probing actions continued and the public 
remained of the belief that the Government was proceeding 
with its preparations to force the Chinese out of NEFA^,
It was, in any case, undoubtedly too late to revert to a 
more prudent policy.
The conflict removed lingering illusions in official 
Indian circles regarding Chinese inhibitions about employing 
force on a requisite scale to achieve desired objectives at 
the expense of India, It brought into focus a grave threat 
in a quarter where geography had been regarded as an almost 
insurmountable barrier to serious attack by land. It con­
firmed the availability of Western military aid in a crisis, 
but also evidenced that the balance of power thesis did not 
preclude a limited conflict in which an aggressor could
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initiate hostilities and terminate action after achieving 
the desired objectives - and then resume his pre-war military- 
posture without interference. The Chinese advance in NEFA 
revealed the absence of the necessary strategic depth in the 
’ corridor’ between Bhutan/Sikkim and East Pakistan without 
which any defence of the area against a sustained assault 
from the north would be most problematical. There had been 
an unreal obsession with the ’historical ghost’ of Moslem 
Pakistan to the detriment of suitable adjustments in defence 
strategy to accord with the changing geo-political context 
in the Himalayan region. The result was traumatic for India 
- militarily, politically and diplomatically.
In the aftermath of the Chinese ceasefire and unilater­
al withdrawal, a reassessment of India’s defence requirements 
was required. The problems facing India were momentous. 
Along a 2800-mile border broken only by several powerless 
kingdoms, India is faced with a powerful China which remains 
in ’illegal’ occupation of Alcsai Chin and has claims to 
32,000 square miles of NEFA, further areas in Ladakh, minor 
claims in the ’middle sector’ and an ’on again, off again’ 
claim to about 400 square miles of Bhutan comprising the 
entire Tashigang area in the eastern part of the state and a 
portion in the north-western sector facing the Chumbi valley. 
Peking also continues to advance such proposals as a
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Confederation of Himalayan States that would include Nepal, 
Bhutan, Sikkim, Nagaland and an ’Eastern Hills StateT in what 
is now NEFA; ’regional autonomy’ for a ’Darjeeling-Duars 
district’; a Federation of Bhutan and Sikkim; and a Gurkhis- 
tan which would include all Nepalis in North Bengal and
A ^ 6i 1 S S cl HI •
Indian technicians continue to help man some border
6 7checkposts on the Nepal-Tibet border ', Kathmandu has resist­
ed Chinese pressure to end the recruitment of Gurkhas by 
India and has even permitted increased recruitment since the 
Sino-Indian border war. But Indian influence in the state 
is being progressively eroded. China has warned that she
would regard any Indian intervention in Nepal as a casus
68belli0 , is rushing construction of the strategic Kathmandu-
69Koderi road ' and is aiding the construction of another road
to link Bhadrapur and Olangchung in eastern Nepal which,
though conceived by Nepalis for commercial purposes, will
also afford the Chinese with a strategic road which outflanks
Sikkim to the west. Nepal is improving her relations with
Pakistan as a deliberate policy aimed at loosening the ties
70with India and, under a tripartite agreement signed with 
Britain and the United States in March 1964, Nepal is acquir­
ing military equipment and stores from these countries - as 
against her former complete dependence upon India for such 
material^.
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Sikkim appears content to remain firmly within the
Indian orbit and has taken various measures to increase its
contribution to its own security. The Sikkimese Government
has imposed a complete ban on any movement across the Sikkim-
Tibet border, has strengthened its system of border check-
posts - which will henceforth be manned the year round - and
has established a checkpost at Uttarey to check possible
Chinese infiltration from Nepal, It is raising Home Guards
equipped with modern weapons, has approached India to train
Sikkimese in mountain warfare and has agreed that half of
the Palace Guards will serve in rotation with Indian forces
72within the state' , India cannot, however, take its position 
in the state for granted and must be in a position to afford 
Sikkim a reasonable degree of security against Chinese attack 
- either alone or with the backing of the Western powers .
Bhutan poses a major headache for Indian defence plan­
ners. The integrity of the state is vital for any successful 
defence of NEFA/Assam and Sikkim. A Chinese thrust into the 
state would threaten Indian forces deployed in NEFA and 
Sikkim with being cut off from succour by India’s main field 
army and, if Nepal remained neutral in such a conflict (as 
is reasonable to presume)could lead to those Indian forces 
covering Darjeeling and Kalimpong being pinned against 
Nepal’s eastern frontier. The result could well be the
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destruction of a number of divisions and Chinese control of 
Assam, Bhutan and Sikkim which India could not contest with­
out massive Western aid and a probable general war. As 
China would regard any Indian military move into Bhutan as a 
casus belli, India must devote its efforts to deterring any 
unprovoked Chinese attack on the state by establishing a 
credible military deterrent in the area and preparing to 
rapidly despatch troops into the state over the strategic 
roads under construction.
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He was not removed. He resigned. He resigned very 
rightly as the Chief of Staff resigned because of 
constructive responsibility. He felt he should 
resign in the circumstances. You see in these 
matters it is a little difficult to say where the 
responsibility lies or whether it lies on anyone 
at all.
Cited, Hindu, 1st January 1 9 6 3.
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32 He confessed in the Lok Sabha on 8 November 1962 that the 
Government (i.e. himself) had felt that fthis type of aggres­
sion was almost a thing of the past’. Cited, ibid, 10 
November 1962.
33 See, for example, his statement in Parliament on 8 Novem­
ber 1962, LSD, 3rd Sess., vol. 9> cols 108-52.
34 Cited, Hindut 26 October 1962. Foreign Report (8 Novem­
ber 1962, pp. 7-8) expressed the view that Nehru*s broadcast 
to the nation on 22 October reflected his fear of alarming 
the country, while his subsequent swing to the other extreme 
evidenced his recognition of the need to meet the public 
mood and the prevailing attitude of the armed forces or be 
faced with an erosion of his own position.
35 India News, 4/2, 4 February 1965. The Trombay establish­
ment subsequently designed and fabricated a plant for this 
purpose, capable of freeze-drying 600 bottles or 180 litres 
per month - the first unit of this type to be built in India.
36 Text of the Ordinance in Times of India, 28 October 1962. 
This Ordinance was superceded by the Defence of India Bill 
which was presented to the Lok Sabha on 21 November 1963 f 
passed without opposition by both Houses, and signed into 
effect by the President in December 1963. This 4 8-clause 
measure incorporates and extends the Defence of India Ordin­
ance and confers upon the Government emergency powers to 
maintain public order and ensure the efficient conduct of 
military operations. The Preventive Detention Act, first initiated in 1950 for one year but continually renewed there­
after, was again renewed in December 1963 for a three-year 
period.
37 A Central Advisory Committee of editors was set up to 
check the publication of material which could be considered 
to jeopardize the security of the country. The Committee 
appears to have interpreted its terms of reference broadly 
and to have included within the area of sensitive material 
expressions of doubt regarding Nehru1s qualities of leader­
ship. For details of some of the newspapers and journals wh< 
received warnings concerning such 1 violations*, see Prem 
Bhatia in the Manchester Guardian Weekly, 10 October 1963; 
statement by the Minister of State in the Home Ministry, Shr: 
Datas, LSI), 3rd Series, vol. 12, 23 January 1963* col. 5969.
38 Throughout the crisis, the task of briefing the press 
was entrusted to the External Affairs Ministry through which
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oddly enough, all information pertaining to border defence 
was released. The immediate consequence of the ineptness of 
the Government’s information policy was aptly summed up by 
one Western observer: ’The people... sense this [national 
humiliation] from the Government’s own evasions and hesita­
tions, lacking direct guidance. If India is confused, those 
in authority have much to answer for’. John Mander, ’’Indian 
Autumn” , Encounter (February 1963), p. 19.
39 Menon’s activities and comments during the first period 
of the war were viewed by the Times of India in an editorial 
on 25 October 1962 as ’a source of bewilderment and dismay’. 
The paper criticized Menon for taking time off at such a 
crucial stage to address a Bombay mass rally at which he 
gave a detailed and rambling explanation or ’justification’ 
of his policy, and considered ’astonishing’ his casual ad­
mission that defence arrangements of the NEFA frontier were 
’found to be inadequate by later events’ - a confession of 
failure which the paper felt Menon ’assumes is mitigated by 
the act of frank confession’.
40 Details of the developments within the Congress Party 
pertaining to the ouster of Menon are taken from an article 
in Thought, 17 November 1962, p. 6. See also K. Rangaswami 
in Hindu, 9 November 1962; ibid, 8 November 1962; The Times,
8 November 1962.
41 Responsibility for the procurement of foreign supplies 
was kept by Nehru, Menon being confined to duties relating 
to inspection and organization, various factories and work­
shops and the research and development organization. In a 
despatch from New Delhi dated 31 October, A.M. Rosenthal 
described Menon’s appointment to Defence Production as a 
’face-saving guesture’ by Nehru but as ’bound to have import­
ant international significance’ as Menon was regarded as the 
chief architect of the theory that if India got into trouble 
with China, Russia would come to her aid; his removal was 
thus a defeat for Russia and a victory for the West. In an 
editorial on 1st November 1962, the Times of India expressed 
the view that Nehru had perhaps ’unnecessarily halted his 
journey at a half-way house’. In an editorial of the same 
date, the New York Times declared that Menon was still too 
highly placed and that his removal from the top list of 
officials ’’would have been welcome evidence... that the Indian 
Government had completely turned away from the attitude of 
unrealistic trustfulness toward the Communist world that con­
tributed to the present crisis on India’s northern frontier’.
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42 The Hindu (5 November 1962) reported that ’quarters close 
to Menon’ had denied that he made any such statement. In 
view of Menon’s well-known personality traits, however, it
is very likely that he did make such a statement.
43 Commenting on Menon’s Tezpur statement, the Times of 
India (3 November 1962) stated:
Perhaps too much importance should not be attached 
to this characteristic piece of egoism...Yet it 
needs to be said that a Union Minister capable of 
audaciously dismissing as ’’nothing’1 changes in a 
key portfolio which he formerly held invites the 
severest strictures. It also provokes the question 
whether the absence of his attitude of anything 
resembling regretful admission of past errors does 
not disqualify him completely from holding a post 
of any consequence.
44 For text of the letter’s contents, see Hindu, 8 November
1962 .
45 As the Nation commented on 1st December 1962:
Menon was a scapegoat in one sense. He represented 
the era of vacillation, of half-heartedness, of 
uncertainty and confusion and bewilderment... He 
stood not for Nehru’s policies and leadership, but 
for the lack of them. The politician’s revolt was 
not against what Nehru had decided, but against 
what he had not decided - then, and for so many 
years before.
46 Foreign Report, 29 November 1962, p. 4«
47 Cited, The Times. 8 November 1962. The Times of India 
(8 November 1962) felt that the removal of Menon was ’un­
questionably the right one in a democracy’ due to his loss 
of public confidence.Whenever a Minister, for whatever reason, forfeits 
the confidence of a substantial part of public 
opinion that is more than sufficient ground for a 
resignation and appropriate reshuffle of personnel.
The principle of collective cabinet responsibility 
does not in any way negate the equally valid prin­
ciple of individual responsibility and it is in 
relation to this that Mr Krishna Menon’s earlier 
letter of resignation was most inadequate. Its 
failure to refer to the military setbacks in NEFA 
with which Mr Menon and his Ministry were directly 
concerned at that time is an astonishing and inex­
plicable omission.
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48 It comprised the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet (the 
Prime Minister and the Ministers for Defence, Defence Produc­
tion, Home Affairs and Finance), the Chief Ministers of the 
major states, the three Chiefs of Staff, leading politicians, 
senior civil servants, retired generals Thimayya, Thorat and 
Rajendrasinghji and retired Chief of Naval Staff, R.D. Katari.
49 The correspondent of the Daily Telegraph reported on 21 
November 1962 that Chavan was being canvassed as a potential 
head of government by military and political circles disillu­
sioned with Nehru and who regarded him as an ’unrealistic 
dreamer’ unfit to lead the country at war.
50 Reddy was widely regarded as a Menon protege but, while 
this may have contributed to his replacement at such a 
crucial juncture, it must be noted that his terra was complet­
ed and that the situation favoured a ’new look’ in a discred­
ited Ministry.
51 According to an informed British observer on India 
affairs, Nehru made a desperate appeal to Britain and the 
United States on 19 November for 15 bomber squadrons to 
attack the advancing Chinese troops. Michael Edwardes, 
’’Illusion and Reality in India’s Foreign Policy'*, Interna­
tional Affairs (January 1965), p. 52. An Indian correspondent 
reported in July 1963 that, during the conflict, the United 
States had moved one squadron of supersonic fighters from 
Europe to Turkey for despatch in the event that India needed 
help, Britain had offered a squadron from Singapore, and an 
American aircraft carrier had been sent to cruise in the 
Indian Ocean. See report by H.R. Vohra of a State Department 
briefing given to correspondents in Times of India, 13 July 
1963.
52 According to reports, the Indian Ministry of External 
Affairs repeated the request on 1st December and Nehru 
repeated it in reply to a query from President Kennedy in 
early January 1963. See Thomas Brady in New York Times, 25 
January and 21 February 1963; Times of India leader, 29 
January 1963.
53 Text of announcement in Peking Review, vols 47 & 48, 30 
November 1962, pp. 5-7.
54 For timetable of Chinese withdrawal, see ibid, No, 49,
7 December 1962, p. 7; No. 50, 14 December 1962, p. 15; No.
1, 4 January 1963, P« 26.
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55 For* a discussion of the Russian reaction, and that of the 
other communist states, see R. Vaidyanath, "The Reaction of 
the Soviet Union and Other Communist States" in International 
Studies, 5:1*2 (July-October 1963), pp. 70-4.
56 See M.S. Anwani, "The Reactions of West Asia and the UAR" 
in ibid t pp. 75-9; Vishal Singh, "The Reactions of South-East 
Asian Countries" in ibid. pp. 80-4; Parimal Kumar Das, "The 
Reaction of the Commonwealth of Nations" in ibid, pp. 64-9* 
with reference to Ghana, Ceylon and Tanganyika. The activit­
ies of the Colombo Conference of six non-aligned nations - 
Ceylon, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Ghana and the U.A.R. - 
illustrates the tendency among the non-aligned to ignore the 
»merits» of the respective parties while promoting Sino- 
Indian discussions aimed at reducing tension.
57 Evidence of the lack of detailed planning against the 
contingency of conflict on a substantial scale was revealed 
by the fact that many of the initial reinformcements for 
NEFA were Madrassis from the warm tropical south of India.
58 For example, rifles urgently required in NEFA were flown 
to Calcutta from depots elsewhere in India in a matter of 
hours but then took six days to reach their destinations in 
the forward areas. See Times of India, 30 January 1965.
59 The Daily Telegraph, 15 October 1962.
60 LSD, 3^d Sess., vol. 13* col. 1331.
61 Ibid, 5th Sess., vol. 19* col. 2213.
62 New York Times, 11 November 1962.
63 Nehru claimed in the Lok Sabha on 8 November 1962 that 
the movement of Chinese troops behind the fhuge mountains’ 
from the western to the eastern sector had not been noticed
»at all». LSD.
64 It is understood that Kaul tended to bypass Sen and deal 
directly with Thapar and Menon, Thapar himself being a pas­
sive bystander to direct dealings between Kaul and Menon and 
primarily desirous of finishing out his term with the minimum 
of fuss.
65 Such probing actions may well have been decided upon by 
Menon and Kaul to maintain the public belief that the Army
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was preparing to eject the Chinese - and therefore excape 
the probable hostile reaction to any cessation of all activ­
ity by a public which had been led to expect dramatic results 
The onset of winter would have thereby enabled both men to 
ease out of the predicament into which their actions and/or 
public statements had placed them.
66 See, for example, G.F. Hudson, "What Does China Want in 
the Himalayas", The Financial Times, 18 February 1963.
67 Times of India, 28 July 1964. According to the Nepal 
leview, cited in Dawn (14 August 1963)# Indian personnel 
manned 14 checkposts. Dawn (29 July 1964) reported that Dr 
Tulsi Guri, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, had assured 
members of the National Panchayat that foreign (i.e. Indian) 
technicians working at northern checkposts would be replaced 
as soon as qualified Nepalese became available. Dawn added 
that Indian technicians and wireless operators at these posts 
totalled 100.
68 Speaking on the first anniversary of the Sino-Nepalese 
boundary treaty, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Marshal Chen 
Yi, warned that ’should any foreign power dare to attack 
Nepal, the Chinese Government and people...will forever stand 
by Nepal’. Cited in SC£P, No. 2836 dated 10 October 1962, p. 
32. As India declared a similar policy as early as 1949# 
both powers have declared Nepal’s integrity to be a basic 
goal of policy.
69 The protocol for the road was signed on 13 January 1963 and the Chinese completed the first phase of the project on 
schedule# the section being opened for single-file three-ton 
traffic on 25 December 1964.
70 President Ayub returned Mahendra’s 1961 visit in May 
1963# on which occasion he was accorded the rank of Field 
Marshal in the Royal Nepalese Army. A Pakistan-Nepal trade 
agreement was signed in October 1962# a transit agreement in 
January 1963 sind an air agreement in the same year. Pakistan 
is training aircraft engineers, mechanics and pilots for the 
Royal Nepal Air Line.
71 The first consignment of American military aid arrived 
in Kathmandu aboard two Hercules transports on 17 October 
1964 and two U.S. Army teams arrived on 20 June 1965 to 
instruct Nepalese soldiers in the use, repair and mainten­
ance of the transport and communications equipment being
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provided. See Hindu, 19 October 1964; The Times, 21 January 
1965.
72 See statements by Maharajah Namgyal at Gangtok, 23 June 
1963j cited in Hindu, 24 June 1963; at Gaigtok, 24 July 1963, 
cited in ibid, 26 July 1963; at Calcutta, 29 July 1963* 
cited in ibid, 31 July 1963.
73 The Maharajah indicated in Gangtok on 23 June 1963 that 
he was confident in India’s ability to defend Sikkim because 
Britain and the United States would come to India’s aid. 
Cited in The Nation, 25 June 1963.
CHAPTER XI
THE HEW INDIAN DEFENCE PROGRAMME
The Indian Government has concluded that ’Military
weakness has been a temptation, and [that] a little military
strength may be a deterrent’^ . As the Union Minister for
Planning, Gulzaril Nanda, declared in a broadcast over
All-India Radio on 6 February 1963:
We can safeguard peace only when we have the 
strength to make aggression a costly and profit­
less adventure. The greater our economic and 
defence potential, the less will be the danger 
from across our borders. The bare truth is that 
our faith in our neighbour in the north has been 
shattered and it cannot soon be restored. India 
has henceforward to remain on a constant vigil and 
in a state of complete readiness for every event­
uality ... From now on, defence and development must 
be regarded as integral and related parts of the national economic plan.2
Although defence planning has been re-oriented to provide 
for operational contingencies involving China, there remains 
some concern with Pakistani intentions due to the latter’s 
attitude during the border war and its subsequent relation­
ship with Peking. The concern appears to have progressively 
increased since early 1963 when the Indian Minister for 
Economic and Defence Co-ordination, T.T. Krishnamachari,
445
446
declared at a Washington press conference that, while India 
was Concerned’ with Pakistanis intentions, * I do not think 
we have to defend ourselves against Pakistan1". Thus, 
Defence Minister Chavan stated at Ahmednagar on 25 October 
1964:
While these host of new problems have to be faced 
in organising the defences of the northern frontier, 
one cannot overlook the threat from across the 
other land frontier. Though politically we do not 
envisage any aggression across these frontiers in 
the foreseeable future, I would like to inform you 
that our defence planning is based on the presump­
tion that such a threat may materialise anytime.4
In accordance with its assessment of the altered strat­
egic situation, the Indian Government has undertaken the 
expansion of the armed forces, production base and opera­
tional infra-structure on a considerable scale. The blue­
print for this expansion is a five-year plan sanctioned in 
early 19643. The plan envisages the attainment of six major 
objectives during the period April 1964-March 1969:
1) creation of a 8259 000-man Army and the modernis­
ation of its weapons and equipment,
2) stabilisation of the Air Force at forty-five 
squadrons, its re-equipment with modern aircraft 
and the provision of suitable ancillary facilities,
3) maintenance of the Navy at approximately its 
present strength with replacement of overage 
vessels by fresh procurement from external sources 
and indigenous construction,
4) establishment of production facilities so as to 
materially reduce dependence on external sources 
of supply,
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5) construction and improvement of communications 
in the border areas aimed at creation of an 
operational infrastructure in the form of roads, 
tracks, airfields, camps, bridges and other 
facilities,
6) expansion of the research organisation.^
According to one press source, the Army is expected to con­
stitute the main fbastionf of defence for five to ten years - 
by which time it is expected that the Air Force will have 
developed its own production base and be capable of assuming 
some of the Armyfs present (i.e. deterrent) functions?.
The financial burden of this defence plan is expected to
total Rs 5000 crores, including a foreign exchange component
ovalued at about Rs 680 crores0. Projected expenditure on 
defence for the Fourth Plan period (1966-71) has been placed 
by the Planning Commission at Rs 5500 crores, involving an 
outlay that is expected to rise from Rs 920 crores (1966-67) 
to Rs 1110 crores (1971-72)^. Although economies will no 
doubt be effected wherever practicable^, it is understood 
from a high-ranking Indian military informant that the Indian 
Cabinet agreed in early March 1964 to make available for 
defence a minimum of Rs 800 crores per annum over the subse­
quent decade irrespective of the level of foreign economic 
and military aid or of the domestic or external situations.
In view of Indiafs chronic shortage of foreign exchange 
even for non-military purposes, the Government has been
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forced to do a complete volte-face on the issue of military 
11aid . It is relying upon Tfriendly1 countries to make
available the desired foreign exchange component in the form
of outright grant aid and/or long-term credits on easy 
12terms . Aid-seeking missions have been despatched to 
various countries but reliance is clearly being placed upon 
the United States, Britain and the fold Commonwealth*
1 3(Canada, Australia and New Zealand) and the Soviet Union .
The Army is being expanded to a well-equipped force of 
21 divisions'^' , including ten mountain divisions specially 
organized, trained and equipped for operations in the 
Himalayan region^-.
Two-thirds of the proposed increase was to be achieved 
by March 1964 and the remainder thereafter, and a number of 
measures were implemented to facilitate attainment of the 
desired goals. A new Recruiting Directorate was established 
in the Adjutant General*s Branch and the recruiting organiz­
ation was expanded. The minimum age for recruitment to the 
ranks remained at 17 years but the prescribed physical 
standards in respect of height, weight and chest measure­
ments were relaxed up to August 1963. Recruitment was thrown
open to all classes into all Arms ’without upsetting the tra
16ditional organisational structure* . In an effort to 
reduce wastage of recruits from the pre-Emergency level of
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ten per cent, psychological tests were introduced and will
form the basis of future recruitment of both technical and
non-technical personnel to the Army (and Air Force)^'7.
Terms of colour and reserve liabilities for new recruits
were introduced effective 25 January 1965 which involve ten
18years with the Colours and five years with the Reserve . 
Emergency Commissions were offered and a large number of 
officers were granted extensions beyond the normal age of 
retirement. The percentage of annual vacancies for Permanent 
Regular Commissions reserved for qualified JCOs and NCOs was
increased from ten to 24 per cent and the strength of the
19Special List Cadre was increased to 1500
Existing facilities for the training of officers and 
other ranks were expanded and new ones created. The capacity 
of the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun was increased 
from 1485 to 1800 on 1st January 1963* 2400 on 1st April 
1963 and 3200 on 1st July 1963 with relevant modifications 
in the duration of the training period. In January 1963* 
two Officer Training Schools were established - one in each 
of Poona and Madras - with an initial capacity of 900 each 
but increased to 1500 by July 1963. New training centres 
were set up for other ranks and the capacity of the regiment­
al training centres was increased from 5670 to 39,804
(Infantry), 5500 to 17,861 (Artillery), 3600 to 29,917
20(Engineers) and 2300 to 11,949 (Signals)
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Training has been re-oriented for warfare in jungle-cum- 
mountain terrain. The capacity of the High Altitude Warfare 
School has been greatly increased and a mobile Army Head­
quarters Training Team is imparting instruction in jungle 
warfare to units at their particular stations, thereby 
avoiding the costly and time-consuming procedure of moving 
units to the Jungle Warfare School at Dehra Dun - albeit at 
some cost in effectiveness. The first course in a programme 
aimed at toughening young officers mentally and physically 
for patrol activity over long periods in the Himalayan 
terrain began in March 1964 at the Infantry School (Mhow).
The organisational structure of infantry, artillery and 
service corps units is being revised with the aim of improv­
ing operational capacity in mountainous areas.
A new Directorate of Combat Development has been set up
in the General Staff Branch to evolve and develop new weapons
and tactical concepts and a series of decisions have been
taken concerning re-equipment of the Army with modern
weapons, equipment and stores adequate for the next seven to
ten years. The .303 Lee Enfield is being replaced by the
21semi-automatic Ishapore rifle of indigenous design and all 
,303s are being converted to the new 7*62 bore, which has 
been adopted as the new standard small arms bore. The Sten 
machine carbine is being replaced by the more modern
450
Sterling, The 4.2 inch mortar is to be replaced by a 
lighter type of local design with a longer range and the 
French-built Brandt heavy mortar has been acquired in quan­
tity and is being produced under licence. A mountain 
howitzer is being developed in Ordnance and new types of 
communications equipment are to be acquired both from local 
production schemes and by foreign purchase. The armoured 
formations will begin receiving medium tanks from the Avadi
Heavy Vehicles factory in late 1965 or early 1966, some 70
22light tanks have been purchased from the Soviet Union and 
light tanks of British design may be produced at Avadi.
A long-deferred provisioning programme to replace the 
Armyfs worn vehicle fleet is in progress. As the production 
schemes underway in the ordnance factories for three-ton 
Shaktiman trucks, one-ton Nissan trucks and eight cwt Nissan 
patrol jeeps are unable to meet the increased needs of the 
Army, large orders have been placed on local automobile man­
ufacturers for Mercedes-Benz three-ton trucks, Dodge one-ton 
power wagons and WillyTs jeeps. Henceforth, trucks will be 
discarded after 35,000 miles or seven years service - which­
ever is later - and before the required first major overhaul, 
and jeeps will be discarded after 30,000 miles or five years 
service - whichever is later •
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The unwieldy Eastern Command was split in two effective 
1st May 1963. The new Eastern Command is responsible for 
Assam, NEFA, Tripura, Manipur and West Bengal and has its 
headquarters at Barrackpore. The newly-created Central 
Command is based at Lucknow with responsibility for Bihar, 
Orissa, Madya Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh. Liaison between 
the two Commands has been maintained by a nucleus of the old 
Eastern Command left at Gauhati while the NEFA Corps remains 
separate^. A new organization has been set up under the 
Master-General of Ordnance for the procurement of equipment 
and stores from foreign countries. To ensure better colla­
tion, evaluation and assessment of intelligence, the number
of officers in the Military Intelligence Directorate has
25been increased by about 50 per cent
The 7th and 14th battalions of the Jammu and Kashmir 
Militia have been merged into the Army and the remainder of 
the Militia passed under the administrative and operational 
control of the regular Service in an agreement signed in 
early 1964 between the Kashmir State Government and the 
Defence Ministry2 .^ One Scout battalion has been raised for 
service on the Uttar Pradesh-Tibet border and another for 
service on the borders with Tibet of Punjab and Himachal 
Pradesh; these units will function in a manner similar to 
the Assam Rifles in NEFA, The Kashmir State Government is
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streamlining the state police and is raising two new battal-
ions of armed police , the Assam Government is preparing a
Rs 2 crores border protection scheme for the border with
28East Pakistan and the Union Government has decided to 
increase the Central Police Reserve by up to 25 per cent^.
Gn instructions from the Centre, Madras is raising a battal­
ion of special armed police for employment on the NEFA 
border; the entire costs of the force will be borne by the 
Central authority0 .
The general expansion appears to be proceeding in 
general accordance to plan. By March 1964, 300,000 men and 
10,000 new officers had been inducted, four mountain and two 
regular infantry divisions were in training and one existing 
infantry division was being re-organized as a mountain form- 
ation° . There continued to be a shortage of doctors, and 
engineers, however; as of 31 December 1963, there were 2721 
officers in the Army Medical Corps against an authorized 
strength of 3357 and the shortage of graduate engineers 
was expected to total 1649 by the end of March 1964^ .  The 
particularly poor response of engineers has forced the Army 
to recruit a large number of non-engineering graduate 
officers for the Corps of Engineers, Signals and EME^‘‘ and 
military service has been made a pre-requisite for employment 
of engineers and doctors in the civil sector.
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The Air Force is being developed into a force of 45 
squadrons with assistance being sought from the United States, 
Britain and the fold Commonwealth1 and the Soviet Union*
This establishment has been conceived to meet the requirements 
of air defence, ground attack, communications, maritime and 
strategic reconnaissance and logistics support to the Army, 
the BRDO, the NEFA and Nagaland administrations and engin- 
eers constructing airfields in border areas ,
The recruiting organization of the IAF has been sharply 
increased, pilot training has been stepped up with reductions 
in the duration of the course where practicable and a ground 
training school for radar operators and mechanics has been 
set up. Two new flying establishments have been established 
and an Air Defence Academy is to be set up in the Hyderabad 
district. Selected personnel are undergoing specialized 
training in Britain3 ,^ the United States3 7^ and the Soviet 
Union38.
The air defence organization has been strengthened by 
the creation in June 1963 of a new Eastern Command with head­
quarters at Shillong (Assam)^. Ground-to-air guided 
missiles are to be employed for the protection of certain 
vital areas and an early warning radar system is under con­
struction across northern India with American aid The
border war spurred the long-proposed shift of Maintenance
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Command from Kanpur to the more centrally-located Nagpur and 
the foundation stone for the new base was laid on 2 February 
1964« Works projects have been implemented for the fresh 
construction, extension or improvement of facilities at 23 
airfields and work on eleven of these sites had been complet­
ed by March 1964^• The congestion evidenced at Palam during 
the war is to be relieved by the construction of a new air­
field at Hindan (near Ghaziabad) for the exclusive use of 
the IAF; consequent on its completion, the Air Force will 
use Palam only for its Communication Squadron (including the 
VIP flight) and some transport aircraft. Policy and proced­
ures for the provisioning and procurement of stores has been 
streamlined.
The transport capacity of the Service has been progres­
sively strengthened. Following the first Chinese attacks, 
the Indian Government contracted with Steward-Davis Inc. of 
Long Beach, California, for the augmentation of the standard 
two Wright R-3350 piston-engines on 27 of their fleet of 53 
C-119s^2. The United States provided 24 C-119 Packets and 
two Caribou Is under their programme of emergency military 
aid and Indian officials appear to have renewed a former 
interest in the Lockheed C-130 transport^. Canada gave eight 
C-47s and five Otters as emergency grant aid and India pur­
chased 16 Caribou Is under a loan agreement concluded in
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Ottawa in July 1963 z . A further 30 An-12s were acquired 
from the Soviet Union under a loan agreement signed in July
* r+
1963' and the decision has been taken to employ this type 
as the standard heavy transport. After some discussion 
within the Government concerning the relative merits of the 
Avro-748^ an order was placed for 29 units but, by December 
19649 no decision had yet been made regarding the suitabil­
ity of this type as the future standard medium transport in 
47the IAF .
Orders were placed for an undisclosed number of Mi-4s 
A Äearly in 1963 and over 20 units had reportedly arrived by 
4 0May 1964 • A further 20 Mi-4s were ordered in September
1964 under the provisions of an Indo-Soviet loan agreement 
concluded at that time^^. A Soviet offer to establish a 
plant in India for the production of this type under licence 
from Avaiaexport^1 was, however, declined by New Delhi for 
the stated reason that fThe number of Mi-4 helicopters re­
quired by the IAF do not justify the establishment of manu-
5 2facture in India1 . Although French credit terms were not 
c 0very attractive , a number of Alouette Ills were purchased 
in 1963 and India proposed to meet its future Service re­
quirements of helicopters through indigenous manufacture of 
this model“* ^ . India is also reported to have shown an inter­
est in obtaining about 50 Boeing Vertold-107 units and a
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group of Boeing officials were, as of mid-1964> scheduled to 
visit India in this connection^.
The Krishak Mk II has been accepted for the role of air 
observation post duties presently performed by the Auster;
30 units have been ordered with deliveries expected to com­
mence in late 1965^ .  The sharply increased requirements 
for training aircraft has been partially alleviated by 36 
Harvards provided by Canada as emergency grant aid and a 
small number of Vampires purchased from Indonesia in November 
1962 . Efforts are being made to acquire further Harvards
from other countries, but ultimate reliance is placed upon 
the IIJT-16 jet trainer ’Kiran’, a model of which will possess 
a ground attack capability. The war caused most of the 
project’s design team to be transferred to priority work on 
the HF-24 with the result that little progress was made up 
to mid-1963> at which time major attention was again given to 
the trainer. The design staff was increased to 60 personnel, 
major assembly of the prototype began in November 1963 and 
final installation of the systems and powerplant was complet­
ed just before the first flight on 4 September 1964* which
r o
was powered by a Bristol Orpheus Viper II engine"5 . The 
first 24 pre-production models are to be produced by the end 
of 196659.
The Vampires, Ouragans and Mysteres are to be phased 
out of frontline service as the IIF-24 Mk I fMarut? becomes 
available. The first four Mk Is were handed over to the IAF 
at Bangalore on 10 May 1964 and a three-squadron TbatchT 
(normally 48 aircraft) is being produced of the supersonic 
Mk IA version, which is powered by the HAL-made Bristol 
Orpheus 703 Reheat engine*^. As an apparent interim measure 
pending the availability of the Mk IAs in quantity, India is
/ I -1negotiating with Britain for perhaps 40 more Hunters0 .
Further Canberra light bombers and reconnaissance air­
craft are being obtained from Britain to augment the exist­
ing units. No apparent decision seems to have been made to 
date, however, regarding the future of this arm.
The manner in which the fighter arm was to be re-equipped 
was for some time the subject of apparent indecision by 
Indian officials and speculation by foreign observers. Dur­
ing the border war, IAF officers reportedly sounded out 
United States authorities as to the possibility of obtaining 
aircraft with a performance roughly comparable to the F-104G^. 
Feelers were put out to Britain also^ and a desire to pur­
chase a tlott of Mirages was apparently not pursued because
/ ’ Athe price demanded by France was fobviouslyf too much0 .
Indian officials were also reported to be looking for an
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aircraft suitable for close support work like the McDonnell 
F-101 »Voodoo»63.
India’s major interest was in the F-104s, however, and 
the Government persisted in its efforts to acquire such air­
craft despite Western convictions that India had no immediate 
need for this high-performance weapons system. From »an 
early date» the IAF and Indian Defence Ministry reportedly 
regarded the joint Indian-Commonwealth-United States air 
exercises held in India in November I96366 »as an opportun­
ity to show that without supersonic fighters the problems of 
Indian defence against air attack are insoluble»6'7. Specu­
lation as to the progress of their efforts continued into 
mid-1964. In February 1964, it was reported that India 
would receive all-weather Convair Delta Dagger F-102 inter­
ceptors armed with air-to-air missiles and fin rockets simul­
taneous with American re-equipment of the Pakistan Air Force
6 8with these same aircraft - and in equal number . Other re­
ports later in the year mentioned an American willingness to
make available three to five squadrons of F-51 Skyray or
6 9F-5B Freedom Fighters equipped with Sidewinder missiles
Possible Indian purchase of some F-104s on a commercial 
basis or the alternative establishment of a F-104 assembly 
or production plant in India was also reported. With the 
apparent concurrence of the State Department, Lockheed
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representatives reportedly took the initiative to hold talks 
with senior officials of the Indian Ministries of Defence, 
Finance and Defence Production in New Delhi in late February 
1964* Lockheed, according to the report, proposed the estab­
lishment of a production unit in India for the F-104 or a 
comparable aircraft; if that were not acceptable to the
Indian Government, an alternative was the sale to India of a
70certain number of F-104s on a commercial basis . In May
1964, it was reported that India had proposed a $ 200 million
American-built plant to manufacture F-104s in India - the
project allegedly being favoured by ’some’ Indian Ministers
to the MIG project. While the report stated that Washington
was unlikely to extend grants for such a project, American
authorities ostensibly had under consideration an assembly
plant to be financed with a 20-year credit from the Export-
71Import Bank in the event the MIG project failed
That particular project had made little real headway by 
1964 and there were sufficient grounds for pessimism concern­
ing its future. The first four units had arrived at Bombay 
on 11 February 1963 under a cloak of secrecy requested by
Moscow in an obvious attempt not to exacerbate relations with
72Peking, and two more arrived later in the spring/ . The MIG- 
213 were of little operational use, however, as they lacked
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such essential equipment as fire-control radar, had meagre 
armament and a severely limited combat radius .
In an effort to play down the significance of the Soviet 
attitude, Nehru claimed that ’The main thing is the building 
up of the plant. The rest was really some for training pur­
poses and samples’^  . But the production scheme was making 
scarcely any progress. By mid-April 1963* plans envisaged 
the establishment of the airframe plant at Nasik (Maharash­
tra) and the aero-engine plant at ICoraput (Orissa). In 
October, Hyderabad was selected as the site of a plant that 
would manufacture electronics equipment and missiles for the 
MIG-21. Final assembly of the aircraft was scheduled for 
Bombay and production was expected to begin in 1965 with 
deliveries to begin in 1966*
Russian technical experts assigned to the project, how­
ever, apparently showed indifference to Indian pressure for 
75speed and New Delhi was unsuccessful in its efforts to per­
suade the Soviet Government to agree to certain modifications 
in the design' . An American correspondent reported from New 
Delhi on 17 December 1963 ’the impending abandonment’ of the 
project for the reason that cost estimates had jumped from 
the initial estimate of $ 143 million to a ’current working 
figure of $ 336 million’ and that Moscow had to date proved 
unwilling to make the MIG-21 an all-weather aircraft with an
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77expanded radius of action . The Indian Defence Ministry
issued an immediate denial, claiming that TThe project is
78proceeding according to planT , but it is very doubtful if 
this revealed other than unwarranted optimism at that stage.
By 5 February 1964* the Minister for Defence Production could 
only state that two project reports were under consideration 
and a third was under preparation with civil works underway 
at Nasik, Koraput and Hyderabad'7^ .
It was reported in a leading Indian daily on 26 January 
1964 that India was not going to acquire MIGs for the reason 
that the cost of establishing the complex of factories was 
prohibitive and American aircraft were preferred by the
O r»IAF° . The same paper reported in early March, however, that 
Anglo-American reluctance to give India high performance air­
craft had caused even the Air Force to veer around to the
view that the MIG project, despite its obvious shortcomings,
8lwas the only political and military solution . Defence
Minister Chavan included three squadrons of F-104s in the
list of defence requirements which he submitted to the United
8 2States Government in May 1964 while India made what would 
seem to have been final efforts to obtain a favourable arrange 
ment with Moscow which would enable the MIG project to proceed 
At this point, for reasons known only to senior Soviet 
leaders but probably related to the virtual irrevocable split
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with Peking, Moscow indicated its willingness to be much 
more co-operative on the MIG project. Shortly after Chavan 
left for Washington with his fshopping list*, information 
1leakedT out in Delhi that Indo-Soviet talks were proceeding 
and included the possibility that Russia would provide the 
components for about 60 MIG-21s to be assembled in India in 
a project to begin about two years later, and perhaps 
credits - as distinct from the purely technical assistance 
agreed to earlier - for the complex of MIG plants to be set
g 2up in India . An Indian defence mission visited Moscow in 
September to finalize arrangements and an agreement was 
signed several hours before President Radhakrishnan arrived 
to begin his state visit. Russia agreed to provide:technical 
aid and plant to facilitate the establishment of the MIG 
factories by the end of 1965; 38 more MIG-21s (in addition 
to the six promised in 1962 but as yet undelivered) incor­
porating the modifications requested by India; and components 
for the initial assembly scheme in India which would presum­
ably include some of the 44 units promised. The Soviet 
authorities also agreed to keep India informed of subsequent
O 1improvements in the design and equipment of the MIG-21° .
The production scheme was initially planned in four 
stages - from major assemblies, from sub-assemblies, from 
detailed parts and from raw materials. To speed up the
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project, however, the first three squadrons are now to be 
imported in fully assembled condition by the end of 1965 and 
will be constructed and tested by Soviet technicians in India 
before they are handed over to the IAF. The second stage 
will begin in 1966, when Indian technicians - with Soviet 
assistance - will assemble the engines and airframes from 
imported components and the Hyderabad plant will commence the 
assembly and part manufacture of instruments and other equip­
ment. It is hoped that manufacture of basic components from 
raw materials will begin towards the end of 1969. The 
missile project, however, is not expected to commence until 
the early 1970s. According to one report, 450 MIG-21s are 
involved in the entire scheme D.
As of mid-1965> therefore, the MIG-21 is conceived as 
the standard interceptor for the IAF through the 1970s, al­
though the economical Gnat will continue to be produced for 
operational squadrons. The future of the HF-24 Mk II 
remains uncertain.
Prime Minister Nehru emphasized the need for a strong
onavy in March 1963° but financial stringency and priorities 
virtually precluded any immediate expansion. Thus the Chief 
of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral B.S. Soman stated in Bombay in 
April 1964 that there was no immediate programme of expansion 
of the Fleet and that no ’big1 warships were on order^. The
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Government is aware of the need to replace the overage
vessels, however, and the matter has been engaging its
88attention
Following the border war, the Indian Government initiat­
ed discussions with Britain, Sweden and Japan regarding
their possible collaboration in the construction of frigates
89at Mazagon Docks . The ’interest1 in possible Swedish or 
Japanese collaboration, however, would appear to have been 
little more than a bargaining counter designed to stimulate 
the British Government into responding to Indian requests 
for long-term credits to cover the external costs of the 
desired scheme to construct three ’Leander’ frigates at 
Mazagon Docks. India reportedly made a formal request for 
such aid to Whitehall at the beginning of 1963 and repeated 
it on three different subsequent occasions through the medium 
of Indian officials visiting Britain for various purposes^0. 
Speaking in the Commons on 28 July 1964 in reply to Labour 
criticisms that his Government was not responsive to India’s 
defence needs, Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas Home claimed 
that, while he had not received a request from Prime Minister 
Shastri for frigates, India was negotiating with a British 
firm and had asked the Government for financial aid. He 
stated that the matter would be discussed during the forth­
coming visit to Britain of Defence Minister Chavan, a visit
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which had been postponed because of Nehru’s death^. On 20 
September I964* the Commonwealth Relations Office announced 
in London that the Government had offered to provide India 
with a special defence credit totalling £ 4*700,000 to cover 
the external costs over the next four years of the construc­
tion of three ’Leander’ class frigates at Mazagon Docks and
’would be ready to consider further help for the project in
o 2the light of circumstances at the time’ . Chavan signed
the agreement during his November visit and it is expected
that the keel of the first frigate will be laid down by
93mid-1966 and that the vessel will be completed by 1971^» 
During the course of his visit, Chavan requested that 
three ’Daring’ class destroyers be loaned to India from the 
Royal Navy’s operational reserve on the undertaking that 
they would be returned in any emergency affecting Britain.
He also expressed the hope that at least two frigates could 
be made available immediately. As Britain only had seven 
’Daring’ class types in service - all fully operational - it 
made a counter-offer of three ’Weapon’ class destroyers of 
World War II vintage from its mothball fleet. Chavan declin' 
ed the offer, however, and the Indian Government remains 
hopeful that Britain will eventually agree to sell more than 
one ’Daring’ class type on credit^. There appears to be 
little interest in a Soviet offer of frigates for technical
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reasons, and the United States reportedly did not respond to 
a request for three destroyer replacements^.
The Indian Government accepted the 1 necessity’ for sub­
marines and Defence Minister Chavan informed the Lok Sabha
on 29 April 1963 that Naval Headquarters had been asked to
96submit its proposals . The Government subsequently revealed 
that it was seeking TaT submarine primarily for training pur-
97poses and that it proposed to place orders for submarines^
Q 8which can be spared by other navies wherever possible^ . 
Sweden was apparently approached but the issue of foreign 
exchange seems to have proved an obstacle to further consid-
QQeration . The United States? offer of a World War II vin­
tage submarine'*'^ has provoked no interest in India, the 
Soviet Union has offered a submarine and the Indian defence 
mission which visited Russia in September 1964 made relevant 
enquiries"^"*", but India clearly prefers to acquire its under­
sea craft from Western, and preferably British, sources. 
Although the British Government was initially cautious in
defining its attitude towards the possible provision of a
102submarine to India , it later agreed in principle to pro-
103vide a submarine for training purposes and the matter was 
discussed during ChavanTs visit in November 1964. Britain 
offered a World War II model - the only one it had available 
for immediate transfer - but Chavan declined the offer on
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the grounds that a unit of that vintage was not suitable for 
training purposes either as regards personnel who would 
eventually man modern submarines or for anti-submarine exer­
cises. The Indian Defence Minister accepted an alternative 
offer whereby a Royal Navy submarine would be loaned to India 
for several months each year and New Delhi has taken under 
consideration a British offer of facilities for the construc­
tion of an fOberonT class type^Z' . Chavan informed the 
Indian Parliament on 5 April 1965, however, the the Govern­
ment was [still] awaiting a decision from Britain regarding 
the terms on which India could obtain a submarine and he de­
clared that the Government would have to look elsewhere (pre­
sumably Russia) if a British unit was not made available^^.
Three seaward patrol boats are under construction in 
local shipyards and are expected to be completed in 1966.
Two minesweepers are also under construction locally, and a
4modern fleet replenishment tanker is to be obtained - seem­
ingly by external purchase. The shipboard air complement of 
the carrier Vikrant has been augmented by ten more Seahawk 
jet fighter-bombers^^ and by several additional Alouette 
III helicopters.
Further base facilities are being developed to extend 
the operational capabilities of the Fleet. Naval base INS 
Gomantalc was commissioned at Marmagoa on 7 March 1964 and
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includes the airfield at Dabolim, which is being developed
as a full-fledged naval air station adequate for modern jet
aircraft"*"*^. On 4 February 1964? Vice Admiral Soman laid
the foundation stone of a naval jetty at Vizagapatnam for
what eventually will be a major new naval base and dockyard.
A new naval establishment, INS Jarawa, was commissioned on
10815 February 1964 at Port Blair in the Andaman Islands and
a British military correspondent has been cited as stating
that additional naval facilities may also be developed in
the Nicobar Islands, another Indian-owned group about 250
miles south of the Andamans on which there is already an
109all-weather airstrip . The Navy has also taken over con­
trol of the coastal batteries from the Army, although the 
batteries will continue to be manned by Territorial Army 
personnel.
Adjustments have been made in the scope and nature of 
the various para-military organizations. Long regarded by 
the Army leadership as having no military value relative to 
the investment"*"^, the various schemes are henceforth being 
regarded largely as a means of inculcating a sense of discip­
line and defence-consciousness among a civilian body in which 
both characteristics are sadly lacking; the military aspects 
of the schemes are being deleted or severely restricted.
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The Territorial Army is being reorganized to correct the 
deficiencies in its structure, training and fitness revealed 
following the embodiment of many of its units during the 
border war, and in accordance with the different weapons and 
tactics dictated by Himalayan operational contingencies. The 
authorized strength of the force has been increased to 
591>580 and its actual strength totalled 490,480 as of early 
1964 - 78 per cent of establishment"*’^"*'. It is probable, 
however, that the TA will henceforth not be viewed as a 
second line of defence liable for frontline service but 
rather as an auxiliary police-cum-civil defence organization 
with perhaps a reduction in its size.
A million-strong Home Guards organization is being set 
up to serve as an auxiliary to the police, assist in the 
maintenance of internal security generally, aid the community 
in emergencies and provide essential services in such eventu­
alities. The basis of organization is one company of 110 men 
for each community development organization in rural areas
and one company for every 25*000 of population in urban
112areas
The Lok Sahayak Sena (viz. National Volunteer Rifles) 
scheme was suspended upon the declaration of the Emergency to 
enable its instructors and equipment to be utilized by the 
Army. Later, 17 of the 27 LSS training teams were re-activated
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and despatched to the border states, but it was decided in 
early 1965 that the scheme had been rendered superfluous by 
the establishment of the Home Guards and other State schemes 
the organization was thereupon dissolved.
The National Cadet Corps has been considerably expanded 
The recruitment of a further 400,000 boys and girls to the 
Senior Division and the Rifles was sanctioned shortly after 
the declaration of the Emergency, and 198,750 boys had been 
enrolled as of 19 January 1963^^. NCC training was intro­
duced as a compulsory subject in the curriculum for male 
college students from the academic session beginning July- 
October 1963> and nearly 925*000 were enrolled by January 
1964"^ ' • The Auxiliary Cadet Corps was abolished in April
1965.
The border war provoked a marked upsurge in the output
of the ordnance factories^^. The production of civil items
was sharply curtailed or suspended outright as the situation
warranted, and the value of production, which totalled Rs
41.88 crores in 1961-62, rose to Rs 63.9 crores in 1 962-6 3*
Rs 120 crores in 1 9 6 3 -6 4 and is expected to exceed Rs 150
crores in 1 9 6 4-65^^. The initial increased output was
achieved without additional investment by means of longer
shifts, the introduction of three shifts in some factories
117and a 30 per cent increase in the labour force For the
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first time, contracts for the manufacture of certain compon­
ent parts for munitions, radar and electronic equipment,
trucks and tractors and the fabrication of clothing were al-
118located to the civil sector wherever possible . By July 
1963f ten items of defence stores had been earmarked for pro­
duction in the private sector^^ and, up to the end of 1963 »
57 contracts worth Rs 5*32 crores had been placed with the
120civil sector for the supply of armament components
121The production of various new items has been undertaken 
The Ishapore semi-automatic rifles began coming off the pro­
duction lines following the unilateral Chinese ceasefire at 
a rate which had increased to several thousand per month by
T O O  1 2 ^February 1963 and to 2500 per month by January 1965 
In February 1964* the Defence Ministry was reportedly testing
I A ia three-inch pack howitzer of local design"1 and the produc­
tion of this item was subsequently undertaken. Production 
of the Brandt heavy mortar under licence began after the 
border war and other lines of production include 7-62 mm. 
ammunition, ammunition for the Brandt mortar and the three- 
inch pack howitzer, 75 mm. light tank shell and light tank 
high explosive shell, 3*5 inch anti-tank rockets, anti-air­
craft guns and improved Sterling carbines. Bulk manufacture 
of electrically-fired ammunition commenced in India for the 
first time in 1964-65 and Ordnance is modifying .303 rifles
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and light machine-guns to the new rimless 7.62 mm. ammuni­
tion.
A new plant was set up at Khamaria (near Jabalpore) in
March 1964 at a cost of Rs 2 lakhs and with British technical
assistance for the manufacture of 30 mm. aircraft ammunition
for the XAF. Construction commenced in January 1964 of a
Rs 50 lakh plant at Chandigarh which will produce air-rifles
in collaboration with the Daisy Manufacturing Company of
125Missouri • A new clothing factory, first conceived in 
1961, was established at Avadi and began the production of 
parachutes in October 1963. The manufacture of field cables 
commenced at the Chandigarh cable plant on 8 September 1963 
and mass production began in February 1964. The Cordite 
Factory (Aruvankadu) was augmented by a new plant commission­
ed in March 1964 which will produce semi-solvent propellants
for rockets. The capacity of Praga Tolls (Secunderabad) to
126manufacture certain small arms is to be increased •
The production of Shaktiman three-ton trucks reached 
3994 units by 31 December 1963 and it was expected that out­
put would total 4300 by March 1964 with an indigenous content
127of about 61 per cent . By 31 December 1963* 4420 Nissan
one-ton trucks and 1847 patrol jeeps had been manufactured
with an indigenous content of about 35 and 28 per cent res- 
128pectively . In February 1964* the Government was
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considering the establishment of a separate factory in the
public sector for the manufacture of one-ton and three-ton
129trucks for the Army and it was subsequently decided to
establish a new vehicle factory for this purpose"^0.
Efforts to speed up the Avadi tank project to permit
131production of the first medium tank by mid-1965 have not
borne fruition and the original target date of late 1965
132remains the goal . The production of light tanks at Avadi
133is also being considered ♦ A French team visited India in
November 1963 and a French technical mission visited India
in January 1964 and carried out an industrial survey pertain-
I34ing to this proposed scheme There appears to be no sub­
stance to a press report that appeared in July I964 to the 
effect that, to conserve foreign exchange, India might seek 
Soviet collaboration in a light tank production scheme in 
India^°^. The Minister for Defence Production, A.M. Thomas, 
informed the Lok Sabha on 14 September 1964 that no Soviet
-I fy £
aid had been sought in this regard . Vickers-Armstrong 
has offered to design a light tank to Indian specifications 
and negotiations were in progress as of December 1964 with 
the expectation that the project might be taken up towards 
the end of 1965^^'7.
India’s aircraft production facilities were subjected 
to the scrutiny of a special committee appointed in March
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1963 under the chairmanship of J.R.D. Tata, head of Air India
"I oInternational and a prominent industrialist . The commit­
tee surveyed the requirements of aircraft and ancillary elec­
tronic equipment required by the armed forces and submitted 
its recommendations to the Government in April 1963. Details 
of the report have not been made public, but it is believed 
to have included a proposal to scrap the MIG project and 
purchase Western supersonic fighters, and to terminate the
Avro project and replace it with a production line for the de
I39Havilland DHC-2 Caribou turboprop utility transport . The 
Government reportedly considered replacing the Avro project 
with a Caribou scheme in recognition that the latter possess­
ed a Tbetter high-altitude capability for operations in 
mountain areas’'*'^  but apparently concluded that it was too 
committed to the Avro project; it thereupon announced that
3 j *iproduction facilities for the Avro were to be expanded 
The Government likewise appears to have regarded itself as 
too deeply committed to the MIG project, both financially 
and politically, to terminate it on purely practical grounds 
and proceeded with it. In apparent accordance with the 
committeefs recommendation, however, the Government has 
amalgamated all the aircraft manufacturing units in a single 
State-owned undertaking called Hindustan Aeronautics India
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Limited and designed to streamline production and effect 
economy in the utilization of men and material.
There is no indication that the Government at any time 
seriously considered terminating the HF-24 Mk II project, but 
little progress is being made in the absence of any decision 
regarding a powerplant. Efforts are continuing to produce a 
suitable engine in India^^^ and, after much speculation, a 
collaboration agreement was signed with the United Arab Repub­
lic in Cairo on 2 November 1964 whereby Egypt will provide 
the engine and India the airframe of a Mach 2 fighter^^.
The issue is confused, however, by a reported Indian proposal 
that the United States and Britain provide aid for the HF-24 
project^' ' ! . Experts from the USAF research and development 
centre at Dayton, Ohio, and representatives of Rolls Royce 
visited India in July 1964 to investigate ways and means of 
improving the performance and rate of production of the 
MF-24 ^ b u t  apparently concluded that the project would re­
quire some years and considerable Western aid in design, 
tooling and finance to mature into a supersonic weapons
I46 „ „ ,system . Powerplants under consideration as of July 1964 
included the Rolls Royce RB.153, a Bristol Siddeley proposal, 
Pratt and Whitney’s J52 (JT-8), General Electric’s J-l and
"I a rnEgypt’s Brandner project ' . With the firm conclusion of
the MIG project in September 1964, however, it was reported
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that the likelihood of American aid for the HF-24 was in 
’cold storage1 for the reasons that two supersonic aircraft 
projects were greatly beyond India’s needs and resources and 
there would be political repercussions inherent in Russian 
and Western subsidies of parallel schemes^^.
The Directorate of Planning and Co-ordination has 
carried out an assessment in respect of India’s requirements 
of ammunition, explosives, propellants, small arms and arma­
ment and proposals based on this assessment have been final­
ized to expand the production base. The Defence Ministry 
has also engaged an American consultant firm, Messrs D.
Little Inc., to examine and report on existing capacity in 
the ordnance factories and the civil sector and the manner in 
which such capacity can be developed in a coordinated way 
for the manufacture of armaments, ammunition, vehicles and 
electronic equipment. The firm will also investigate and 
report on a means whereby production and material control 
can be introduced into the ordnance establishment.
The existing ordnance factories will be modernized dur­
ing the 1964-69 period at an estimated cost of Rs 30 crores,
which includes a foreign exchange component of Rs 15
149crores
Phase One of the expansion scheme initially envisaged the 
establishment of six new factories - a Filling Factory at 
Bhandara, near Nagpur; an Engineering Factory at Ambajahari
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for heavy artillery shells; an Explosives Factory at Burla; 
a Propellants Factory at Panvel; a small arms ammunition 
factory at Varangaon, near Bhusaval; and a small arms factory 
at Tiruchirapalli, which will concentrate on semi-automatic 
rifles. Four of these proposed sites are in Maharashtra, 
with Burla and Tiruchirapalli being in Orissa and Madras 
respectively.
Implementation of the expansion plan was heavily depend­
ent upon foreign assistance which has been offered up to the 
date of writing (June 1965) for only three of the factories. 
The United States provided a complete ammunition plant that 
was formally opened at Varangaon on 15 October 1964^ and 
is assisting in the establishment of the Ambajahari factory. 
Britain provided aid for the Bhandara unit which was set up 
at a cost of Rs 16 crores, including a foreign exchange com­
ponent of Rs 4 crores. Inaugurated on 19 December 1964? the 
factory incorporates plant and ancillary equipment from 
Britain, Sweden, West Germany, Belgium and France and is the 
first project of its size and complexity ever attempted by 
the Directorate-General of Ordnance Factories. It began 
production in January 1965? will ultimately employ about 4000 
workers and is expected to save about Rs 4 crores of foreign 
exchange per annum'*'^ .
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India has to date received no offers of aid for the 
Panvel, Burla and Tiruchirapalli factories. The Panvel and 
Burla projects would have cost Rs 60 crores (including Rs 21 
crores in foreign exchange) to set up, and American experts 
advised against their establishment on the grounds that their 
’investment-output’ ratio was high and their civil use in 
times of general peace was very limited. The Indian Govern­
ment has accepted this expert advice and w^ i.11 stockpile the 
necessary explosives and propellants through the importation
of Rs 8 crores worth of these items and the augmentation of
15 2production at the Bhandara plant . New Delhi has decided, 
however, to go ahead with the Tiruchirapalli project, using 
the country’s weak foreign exchange reserves.
No details of Stage Two of the expansion scheme have 
yet come to the writer’s attention, but it is understood to 
aim at self-sufficiency for the Army in its requirements.
The defence research organization is being further ex­
panded. New laboratories of Instruments Research and Devel­
opment Establishment were inaugurated at Dehra Dun on 30 
October 1964• An Armament Research Laboratory for work relat 
ing to the design and development of armament stores is 
expected to start functioning by mid-1965•
Border communications are being substantially extended. 
In mid-1963, the BRDO approved a programme which involves
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the construction of 3000 miles of new roads and the improve­
ment of 3000 miles of existing roads^0 .^ A long-deferred Rs 
25 crores project to supplement the 221-mile Leh-Srinagar 
road (itself being improved with American aid) with another 
link connecting Manali to Upshi and Kulu in eastern Ladakh 
was sanctioned in late 1963 or early I964 with survey and 
trace-cutting expected to begin in May 1964*^^. The Minister 
for Transport, Raj Bahadur, informed the Lok Sabha on 24 
March I964 of a Government decision to build a Rs 100 crores 
700-mile road from Bareilly in western Uttar Pradesh to 
Amingaon in Assam along the Himalayan f oothills ^ . The 
main road connecting Manali to Keylong across the 13,400-feet
■j ^  /
Rohtang Pass is being widened for use by trucks 3 . A new 
motorable road is being built to link Leh and Chuehul and 
sited some distance back from the old lateral road between 
the two points which, though still in use, is very vulnerable 
in the event of renewed hostilities. Nine new airfields had 
been constructed in the border areas by November 1963 3/ and 
the United States is assisting in the construction of a mil­
itary airfield at Leh. The Tezpur-North Lakhimpur road is 
being improved for heavy traffic and the Hindustan-Tibet road 
is nearing completion. By January 1965, the first phase of 
the North Sikkim highway, a 47-mile road linking Gangtok and 
Sinhik, had been completed by the CPM) at a cost of about
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Rs 2.5 crores and opened to traffic'1'"0. An intensive devel­
opment programme has been launched in the far-flung and 
sparsely populated areas of Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, 
Punjab, Assam and NEFA"1'^ . A network of mostly jeepable 
roads has been laid and all villages save 17 in the Lahaul- 
Spiti district of Uttar Pradesh bordering Tibet have been 
inter-connected by bridle paths’**^. India is also meeting 
the entire estimated Rs 9 crores cost of the 128-mile
Sounauli-Fokhra road project in Nepal which is expected to
1 /1be completed in late 1968±
Notes
1 Statement by the President of India, Dr S.S. Radhakrishnan, 
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CONCLUSIONS
There would appear to be no basis for the view that the 
policies of a sovereign India during the 1947~62 period constit 
uted a unique approach to national security distinct from the 
traditional one of power politics. Given India’s geographical 
contiguity to the Soviet Union and China and the need to 
maximise the sources from which economic aid might be obtained 
IndiaTs leaders opted for a policy of non-alignment via a vis 
the two power blocs. Such a posture was designed to avoid 
giving provocation to the communist powers and to preclude 
India’s automatic involvement in any East-West conflict. It wa, 
also regarded as the best contribution which a weak, but 
potentially powerful, India could make towards the maintenance 
of the balance of power between the Soviet and Western blocs. 
Panch sheel and the ’peace area’ were natural corollaries to 
this stance — all of which were designed to buffer India agains 
the rivalries of the major powers.
In accordance with the financial limitations imposed by th< 
country’s economic and social backwardness, India’s military 
liabilities were confined to what may be called the domestic 
military requirement of defence of the frontiers against a mino: 
power with added provision for aid to the civil power in the
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m a in te n a n c e  o f  la w  an d  o r d e r .  I n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  an  a t t a c k  by  a 
m a jo r  p o w e r , t h e  I n d i a n  G o v e rn m e n t p r o c e e d e d  on  t h e  p r e m is e  th a 1  
e x t e r n a l  a i d  w o u ld  b e  w e l l - n i g h  a x i o m a t i c  by  t h e  d e s i r e  o f  e i t h u  
o f  t h e  p o w e r b l o c s  t o  p r e v e n t  I n d i a Ts  v a s t  r e s o u r c e s  f ro m  
f a l l i n g  u n d e r  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  o p p o s in g  b l o c .  The o n l y  s e r i o i  
m i l i t a r y  p ro b le m  a p p e a r e d  t o  p r e s e n t  i t s e l f  i n  t h e  N o r th - W e s t  
i n  t h e  fo rm  o f  P a k i s t a n  a n d  t h e  s u b o r d i n a t e  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  A zad  
K a s h m ir ,  The a s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h i s  t h r e a t  an d  t h e  o p e r a t i o n a l  p l a i  
c o n c e iv e d  t o  m e e t i t  w e re  b a s i c a l l y  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  TIP la n  o f  
O p e r a t i o n s  ( I n d i a  19 3 8 Tr w h ic h  h a d  b e e n  p r e p a r e d  w i t h  r e g a r d s  t (  
a p o s s i b l e  A fg h a n  t h r e a t .  As t h e  c o n t in g e n c y  o f  a s e r i o u s  C hine 
a t t a c k  i n  t h e  H im a la y a n  r e g i o n  w as v i r t u a l l y  d i s m i s s e d  e v e n  
a f t e r  1 9 5 9 , t h e  o r i e n t a t i o n  o f  s t r a t e g y  a g a i n s t  P a k i s t a n  
r e m a in e d  l a r g e l y  u n c h a n g e d  up t o  t h e  e v e  o f  t h e  S i n o - I n d i a n  
b o r d e r  c o n f l i c t  i n  O c to b e r  1 9 6 2 ,
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I n d ia ’s response  to  the Chinese occupation  o f T ib e t in  1950-51 bore some 
esem blance to  the p o lic y  adopted by B r i ta in  towards C hina’s a ttem p t to  r e - a s s e r t  h 
o n tro l  in  T ib e t in  1906-11. The l e g a l i t y  o f the  Chinese a c tio n  was reco gn ized  and , 
hough asylum was g ran ted  to  the D alai Lama and o th e r  T ibetan  re fu g e e s , th e se  pe rso  
e re  not p e rm itted  to  c a rry  on p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s  w hile r e s id e n t  in  In d ia .  While 
cod r e la t io n s  were d e s ire d  w ith  C hina, prudence d ic ta te d  th a t  In d ia  would have to  
tren g th en  i t s  p o s it io n  in  the Himalayan kingdoms and along the  Ind o -T ib e tan  f ro n t! ,  
g a in s t p o s s ib le  Chinese aggrand isem ent. N epal, Bhutan and Sikkim were a cc o rd in g ly  
nought in to  in tim a te  t r e a ty  r e la t io n s h ip  w ith  In d ia  and m easures were undertaken  t< 
remote s o c ia l ,  economic and p o l i t i c a l  p ro g re ss  in  th ese  kingdoms. The p o lic in g  and 
ä m in is tra tio n  o f the  border a re a s  con tiguous to  T ib et were a lso  made more comprehe.
he similarities between the Himalayan policies of Britain and a sovereign India 
Id not, however, be over-drawn, Britain's modest and economical response to the 
ese re-entry into Tibet was sufficient to preserve her position in the area, but 
an power and influence in the Himalayan region suffered progressive erosion. The 
ons are several. Britain faced a militarily impotent and decadent Manchu China 
h collapsed due to internal stresses, while the Nehru Government had to contend 
a resurgent Chinese state of some permanency and possessed of a large, if H i ­
pped, military machine. In the prevailing state of military technology, the Britis 
rs of India were able to draw comfort from the Himalayan mountain mass; by 1950, 
nological developments had rendered the Himalayas of doubtful value as a barrier 
.nst an attack from the north or north-east. The military capability of imperial 
.ain had posed a deterrent to Chinese aggressive acts, while the armed forces of 
ipendent India were relatively much less significant and were, moreover, deployed 
.nst Pakistan in the north-west.
In formulating his country's policies towards China's Himalayan postures, Nehru 
.ed to fully appreciate the fact that the policies of the former British Government 
.d no longer suffice in the radically altered geo-political context. This failure 
compounded by other errors of judgment. Nehru mistakenly persisted in the view 
; China valued Indian goodwill too much to risk losing it for the sake of possessin
<v m (,
jw square miles of Himalayan territory; ^ /Chinese inroads in the Himalayan region 
3 went without serious challenge until the point had been reached where neither 
srnment could make real concessions on either a unilateral or bilateral basis with- 
loss of prestige and, in India’s case at least, serious internal repercussions, 
ru relinquished India's inherited treaty rights in Tibet without even seeking to 
Hire some sort of quid pro quo. He hesitated to take firm counter-measures in the 
alayas for fear of provoking Peking, even though the latter appeared to act withoul 
similar inhibition. Nehru's actual measures, once undertaken, were so cloaked in 
recy as to be of minimal deterrent value and his generally passive response to 
na would appear to have had the effect of encouraging, rather than deterring, Chin«
inducement of the Government to pay Pakistan a large sum owing 
to it after partition: TTThe years that have followed have been 
utterly barren of any act of Gandhian compromise and reconcil­
iation on the part of the Government of India”. On IndiaTs
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attitude towards Kashmir, Goa and the border dispute with 
China, a leading Irish newspaper commented with perspeefcaace 
insight in mid-1962:
On the subject of Kashmir, to which Pakistan 
has an arguable claim, Mr Nehru refuses both a 
plebiscite and a conference. On Goa, where 
India has a good case if not a watertight one, 
he chose the unilateral decision of military 
occupation. On the Chinese border dispute, 
where India is one hundred per cent in the 
right, he is ready to grasp at any straw to 
bring the aggressor to the negotiating table.
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that 
what Mr Nehru has he holds, what he can obtain 
without trouble he takes and what he has taken 
from him by superior force he considers ^
negotiable even when it is his in all justice.
The ambivalence underlying India’s entire approach to disputes
is further evidenced by the statement offered by an official
Indian publication in defence of the Goa action: ftA nation
has the ultimate right to use force in situations where methods
of peace and persuasion have failed and where justice and one’s
own rights demanded positive action”. Peking could use the
Indian military policy reflected continual and usually unsatisfc
ory compromises between what was politically desirable, financic
possible and militarily prudent.
The Indian Navy represented a compromise between self- 
reliance and explicit dependence upon friendly powers. The 
development of a navy powerful enough to dominate the Indian 
Ocean against a major power was beyond India’s financial
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capacities, while continued explicit reliance upon the Royal 
Navy for naval defence was neither politically possible nor wise - 
as India and Australia had both learned to their regret on the fal 
of Singapore in 1942. India thus developed a small task force 
large enough to give her local superiority against any neighbourin 
country in the strategic arc from Suez to Singapore and so 
constituted as to facilitate cooperation with Western navies in 
defence of mutual interests in the Indian Ocean against Soviet-blo 
submarines in any general war. To some extent, the Indian 
Navy assumed the functions of the former East Indies squadron 
of the Royal Navy. The development programme was affected 
considerably by financial stringency, but to no apparent extent 
by Pakistanior Chinese postures.
The Indian Air Force was developed as a balanced tactical 
air force possessing local superiority against any neighbouring 
country, save China. The prestige attached to modern aircraft 
clearly placed the Service in a very favourable position as 
regards budgetary allocations. The Hunter acquisition and the 
MIG deal attest to the primacy of this factor over objections 
by the Finance Ministry and the budget-starved Army and Navy.
The Army is role during the 1947-62 period was consistent 
with its pre-war responsibilities of internal security, watch 
and ward on the frontiers (primarily in Kashmir but also in 
Nagaland from 1955 and NEFA and Ladakh from 1959) and defence 
against a minor power. The regular professional standing Army
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was retained, together with conventional armaments, and contrary 
to sound military policy but consistent with financial stringency 
effectiveness tended to be subordinated to size.
In view of the complacency with which India’s political 
leaders viewed their country’s security during most of the 
1947~62 period and in the context of acute poverty, the military 
programme would seem to reflect a belief that a sizable military 
establishment was required for reasons of prestige and general 
prudence in a power-conscious world. A Round Table commentator 
charged in 1957 that "India is doing what all others do, nothing 
worse and nothing better. Only persistent claims to be doing 
better make the affair look worse. And the fact that India is so 
poor makes it much more painful too”/  The Eastern Economist 
expressed the view in 1958 that "India is suffering from the same
I
fears, complexes and neuroses she suspects and condemns elsewhere",
The Times wrote in 1961:
Whatever dissension there may be about the 
assessment of the threat, India is 
apparently growing increasingly aware 
of the need to supplement political 
neutrality with effective national defence.
Non-alignment is an attractive ideal, but 
for a population of 438 million something 
more obviously dynamic may be needed as an 
outward mark of progress. Mr Menon’s dictum 
that militarism is different from 
preparations to defend one’s country is a 
fair point, but India’s growing military 
strength may be as much a symbol of desire 
for international status as a reaction to any specific threat." ^
501
Also, as John Maddox and Leonard Beaton have observed with
reference to the Nehru Governmentf s stern anti-nuclear line:
The skeptic about Indian sincerity in 
these protestations may point to two 
tendencies of Indian policy; the high 
priority given to the atomic energy 
programme based on complete self-sufficiency 
in all the related technologies, and the 
consistent opposition of the Indian 
Government in the International Atomic 
Energy Agency to safeguards in peaceful 
nuclear sharing. These certainly suggest 
an anxiety to have the option on producing 
a bomb. ?
Noting further that the Indian atomic energy programme has 
proceeded at heavy cost in scarce money and scientific and 
technical personnel, Beaton and Maddox have concluded that 
T,the most reasonable inference is that Mr Nehru, advised by 
Dr Bhabha, has decided to give the country the option to produce 
a nuclear device in 1963 in case this should become politically
gor militarily necessary”,
In the aftermath of the border conflict, defence has become 
an obsession in India. The Defence portfolio has been catapulted 
from relative obscurity to become perhaps the most attractive 
post in government next to that of Prime Minister. The position 
of the armed forces has changed dramatically and the Indian 
peoples1 awareness of the feelings and needs of the military wil 
make them and their elected representatives more solicitous 
of military (particularly Army) views. The Army has thus become 
a more positive political force. The prominence now being
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accorded to military views is apparent in the manner in which 
India has responded to date to the altered strategic situation.
A useful comparison can be made of current Indian policy and 
the course adopted by Pakistan in 1947.
In 1947, Pakistani military planners were faced with an 
uneasy ceasefire in Kashmir, a fairly long and exposed frontier 
in the Punjab and Rajasthan (not to speak of East Bengal) and 
an historical problem on the North-West Frontier involving restless 
tribals and an Afghan neighbour with stated claims to territories 
beyond the Durand Line* In the Pakistani view, their larger 
Indian neighbour had seized territory that rightfully belonged 
to Pakistan and such a seizure could not be accorded legitimacy. 
Considerations of relative national strength and acute strategic 
vulnerabilities precluded any attempt to eject Indian forces from 
those portions of Kashmir under their occupation, but military 
preparations had to be undertaken both to deter further rtaggressioi 
and to permit Pakistan to negotiate outstanding disputes with 
India from a position of at least reasonable strength. Pakistan 
accordingly redeployed its army and air force to face India, 
taking the risk of leaving light semi-military forces to police 
the North-West Frontier and relying upon diplomacy and a stronger 
military posture to deter overt aggression from that quarter.^
To reduce the military imbalance with India while proceeding 
with economic development, Pakistan looked to external aid 
and, in the prevailing context, secured American military and
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economic aid and formally aligned herself with the West in the 
cold war.
Following the border war with China, Indian military planners 
faced a similar predicament - an uneasy ceasefire in Ladakh and 
NEFA, a long and vulnerable frontier with a more powerful neighbou: 
with stated designs on Indian territory, and the »historical1 
problem posed by Pakistan. India could not contend with a 
simultaneous threat from both these states and certain risks 
had to be taken. Notwithstanding professed political fears of 
possible Sino-Pakistani collusion against India, it is understood 
from a reliable Indian military source that, while border 
incidents with Pakistan are expected to continue pending a 
political settlement, neither an isolated attack from Pakistan 
nor Pakistani cooperation with China in a concerted attack against 
India is envisaged. The prudence of PakistanTs military leaders, 
Western pressures (backed, if necessary, by economic and military 
sanctions) and India»s vastly superior military power are 
considered a credible deterrent to serious aggression from 
Pakistan.
To enable the country to continue with its ambitious 
economic plans simultaneous with the creation of a military 
deterrent to Chinese aggressive designs in the Himalayan 
region, India has reversed its previous attitude towards military 
aid. Military aid is being assiduously sought from all possible
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sources, including the Soviet bloc, but major reliance is clearl
being placed upon the United States, Britain and the 'old
Commonwealth' (Canada, Australia and New Zealand).
India's new defence planning is not merely a limited
reaction to specific Himalayan needs, however, but represents
a deliberate intention to "have strong defence not only
specifically to meet the Chinese menace but also as a national
policy".^ There appears to be a desire to project India's
military strength beyond the confines of the sub-continent
itself. The long-term defence plan has been described as
having "little or nothing to do with the border dispute as
such and will be primarily concerned with India's larger role
in South-East Asia in relation particularly with Communist
China".^ One Indian daily commented in May 1963 that "New
Delhi is also coming around to the view that India's defence
against Chinese expansion cannot be organised solely on a natior
basis and that she has to look upon the problem in relation to
12South-East Asia as a whole". The decision to expand the Army
has been described by the Indian High Commissioner in Britain,
N.C. Chagla, as "not only in our interests but in the interests
cf the whole of South-East Asia and, ultimately, of democracy ar 
13jeace". The decision to construct air and naval facilities ir 
the Andaman and Nicobar Islands provoked a press comment that 
Ta decision has been taken to play a bigger role in the defence 
cf South-East Asia"."^ The same decision was defended by Rear
Admiral S.G. Karmakar (Flag Officer, Bombay) as due to the need 
to guard the Indian Ocean and its approaches against all event­
ualities in view of ChinaTs ability to cripple Indian trade in a 
surprise submarine attack from a single base in South-East 
Asia."15
The Indian Government’s intention to proceed with its 
military build-up of developments in Sino-Indian relations - and 
in the context of a faltering economy and ever-increasing 
dependence upon the West even for food - suggests a serious 
distortion of the country’s military requirements. The army 
programme would appear to represent a reasonable response to 
the possible contingencies involving China, although several 
divisions remain deployed in Kashmir against Pakistan for 
primarily political reasons related to the stability of the loca] 
government. The development schemes for two supersonic aircraft, 
however, is neither warranted by the strategic situation nor 
related to India’s financial capacities. There is also no 
reason for immediate procurement of additional naval vessels, 
particularly submarines, as the possibilities of attack by 
Chinese submarines must be regarded as distant. The defence 
production expansion plan would also seem to be excessive to 
basic needs as attested by the deferment of two of the six 
new plants originally envisaged - the lack of which will be 
compensated for by increased production from an established plan-
and stockpiling of imported materials at a fraction of the 
cost of setting up the two factories for which there would be 
little civil use.
The explosion by China of a nuclear device on 15 October 
I964 has introduced a new factor into Indian defence policy which 
will inevitably have far-reaching consequences for the country*s 
future defence and foreign policies.
The blast, and a subsequent second detonation, have provoked 
a heated debate in India regarding the relative merits of 
an Indian nuclear arsenal. Some Congressmen and Socialists 
argued during the debate in Parliament on 23-27 November 1964 
that India required an independent nuclear deterrent. The 
Right-wing Opposition and independents generally recognised 
that India could not afford such a programme but felt that there 
was a need for India to secure guarantees against Chinese 
nuclear blackmail from the established nuclear powers - America, 
Britain and France. A third school of thought, which includes 
ex—Defence Minister Krishna Menon- argued that the situation 
required neither Indian possession of the tbombt nor attempts 
to secure guarantees from other nuclear powers, but that India 
must direct its efforts to mobilise international opinion 
against nuclear proliferation and for disarmament.
The Government has declared itself against any nuclear 
weapons programme for the present. At the Cairo conference of non
aligned nations, Shastri proposed that a deputation be sent to 
Peking to dissuade China from proceeding with its development of 
a nuclear capability. He has also suggested a Western-Soviet 
shield for all non-nuclear powers - an ill-disguised attempt to 
associate Russia with what would otherwise be total reliance upon 
the West. At the same time, however, he has reserved the right 
for the Government to take up the option.
IndiaTs professed sense of morality will have little to do 
with any decision as it has never determined policy decisions 
in India and cannot be expected to do so in future. Nor will New 
Delhi be likely to assume that self-denial on its part will bring 
it useful sympathy or prestige in the world; its claim to moral 
superiority has not been substantiated by its past conduct.
Prestige will be an important consideration. If it is 
concluded that the development of a nuclear capability is a 
necessary »union card» for admission to great power deliberations, 
then it can be assumed that the decision will ultimately be taken. 
Indian policy-makers, however, can not be unmindful that an Indian 
explosion would have anything near the same impact which accom­
panied the Chinese »bomb». Nor would it necessarily enhance India 
prestige among the increasingly more sophisticated nations of Afro 
Asia - several of which could probably develop a similar capabilit 
at less strain on their economies. The reaction among the countri 
of the Western and Soviet blocs would probably be unsympathetic
and even hostile, with possible reductions in economic aid or 
refusals to increase the present of aid to cover the diversion 
of IndiaTs scarce resources to a nuclear weapons project. Such 
a decision would require India to renounce her adherence to the 
test-ban treaty with consequent doubts in many areas as to 
India*s bona fides on any matter.
At the present stage, Indiafs commencement of a nuclear 
weapons programme would require either Canadian permission to 
utilise the Trombay reactor or use of the reactor without such 
permission, either on a clandestine or open basis. Canada coulc 
not consent to such use of the reactor without destroying 
her policy towards such installations and a unilateral decision 
would seriously strain not only Indo-Canadian relations but alsc 
Indo-West relations and would not be likely to please Moscow.
The adamant and self-righteous stand which has hitherto charactc 
ised Indian policy on disarmament and nuclear weapons poses an 
obstacle to any Indian nuclear decision in the positive which 
New Delhi could not take lightly.
A nuclear capability is, however, within IndiaTs scientific 
and financial resources although it would impose a further burdc 
on an economy already functioning only with large-scale western 
and Soviet aid. Russia and the West cannot reasonably be 
expected to offer increased economic aid to cover the major cos1 
of an Indian nuclear programme in the military sphere. India
cannot possibly acquire a strategic nuclear capability and 
would have to be satisfied with a tactical capability like that 
of France and the United Kingdom. Even the cost of this would h 
heavy as Britain’s V-bomber force of 150-200 planes cost £500 
million. The Canberra Mk 8 could carry a small atomic bomb but 
it would be very vulnerable to a modern air defence system. For 
a credible deterrent5 India would require an aircraft with at 
least limited supersonic capability like the B-583 Mirage IV3 
several Russian types or civil aircraft like the Boeing 7073 
DC-83 Comet IV 3 Caravelle, TU-104 (a direct development of the 
Badger) and TU-H4 (a direct development of the Bear) . The F-10 
would provide a good supersonic strike aircraft over short- 
medium ranges and the Mk 2 version of the HF-24 might also be 
adaptable, India could seek either to develop the HF-24 or buy 
a Mach 2 platform — but both would be very costly and the 
expense of the latter might be prohibitive even if countries 
possessing such aircraft were prepared to make sales.
The usefulness of an independent Indian nuclear force is 
debateable. The Chinese heartland is virtually out of reach 
of Indian aircraft while India’s major cities and industrial 
centres are acutely vulnerable to air power based in Tibet.
The usefulness of strikes against Chinese communications in Tibe 
would scarcely compensate for the devastation which would result 
from the Chinese nuclear response. In any case it seems unlikel 
that Chinese leaders would employ nuclear weapons against a
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neighbour over which its conventional superiority is so 
marked. China’s main strength for the foreseeable future will 
be in her reserves of disciplined manpower and Indian military 
planners must formulate their policy accordingly. Like many 
nations before her, India must henceforth live with insecurity.
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CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE 
(1 ,0 0 0  m i l l i o n  r u p e e s )
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960
Income from p r o p e r t y  and 
e n t r e p e u r / f s h ip 0 .6 8 0 .7 8 0 .5 9 0 . 5 0 0 .6 3 0 .6 6 0 .8 6 0 .8 6  0 .8 8 1 .0 0 1 .0 0
2. L ess  d i r e c t  i n t e r e s t  on t h e  p u b l i c  
d e b t 0 .3 7 0 .3 7 0 .3 7 0 . 4 0 0 .3 9 0 . 4 6 0 . 4 6 0 .5 8  0 .6 9 1 .0 0 1 .1 5
3. I n d i r e c t  t a x e s 4 . 2 8 5 .3 1 4 .6 1 4 .7 3 5 .2 3 5 .5 8 6 . 4 6 7 .8 9  8 .1 7 8 .9 9 9 .7 9
4. D i r e c t  t a x e s  on c o r p o r a t i o n s 0 .3 9 0 .4 1 0 .4 4 0 .4 1 0 .3 7 0 .3 7 0 .5 1 0 .5 6  0 .5 4 0 .7 8 1 .3 8
5 . D i r e c t  t a x e s  on h o u s e h o ld s  and 
p r i v a t e  n o n - p r o f i t  i n s t i t u t i o n s 1 .9 2 2 ,0 2 2 .0 4 1 .9 9 2 .0 0 2 .1 8 2 .4 2 2 .6 7  2 . 8 2 2 .7 0 2 .3 9
6. O th e r  c u r r e n t  t r a n s f e r s  from h o u se ­
h o ld s  and p r i v a t e  n o n - p r o f i t  
i n s t i t u t i o n s 1 .1 1 1 .0 0 1 .0 2 1 .0 9 1 .0 9 1 .4 3 1 . 5 0 1 .4 8  1 .8 3 1 .8 1 2 .0 0
7. C u r r e n t  t r a n s f e r s  from  t h e  r e s t  o f  
t h e  w o rld 0 .2 2 0 .0 2 0 .1 1 0 .1 9 0 .1 6 0 .45 0 .45 0 .3 4  0 .3 5 O. 3 6 0 .3 7
C u r r e n t  rev e n u e 8 .0 3 9 .1 7 8 . 4 4 8 .5 1 9 .0 9 1 0 .2 1 1 1 .7 4 1 3 .2 2  1 3 .9 0 1 4 .6 4 1 5 .7 8
8. C onsum ption  e x p e n d i tu r e 5 .5 9 5 .8 5 6 .0 4 6 .4 4 6 .7 2 7 .15 7 .8 7 9 .2 0  9 .9 1 1 0 .75 1 1 .6 9
a )  C i v i l 3 .7 1 3 .8 8 4 .0 6 4 .35 4 . 6 2 5 .1 2 5 .6 1 6 .2 7  6 .9 9 7 .7 9 8 .5 2
b )  D efence 1 .8 8 1 .9 7 1 .9 8 2 .0 9 2 .1 0 2 .0 3 2 . 2 6 2 .93  2 .9 2 2 .96 3 .1 7
9. S u b s i d i e s 0 .4 1 0 .45 0 . 3 6 0 .1 5 0 .1 3 0 .1 7 0 .2 9 0 .5 0  0 .4 9 0 .5 1 0 .6  7
10. Current transfers to households and
private non-profit institutions 0.59 0.59 0.71 0.76 0.91 1.26 1.42 1.50 1.60 1.90 2.16
11. Current transfers to the rest of 
the world - - - - - - - - - - -
Current expenditure 6.59 6.89 7.11 7.35 7.76 8.58 9.58 11.20 12.00 13.16 14.52
Saving 1.44 2.28 1.33 1.16 1.33 1.63 2.16 2.02 1.90 1.48 1.26
Source: United Nations: Year Book of National Accounts Statistics 1959» I960, 1961, 1962
APPENDIX II
ACTUAL GROSS EXPENDITURE OF EFFECTIVE ARMY AND NON -EFFECTIVE ARMY DURING THE YEARS 1945>-50 TO 1962-63
(in lakhs of Rs)
Details 1949-50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53 1953-54 1954-55 1955-56 1956-57 1957-58
1
Effective Army
Main Head 1 - Pay & allowances of 
the Army 32,56 37,71 42,15 44,75 44,89 45,46 44,73 45,11 49,07
2 Main Head 2 - Pay & allowances and 
Miscellaneous expenses of Territorial 
Army, National Cadet Corps, State 
Forces, etc. 2,78 8,71 1 , 2 8 40 45 64 1,24 1,44 1,54
3 Main Head 3 - Pay and allowances of 
Civilians 23,05 21,74 22,36 22,48 22,96 22,53 22,75 23,04 2 4 , 6 4
4 Main Head 4 - Transportation and 
Miscellaneous 13,76 11,07 12,59 11,93 1 1 , 4 0 12,23 11,67 12,31 14,03
5 Main Head 5 - Expenditure on 
Manufacturing and Research 
Establishment 15,27 17,20 20,14 20,43 17,55 16,99 16,74 16,46 17,78
6 Main Head 6 - Purchase and sale of 
Stores 30,06 28,14 33,15 35,65 31,41 29,39 19,95 25,22 37,97
7 Main Head 7 - Expenditure on Works 11,42 11,02 1 5 , 6 6 14,94 14,13 13,53 1 2 , 9 0 12,75 11,54
8 Main Head 8 - Charges in England 4,81 11,72 6 , 3 0 7,06 5,34 9,71 7,31 16,52 22,88
9 Main Head 9 - Loss or gain by Exchange - 2 1 1 1 2 1 3 4
Total - Effective Army 1,33,71 1,47,33 1,53,64 1,57,65 1,48,14 1,50,50 1,37,30 1 ,5 2 , 8 8 1,79,49
Non-Effective - Rewards & Pensions 
Army (including State Forces) 7,7 2 9,06 9,43 9,44 9,62 10,16 13,64 13,76 13,82
Grand Total - Effective and 
Non-Effective 1,41,43 1,56,39 1,63,07 1,67,09 1,57,76 1 ,6 0 , 6 6 1,50,94 1,66,64 1,93,31
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APPENDIX II (cont.)
ACTUAL GROSS EXPENDITURE OF EFFECTIVE ARMY 
(in lakhs of Rs)
AND NUN-EFFECTIVE ARMY DURING THE YEARS 1949-50 TO 1962-6; ' ■;
Details 1958-59 1959-60 1960-61 1961-62 1962-63
Revised Estimates 
1963-i64
Budget Estimates
1964-65
Effective Army
1 Main Head 1 - Pay & allowances of 
the Army 52,61 53,50 65,75 69,42 84,84 1,21,32 1,35,99
2 Main Head 2 - Pay & allowances and
Miscellaneous expenses of Territorial 
Army, National Cadet Corps, State 
Forces, etc. 1,84 2,16 3,57 3,84 4,53 9, 26 6,15
3 Main Head 3 - Pay and allowances of 
Civilians 25,40 25,92 29,41 25,77 30,59 37J20 40,00
4 Main Head 4 - Transportation and 
Miscellaneous 16,43 15,49 17,76 20,75 30,13 36,03 35,20
5 Main Head 5 - Expenditure on 
Manufacturing and Research 
Establishment 19,09 25,56 28,79 43,73 80,65 1,42,50 1,54,40
6 Main Head 6 - Purchase and sale of 
Stores 36,00 29,92 29,51 39,57 83,70 1,71J49 1,77,94
7 Main Head 7 - Expenditure on Works 11,65 12,48 13,73 11,96 17,44 26,18 22,76
8 Main Head 8 - Charges in England 4,65 2,22 1,91 2,92 6,59 6,78 10,45
9 Main Head 9 - Loss or gain by Exchange 1 - - 1 1 1 -
Total - Effective Army 1,67,68 1,67,25 1,90,43 2,17,97 3,38,48 5,50, 77 5,82,89
Non-Effective - Rewards & Pensions 
Army (including State Forces) 13,84 14,69 14,84 18,67 17,94 18,40 21,36
Grand Total - Effective and 
Non-E ffective 1 ,81,52 1,81,94 2,05,27 2,36,64 3,56,42 5,69,17 6,04,25
Source: Indian Ministry of Defence.
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APPENDIX I I I
EXPENDITURE OF THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE 
( l a k h s  o f  r u p e e s :  Rs 1 l a k h  = £ s t g  7 5 0 0 )
------   ----- -—  ............................ ........ —  ■ —  ■ - -  - ■  --------------------------------------------
NAVY AIR FORCE
Y e a r R e v e n u e C a p i t a l T o t a l R ev e n u e C a p i t a l T o t a l
1 9 5 1 - 5 2 7 6 6 .1 8 1 2 7 .2 1 8 9 3 .3 9 1 6 0 2 .5 0 1 1 1 .9 1 1 7 1 4 .4 1
1 9 5 2 -5 3 8 6 8 .6 9 1 7 7 .2 7 1 0 4 5 .9 6 1 5 6 2 .7 4 1 8 7 .8 2 1 7 5 0 .5 6
1 9 5 3 - 5 4 1 0 4 2 .6 2 2 1 6 .1 8 1 2 5 8 .8 0 2 8 5 6 .6 1 1 6 4 .2 6 3 0 2 0 .8 7
1 9 5 4 - 5 5 1 1 0 8 .2 4 3 9 4 .7 7 1 5 0 3 .0 1 2 9 7 3 .7 8 2 0 2 .9 9 3 1 7 6 .7 7
1 9 5 5 - 5 6 1 2 0 4 .6 7 7 3 3 .5 2 1 9 3 8 .1 9 3 0 0 5 .6 3 2 7 1 .2 3 3 2 7 6 .8 6
1 9 5 6 - 5 7 1 2 4 6 .6 1 8 1 0 . 8 7 2 0 5 7 .4 8 3 8 5 8 .5 0 3 6 8 .1 4 4 2 2 6 .6 4
1 9 5 7 - 5 8 1 4 1 6 .8 0 1 3 3 1 .8 5 2 7 4 8 .6 5 7 2 7 4 .6 8 4 3 2 .2 6 7 7 0 6 .9 4
1 9 5 8 - 5 9 1 6 3 7 .6 6 1 5 5 0 .4 1 3 1 8 8 .0 7 7 7 3 5 .0 4 3 3 4 .8 0 8 0 6 9 .8 4
1 9 5 9 - 6 0 1 5 1 1 .1 2 1 9 2 5 .5 0 3 4 3 6 .6 2 6 0 9 1 .2 0 3 3 4 .4 7 6 4 2 5 .6 7
1 9 6 0 - 6 1 1 7 6 6 .9 6 1 5 2 4 .0 1 3 2 9 0 .9 7 5 3 1 9 .1 7 3 8 7 .5 1 5 7 0 6 .6 8
1 9 6 1 - 6 2 2 0 6 6 .4 5 4 4 1 .3 4 2 5 0 7 .7 9 5 4 0 7 .9 7 4 5 3 .6 1 5 8 6 1 .5 8
1 9 6 2 -6 3 1 6 5 8 .1 6 5 0 1 .9 5 2 1 6 0 .1 1 7 7 8 8 .1 0 L 6 6 5 .0 9 9 4 5 3 .1 9
T o t a l 1 6 2 9 4 .1 6 9 7 3 4 .8 8 2 6 0 2 9 .0 4 5 5 4 7 5 .9 2 4 9 1 4 .0 9 6 0 3 9 0 .0 1
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APPENDIX IV
OFFICIAL MILITARY EXPENDITURE STATISTICS
Country Military
budget
expenditure
Gross Military budget
domestic expenditure
product as % of GDP
United States ($) 44,613.0 455,628.0 9.8
Yugoslavia (dinars) 177,500 1,977,300 9.0
Burma (kyats) 393.1 5,407.0 7.3
Russia (roubles) 94,100 1,360,333 6.9
Britain (£) 1,467.1 22,694.0 6.5
France (NF) 14,713.0 236,200.0 6.2
Sweden (kroner) 2,620.0 55,256.0 4.7
Canada ($) 1,533.1 33,548.0 4.6
Indonesia (rupiah) 8,642.0 187,100.0a 4.6
Communist China (yuan) 5>437 123,800 4.4
West Germany (DM) 8,591.0 230,077.0 3.7
Norway (kroner) 1,004.4 29,255.0 3.4
Thailand (baht) 1,465.1 46,379.0 3.2
Belgium (francs) 17,039.0 554,467.0 3.1
Switzerland (franks) 973.9 32,067.0 3.0
Australia (£) 179.1 5,943.0 3.0
Malaya ($)^ 160.6 5 ,310.0 3.0
Pakistan 3.0C
Turkey (lires) 1,020.5 38,653.0 2.6
INDIA (rupees) 2,808.0 119,450.0d 2.4d
New Zealand (£) 25.7 1,166.0 2.2
Finland (million 
markhaa) 20.5 1,186.0 1.7
Japan (million yen) 181.0 11,037.3 1.6
Philippines (pesos) 173.9 10,649.0 1.6
Ceylon (rupees) 58.8 5,692.5 1.0
Note: All figures represent the average for the period
1957-59 and units of currency are one million, unless 
otherwise stated.
a Gross domestic product at factor cost, 
b The figure is for 1957. 
c Ratio to net national product, 
d Net domestic product at factor cost.
Source: Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament: 
Report of the Secretary-General Transmitting the 
study of his consultative group (Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, New 
York, 1962), E/3593/Rev. 1, annex 2, tables 2-1, 2-2 
and 2-3.
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APPENDIX V(a)
DEFENCE EXPENDITURE OF BRITISH INDIAa: SELECTED YEARS
(crores of rupees)
Year Defence Year Defence Defence % of Total Expenditure
1891 24.1 1937 47.4 54.5
1911 29.3 1938 46.18 54.3
1914 30.7 1939 49.54 52.4
1915 33.4 1940 73.61 64.5
1916 37.5 1941 103.93 70.6
1917 43.6 1942 214.62 74.3
1918 66.7 1943 358.40 81.5
1919 87.0 1944 395.49 79.7
1920 87.4 1945 360.23 74.3
1921 69.8 1946 207.37 6O.4
1923 56.2 1947b 86.63 46.8
1931 51.8 1948 146.05 45.5
1932 46.7 1949 148.86 46.9
1936 45.5 1950 164.13 46.7
Sources: P.J. Thomas, The Growth of Federal Finance in India 
(Madras, Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 502 for period 1891-1936; R.N. Poduval, Finance of the Gov­
ernment of India Since 1935 (Delhi, Premier Publish­
ing, 1951), pp. 36-7 for period 1937-50. See also R.N. Bhargava, The Theory and Working of Union 
Finance in India (London. Allen & Unwin), pp. 279-88.
a Refers to GOI up to 1921 and to Central Government there­
after. Because of the changes in financial policy from 
1921 comparisons between periods before and after are mis­
leading.
b Figures from 1947 inclusive refer to Indian Union.
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APPENDIX V(b)
NET EXPENDITURE OF BRITISH INDIA ON SELECTED ITEMS
(crores of rupees)
Item 1857-58 1901-2 1913-4 1921-2 1930-1 Percentage increase1901-2 to 1930-1
Defence 16.7 24.7 29.8 69.8 54.3 119.8(47.7$)a - (3 2 .0%) (23.5$)
Police 2.6 4.4 7.3 12.8 13.6 209.1
(7 .5%) - (11.33$) (12.2$;)
Law & Justice (included in 4.4 6.1 7.8 9.0 104.5Police) — — (inclu in (inclu in
Police) Police)
General ^
Administration0 3.0 2.0 3.0 10.3 14.1 605.0
Education 0.2 1.7 4.8 9.0 13.8 711.8
(0 .6%) - - (4.94$) (6.91$)
Public Health0 0.1 2.6 3.5 6.1 6.7 153.8
(0 .4%) - (3.33$) (3.56$)
Agriculture — — — 2.0 3.1 —(1.08$) (1.66$)
Civil Worksd 3.1 4.2 10.1 12.6 12.9 207.1
Note: a Percentage of total expenditure.
c Includes medical aid and famine relief.
b Does not include the 
d Chargeable to revenue
charges of land revenue collection.
Source: P.J. Thomas, The Growth of Federal Finance in India (Madras, Oxford University Press, 1939), pp. 9-10
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APPENDIX VI
COMPARISON OP EXPENDITURE OF SELECTED COUNTRIES
Country Year Total
Expenditure
Defence
charges
Defence as % 
of expenditure
U.K. 1928-29 818 .0 113.5 13 .87(£ million) 1935-36 824.3 124 .2 15 .06
France (million 1930-31 5 0 , 3 9 8 . 2 1 2 , 9 4 8 . 9 25 .69francs) 1936 4 0 , 3 0 6 . 8 8 , 5 2 3 . 7 21 .14
Germany 1928-29 8 , 5 1 6 . 9 757.9 8 .94(million RM)
1934-35 8 , 2 3 2 . 3 1 , 1 0 4 . 5 13 .41
Italy (million 1928-29 1 9 , 6 4 6 . 0 4 , 2 8 9 . 0 21 .8lira) 1934-35 , 2 0 , 8 4 7 . 0 5 , 1 6 1 . 0 24.76
Sweden (million 1928-29 701 .2 133 .4 19 . 02kroner) 1935-36 867 .3 120 .9 13 .94
U.S.A. 1928-29 3 , 7 2 2 . 5 1 , 1 6 8 . 6 31 .39($ million) 1936-37 8 , 4 8 0 . 8 1 , 5 9 3 . 1 18 .78
Canada 1928-29 356 .9 19 . 7 5 .5 2($ million) 1936-37 53 5 . 2 3 7 .7 7 .04
Australia 1928-29 81 .3 34 .6 42 .56(£ million) 1936-37 1 1 0 . 7 25 .0 22.58
Japan (million 1928-29 1 , 8 1 4 - 9 517 .2 28.5yen) 1936-37 2 , 3 H . 5 1 , 0 6 0 . 1 41 .58
Russia (million 1928-29 6 , 3 3 9 . 9 793 .7 12 .5roubles) 1936-37 7 8 , 7 1 5 . 0 1 4 ,8 1 5 . 5 18 .95
INDIA 1928-29 1 , 2 9 3 . 0 584 .9 45 .23(Rs million) 1936-37 1 , 2 2 7 . 0 503 .8 41 .06
Source: P.J. Thomas, The Growth of Federal Finance in India 
(Madras, Oxford University Press, 1 9 3 9 ) ,  pi 494 •The percentage calculations are the writer’s and are 
based on the figures.
APPENDIX VII
NOTES ON BRITISH HIMALAYAN POLICY
British policy in the Himalayan region was directed to­
wards the assertion of such forms of control as were deemed 
necessary to maintain tranquility on the frontiers of the 
areas over which the Crown exercised paramountcy, and to deny 
influence in, or control of, these strategic areas to any 
other Power,
The expanding Gurkha kingdom in Nepal was defeated in 
1814-16, The question of annexation arose but was rejected^, 
and the Treaty of Sagauli signed on 2 December 1815 provided 
only for Gurkha withdrawal from Sikkim, Kumaon, Garhwal and 
the Terai to the west of the Gandak River, acceptance of a 
British Resident and agreement to British recruitment of 
Gurkhas for the army in India , Britain’s subsequent strict 
adherence to a policy of non-interference in Nepali affairs
1
Britain clearly concluded that, as one official declared 
at about that time: Ta frontier of seven or eight hundred 
miles between two powerful nations [British India and Chinese 
Tibet] holding each other in mutual contempt seems to point 
at anything but peace’. Cited in Alistair Lamb, Britain and 
Chinese Central Asia (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, i960"), 
p. 40.
2
For brief comments on the origins of the Gurkha Rifles, 
see Lt. General Sir Francis Tuker, Gorkha: The Story of the 
Gurkhas of Nepal (London, Constable & Co., 1957)> PP* 297-9.
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and acceptance of the kingdom’s policy of almost total exclu­
sion of Europeans facilitated the maintenance of a friendly 
relationship to the mutual advantage of both Governments. 
Nepalese aid during the Mutiny in 1857 was rewarded by the 
restoration to Nepal of a large part of the Terai annexed in 
I8l6; NepalTs support to the Younghusband expedition to 
Lhasa in 1904 was at least balanced by the support received 
by Kathmandu in countering Chinese demands during the period 
I906-II5 generous Nepalese add during the Great War provoked 
a token annual grant of its 1 million in perpetuity***. Nepal’s 
complete independence was formally recognised by a Treaty of
Peace and Friendship signed in 1925 which provided, in part,
2for mutual consultation on problems involving a third party • 
The subsequent relationship up to the British withdrawal 
from the Indian sub-continentfc in 1947 was close and friendly, 
attested to by the generous aid which Nepal provided to 
Britain during the Second World War.
British political contact with Sikkim commenced in the 
spring of 1815, when a British force entered Morung during 
actions against the Gurkhas. The Treaty of Sagauli restored
1
This was capitalised in 1947 with a gift of £1.75 million.
2
In accordance with this relationship, the British Resident 
was re-designated an Envoy in 1920 and subsequently became a 
Minister Plenipotentiary.
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to the Sikkimese ruler the territories previously wrested 
from him by the Gurkhas and, under the terms of the Treaty 
of Titalia signed in February 1817* the East India Company 
guaranteed Sikkim against renewed Gurkha aggression in re­
turn for which Sikkim placed her foreign relations under a 
measure of Company control. In 1835* the Sikkimese ruler 
was induced to cede the Darjeeling tract under a deed of 
grant in return for an annual allowance^.
Friction persisted over the issue of slaves and the 
mistreatment of several British officials by Sikkimese 
authorities in 1849 provoked Lord Dalhousie to annex the 
Terai district and the hill tracts of Darj'eeling west of the 
Tista River. The kidnapping of British subj'ects culminated 
in a British military action against the kingdom in 1860-61. 
A treaty was concluded on 28 March 1861 which provided for 
an annual subsidy to Sikkim on condition that its ruling 
authorities maintained the peace.
The entry of a Tibetan force into the state in 1886 
provoked British demands to both the Chinese and Tibetan
1
An allowance of Rs 3>000 was granted in 1841* increased to 
Rs 6,000 in I846, suspended in 1849* resumed, forfeited in 
i860, restored in 1861, increased to Rs 9*000 in 1868 and to 
Rs 12,000 in 1873* suspended in 1889 and ultimately restored 
in 1918.
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authorities that it be withdrawn. When the warning went un­
heeded, a force was despatched to eject the Tibetans in March 
1888. Subsequent Anglo-Chinese negotiations led to a conven­
tion being concluded in March 1890 in which the water-parting 
of the Tista was stipulated as the boundary between Sikkim 
and Tibet, and Sikkim was recognised as a British protector­
ate with Britain having direct and exclusive control over the 
internal administration and foreign relations of the state.
A supplementary agreement was concluded between the same two 
Governments in December 1893 > "the chief provision of which 
established a trade outlet at Yatung, eight miles inside the 
Tibetan border. Non-recognition of the treaties by the 
Tibetans contributed to the Younghusband expedition in 1904> 
and the Lhasa Convention concluded between Tibet and Britain 
provided for Tibetan acceptance of the 1890 and 1893 
treaties.
In 1888, Mr J.C. White of the Public Works Department 
was appointed Political Agent to assist the Maharaja in the 
kingdom’s administration, the authority of the latter person 
being progressively reduced. A revenue system was establish­
ed, a basis was laid for taxation, Nepalese immigration was 
encouraged so as to bring unused land under cultivation, and 
the development of roads was undertaken"*". Foreigners were
By 1900, it was possible to -travel from one end of Sikkim
1
5*+3
allowed into Sikkim only by special permission of the 
British authorities.
British relations with Sikkim after 1890, which were 
described by a former Political Officer in the state as be­
ing characterised by ftoo little tact and sympathy, too much 
of the hobnailed bootT^ , were adjusted in 1918. In April of 
that year, Maharaja Tashi Namgyal was invested with full ad­
ministrative powers. The subsequent period up to the 
British withdrawal from India in 1947 was one of tranquility 
within Sikkim and of close and cordial Anglo-Sikkimese rela­
tions. In both world wars, the Sikkimese gave loyal support 
to British efforts and TashiTs eldest son died in service 
with the Royal Air Force in 1941*
British contact with Bhutan began with the British ejec­
tion of a Bhutanese force from Cooch Behar in 1792 persuant 
to a request from the principalityfs ruler. Following its 
occupation of Assam in 1826, the East India Company confirmed 
and renewed an agreement whereby Bhutan occupied the Assam 
Duars for payment of an annual tribute. Subsequent misunder­
standings, missed payments and persistent Bhuatnese
to the other by a mule track and, in 1906, Sikkim was linked 
to India by a road suitable for wheeled traffic.
1
Sir Charles Bell, Tibet Past and Present (Oxford, Claren­
don Press, 1924)f P* 170.
depredations caused the Company to annex the Assam Duars in 
I84I for a compensatory payment of Rs 10,000 per annum. 
Further Bhutanese raids against British territory and the 
maltreatment of a British envoy provoked the annexation, in 
November 1864* of the Assam Duars, the Ambari Falakata (a 
Bhuatnese enclave virtually surrounded by British territory), 
the Bengal Duars and such hill territory as was considered 
essential for the control of the 18 duars (passes) which 
passed through the Himalayan foothills into central Bhutan. 
The ensuing brief Anglo-Bhutanese war ended with the conclu­
sion of the Treaty of Sinchula on 11 November 1865 whereby 
Bhutan agreed to refer all disputes with Sikkim and Cooch 
Behar to the British Government for arbitration, maintain 
free trade and return fugitives from British justice. In 
return, the British Government agreed to pay compensation for 
the Duars in the amount of Rs 25*000 for the first year, Rs 
35*000 for the second, Rs 45*000 for the third and Rs 50,000 
for each year thereafter - on condition that Bhutan maintain­
ed the peace.
The subsidy afforded a considerable source of income 
which the Bhutanese clearly wished to maintain and good 
Anglo-Bhuatnese relations ensued which were not appreciably 
affected by minor disputes in 1868 and 1880. Bhutan refused 
aid to Tibet in the Anglo-Tibetan conflict in 1888 and, in
reply to a request for an open demonstration of support for 
British policy in 1904, Bhutan despatched a Mission to 
accompany General Macdonald in his march to Lhasa'*'. In 
1907, British support enabled the penlop (governor) of the 
Tongsa District to establish himself as the hereditary king 
and thereby promoted a measure of political stability in the 
previously strife-torn state.
Tibetan developments provoked British initiatives lead­
ing to the amendment of the Treaty of Sinchula in 1910.
Bhutan agreed to accept the guidance of the British Govern­
ment in its external relations, and Britain increased the 
annual subsidy to Rs 100,000 and undertook not to interfere 
in the kingdom1s internal administration. A political crisis 
in the state in 1929, however, caused the creation of the 
post of dewan or chief minister in an effort to streamline 
the Bhutanese administration and maintain law and order. In 
1942, for reasons clearly related to the Japanese threat to 
Assam, the British increased the subsidy to Rs 200,000.
1
Up to 1904, political relations between Bhutan and the 
British Indian Government were carried on through the medium 
of the Bengal Government. Tibetan developments in that year 
caused these relations to be transferred to Colonel 
Younghusband, who communicated directly with the Indian Gov­
ernment. Upon the termination of the Mission, conduct of 
these political relations was transferred to the Political 
Officer in Sikkim.
5^ 6
British contact with the tribals in the north-east fol­
lowed upon the occupation of Assam in 1826. The policy sub­
sequently pursued towards these peoples has been described 
as one of 1 acquiring loose political control over these 
areas, with the minimum of interference compatible with the 
protection of these tribesmen and restraining them from 
raiding either Indian or Chinese territory1 Varying 
degrees of British TauthorityT was asserted in treaties and 
agreements with the Akas in 1842, 1844 and 1888; with the 
Daflas in 1835> 1837 and 1852; with the Miris and Abhors in 
1862-63 and 1866, and with the Monbas in 1844 and 1853« No 
written agreements were concluded with the Mishmis. The 
Naga Hills District of about 4,000 square miles was adminis­
tered by the Government of India through its agent, the 
Governor of Assam, as an TExcluded AreaT and its inhabitants 
were extensively evangelised, especially by American Baptists. 
The Naga areas lying to the east of this administered dis-
2trict were collectively classed as an *Unadministered Area1 .
1
White Paper. II, appendix I entitled Tt Historical Background 
of the Himalayan Frontier of India” , p. 130.
2
For useful discussions of the Naga areas, see Sir Robert 
Reid, ”The Excluded Areas of Assam”, Geographical Journal, 
vol. 103 (1944) f PP. 18-28; J.P. Mills, ”The Assam-Burma 
Frontier”, ibid, vol. 67 (1926), pp. 289-99.
To check tribal depredations, British authority largely 
continued the policy of earlier Assamese rulers - suspension 
of the subsidy, blockade (thereby denying the particular 
tribe access to the goods and markets of Assam, which they 
required) and, in the last resort, punitive expeditions'^. 
This last alternative was disliked both on the grounds of 
expense and because of the morally-based opposition by 
British and Indian politicians. To lessen the chances of 
friction with the tribes, the Bengal Frontier Regulation of 
1873 created an 1 inner line1 beyond which certain classes 
of people could not pass without special permits. Where it 
existed, this line served as an administrative boundary 
beyond which no taxes were collected. Though the tribal 
areas of Assam Himalaya were not directly administered, they 
were nonetheless regarded as falling within the British 
sphere of influence.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, there were 
persons who argued the need for a forward policy into the 
areas beyond the foothills in Assam. Champion of such an 
approach was Noel Williamson who, in 1905, was appointed to
1
Such expeditions were sent against the Akas in I883 , the 
Daflas in 1874-75f the Miris and Abhors in 1859* the Abhors 
in i860, 1894 and 1911 and the Mishmis in 1899. A revolt in 
the Naga Kills was put down in 1877-80.
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the post of Assistant Political Officer, Sadiya. He argued 
the need to make the tribals aware of the benefits of 
British rule but, though supported by the Viceroy, Lord 
Minto, a forward policy was rejected by the Secretary of 
State for India, Lord Morley, as likely to lead to progress­
ive annexation which it might be difficult to limit. None­
theless, Williamson ventured up the Lohit in the winter of 
1907-08 and on three further occasions, meeting his death at 
the hands of Abhor tribesmen in early 1911.
A case for the policy favoured by Williamson had, in 
the meantime, been building up as a result of the interest 
which the Chinese were showing in the regions adjoining Assam 
Himalaya consequent on their forceful re-entry into Tibet in 
I909-IO. The death of Williamson provided the excuse and 
immediate occasion for a forward move - despite the reluct­
ance of the Viceroy and the British Cabinet for fear of 
thereby provoking reprisals from China in the trade sphere 
and from Russia in Central Asia. The resulting plan of 
action had, as its ultimate objective, fto define a border 
more or less along the mountain crests and main watersheds, 
to exercise British control 11 of a loose political nature” up 
to that boundary, and, if the circumstances seemed propit- 
uous, to inform China of the new limits of British
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sovereignty* . A military expedition punished the Abhors, 
missions were sent to the Miris and Mishmis, and a host of 
surveys were undertaken which greatly improved the state of 
British knowledge about Assam Himalaya, The hills were 
divided into Western, Central and Eastern Sections (subse­
quently modified and given new names) under the supervision 
of Political Officers. The construction of a road up the 
Lohit commenced in 1912 but made slow progress and came to a 
halt in 1914 long before it had even reached the boundary 
area. A recommendation by T.P.M. 0fCallaghan (Assistant 
Political Officer, Eastern Section) in early 1914 that work 
should continue on the road and that construction of a milit­
ary post near Walong be undertaken was ignored.
Little attention was paid to the tribal aread during the 
period between the two world wars. No attention was given to 
a warning from one Political Officer in 1928 that the 
Tibetan frontier would become of great political importance 
once normalcy returned to the Chinese internal scene. In 
1936, the Tibetans were still administering and taxing the 
Tawang Tract. The publication of Chinese maps, which showed 
all of Assam Himalaya as part of Tibet (i.e. China), caused
T
Cited, Alistair Lamb, The india-China Border (London,
Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 139•
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the Governor of Assam to despatch a Political Officer in 1938 
to demonstrate British sovereignty in Tawang by means of 
collecting a tax. Upon his return, the officer proposed that 
the Tibetans be removed over the McMahon Line and that 
British officials be permanently stationed in Tawang and 
Dirrang Dzong - but the Indian Government was unwilling to 
accept additional administrative responsibility and the 
associated expense. In response to Tibetan efforts to 
collect taxes and labour in the Dihang Valley as far as 
Karko, however, British Political Officers began to tour up 
the Dihang deep into Abhor country.
The Japanese threat and the appearance of further 
Chinese maps prompted the establishment of armed posts at 
Karko and Riga in the Dihnag Valley in 1940-419 the exten­
sion of armed posts up the Lohit to the McMahon Line in 
1943y the preparation of plans for a motor road from Sadiya 
to Rima, and concerted efforts to cultivate tribal loyal­
ties. Tribals were employed as porters during the military 
operations against the Japanese and the Nagas were armed and 
conducted skillful guerilla operations. In 1942 the Tirap 
Frontier Tract was created from the Sadiya Frontier Tract 
and, in 1946, the Balipara Frontier Tract was bifurcated into 
two divisions - the Abhor Hills and the Mishmi Hills.
APPENDIX VIII
THE ARMIES OF THE HONOURABLE EAST INDIA COMPANY 
(establishment on the eve of the Mutiny,1857)
British*" Native
Cavalry Artillery Infantry Total Cavalry+ Artillery Sappers & Mxners Infantry Total
Bengal 1,366 3,063 17,003 21,432 19,288 4,734 1,497 112,052 137,571
Madras 639 2,128 5,941 8,708 3,202 2,407 1,270 42,373 49,252
Bombay 681 1,578 7,101 9,360 8,433 1,997 637 33,861 44,928
Local Forces & 
Contingents 6,796 2,118 23,640 32,554
Military Police - - - - - - -
unclass. 7,756
38,977
2,686 6,769 30,045 39,500 37,719 11,256 3,404 211,926 311,038
* Including the Company’s European troops,
+ Including irregulars and local forces not designated in "forces” and "contingents”.
Source: Military Handbook of General Information on India, compiled in the Division of the Chief of the Staff, 
Intelligence Branch (Simla, Government Press, 1908), p. 325.
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APPENDIX IX
STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE ARMY IN INDIAj g g y  -
British Indian
Cavalry Artillery
Royal
Engineer
Officers
Infantry Total Cavalry Artillery iSappers & 
Miners
Infantry Total
Bengal 3,736 7,084 203 34,442 45,515 15,202 1,508 1,438 58,944 77,092
Madras 2,524 1,658 35 11,143 15,360 2,146 271 1,495 28,737 32,649
Bombay 631 2,947 45 8,104 11,727 4,667 452 935 22,490 28,544
Hyderabad
Contingent - — — - - 2,000 536 - 5,004 7,540
Other local 
corps - - - - - 1,598 - - 5,669 7,267
Total 6,941 11,689 283 53,689 72,602 25,613 2,767 3,868 120,844 153,092
Grand Total, Army in India: 225,694
Source: The Army in India and its Evolution (Calcutta, Superintendent Government Printing, India, 1924) ,  P» 197«
APPENDIX X(a)
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REGIONAL COMPOSITION OF THE INDIAN ARMY 
(percentage of total)
Years
Punjab, North-West 
Frontier & 
Kashmir
Nepal, 
Garhwal £ 
Kumaon
North-East India, 
t United Provinces
& Bihar Soutll India Burma
1856 less than 10 negligibles not less than 90 - nil
1858 47 6 47 - -
1883 48 17 35 - -
1893 53 24 23 - -
1905 47 15 22 16 -
1919 46 14.8 25.5 12 1.7
1930 58.5 22 11 5.5 3
Source: Dr B.R. Ambedkar, Pakistan or Partition of India (Bombay, Thacker & Co., Ltd,,, 3rd edition, 1946), p. 60
APPENDIX X(b)
COMMUNAL COMPOSITION OF THE INDIAN ARMY 
(percentage of total)
Area & Major 
Communities 1914 1918 1919 1930
1. Punjab, NWFP & 
Kashmir 47.0 46.5 46.0 58.5
a. Sikhs 19.2 17.4 15.4 13.58
b. Punjabi Moslems 11.1 11.3 12.4 22.6
c. Pathans 6.2 5.42 4.54 6.35
2. Nepal, Kumaon
a. Garhwalis 15.0 16.6 12.2 16.4
b. Gurkhas 13.1 16.6 12.2 16.4
3. Upper India 22.0 22.7 25.5 11.0
a. UP Raj puts 6.4 6.8 7.7 2.55
b. Hindustani 
Mussalmans 4.1 3-42 4.45 nil
c. Brahmins 1.8 1.86 2.5 nil
4. South India 16.0 11.9 12.0 5.5
a. Marathas 4.9 3.85 3.7 5.33
b. Madrassi
Mussalmans 3.5 2.71 2.13 nil
c. Tamils 2.5 2.0 1.67 nil
5 * Burmans nil negligible 1.7 3.0
Source: Dr B.R. Ambedkar , Pakistan or Partition of India
(Bombay, Thacker 
p. 65.
& Co. , Ltd., 3rd edition, 1946),
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Province
Combatant
Recruits
Enlisted
Non-Combatant
RecruitsEnlisted Total
Madras 51,223 41,117 92,340
Bombay 41,272 30,211 71,483
Bengal 7,117 51,935 59,052
United Provinces 163,578 117,565 281,143
Punjab 349,688 97,288 446,976
North-West Frontier 32,181 13,050 45,231
Baluchistan 1,761 327 2,088
Burma 14,094 4,579 18,673
Bihar & Orissa 8,576 32,976 41,552
Central Provinces 5,376 9,631 15,007
Assam 942 14,182 15,124
Ajmer-Merwara 7,341 1,632 8,973
Nepal 58,904 - 58,904
Total 742,053 414,493 1,156,546
Source: Dr B.R. Ambedkar, Pakistan or Partition of India
(Bombay, Thacker & Co., 
P. 56.
Ltd., 3rd edition, 1946)
Province
Population
(millions)
Combatant Recruits 
Enlisted
Pun j ab 20 326,000
United Provinces 47 142,000
Madras 40 46,000
Bombay
North-West Frontier 
& Baluchistan
20 36,000
3 33,000
Burma 12 13,000
Bihar & Orissa 33 8,000
Bengal 45 7,000
Central Provinces 13 5,000
Assam 6 1,000
A j mer 1/2 7,000
Total 240 624,000
Source: Report of the Army in India Committee 1919-1920. 
Part VI, p. 71.
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Northern Southern Bodyguards & Total Actual
Army Army Nepal Escorts Strengths
Regular
Forces
British 41,243 32,616 - 78,859
Indian 85,841 67,566 353 153,760
Indian
Army
Reserves
18,346 12,644 - 30,990
Volunteer
Forces 17,269 17,721 - 34,990
Volunteer
Force
Reserves 954 853 1,807
Imperial
Service 8,579 11,899 20,478Troops
Military Police, 
Militia, Levies 13,967 17,181 . 31,148
Note: The Volunteers were organised in 81 different units. The military police consisted of the Military Police 
of the North-West Frontier Province, the Dera Ghazi Khan Military Police, the Burma Military Police (11 
battalions in Upper Burma and 3 in Lower Burma), and 5 battalions of military police in Eastern Bengal 
and Assam. The militia/levies comprised 2 battalions of Khyber Rifles, 2 battalions of Kurram Militia, 
the North and South Waziristan Militia, the Zhob Levy Corps, Chitrali Scouts, Mehran Levy Corps and 
Samana Rifles.
Source: Military Handbook of General Information on India, compiled in the Division of the Chief of the Staff, 
Intelligence Branch (Simla, Government Press, 1908), pp. 347-8.
APPENDIX XI(b)
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DEPLOYMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES IN INDIA
(1907) ' “
Northern Army
1st (Peshawar) Division - infantry brigades at Peshawar
and Nowshera; cavalry brigade at 
Nowshera.
2nd (Rawalpindi) Division - mixed brigades at Rawalpindi,
Jhelum, Abbottabad and Siakhot.
3rd (Lahore) Division - mixed brigades at Jullundur,
Sirhind and Ferezpore; cavalry 
brigade at Ambala.
7th (Meerut) Division - mixed brigades at Garhwal and
Bareilly; cavalry brigade at 
Meerut.
8th (Lucknow) Division - mixed brigades at fyzabad and
Allahabad; infantry brigade at 
Lucknow; the Assam brigade and 
the Presidency brigade.
Independent frontier brigades at Kohat, Bannu and Derajat.
Southern Army
4th (Quetta) Division
5th (Mhow) Division
6th (Poona) Division
- infantry brigade at Quetta; 
mixed brigade at Karachi.
- mixed brigades at Jhansi, 
Nasirabad and Jubbulpore.
- 1st and 2nd infantry brigades at 
Secunderabad; mixed brigade at 
Madras; infantry brigade and 
cavalry brigade at Bangalore; a 
Southern brigade.
Burma - mixed brigades at Rangoon and Mandalay comprising a 
total of 2 companies of Royal Garrison Artillery, 2 
batteries of Indian mountain artillery, 4 British and 
7 Indian infantry battalions.
Aden - a brigade comprised of 1/8 regiment of Indian caval­
ry, 3 companies of Royal Garrison Artillery, 1 
company of sappers and miners, 1 British and 2 
Indian infantry battalions.
Source: Military Handbook of General Information on India, 
compiled in the Division of the Chief of the Staff. 
Intelligence Branch (Simla, Government Press, 1908), 
PP. 337-8, 348.
APPENDIX XII
ARMY IN INDIA 1914
(exclusive of native artificers & followers)
Northern Southern T otal
British Army
Royal Artillery 7,973 7,796 15,769
Cavalry 3,756 1,878 5,634
Royal Engineers 213 111 324
Infantry 28,948 24,798 53,746
Indian Army, & c. 72 30 102
Total 40,962 34,613 75,575
Indian Army
British Indian British Indian British Indian
Artillery 57 6,440 11 3,603 68 10,043
Cavalry 372 15,440 211 8,810 583 24,250
Infantry 1,095 65,688 930 54,304 2,025 119,992
Sappers, Miners, & c. 167 2,251 269 3,325 436 5,576
Total 1,691 89,819 1,421 70,042 3,112 159,861
Imperial Service Troops - 9>077 (Northern) and 11,992 (Southern) 
Indian Reservists - 13,381 (Southern) and 22,743 (Northern)
Volunteer Force - 18,617 (Northern) and 20,853 (Southern)
Source: Whitaker*s Almanac, 1915» p. 585«
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APPENDIX XIII
ACTUAL STRENGTH Of COMBATANT TROOPS Of THE ARMY IN INDIA. 1 SEPTEMBER 1923
British Army Indian Army Total
GrandBritish Indian Total British Indian Total British Indian Total
Cavalry 4,811 - 4,811 288 10,879 11,167 5,099 10,879 15,978
Artillery 11,382 12,386 23,768 Inclu in figures for Br Army 11,382 12,386 23,768
Tank Corps 1,004 - 1,004 - - - 1,004 - 1,004
Sappers & Miners - - - 297 7,586 7,883 297 7,586 7,883
Indian Signal Corps - - - 2,221 3,152 5,373 2,221 3,152 5,373
Infantry 44,155 1,826 46,341 1,588 102,890 104,478 46,103 104,716 150,819
Total 61,712 14,212 75,924 4,394 124,507 128,901 66,106 138,719 204,825
Source: The Army in India and its Evolution (Calcutta, Superintendent Government Printing, India, 1924), p. 220
560
APPENDIX XIV
LIABILITY OF INDIA TU SUPPLY REINFORCEMENTS OUTSIDE INDIA 
India Office, Whitehall, S.W. 1. '23 March 1937*
1. I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to 
invite attention to the fact that the Government of India 
have from time to time been asked by H.M. Government to pre­
pare schemes for the reinforcement of certain places outside 
India and the potential commitments which they may be asked 
to discharge may be summarised as follows:-
Iranian oil-fields .. 1 Infantry Brigade
Singapore ♦• 1 Infantry Brigade
Hong Kong .• 2 Infantry Battalions
Egypt •• 2 Infantry Brigades
Burma .. 1 Infantry Brigade.
2. The Government of India have now suggested that the sit­
uation in regard to these schemes should be reviewed and 
that an indication should be given on the following points:-
(a) the schemes which it will now be necessary to 
maintain,
(b) the extent to which the schemes must be capable of 
being put into operation simultaneously.
3. It is suggested for the concurrence of the Army Council 
that the schemes should be classified into two main divisions 
as given below, and that the classification should be subject 
to periodical review by the Army Council.
(a) Plans to be maintained at such a degree of readi­
ness that they could be put into effect at short
notice
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It is suggested that under this heading the follow­
ing might be included subject to confirmation and 
periodical review by the Army Council:-
Reinforcement of Singapore (Scheme M).
Defence of Anglo-Iranian Oilfields.
Scheme M (Emergency) for reinforcement of 
Singapore (Burma only).
(b) Plans for which reasonable warning can be antici­
pated.
Reinforcement of Hong Kong.
Reinforcement of Egypt.
Reinforcement of Burma.
A situation in any theatre in this category may de­
teriorate necessitating the desirability of the plan 
for reinforcement being transferred temporarily to cat­
egory (a). Should such an eventuality appear imminent 
it is requested that early information should be 
afforded.
4. Finally, I am to invite attention to C.I.D. Paper No. 
I3O-D, paragraph 44y governing the Government of Indiafs 
commitments regarding the supply of reinforcements from 
India and the conclusion reached by H.M. Government (namely 
that the principle should be generally accepted that, except 
in the gravest emergency, the Army in India should be
employed outside the Indian Empire only after consultation 
with the Governor-General in Council), and to the understand­
ing attached to India’s acceptance of any commitments that 
troops can only be supplied by India provided the situation 
in India at the time permits.
R.C. Wilson
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Source: Bisheshwar Prasad, Defence of India: Policy and
Plans, Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, 
India and Pakistan (Orient Longmans, 1963)* 
appendix I, pp. 241-2.
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APPENDIX XV
THE CHATEIELP COMMITTEE REPORT, 1938-39 
(A Summary)
The Committee proceeded on the assumption that fa 
settled defence policy can and will be laid down, in accord­
ance with the principle that responsibility for the defence 
of India rests...with the British Government and with no one 
else’ and was of the view that there should be no ’whittling 
away of the responsibility of the British Government for the 
defence of India’.
The Committee advanced the view that the ’Major’ and 
’Minor’ divisions of responsibility for Indian defence had 
been rendered obsolete by international developments. It 
declared that ’The arena of India’s defence against external 
aggressions should therefore now be regarded as covering not 
only primarily her North-Western land frontier but also to an 
increasing extent her sea communications in Eastern waters 
and the strategic points which are vital to their security’. 
The Committee noted that this principle had been embodied in 
the naval agreement concluded in January 1938 and it recom­
mended that India should acknowledge her external defence 
responsibilities and should bear the ordinary maintenance
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costs of units designated for external employment in an 
emergency affecting her external security. The suggestions 
of the Pownall Sub-Committee that an Imperial division be 
set aside solely for Imperial use was negatived by the 
Committee in favour of a policy whereby units designated for 
external employment would form an integral part of the forces 
in India as a whole, but would be equipped on a higher scale.
The Committee defined the basis of distribution of the 
Army in India as comprising frontier defence, internal sec­
urity, coast defence, general reserve and external defence 
troops. It made specific proposals regarding the moderniza­
tion of the army and it expressed the belief that the in­
creased efficiency and mobility afforded thereby would permit 
of an approximate 25 per cent of the British troops in India 
to be shifted to the Home Establishment (while remaining in 
India) and a proportionately less, but absolute, reduction 
in the Indian component.
The Committee proposed that the re-equipment of the 
four bomber squadrons then in progress should be aided by a 
grant of about £1,700,000, and that the remaining RAF squad­
rons in India be re-equipped with Blenheims, Lysanders and 
Valentias. Measures were also to be effected to bring the 
stocks of stores for war requirements up to the requisite
scale
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The Committee accepted the Nine Year Plan prepared by 
the Flag Officer Commanding, Royal Indian Navy‘S, except as 
regards the proposed loan of four minesweepers from the 
Royal Navy. It endorsed the proposal of the Auchinleck 
(Modernisation) Committee that two bomber squadrons be 
equipped for the dual role of frontier and coast defence, 
confirmed the proposals of the General Staff regarding the 
requirements of coast defence and anti-aircraft artillery ,
1
This plan proposed the construction of four ’Bittern’ class 
escort vessels and four ’Mastiff’ class trawlers, the loan 
from the Royal Navy of four ’Halycon’ class minesweepers, 
and the re-arming of the sloops Indus and Hindustan - thus 
providing six sloops towards the protection of maritime com­
munications and four minesweepers for keeping India’s ports 
open. The plan also envisaged the taking up in wartime of 
48 merchant vessels - 25 to be fitted out as auxiliary mine­
sweepers and 23 to be fitted out as anti-submarine craft and 
distributed over all the major ports. Bisheshwar Prasad, 
Defence of India: Policy And Plans. Combined Inter-Services 
Historical Section, India and Pakistan (Orient Longmans, 
1963), PP. 46-7.2
The proposed installations (which were apparently set up 
in the early part of the war) comprised:
Bombay - 2 7*5-inch guns, 2 6-inch (45°) guns, 3 6-inch
(15°) guns, 4 H.D.C. lights and 8 3-inch AA
Calcutta -
Karachi -
Cochin -
Madras
Vizagapatam -
Ibid , p. 45«
guns.
2 6-inch (15°) guns, 2 
6 3-inch AA guns.
2 6-inch (45°) guns, 3 
4 3-inch AA guns.
2 6-inch (45°) guns, 3 
4 3-inch AA guns.
2 6-inch (45°) guns, 3 
4 3-inch AA guns, 
nil.
H.D.C.
H.D.C.
H.D.C.
H.D.C.
lights and 
lights and 
lights and 
lights,
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and suggested the raising of five flights of aircraft on a 
voluntary basis to assist in the defence of the major ports.
The Committee proposed that India should be made 
self-sufficient in munitions required for war to the maximum 
possible extent. The existing factories were to be expanded 
and a new factory was to be constructed for the manufacture 
of TNT. The resources of private enterprise were to be 
drawn upon, but it was recognized that the existing state of 
industrial development in India necessitated that initial 
reliance for defence items be placed upon government factor­
ies .
It was estimated that the net capital cost of the 
measures proposed would total £34>33 millions. As such 
funds were not available in India, the Committee noted that 
the British Government was prepared to obtain parliamentary 
sanction for the provision of this sum from the Home 
Exchequer over a five-year period - the estimated time re­
quired to implement the non-naval aspects of the plan. 
Three-quarters of this sum would be provided as a free grant 
and the remaining one-quarter as a loan.
APPENDIX XVI
THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE INDIAN ARMED FORCES
IN AUGUST 1939
1. Army^
22 cavalry and armoured regiments including 4 Bodyguard 
units
4 batteries of field artillery
28 sapper and miner companies including field troops 
and divisional Headquarter companies
113 infantry battalions including 17 training battalions 
and Gurkha battalions but excluding 20 trainer com­
panies of Gurkha Rifles
Personnel: 194>373 in India and overseas excluding Indian 
State Forces, auxiliary and reserve forces, all 
British other ranks and British officers in British 
service.
2. Navy2
5 sloops (2 of pre-1922 commission)
1 survey vessel 
1 patrol vessel 
1 steam trawler
Personnel: 19 Indian and 95 British commissioned officers 
25 Indian and 30 British warrant officers and 1,677 
Indian ratings.
3. Air Force^
1 (incomplete) army co-operation squadron equipped 
with Wapiti aircraft
Personnel: 16 commissioned officers, 1 warrant officer,
268 other ranks and 1,343 persons in other categories
Sources: 1 Nandan Prasad, Expansion of the Armed Forces and 
Defence Organisation 1939-45. Combined Inter- 
Services Historical Section, India and Pakistan 
(London, Orient Longmans, 1956), appendix I, 
p. 393.
2 Ibid, pp. 399 and 408-9.
3 Ibid, pp. 398-9 and 408-9.
APPENDIX XVII
THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE INDIAN ARMED FORCES 1945
1. Army (August 1945
19 cavalry and armoured regiments including 2 Indian 
States Forces Regiments serving under the Crown.
207 batteries of artillery of all types
107 companies of Indian Engineers including field com­
panies, field park companies and field squadrons 
but excluding all laundry, pipeline companies, etc.
268 battalions of infantry including 32 Indian States 
Forces and 8 Gurkha battalions serving under the 
Crown but excluding independent and garrison com­
panies, etc.
Personnel: 2,065>554 including 16,351 of Indian State Forces serving overseas but excluding all British 
units as of 1 July 1945.
2. Navy (1 July 1945)^ - includes ships in service and those
about to be commissioned.
6 modern sloops
3 frigates
4 corvettes
4 ’Bathurst* class minesweepers 
13 ’Bangor* class minesweepers 
18 trawlers 
4 motor minesweepers 1 landing ship infantry (large)
1 coastal force depot ship 
4 old sloops
2 store ships
1 salvage vessel 
4 old gunboats
1 mobile wiping and deperming unit
11 vessels of coastal forces organised in 3 flotillas
2 detached boats for anti-submarine and torpedo training 
41 craft in the landing craft wing
4 LCA flotillas
3 LCW formations
Personnel: 30,478 excluding civilians and non-combatants.
3. Air Force (1 July 1945)^
3 fighter reconnaissance squadrons 
2 ground attack squadrons 
2 light bomber squadrons 
2 fighter squadrons
Personnel: 29,201 officers, airmen and enrolled followers 
excluding civilians and temporary followers.
Sources: 1. Nandan Prasad, Expansion of the Armed Forces and 
Defence Organisation 1939-45. Combined Inter- 
Services Historical Section, India and Pakistan 
(London, Orient Longmans 1956), appendix 1, p. 399.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.. pp. 398-9.
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Recruit Intake by Classes, 3 September 1939 - 31 August 1945
Hindus Mussalmans
Ahirs 38,150 Pathan 65,103
Assamese 2,772 Afridi 3,710
Bengalis 19,239 Bangach 2,685
Bhils 255 Khattahs 5,252
Brahmans 66,608 Orakzais 736
Chamars 7,453 Yusufzais 10,906
D ogras 29,944 Others 41,814
Garhwalis 18,932 Assamese 3,122
Gherts 358 Baluchis 1,195
Gujars 15,865 Bengalis 61,615
Gurkhas 109,702 Dekhani 19,354
Jats 71,339 Hazarwals 23,884
Kabirpanthis 454 Hindustani 27,638
Kolis 927 Madrassis 28,799
Kumaonis 20,110 Meos 2,757
Kumhars 1,129 Merats (Khatals) 1,052
Lodhis (UP & CP) 1,366 Punjabi 314,356
Madrassis 302,732 Raj & C.I. 9,852
Mahars 10,059 Ranghars 7,581
Mahrattas 58,421 Others 51,045
Meghs 310 Total 617,353
Mers (Rawats) 2,309
Minas 1,608 Christians
Oriyas 1,920 Assamese 1,073
Raj puts 73,121 Madrassis 59,946
Shilpkars 1,469 Others 39,216
Others 208,284 Total 100,235
Total 1,064,836
Miscellaneous
Sikhs Hos 1,009
Jats 44,751 Mundas 479
Oraons 372M & R 33,244 Santhals 288
Others 34,383 Others 141,031
Total 112,378 Total 143,199
Source: Nandan Prasad, Expansion of the Armed Forces and
Defence Organisation 1939-45« Combined Inter-Services 
Historical Section, India and Pakistan (London,
Orient Longmans 1956), appendix 13, p. 460.
APPENDIX XVIII(b)
ROYAL INDIAN AIR FORCE
Recruit Intake by Province and State of Origin World War II
Province
Assam 772
Baluchistan 50
Bihar & Orissa 1895
Bengal 5888
Bombay 4473
Central Provinces & Berar 1761
Delhi 340
Madras 10711
North-West Frontier Province 479
Punjab 7159
Sind 173
United Provinces 22946
State
Cochin 679
Gwalior 71
Hyderabad 671
Indore 41
Jammu & Kashmir 249
Mysore 778
Travancore 2885
Other Indian States 826
Burma 8
Ceylon 9
Goa 8
South Africa 2
Grand Total 42874
Source: Nandan Prasad, Expansion of the Armed Forces and
Defence Organisation, Combined Inter-Services Histo 
rical Section. India and Pakistan (London, Orient 
Longmans 1956), appendix 14, p. 461.
APPENDIX XVIII(c) 
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Provincial and Communal Origin of Ratings as of 15 August 1945
Provincial Origin Communal Origin
Punjab 4990 Hindus 9448
Bombay 1890 Moslems 7843
Madras 5888 Christians 4548
Goa & Portuguese India 178 Pathans 475
North-West Frontier Raj puts 347Province 693 Sikhs 342
United Provinces 1687 Anglo-Indians 307Travancore 2152
Mahrattas 202
Central Provinces &
Berar 295 Parsees 26
Bengal 2668 Buddhists 17
Kashmir 292 Jews 7
Rajputana 208 Gurkhas 5
Sind 75
Assam 282
Delhi 150
Bihar & Orissa 430
Cochin 493
Hyderabad 340
Mysore 187
Others 669
Total 23567 Total 23567
Source: Nandan Prasad, Expansion of the Armed Forces and 
Defence Organisation, Combined Inter-Services 
Historical Section, India and Pakistan (London, 
Orient Longmans 1956), appendix 9, p. 456,
APPENDIX XIX(a)
BRITISH PLANNING FÜR INDIA *S POSTWAR DEFENCE FORCES
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Demobilisation planning began in August 1942, At the 
request of the Adjutant-General, a meeting was held on 7 
August 1942 which was attended by the Secretary of War and 
the Secretary of the Department of Defence* It was concluded 
that India would require an army of about 250,000 men for 
interim postwar defence, with a further 150,000 needed for 
overseas garrisons.
The first major step in fixing demobilisation targets 
was taken in January I944, at which time the Commander-in- 
Chief directed the Chiefs of Staff Committee to prepare a 
paper defining the size and composition of the defence 
forces required for India after the cessation of the war 
with the Axis powers* The appreciation was to be based upon 
the following assumptions:
a) no constitutional change had occurred in India which 
affected the status or composition of the defence 
forces.
b) Burma would remain independent of India and was un­
likely to have forces beyond her needs of internal 
security for many years to come.
c) The problems of internal security and of the 
North-West Frontier had undergone no radical change.
d) India would be responsible for maintaining land and 
air forces adequate to defend itself against a minor 
power and against a major power until such time as 
Imperial reinforcements could arrive. Naval forces 
would be limited to those needed for local naval
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defence and to assist in the protection of trade in 
the Indian Ocean.
e) India was responsible for maintaining an external 
defence force based on the principles proposed by 
the Chatfield Committee and accepted by His Majestyfs 
Government and the Government of India in 1939*
f) Japan would present no threat to India.
g) Russia would remain in friendly relations with 
Britain and the United States, preoccupied with 
internal reconstruction and unlikely to threaten 
India except by subversive means for some years. It 
would, however, retain a considerable measure of 
control in northern Iran.
h) China would have acquired sufficient military equip­
ment from the United States to maintain a consider­
able regular force.
The Chiefs of Staff Committee submitted its report on 
the size and composition of the postwar forces in India in 
March 1944* It based its recommendations on the following 
appreciation of the postwar situation:
a) A threat from Afghanistan was unlikely if India 
maintained adequate forces, but the border tribals 
would create trouble if conditions in India were 
unsettled.
b) Relations with the Soviet Union and China were likely 
to be generally friendly. However, after a few years 
when their shattered economies were rehabilitated, 
aggression from them could not be ruled out.
c) India would remain responsible for internal security, 
for defence against a minor power, and for defence 
against a major power until Imperial reinforcements 
could arrive.
d) India would provide the greater part of the garris­
ons for South-East Asia Command areas (i.e. Burma, 
Malaya and Siam) and Indian forces might be needed
?/•+
for some time in Persia and Iraq Command and in the 
Middle East area.
e) Internal security would be a difficult problem.
The Committee concluded that, in the immediate postwar 
period, army requirements would total nine infantry divi­
sions, five infantry brigade groups, 113 infantry battalions 
and 22 garrison companies. The forces needed for internal 
security were estimated as 63 infantry battalions, 22 garris­
on companies and 6 battalions of special armed constabulary. 
The permanent North-West Frontier garrison was estimated at 
50 infantry battalions organised in brigade groups in accord­
ance with tactical needs, plus a divisional HQ equivalent to 
5 infantry brigades with supporting arms, ancillary troops 
and an armoured element. These forces included immediate 
reserves for the North-West Frontier garrison. The garrisons 
for occupied countries, which would later be available for 
meeting a major threat, were estimated at 7 infantry divi­
sions - 3 in Burma, 1 in Malaya, 1 in Siam and 2 in 
PAIC/Middle East. Two infantry divisions were allotted as 
general reserve.
The role of the Indian Navy was defined as to ensure 
the defence of bases and the security of coastal shipping 
against submarine, mining and air attack and to assist in 
the protection of ocean shipping. The establishment envis­
aged by the Committee to fulfill this role comprised one
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cruiser squadron of three ships; one flotilla of nine des­
troyers; one flotilla of eight miscellaneous ships (motor 
minesweepers, fBangor/Bathurst? minesweepers for training 
reservists and frigates for miscellaneous duties); three 
flotillas of coastal craft; two surveying vessels, auxil­
iaries and trawlers; a nucleus of assault ships and craft; 
and one repair ship.
The role of the Indian Air Force was defined as tribal 
control on the North-West Frontier, air transport primarily 
for internal security, defence of the North-West and North- 
East frontiers, seaward recconaissance, shipping protection 
and cooperation with the navy. The establishment envisaged 
to fulfill this role was estimated by the Committee as: 7 
squadrons for tribal control; 5 squadrons for internal sec­
urity; 3 squadrons for the North-East Frontier; and 21 
squadrons to form a nucleus for expansion in case of a major 
threat of war.
The report of the Committee was accepted by the Indian 
Government as a useful foundation for further detailed study 
of the question.
In a further report submitted in April 1945> the Chiefs 
of Staff proposed force levels for the immediate postwar 
period (designated as the fupper limit1), and for the ulti­
mate postwar military establishment in India (the flower
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limit1). The cost of the flower limit* was estimated by the 
Financial Adviser at Rs 130 crores for *effective charges* 
(navy, Rs 6-10 crores; army, Rs 80 crores; air force, Rs 42 
crores) and Rs 15 crores for *non-effective charges*• A 
rough estimate of India*s stabilised postwar budget prepared 
by the Financial Adviser, the finance Member and the finance 
Department, however, had allotted only Rs 70-75 crores for 
defence and the Financial Adviser accordingly recommended a 
drastic cut in the *lower limit*. Acting on this proposal, 
the Commander-in-Chief issued a directive to the Chiefs of 
Staff on 24 April 1945 to ascertain the minimum needs re­
quired by India for local defence; i.e., to maintain law and 
order in India, to maintain order among the tribes and 
peoples of the North-West and North-East frontiers, to 
conduct war with Afghanistan (neither side having allies), 
and to protect India*s coasts, coastal merchant shipping and 
fisheries.
The Chiefs of Staff effected further reductions by 
omitting all landing craft and reducing the number of sloops 
and frigates for the navy; by reducing the army establishment 
by three infantry divisions and an armoured brigade; and by 
omitting the nucleus aircraft previously allotted to the air 
force for meeting a major threat. The proposals of the 
Chiefs of Staff for the *lowest limit* were accepted by the
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Commander-in Chief1 s War Committee on 12 June 1945 > but it 
was generally realised that this ’lowest limit’ was based 
largely upon financial considerations and represented, in no 
sense, a military recommendation. The cost estimates of the 
three levels (’effective expenditure’) were (crores of 
rupees):
Royal Indian Navy Army RIAF Total
upper limit 10 120 54 184
lower limit 6 80 42 128
lowest limit 5 62 23 98
Source: S.V. Desika Char, ’’Planning for the Post-War Defence 
Forces” in Nandan Prasad, Expansion of the Armed 
Forces and Defence Organisation 1939-45» Combined 
Services Historical Section, India and Pakistan 
(London, Orient Longmans, 1956), pp. 196-206.
APPENDIX XIX(b)
1. Navy
cruisers
sloops
frigates
corvettes
minesweepers
trawlers
motor minesweepers
hulks for reserve training
HDMLs
MLs
depot ship
sea-going training ships 
landing ships (all types) 
landing ships
POSTWAR PLANNING 
(as of 12 June 1945)
Upper Limit Lower Limit Lowest Limit
7
9+
3
16
20
10
2
27
2716
194
3
38
8(4)
3
6
8(5)
16(8)
11(6)
8(4)2
8
16(8)
11(6)
8 (8 )
8
1
Note: Figures in brackets show the number of vessels included in totals but to be held in reserve: 
+ includes survey ships.
2. Air Force
transport 15 
tac recc, fighter recc or g/a 13 
fighter 12 
photo/recc flight 2 
light or fighter/bember 3 
heavy bomber 4 
long range general recc 2
78
12
1
3
4 2
76
2
2
2
Total squadrons and flights 37 19 (later 19^)51
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3• Army
Corps HQ
defence 50 bns in bde gps 11 bns in 4 bd<5 gps 11 bns in 4defence reserve 5 bde gps & armoured element ++ ++security 63 bns ++ ++corps troops 2 2 2
divisions 10 9 & 12 bns 6 & 12 bnsdivisions 1 1 1
brigades 1 2 1
divisions 1 — -
brigade groups - 1 1
Note: ++ denotes frontier defence reserve and internal security troops included in
Source: S.V. Desika Char, "Planning For The Post-War Defence Forces" in Nandan Prasad, ___________ ____
Forces and Defence Organisation 1939-45# Combined Inter-Services Historical Section, India and Pakistan 
(London, Orient Longmans 1956), appendix 17, p. 464 (navy); p. 465 (air force), p. 464 (army).
formations.
Expansion of the Armed
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APPENDIX XX
Excerpts from **The Defence of India** by Jawaharlal Nehru, 
published in Youn^ India. September 24 and October 1, 1931.
fThe strength of a country in defence is always relative 
to the strength of other countries and to the world situa­
tion. No country in the world, with the possible exception 
of the United States of America, can withstand a combination 
of powers. Apart from half a dozen great powers every other 
country is weak as compared to them. Many countries, like 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Austria and the Balkan states, can 
be crushed easily by any one great power. But they retain 
their independence because of the rivalry of others. IndiaTs 
position is far stronger. Geographically she is as safe as 
almost any country, and politically the world situation 
favours her and makes an invasion of her extremely unlikely.
*If the domination of England over India ceases and 
India becomes free, what will be the reaction of other 
powers? It may be that some will covet her, but the master 
desire will be to prevent any other nation from possessing 
India. No country will tolerate the idea of another gaining 
dominion over India and thus acquiring the commanding posi­
tion which England occupied for so long. If any power was 
covetous enough to make the attempt, all the others would
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combine to prevent this and to trounce the intruder. This 
mutual rivalry would in itself be the surest guarantee 
against an attack on India.
»But let us examine this question further. What country 
would threaten us? The countries of Western Europe are too 
much involved in their mutual hates and jealousies to trouble 
us much. The United States of America is too far away for 
effective action. Japan has her hands full with the new 
developments in China and the latest, and sometimes apparent, 
hostility of the United States. In any event, the Western 
European powers will not permit her to embark on any such 
adventure. China will have to face her own great difficul­
ties for a long time to come and, besides, it is difficult 
to imagine that our relations with her will be anything but 
friendly. Thus no danger threatens us from any of these 
countries. There remain for consideration two countries, 
the little state of Afghanistan and Russia.
»Afghanistan in the past has had the closest bonds with 
India and it should be our endeavour to revive them. Even 
if we do not succeed in doing so, we have little to fear 
from her. The strength of her people lies in defence in 
their mountain fortresses and not in serious attack. Her 
people are brave fighters, but their resources are very 
limited. She is having her own troubles and wants peace to
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develop her resources and consolidate her position. But at 
the worst, if war came, it ds quite possible that she may- 
carry a number of successful raids before we can defeat and 
hold her in check. It is not conceivable that Afghanistan 
can succeed ultimately against us.
’ Russia then remains tlhe sole country that may threaten 
our freedom. She is grown iand is in a favourable position 
to attack us. But it is a well-known fact that although she 
is strong and almost invulnerable in defence, she is weak in 
attack. The Soviet Government has made good against a host 
of external enemies and an ^abundance of difficulty and mis­
fortune at home. These difficulties and enmities continue 
and it is exceedingly unlikely that it will embark on an 
aggressive campaign with so many dangers to face at home and 
abroad. Such a venture wouZLd inevitably expose Russia’s 
flanks to a host of enemies who have long been waiting for 
a chance to swoop down on her. In spite of her growing 
strength and self-confidence Russia is haunted by the fear 
of combinations against her in Western Europe and she dare 
not imperil her existence Tby attacking India and having her 
long frontiers exposed.
’It is notorious that IRussia is full today of her Five 
Year Plan. She can think of nothing else, except the build­
ing up of her industries amd utilising her resources to the
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full. Probably the Five Year Plan may be followed by 
another, requiring a similar expenditure of energy.
TThere is also no economic urge for Russia to covet 
India. Both countries are stiPl mainly agricultural and are 
being industrialised. Both have enough raw materials and 
need capital and machinery and experts. They are too similar 
to be of much help to each oth<er. India has been and is 
useful to England because the Patter is highly industrialised 
and has a great deal of surplus capital. Russia has no such 
capital and will not have it for a long time.
fThere has been traditional rivalry between England and 
Russia for generations past and, under English influence, we 
have been made to fear the bog<ey of a Russian invasion. Why 
should we inherit this hate an*d fear of Russia from England? 
It does not concern us. Russi.a will have nothing to fear 
from a free India and we need liave no fear of her. The 
danger from Russia, such as there is, is caused solely by 
this rivalry between her and England. It ceases for us as 
soon as British domination is removed and we are free. Our 
position thus, in a military sense, is better and stronger 
as an independent country than it would be if we continued 
to be involved in British imperial policy.
fWe are inevitably led to the conclusion that the 
position of Free India in the world would be a favourable
one and the chances of external attack on her are remote. 
But none the less we have to prepare for all contingencies 
and devote ourselves to the speedy reconstruction of our 
defence forces.’
Source: Bimla Prasad, The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy 
(Calcutta, Bookland Private Limited), appendix II, 
pp. 281-3.
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APPENDIX XXI
STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES 
July 1945 - July 1947 ~
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Air Forces in India Indian States Forces
Indian Army British Army RIN & ALFSEA (RAF & RIAF) Units in India-Command, 
ALFSEA & Overseas
1 July 1945 2,049,203 226,130 37,863 207,632 41,463
100# 100# 100# 100# 100#
1 October 1945 2,015,763 249,632 37,109 211,955 41,304
98.3$ 110.4# 98# 102# 99.6#
1 January 1946 1,835,812 239,472 31,261 214,902 32,013
89.5# 106# 82.5% 103.5# 77.2#
1 April 1946 1,682,773 197,897 23,960 188,463 17,313
82.1# 87.5% 63% 90.7# 4.17#
1 July 1946 1,363,486 149,322 19,882 137,076 7,7 88
66.5# 66.0# 52.5# 66.0# 18.7#
1 October 1946 1,128,588 118,176 18,109 58,324 4,582
55.0# 52.3# 47.8# 28.0# 11.0#
1 January 1947 883,692 48,485 16,821 49,666 2,101
43.17« 21.5# 44.4# 23.9# 5.0#
1 April 1947 624,013
30.4#
37,983
16.7%
15,838
41.0#
39,063
18.8#
—
1 July 1947 507,422
24.2#
29,972
13.2#
15,001
39.6#
33,463
16.1#
Note: These figures include all ranks and categories, including enrolled and unenrolled non-combatants.
Source: Nandan Prasad, Expansion of the Armed Forces and Defence Organisation 1939-45. 1Combined Inter-Services
Historical Section, India and Pakistani (London, Orient Longmans 1956), p. 215.
APPENDIX XXII
TUE TEXT OF THE INDIA-SIKKIM PEACE TREATY ISSUED 
IN GANGTOK ON DECEMBER 5, 1950
The President of India and His Highness the Maharaja of 
Sikkim, being desirous of further strengthening the good 
relations already existing between India and Sikkim, have 
r^esolved to enter into a new Treaty with each other, and the 
President of India has, for the purpose, appointed as his 
plenipotentiary Shri Harishwar Dayal, Political Officer in 
Sikkim, and His Highness the Maharaja having examined Shri 
Harishwar DayalTs credentials and found them good and in due 
form, the two have agreed as follows
ArticLe I
All previous treaties between the British Government 
and Sikkim which are at present in force as between India 
and Sikkim are hereby formally cancelled.
Article II
Sikkim shall continue to be a Protectorate of India and, 
subject to the provisions of this Treaty, shall enjoy auton­
omy in regard to its internal affairs.
Article III
(1) The Government of India will be responsible for the 
defence and territorial integrity of Sikkim. It shall have 
the right to take such measures as it considers necessary 
for the defence of Sikkim or the security of India, whether
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preparatory or otherwise, and whether within or outside 
Sikkim. In particular, the Government of India shall have 
the right to station troops anywhere within Sikkim.
(2) The measures referred to in paragraph (1) will as 
far as possible be taken by the Government in consultation 
with the Government of Sikkim.
(3) The Government of Sikkimi shall not import any arms, 
ammunition, military stores or other warlike material of any 
description for any purpose whatsoever without the previous 
consent of the Government of India.
Article IV
(1) The external relations of Sikkim, whether political 
economic or financial, shall be conducted and regulated 
solely by the Government of India; and the Government of 
Sikkim shall have no dealings with any foreign power.
(2) Subjects of Sikkim travelling to foreign countries 
shall be treated as Indian protected persons for the purpose 
of passports, and shall receive from Indian representatives 
abroad the same protection and facilities as Indian 
nationals.
Article V
The Government of Sikkim agrees not to levy any import 
duty, transit duty or other impost on goods brought into, or 
in transit through, Sikkim; and the Government of India
agrees not to levy any import or other duty on goods of 
Sikkimese origin brought into Imdia from Sikkim,
Article VI
(1) The Government of India shall have the exclusive 
right of constructing, maintaini.ng and regulating the use of 
railways, aerodromes and landing grounds and air navigation 
facilities, posts, telegraphs, telephones and wireless in­
stallations in Sikkim; and the Government of Sikkim shall 
render the Government of India every assistance in their con­
struction, maintenance and proteection.
(2) The Government of Sikkiim may, however, construct, 
maintain, and regulate the use of, railways and aerodromes 
and landing grounds and air navigation facilities to such 
extent as may be agreed to by th<e Government of India.
(3) The Government of India shall have the right to 
construct and maintain in Sikkim roads for strategic pur­
poses and for the purpose of improving communications with 
India and other adjoining countries and the Government of 
Sikkim shall render the Government of India every assistance 
in the construction, maintenance and protection of such roads.
Article VII
(1) Subjects of Sikkim shall have the right of entry 
into, and free movement within, ilndia, and Indian nationals 
shall have the right of entry in to, and free movement within,
Sikkim
(2) Subject to such regulations as the Government of 
Sikkim may prescribe in consultation with the Government of 
India, Indian nationals shalU have:-
(a) the right to carry on trade and commerce in
Sikkim; and
(b) when established in any trade in Sikkim, the
right to acquiree, hold and dispose of any 
property, movable or immovable, for the pur­
poses of their trade or residence in Sikkim.
(3) Subjects of Sikkim shall have the same right -
(a) to carry on trade and commerce in India, and to
employment therein; and
(b) of acquiring, holding and disposing of property
movable and imnnovable, as Indian nationals.
Article VIII
(1) Indian nationals within Sikkim shall be subject to 
the laws of Sikkim and subjects of Sikkim within India shall 
be subject to the laws of India.
(2) Whenever any criminal proceedings are initiated in 
Sikkim against any Indian national or any person in the 
service of the Government of India or any foreigner, the Gov 
eminent of Sikkim shall furnish the Representative of the 
Government of India in Sikkinn (hereinafter referred to as 
the Indian Representative) with particulars of charges 
against such person.
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If in the case of any person in the service of the Gov­
ernment of India or any foreigner it is so demanded by the 
Indian Representative, such per?son shall be handed over to 
him for trial before such court, as may be established for 
the purpose by the Government of India either in Sikkim or 
outside*
Articie JDC
(1) The Government of Siklcim agrees to seize and 
deliver up any fugitive offender from outside Sikkim who has 
taken refuge therein on demand being made by the Indian Rep­
resentative* Should any delay occur in complying with such 
demand, the Indian police may Ifollow the person whose surren­
der has been demanded into any part of Sikkim, and shall, on 
showing a warrant signed by the Indian Representative, 
receive every assistance and protection in the prosecution
of their object from the Sikkim officers*
(2) The Government of India similarly agrees, on demand 
being made by the Government off Sikkim, to take extradition 
proceedings against, and surrender, any fugitive offender 
from Sikkim who has taken refuge in the territory of India.
(3 ) In this Article, Mfugitive offender11 means a person 
who is accused of having committed an extradition offence as 
defined in the First Schedule to the Indian Extradition Act, 
1903, or any other offence which may hereafter be agreed
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upon between the Government of India and the Government of 
Sikkim as being an extradition offence.
Article X
The Government of India, having in mind the friendly 
relations already existing between India and Sikkim and now 
further strengthened by this Treaty, and being desirous of 
assisting in the development and good administration of 
Sikkim, agrees to pay the Government of Sikkim a sun of 
rupees three lakhs every year so long as the terms of this 
Treaty are duly observed by the Government of Sikkim,
The first payment under* this Article will be made 
before the end of the year 3L950, and subsequent payments 
will be made in the month off August every year.
Article XI
The Government of India shall have the right to appoint 
a Representative to reside in Sikkim; and the Government of 
Sikkim shall provide him ancd his staff with all reasonable 
facilities in regard to their residential and office accom­
modation and generally in regard to their carrying out their 
duties in Sikkim,
Article XII
If any dispute arises iLn the interpretation of the pro­
visions of this Treaty whicln cannot- be resolved by mutual 
consultation, the dispute sbiall be referred to the Chief
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Justice of India whose decision thereon shall be final.
Article XIII
This Treaty shall conue into force without ratification 
from the date of signature by both the parties.
Source: Foreign Policy of India; Texts of Documents 1947-59 (G.O.I. Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 2nd edi- 
tion, December 195 9 ), pp. 37-40.
APPENDIX XXIII
THE TEXT OF THE INDO-BHUTAN TREATY SIGNED AT 
DARJEELING ON~AUGUST 1949"!
The Government of India on the one part, and His 
Highness the Druk Gyalpo's Government on the other part, 
equally animated by the desire to regulate in a friendly 
manner and upon a solid and durable basis the state of af­
fairs caused by the termination of the British Government's 
authority in India, and to promote and foster the relations 
of friendship and neighbourli.ness so necessary for the 
well-being of their peoples, have resolved to conclude the 
following treaty, and have, for this purpose named their 
representatives, that is to say Sri Harishwar Dayal repre­
senting the Government of India, who has full powers to 
agree to the said treaty on behalf of the Government of 
India, and Deb Zimpon Sonam, Tobgye Dorji, Yang-Lop Sonam, 
Chho-Zim Thondup, Rin-Zim Tandin and Ha Drung Jigmie Palden 
Dorji, representing the Government of His Highness the Druk 
Gyalpo, Maharaja of Bhutan, who have full poi^ers to agree to 
the same on behalf of the Government of Bhutan.
Article I
There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between 
the Government of India and the Government of Bhutan.
Article II
The Government of India undertakes to exercise no
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interference in the interna.1 administration of Bhutan. On 
its part the Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided by 
the advice of the Government of India in regard to its 
external relations.
Ar ticle III
In place of the compensation granted to the Government 
of Bhutan under Article 4 of the Treaty of Sinchula and en­
hanced by the treaty of the eighth day of January 1910 and 
the temporary subsidy of Ru.pees one lakh per annum granted 
in 1942, the Government of India agrees to make an annual 
payment of Rupees five lakhis to the Government of Bhutan.
And it is further hereby agrreed that the said annual payment 
shall be made on the tenth 'day of January every year, the 
first payment being made on the tenth day of January 1950. 
This payment shall continue so long as this treaty remains 
in force and its terms are «duly observed.
Ar ticle IV
Further to mark the friendship existing and continuing 
between the said Government's, the Government of India shall, 
within one year from the date of signature of this treaty, 
return to the Government of Bhutan about thirty-two square 
miles of territory in the a:rea known as Dewangiri. The Gov­
ernment of India shall appoint a competent officer or offic­
ers to mark out the area so returned to the Government of
Bhutan
595
Artü-cle V
There shall, as heretofore, be free trade and commerce 
between the territories of thee Government of India and of 
the Government of Bhutan; and the Government of India 
agrees to grant the Government of Bhutan every facility for 
the carriage, by land and water, of its produce throughout 
the territory of the Government of India, including the 
right to use such forest roads as may be specified by mutual 
agreement from time to time.
ArtiLcle VI
The Government of India agrees that the Government of 
Bhutan shall be free to import with the assistance and 
approval of the Government of India, from or through India 
into Bhutan, whatever arms, amwiunition, machinery, warlike 
material or stores may be required or desired for the 
strength and welfare of Bhutan, and that this arrangement 
shall hold good for all time ns long as the Government of 
India is satisfied that the intentions of the Government of 
Bhutan are friendly and that there is no danger to India from 
such importations. The Government of Bhutan, on the other 
hand, agrees that there shall be no export of such arms, 
ammunition, etc., across the frontier of Bhutan either by 
the Government of Bhutan or by private individuals.
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Art.iicle VII
The Government of India and the Government of Bhutan 
agree that Bhutanese subjects] residing in Indian territories 
shall have equal justice itfithi Indian subjects, and that 
Indian subjects residing in Bihutan shall have equal justice 
with the subjects of the Government of Bhutan.
Artiicle VIII
(1) The Government of Unidia shall, on demand being duly- 
made in writing by the Government of Bhutan, take proceedings 
in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Extradition 
Act, 1903 (of which a copy shiall be furnished to the Govern­
ment of Bhutan), for the surrender of all Bhutanese subjects 
accused of any of the crimes; specified in the first schedule 
of the said Act who may take refuge in Indian territory.
(2) The Government of Bihiutan shall, on requisition be­
ing duly made by the Governimemt of India, or by any officer 
authorised by the Government, of India in this behalf, 
surrender any Indian subjects;, or subjects of a foreign 
power, whose extradition may be required in pursuance of any 
agreement or arrangements maidie by the Government of India 
with the said power, accused of any of the crimes, specified 
in the first schedule of Act. XV of 1903* who may take refuge 
in the territory under the j uirisdiction of the Government of 
Bhutan, and also any Bhutanese subjects who, after committing
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any of the crimes referred to in Indian territory, shall 
flee into Bhutan, on such evidence of their guilt being 
produced as shall satisfy the; local court of the district 
in which the offence may have; been committed.
Arti.cle IX
Any differences and dispmtes arising in the application 
or interpretation of this tre;aty shall in the first instance 
be settled by negotiation. TLf within three months of the 
start of negotiations no settlement is arrived at, then the 
matter shall be referred to the Arbitration of three arbi­
trators, who shall be nationals of either India or Bhutan, 
chosen in the following manne;r:-
(1) One person nominatedi by the Government of India;
(2) One person nominatedi by the Government of Bhutan;
(3) A Judge of the Feder*al Court, or of a High Court in
India, to be chosem by the Government of Bhutan, 
who shall be Chairman.
The judgment of this Tri.bunal shall be final and execut­
ed without delay by either pairty.
Art;icle X
This treaty shall continiue in force in perpetuity 
unless terminated or modifiedl by mutual consent.
Done in duplicate at Dar’jeeling this eighth day of 
August, one thousand nine humdred and fortynine, corresponding
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with the Bhutanese date the fifteenth day of the sixth 
month of the Earth-Bull year*
Source: Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents 1947-59 
(G*0,I* Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 2nd edi­
tion, December 1959)> pp. 17-19*
APPENDIX XXIV
THE TEXT OF THE INDO-NEPALESE TREATY OF PEACE AND 
FRIENDSHIP ISSUED IN KHATMANDU ON JULY 31, 1950
The Government of India amd the Government of Nepal, 
recognising the ancient ties wlhich have happily existed bet­
ween the two countries for centuries;
Desiring still further to strengthen and develop these 
ties and to perpetuate peace between the two countries;
Have resolved therefore to enter into a treaty of Peace 
and Friendship with each other, and have, for this purpose, 
appointed as their plenipotentiaries the following persons, 
namely,
THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA:
HIS EXCELLENCY SHRI CHANDRESHWAR PRASAD NARAIN SINGH, 
Ambassador of India in Nepal.
THE GOVERNMENT OF NEPAL:
MOHUN SHAMSHER JANG BAHADUR RANA, Maharaja, Prime 
Minister and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of Nepal, 
who, having examined each other’s credentials and found them 
good and in due form have agreed as follows:
Article I
There shall be everlasting peace and friendship between 
the Government of India and the Government of Nepal. The 
two Governments agree mutually to acknowledge and respect 
the complete sovereignty, territorial integrity and independ 
ence of each other.
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Artti.de II
The two Governments hereby undertake to inform each 
other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any 
neighbouring state likely to cause any breach in the friendly 
relations subsisting between the two Governments.
Article III
In order to establish and maintain the relations refer­
red to in Article I the two governments agree to continue 
diplomatic relations with each other by means of representa­
tives with such staff as is necessary for the due perform­
ance of their functions.
The representatives and such of their staff as may be 
agreed upon shall enjoy sucKi diplomatic privileges and immun­
ities as are customarily granted by international law on a 
reciprocal basis:
Provided that in no case shall these be less than those 
granted to persons of a similar status of any other State 
having diplomatic relations with either Government.
Article IV
The two Governments agiree to appoint Consuls-General, 
Consuls, Vice-Consuls and other consular agents, who shall 
reside in towns, ports and other places in each other’s 
territory as may be agreed to.
Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls and consular 
agents shall be provided with. exequaturs or other valid
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authorization of their appoimtment• Such exequator or 
authorization is liable to be? withdrawn by the country which 
issued it, if considered nece?ssary. The reasons for the 
withdrawal shall be indicated! wherever possible.
The persons mentioned above shall enjoy on a reciprocal 
basis all the rights, privile?ges, exemptions and immunities 
that are accorded to persons of corresponding status of any 
other State.
Artticle V
The Government of Nepal shall be free to import, from 
or through the territory of Undia, arms, ammunition or war­
like material and equipment mecessary for the security of 
Nepal. The procedure for giwing effect to this arrangement 
shall be worked out by the twvo Governments acting in consul­
tation.
Artticle VI
Each Government undertakes, in token of the neighbourly 
friendship between India and Nepal, to give to the nationals 
of the other, in its territorry, national treatment with 
regard to participation in imdustrial and economic develop­
ment of such territory and tco the grant of concessions and 
contracts relating to such development.
Artaicle VII
The Governments of Indica and Nepal agree to grant, on a
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reciprocal basis, to the nationals of one country in the 
territories of the other the smne privileges in the matter 
of residence, ownership of property, participation in trade 
and commerce, movement and othcer privileges of a similar 
nature.
Article VIII
So far as matters dealt w.ith herein are concerned, this 
Treaty cancels all previous treaties, agreements and arrange 
ments entered into on behalf of India between the British 
Government and the Government <of Nepal.
Article IX
This Treaty shall come intto force from the date of sig­
nature by both Governments.
Articlle X
This Treaty shall remain :in force until it is terminat­
ed by either party by giving oine year’s notice.
Source: Foreign Policy of Indi.as Texts of Documents 1947-59 
(G.O.I. Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 2nd edi- 
tion, December 1959)> ]pp. 31-3*
APPENDIX XXV _
HIGHER DEPENCE ORGANIZATION
The executive management of Indian defence is character­
ized by a hierarchical striucture of committees arranged in 
the classic pyramid based «on the three Services with Cabinet 
constituting the apex. A superimposed conciliar structure 
provides a formal means for lateral communication among 
officials at similar levels in different hierarchies, but 
the vertical *superior-sub«ordinate* relationship constitutes 
the ♦skeleton1. It is witlhiln this system that the three 
Services struggle concurrently against each other and 
against budgetary pressures from Finance and an economy- 
minded Administration.
This committee system of policy management evolved 
largely ad[ hoc after independence. The 14 high-powered 
defence committees in existence in 1948-49 had, by 1958, 
increased to 48 but the core continued to be constituted by 
six committees. The composition and responsibilities of 
these six committees may be briefly noted.
The Chiefs of Staff c«oimmittee is comprised of the three 
Service Chiefs. It is the only purely professional body but 
its functions are merely advisory with no powers of decision.
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6o4
The Defence Minister’s Arnmy, Navy and Air Force Commit­
tees are comprised of the Defemce Minister as Chairman and 
the two Deputy Defence Ministerrs, the concerned Service 
Chief, the Defence Secretary amd the Financial Adviser 
(Defence) as members. These fchiree committees deal with 
matters peculiar to each Serviere but having no direct bear­
ing on the other Services.
The Defence Minister’s (ZCmter-Services) Committee is 
comprised of the Defence Ministter as Chairman and the two 
Deputy Defence Ministers, the tthree Service Chiefs, Defence 
Secretary, Financial Adviser (D)efence) and the Scientific 
Adviser as members. This commiittee deals with all important 
matters of joint concern to anjy two or all three Services 
and its decisions are final and! binding on all concerned. 
Where particular policy issues are involved, the committee 
submits its records to the DCC for consideration.
The Defence Committee of CCabinet consists of the Prime 
Minister as Chairman, the Minissters of Defence, Finance,
Home Affairs and Transport as members with the three Service 
Chiefs, Defence Secretary and IFinancial Adviser in attend­
ance. It is the highest policjy-making body for all practical 
purposes but, as a committee <oif Cabinet, it may refer certain 
issues to the full Cabinet for confirmation.
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The Eastern Sector
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Map C(b)
The Middle and Western Sectors
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MAP D
Location of Certain Indian Military Posts in Ladakh (July 1962)
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